utilitarianism-第9部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！

n；　when　intellectual　culture　goes　on；　yield　by　degrees　to　the　dissolving　force　of　analysis：　and　if　the　feeling　of　duty；　when　associated　with　utility；　would　appear　equally　arbitrary；　if　there　were　no　leading　department　of　our　nature；　no　powerful　class　of　sentiments；　with　which　that　association　would　harmonise；　which　would　make　us　feel　it　congenial；　and　incline　us　not　only　to　foster　it　in　others　（for　which　we　have　abundant　interested　motives）；　but　also　to　cherish　it　in　ourselves；　if　there　were　not；　in　short；　a　natural　basis　of　sentiment　for　utilitarian　morality；　it　might　well　happen　that　this　association　also；　even　after　it　had　been　implanted　by　education；　might　be　analysed　away。　　　But　there　is　this　basis　of　powerful　natural　sentiment；　and　this　it　is　which；　when　once　the　general　happiness　is　recognised　as　the　ethical　standard；　will　constitute　the　strength　of　the　utilitarian　morality。　This　firm　foundation　is　that　of　the　social　feelings　of　mankind；　the　desire　to　be　in　unity　with　our　fellow　creatures；　which　is　already　a　powerful　principle　in　human　nature；　and　happily　one　of　those　which　tend　to　become　stronger；　even　without　express　inculcation；　from　the　influences　of　advancing　civilisation。　The　social　state　is　at　once　so　natural；　so　necessary；　and　so　habitual　to　man；　that；　except　in　some　unusual　circumstances　or　by　an　effort　of　voluntary　abstraction；　he　never　conceives　himself　otherwise　than　as　a　member　of　a　body；　and　this　association　is　riveted　more　and　more；　as　mankind　are　further　removed　from　the　state　of　savage　independence。　Any　condition；　therefore；　which　is　essential　to　a　state　of　society；　becomes　more　and　more　an　inseparable　part　of　every　person's　conception　of　the　state　of　things　which　he　is　born　into；　and　which　is　the　destiny　of　a　human　being。　　　Now；　society　between　human　beings；　except　in　the　relation　of　master　and　slave；　is　manifestly　impossible　on　any　other　footing　than　that　the　interests　of　all　are　to　be　consulted。　Society　between　equals　can　only　exist　on　the　understanding　that　the　interests　of　all　are　to　be　regarded　equally。　And　since　in　all　states　of　civilisation；　every　person；　except　an　absolute　monarch；　has　equals；　every　one　is　obliged　to　live　on　these　terms　with　somebody；　and　in　every　age　some　advance　is　made　towards　a　state　in　which　it　will　be　impossible　to　live　permanently　on　other　terms　with　anybody。　In　this　way　people　grow　up　unable　to　conceive　as　possible　to　them　a　state　of　total　disregard　of　other　people's　interests。　They　are　under　a　necessity　of　conceiving　themselves　as　at　least　abstaining　from　all　the　grosser　injuries；　and　（if　only　for　their　own　protection）　living　in　a　state　of　constant　protest　against　them。　They　are　also　familiar　with　the　fact　of　co…operating　with　others　and　proposing　to　themselves　a　collective；　not　an　individual　interest　as　the　aim　（at　least　for　the　time　being）　of　their　actions。　So　long　as　they　are　co…operating；　their　ends　are　identified　with　those　of　others；　there　is　at　least　a　temporary　feeling　that　the　interests　of　others　are　their　own　interests。　Not　only　does　all　strengthening　of　social　ties；　and　all　healthy　growth　of　society；　give　to　each　individual　a　stronger　personal　interest　in　practically　consulting　the　welfare　of　others；　it　also　leads　him　to　identify　his　feelings　more　and　more　with　their　good；　or　at　least　with　an　even　greater　degree　of　practical　consideration　for　it。　He　comes；　as　though　instinctively；　to　be　conscious　of　himself　as　a　being　who　of　course　pays　regard　to　others。　The　good　of　others　becomes　to　him　a　thing　naturally　and　necessarily　to　be　attended　to；　like　any　of　the　physical　conditions　of　our　existence。　Now；　whatever　amount　of　this　feeling　a　person　has；　he　is　urged　by　the　strongest　motives　both　of　interest　and　of　sympathy　to　demonstrate　it；　and　to　the　utmost　of　his　power　encourage　it　in　others；　and　even　if　he　has　none　of　it　himself；　he　is　as　greatly　interested　as　any　one　else　that　others　should　have　it。　Consequently　the　smallest　germs　of　the　feeling　are　laid　hold　of　and　nourished　by　the　contagion　of　sympathy　and　the　influences　of　education；　and　a　complete　web　of　corroborative　association　is　woven　round　it；　by　the　powerful　agency　of　the　external　sanctions。　　　This　mode　of　conceiving　ourselves　and　human　life；　as　civilisation　goes　on；　is　felt　to　be　more　and　more　natural。　Every　step　in　political　improvement　renders　it　more　so；　by　removing　the　sources　of　opposition　of　interest；　and　levelling　those　inequalities　of　legal　privilege　between　individuals　or　classes；　owing　to　which　there　are　large　portions　of　mankind　whose　happiness　it　is　still　practicable　to　disregard。　In　an　improving　state　of　the　human　mind；　the　influences　are　constantly　on　the　increase；　which　tend　to　generate　in　each　individual　a　feeling　of　unity　with　all　the　rest；　which；　if　perfect；　would　make　him　never　think　of；　or　desire；　any　beneficial　condition　for　himself；　in　the　benefits　of　which　they　are　not　included。　If　we　now　suppose　this　feeling　of　unity　to　be　taught　as　a　religion；　and　the　whole　force　of　education；　of　institutions；　and　of　opinion；　directed；　as　it　once　was　in　the　case　of　religion；　to　make　every　person　grow　up　from　infancy　surrounded　on　all　sides　both　by　the　profession　and　the　practice　of　it；　I　think　that　no　one；　who　can　realise　this　conception；　will　feel　any　misgiving　about　the　sufficiency　of　the　ultimate　sanction　for　the　Happiness　morality。　To　any　ethical　student　who　finds　the　realisation　difficult；　I　recommend；　as　a　means　of　facilitating　it；　the　second　of　M。　Comte's　two　principle　works；　the　Traite　de　Politique　Positive。　I　entertain　the　strongest　objections　to　the　system　of　politics　and　morals　set　forth　in　that　treatise；　but　I　think　it　has　superabundantly　shown　the　possibility　of　giving　to　the　service　of　humanity；　even　without　the　aid　of　belief　in　a　Providence；　both　the　psychological　power　and　the　social　efficacy　of　a　religion；　making　it　take　hold　of　human　life；　and　colour　all　thought；　feeling；　and　action；　in　a　manner　of　which　the　greatest　ascendancy　ever　exercised　by　any　religion　may　be　but　a　type　and　foretaste；　and　of　which　the　danger　is；　not　that　it　should　be　insufficient　but　that　it　should　be　so　excessive　as　to　interfere　unduly　with　human　freedom　and　individuality。　　　Neither　is　it　necessary　to　the　feeling　which　constitutes　the　binding　force　of　the　utilitarian　morality　on　those　who　recognise　it；　to　wait　for　those　social　influences　which　would　make　its　obligation　felt　by　mankind　at　large。　In　the　comparatively　early　state　of　human　advancement　in　which　we　now　live；　a　person　cannot　indeed　feel　that　entireness　of　sympathy　with　all　others；　which　would　make　any　real　discordance　in　the　general　direction　of　their　conduct　in　life　impossible；　but　already　a　person　in　whom　the　social　feeling　is　at　all　developed；　cannot　bring　himself　to　think　of　the　rest　of　his　fellow　creatures　as　struggling　rivals　with　him　for　the　means　of　happiness；　whom　he　must　desire　to　see　defeated　in　their　object　in　order　that　he　may　succeed　in　his。　The　deeply　rooted　conception　which　every　individual　even　now　has　of　himself　as　a　social　being；　tends　to　make　him　feel　it　one　of　his　natural　wants　that　there　should　be　harmony　between　his　feelings　and　aims　and　those　of　his　fellow　creatures。　If　differences　of　opinion　and　of　mental　culture　make　it　impossible　for　him　to　share　many　of　their　actual　feelings…　perhaps　make　him　denounce　and　defy　those　feelings…　he　still　needs　to　be　conscious　that　his　real　aim　and　theirs　do　not　conflict；　that　he　is　not　opposing　himself　to　what　they　really　wish　for；　namely　their　own　good；　but　is；　on　the　contrary；　promoting　it。　This　feeling　in　most　individuals　is　much　inferior　in　strength　to　their　selfish　feelings；　and　is　often　wanting　altogether。　But　to　those　who　have　it；　it　possesses　all　the　characters　of　a　natural　feeling。　It　does　not　present　itself　to　their　minds　as　a　superstition　of　education；　or　a　law　despotically　imposed　by　the　power　of　society；　but　as　an　attribute　which　it　would　not　be　well　for　them　to　be　without。　This　conviction　is　the　ultimate　sanction　of　the　greatest　happiness　morality。　This　it　is　which　makes　any　mind；　of　well…developed　feelings；　work　with；　and　not　against；　the　outward　motives　to　care　for　others；　afforded　by　what　I　have　called　the　external　sanctions；　and　when　those　sanctions　are　wanting；　or　act　in　an　opposite　direction；　constitutes　in　itself　a　powerful　internal　binding　force；　in　proportion　to　the　sensitiveness　and　thoughtfulness　of　the　character；　since　few　but　those　whose　mind　is　a　moral　blank；　could　bear　to　lay　out　their　course　of　life　on　the　plan　of　paying　no　regard　to　others　except　so　far　as　their　own　private　interest　compels。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　4　　　　　　　Of　what　sort　of　Proof　the　Principle　of　Utility　is　Susceptible。

　　IT　HAS　already　been　remarked；　that　questions　of　ultimate　ends　do　not　admit　of　proof；　in　the　ordinary　acceptation　of　the　term。　To　be　incapable　of　proof　by　reasoning　is　common　to　all　first　principles；　to　the　first　premises　of　our　knowledge；　as　well　as　to　those　of　our　conduct。　But　the　former；　being　matters　of　fact；　may　be　the　subject　of　a　direct　appeal　to　the　faculties　which　judge　of　fact…　namely；　our　senses；　and　our　internal　consciousness。　Can　an　appeal　be　made　to　the　same　faculties　on　questions　of　practical　ends？　Or　by　what　other　faculty　is　cognisance　taken　of　them？　　　Q