utilitarianism-第5部分

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　but；　after　all；　this　self…sacrifice　must　be　for　some　end；　it　is　not　its　own　end；　and　if　we　are　told　that　its　end　is　not　happiness；　but　virtue；　which　is　better　than　happiness；　I　ask；　would　the　sacrifice　be　made　if　the　hero　or　martyr　did　not　believe　that　it　would　earn　for　others　immunity　from　similar　sacrifices？　Would　it　be　made　if　he　thought　that　his　renunciation　of　happiness　for　himself　would　produce　no　fruit　for　any　of　his　fellow　creatures；　but　to　make　their　lot　like　his；　and　place　them　also　in　the　condition　of　persons　who　have　renounced　happiness？　All　honour　to　those　who　can　abnegate　for　themselves　the　personal　enjoyment　of　life；　when　by　such　renunciation　they　contribute　worthily　to　increase　the　amount　of　happiness　in　the　world；　but　he　who　does　it；　or　professes　to　do　it；　for　any　other　purpose；　is　no　more　deserving　of　admiration　than　the　ascetic　mounted　on　his　pillar。　He　may　be　an　inspiriting　proof　of　what　men　can　do；　but　assuredly　not　an　example　of　what　they　should。　　　Though　it　is　only　in　a　very　imperfect　state　of　the　world's　arrangements　that　any　one　can　best　serve　the　happiness　of　others　by　the　absolute　sacrifice　of　his　own；　yet　so　long　as　the　world　is　in　that　imperfect　state；　I　fully　acknowledge　that　the　readiness　to　make　such　a　sacrifice　is　the　highest　virtue　which　can　be　found　in　man。　I　will　add；　that　in　this　condition　the　world；　paradoxical　as　the　assertion　may　be；　the　conscious　ability　to　do　without　happiness　gives　the　best　prospect　of　realising；　such　happiness　as　is　attainable。　For　nothing　except　that　consciousness　can　raise　a　person　above　the　chances　of　life；　by　making　him　feel　that；　let　fate　and　fortune　do　their　worst；　they　have　not　power　to　subdue　him：　which；　once　felt；　frees　him　from　excess　of　anxiety　concerning　the　evils　of　life；　and　enables　him；　like　many　a　Stoic　in　the　worst　times　of　the　Roman　Empire；　to　cultivate　in　tranquillity　the　sources　of　satisfaction　accessible　to　him；　without　concerning　himself　about　the　uncertainty　of　their　duration；　any　more　than　about　their　inevitable　end。　　　Meanwhile；　let　utilitarians　never　cease　to　claim　the　morality　of　self　devotion　as　a　possession　which　belongs　by　as　good　a　right　to　them；　as　either　to　the　Stoic　or　to　the　Transcendentalist。　The　utilitarian　morality　does　recognise　in　human　beings　the　power　of　sacrificing　their　own　greatest　good　for　the　good　of　others。　It　only　refuses　to　admit　that　the　sacrifice　is　itself　a　good。　A　sacrifice　which　does　not　increase；　or　tend　to　increase；　the　sum　total　of　happiness；　it　considers　as　wasted。　The　only　self…renunciation　which　it　applauds；　is　devotion　to　the　happiness；　or　to　some　of　the　means　of　happiness；　of　others；　either　of　mankind　collectively；　or　of　individuals　within　the　limits　imposed　by　the　collective　interests　of　mankind。　　　I　must　again　repeat；　what　the　assailants　of　utilitarianism　seldom　have　the　justice　to　acknowledge；　that　the　happiness　which　forms　the　utilitarian　standard　of　what　is　right　in　conduct；　is　not　the　agent's　own　happiness；　but　that　of　all　concerned。　As　between　his　own　happiness　and　that　of　others；　utilitarianism　requires　him　to　be　as　strictly　impartial　as　a　disinterested　and　benevolent　spectator。　In　the　golden　rule　of　Jesus　of　Nazareth；　we　read　the　complete　spirit　of　the　ethics　of　utility。　To　do　as　you　would　be　done　by；　and　to　love　your　neighbour　as　yourself；　constitute　the　ideal　perfection　of　utilitarian　morality。　As　the　means　of　making　the　nearest　approach　to　this　ideal；　utility　would　enjoin；　first；　that　laws　and　social　arrangements　should　place　the　happiness；　or　（as　speaking　practically　it　may　be　called）　the　interest；　of　every　individual；　as　nearly　as　possible　in　harmony　with　the　interest　of　the　whole；　and　secondly；　that　education　and　opinion；　which　have　so　vast　a　power　over　human　character；　should　so　use　that　power　as　to　establish　in　the　mind　of　every　individual　an　indissoluble　association　between　his　own　happiness　and　the　good　of　the　whole；　especially　between　his　own　happiness　and　the　practice　of　such　modes　of　conduct；　negative　and　positive；　as　regard　for　the　universal　happiness　prescribes；　so　that　not　only　he　may　be　unable　to　conceive　the　possibility　of　happiness　to　himself；　consistently　with　conduct　opposed　to　the　general　good；　but　also　that　a　direct　impulse　to　promote　the　general　good　may　be　in　every　individual　one　of　the　habitual　motives　of　action；　and　the　sentiments　connected　therewith　may　fill　a　large　and　prominent　place　in　every　human　being's　sentient　existence。　If　the；　impugners　of　the　utilitarian　morality　represented　it　to　their　own　minds　in　this　its；　true　character；　I　know　not　what　recommendation　possessed　by　any　other　morality　they　could　possibly　affirm　to　be　wanting　to　it；　what　more　beautiful　or　more　exalted　developments　of　human　nature　any　other　ethical　system　can　be　supposed　to　foster；　or　what　springs　of　action；　not　accessible　to　the　utilitarian；　such　systems　rely　on　for　giving　effect　to　their　mandates。　　　The　objectors　to　utilitarianism　cannot　always　be　charged　with　representing　it　in　a　discreditable　light。　On　the　contrary；　those　among　them　who　entertain　anything　like　a　just　idea　of　its　disinterested　character；　sometimes　find　fault　with　its　standard　as　being　too　high　for　humanity。　They　say　it　is　exacting　too　much　to　require　that　people　shall　always　act　from　the　inducement　of　promoting　the　general　interests　of　society。　But　this　is　to　mistake　the　very　meaning　of　a　standard　of　morals；　and　confound　the　rule　of　action　with　the　motive　of　it。　It　is　the　business　of　ethics　to　tell　us　what　are　our　duties；　or　by　what　test　we　may　know　them；　but　no　system　of　ethics　requires　that　the　sole　motive　of　all　we　do　shall　be　a　feeling　of　duty；　on　the　contrary；　ninety…nine　hundredths　of　all　our　actions　are　done　from　other　motives；　and　rightly　so　done；　if　the　rule　of　duty　does　not　condemn　them。　It　is　the　more　unjust　to　utilitarianism　that　this　particular　misapprehension　should　be　made　a　ground　of　objection　to　it；　inasmuch　as　utilitarian　moralists　have　gone　beyond　almost　all　others　in　affirming　that　the　motive　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　morality　of　the　action；　though　much　with　the　worth　of　the　agent。　He　who　saves　a　fellow　creature　from　drowning　does　what　is　morally　right；　whether　his　motive　be　duty；　or　the　hope　of　being　paid　for　his　trouble；　he　who　betrays　the　friend　that　trusts　him；　is　guilty　of　a　crime；　even　if　his　object　be　to　serve　another　friend　to　whom　he　is　under　greater　obligations。　　　But　to　speak　only　of　actions　done　from　the　motive　of　duty；　and　in　direct　obedience　to　principle：　it　is　a　misapprehension　of　the　utilitarian　mode　of　thought；　to　conceive　it　as　implying　that　people　should　fix　their　minds　upon　so　wide　a　generality　as　the　world；　or　society　at　large。　The　great　majority　of　good　actions　are　intended　not　for　the　benefit　of　the　world；　but　for　that　of　individuals；　of　which　the　good　of　the　world　is　made　up；　and　the　thoughts　of　the　most　virtuous　man　need　not　on　these　occasions　travel　beyond　the　particular　persons　concerned；　except　so　far　as　is　necessary　to　assure　himself　that　in　benefiting　them　he　is　not　violating　the　rights；　that　is；　the　legitimate　and　authorised　expectations；　of　any　one　else。　The　multiplication　of　happiness　is；　according　to　the　utilitarian　ethics；　the　object　of　virtue：　the　occasions　on　which　any　person　（except　one　in　a　thousand）　has　it　in　his　power　to　do　this　on　an　extended　scale；　in　other　words　to　be　a　public　benefactor；　are　but　exceptional；　and　on　these　occasions　alone　is　he　called　on　to　consider　public　utility；　in　every　other　case；　private　utility；　the　interest　or　happiness　of　some　few　persons；　is　all　he　has　to　attend　to。　Those　alone　the　influence　of　whose　actions　extends　to　society　in　general；　need　concern　themselves　habitually　about　large　an　object。　In　the　case　of　abstinences　indeed…　of　things　which　people　forbear　to　do　from　moral　considerations；　though　the　consequences　in　the　particular　case　might　be　beneficial…　it　would　be　unworthy　of　an　intelligent　agent　not　to　be　consciously　aware　that　the　action　is　of　a　class　which；　if　practised　generally；　would　be　generally　injurious；　and　that　this　is　the　ground　of　the　obligation　to　abstain　from　it。　The　amount　of　regard　for　the　public　interest　implied　in　this　recognition；　is　no　greater　than　is　demanded　by　every　system　of　morals；　for　they　all　enjoin　to　abstain　from　whatever　is　manifestly　pernicious　to　society。　　　The　same　considerations　dispose　of　another　reproach　against　the　doctrine　of　utility；　founded　on　a　still　grosser　misconception　of　the　purpose　of　a　standard　of　morality；　and　of　the　very　meaning　of　the　words　right　and　wrong。　It　is　often　affirmed　that　utilitarianism　renders　men　cold　and　unsympathising；　that　it　chills　their　moral　feelings　towards　individuals；　that　it　makes　them　regard　only　the　dry　and　hard　consideration　of　the　consequences　of　actions；　not　taking　into　their　moral　estimate　the　qualities　from　which　those　actions　emanate。　If　the　assertion　means　that　they　do　not　allow　their　judgment　respecting　the　rightness　or　wrongness　of　an　action　to　be　influenced　by　their　opinion　of　the　qualities　of　the　person　who　does　it；　this　is　a　complaint　not　against　utilitarianism；　but　against　having　any　standard　of　morality　at　all；　for　certainly　no　known　ethical　standard　decides　an　action　to　be　good　or　bad　because　it　is　done　by　a　good　or　a　bad　man；　still　less　because　do