utilitarianism-第7部分

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ple　time；　namely；　the　whole　past　duration　of　the　human　species。　During　all　that　time；　mankind　have　been　learning　by　experience　the　tendencies　of　actions；　on　which　experience　all　the　prudence；　as　well　as　all　the　morality　of　life；　are　dependent。　People　talk　as　if　the　commencement　of　this　course　of　experience　had　hitherto　been　put　off；　and　as　if；　at　the　moment　when　some　man　feels　tempted　to　meddle　with　the　property　or　life　of　another；　he　had　to　begin　considering　for　the　first　time　whether　murder　and　theft　are　injurious　to　human　happiness。　Even　then　I　do　not　think　that　he　would　find　the　question　very　puzzling；　but；　at　all　events；　the　matter　is　now　done　to　his　hand。　　　It　is　truly　a　whimsical　supposition　that；　if　mankind　were　agreed　in　considering　utility　to　be　the　test　of　morality；　they　would　remain　without　any　agreement　as　to　what　is　useful；　and　would　take　no　measures　for　having　their　notions　on　the　subject　taught　to　the　young；　and　enforced　by　law　and　opinion。　There　is　no　difficulty　in　proving　any　ethical　standard　whatever　to　work　ill；　if　we　suppose　universal　idiocy　to　be　conjoined　with　it；　but　on　any　hypothesis　short　of　that；　mankind　must　by　this　time　have　acquired　positive　beliefs　as　to　the　effects　of　some　actions　on　their　happiness；　and　the　beliefs　which　have　thus　come　down　are　the　rules　of　morality　for　the　multitude；　and　for　the　philosopher　until　he　has　succeeded　in　finding　better。　That　philosophers　might　easily　do　this；　even　now；　on　many　subjects；　that　the　received　code　of　ethics　is　by　no　means　of　divine　right；　and　that　mankind　have　still　much　to　learn　as　to　the　effects　of　actions　on　the　general　happiness；　I　admit；　or　rather；　earnestly　maintain。　The　corollaries　from　the　principle　of　utility；　like　the　precepts　of　every　practical　art；　admit　of　indefinite　improvement；　and；　in　a　progressive　state　of　the　human　mind；　their　improvement　is　perpetually　going　on。　　　But　to　consider　the　rules　of　morality　as　improvable；　is　one　thing；　to　pass　over　the　intermediate　generalisations　entirely；　and　endeavour　to　test　each　individual　action　directly　by　the　first　principle；　is　another。　It　is　a　strange　notion　that　the　acknowledgment　of　a　first　principle　is　inconsistent　with　the　admission　of　secondary　ones。　To　inform　a　traveller　respecting　the　place　of　his。　ultimate　destination；　is　not　to　forbid　the　use　of　landmarks　and　direction…posts　on　the　way。　The　proposition　that　happiness　is　the　end　and　aim　of　morality；　does　not　mean　that　no　road　ought　to　be　laid　down　to　that　goal；　or　that　persons　going　thither　should　not　be　advised　to　take　one　direction　rather　than　another。　Men　really　ought　to　leave　off　talking　a　kind　of　nonsense　on　this　subject；　which　they　would　neither　talk　nor　listen　to　on　other　matters　of　practical　concernment。　Nobody　argues　that　the　art　of　navigation　is　not　founded　on　astronomy；　because　sailors　cannot　wait　to　calculate　the　Nautical　Almanack。　Being　rational　creatures；　they　go　to　sea　with　it　ready　calculated；　and　all　rational　creatures　go　out　upon　the　sea　of　life　with　their　minds　made　up　on　the　common　questions　of　right　and　wrong；　as　well　as　on　many　of　the　far　more　difficult　questions　of　wise　and　foolish。　And　this；　as　long　as　foresight　is　a　human　quality；　it　is　to　be　presumed　they　will　continue　to　do。　Whatever　we　adopt　as　the　fundamental　principle　of　morality；　we　require　subordinate　principles　to　apply　it　by；　the　impossibility　of　doing　without　them；　being　common　to　all　systems；　can　afford　no　argument　against　any　one　in　particular；　but　gravely　to　argue　as　if　no　such　secondary　principles　could　be　had；　and　as　if　mankind　had　remained　till　now；　and　always　must　remain；　without　drawing　any　general　conclusions　from　the　experience　of　human　life；　is　as　high　a　pitch；　I　think；　as　absurdity　has　ever　reached　in　philosophical　controversy。　　　The　remainder　of　the　stock　arguments　against　utilitarianism　mostly　consist　in　laying　to　its　charge　the　common　infirmities　of　human　nature；　and　the　general　difficulties　which　embarrass　conscientious　persons　in　shaping　their　course　through　life。　We　are　told　that　a　utilitarian　will　be　apt　to　make　his　own　particular　case　an　exception　to　moral　rules；　and；　when　under　temptation；　will　see　a　utility　in　the　breach　of　a　rule；　greater　than　he　will　see　in　its　observance。　But　is　utility　the　only　creed　which　is　able　to　furnish　us　with　excuses　for　evil　doing；　and　means　of　cheating　our　own　conscience？　They　are　afforded　in　abundance　by　all　doctrines　which　recognise　as　a　fact　in　morals　the　existence　of　conflicting　considerations；　which　all　doctrines　do；　that　have　been　believed　by　sane　persons。　It　is　not　the　fault　of　any　creed；　but　of　the　complicated　nature　of　human　affairs；　that　rules　of　conduct　cannot　be　so　framed　as　to　require　no　exceptions；　and　that　hardly　any　kind　of　action　can　safely　be　laid　down　as　either　always　obligatory　or　always　condemnable。　There　is　no　ethical　creed　which　does　not　temper　the　rigidity　of　its　laws；　by　giving　a　certain　latitude；　under　the　moral　responsibility　of　the　agent；　for　accommodation　to　peculiarities　of　circumstances；　and　under　every　creed；　at　the　opening　thus　made；　self…deception　and　dishonest　casuistry　get　in。　There　exists　no　moral　system　under　which　there　do　not　arise　unequivocal　cases　of　conflicting　obligation。　These　are　the　real　difficulties；　the　knotty　points　both　in　the　theory　of　ethics；　and　in　the　conscientious　guidance　of　personal　conduct。　They　are　overcome　practically；　with　greater　or　with　less　success；　according　to　the　intellect　and　virtue　of　the　individual；　but　it　can　hardly　be　pretended　that　any　one　will　be　the　less　qualified　for　dealing　with　them；　from　possessing　an　ultimate　standard　to　which　conflicting　rights　and　duties　can　be　referred。　If　utility　is　the　ultimate　source　of　moral　obligations；　utility　may　be　invoked　to　decide　between　them　when　their　demands　are　incompatible。　Though　the　application　of　the　standard　may　be　difficult；　it　is　better　than　none　at　all：　while　in　other　systems；　the　moral　laws　all　claiming　independent　authority；　there　is　no　common　umpire　entitled　to　interfere　between　them；　their　claims　to　precedence　one　over　another　rest　on　little　better　than　sophistry；　and　unless　determined；　as　they　generally　are；　by　the　unacknowledged　influence　of　considerations　of　utility；　afford　a　free　scope　for　the　action　of　personal　desires　and　partialities。　We　must　remember　that　only　in　these　cases　of　conflict　between　secondary　principles　is　it　requisite　that　first　principles　should　be　appealed　to。　There　is　no　case　of　moral　obligation　in　which　some　secondary　principle　is　not　involved；　and　if　only　one；　there　can　seldom　be　any　real　doubt　which　one　it　is；　in　the　mind　of　any　person　by　whom　the　principle　itself　is　recognised。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　3　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Ultimate　Sanction　of　the　Principle　of　Utility。

　　THE　QUESTION　is　often　asked；　and　properly　so；　in　regard　to　any　supposed　moral　standard…　What　is　its　sanction？　what　are　the　motives　to　obey　it？　or　more　specifically；　what　is　the　source　of　its　obligation？　whence　does　it　derive　its　binding　force？　It　is　a　necessary　part　of　moral　philosophy　to　provide　the　answer　to　this　question；　which；　though　frequently　assuming　the　shape　of　an　objection　to　the　utilitarian　morality；　as　if　it　had　some　special　applicability　to　that　above　others；　really　arises　in　regard　to　all　standards。　It　arises；　in　fact；　whenever　a　person　is　called　on　to　adopt　a　standard；　or　refer　morality　to　any　basis　on　which　he　has　not　been　accustomed　to　rest　it。　For　the　customary　morality；　that　which　education　and　opinion　have　consecrated；　is　the　only　one　which　presents　itself　to　the　mind　with　the　feeling　of　being　in　itself　obligatory；　and　when　a　person　is　asked　to　believe　that　this　morality　derives　its　obligation　from　some　general　principle　round　which　custom　has　not　thrown　the　same　halo；　the　assertion　is　to　him　a　paradox；　the　supposed　corollaries　seem　to　have　a　more　binding　force　than　the　original　theorem；　the　superstructure　seems　to　stand　better　without；　than　with；　what　is　represented　as　its　foundation。　He　says　to　himself；　I　feel　that　I　am　bound　not　to　rob　or　murder；　betray　or　deceive；　but　why　am　I　bound　to　promote　the　general　happiness？　If　my　own　happiness　lies　in　something　else；　why　may　I　not　give　that　the　preference？　　　If　the　view　adopted　by　the　utilitarian　philosophy　of　the　nature　of　the　moral　sense　be　correct；　this　difficulty　will　always　present　itself；　until　the　influences　which　form　moral　character　have　taken　the　same　hold　of　the　principle　which　they　have　taken　of　some　of　the　consequences…　until；　by　the　improvement　of　education；　the　feeling　of　unity　with　our　fellow…creatures　shall　be　（what　it　cannot　be　denied　that　Christ　intended　it　to　be）　as　deeply　rooted　in　our　character；　and　to　our　own　consciousness　as　completely　a　part　of　our　nature；　as　the　horror　of　crime　is　in　an　ordinarily　well　brought　up　young　person。　In　the　meantime；　however；　the　difficulty　has　no　peculiar　application　to　the　doctrine　of　utility；　but　is　inherent　in　every　attempt　to　analyse　morality　and　reduce　it　to　principles；　which；　unless　the　principle　is　already　in　men's　minds　invested　with　as　much　sacredness　as　any　of　its　applications；　always　seems　to　divest　them　of　a　part　of　their　sanctity。　　　The　principle　of　utility　either　has；　or　there　is　no　reason　why　it　might　not　have；　all　the　sanctions　which　belong　to　any　oth