memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第12部分

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；　that　General　Schofield　must　be　near　by；　in　close　support　of　Hooker's　right　flank。　　General　Thomas　had　before　this　occasion　complained　to　me　of　General　Hooker's　disposition　to　〃switch　off；〃　leaving　wide　gaps　in　his　line；　so　as　to　be　independent；　and　to　make　glory　on　his　own　account。　　I　therefore　resolved　not　to　overlook　this　breach　of　discipline　and　propriety。　　The　rebel　army　was　only　composed　of　three　corps；　I　had　that　very　day　ridden　six　miles　of　their　lines；　found　them　everywhere　strongly　occupied；　and　therefore　Hooker　could　not　have　encountered　〃three　entire　corps。〃　　Both　McPherson　and　Schofield　had　also　complained　to　me　of　this　same　tendency　of　Hooker　to　widen　the　gap　between　his　own　corps　and　his　proper　army　（Thomas's）；　so　as　to　come　into　closer　contact　with　one　or　other　of　the　wings；　asserting　that　he　was　the　senior　by　commission　to　both　McPherson　and　Schofield；　and　that　in　the　event　of　battle　he　should　assume　command　over　them；　by　virtue　of　his　older　commission。

They　appealed　to　me　to　protect　them。　　I　had　heard　during　that　day　some　cannonading　and　heavy　firing　down　toward　the　〃Kulp　House；〃　which　was　about　five　miles　southeast　of　where　I　was；　but　this　was　nothing　unusual；　for　at　the　same　moment　there　was　firing　along　our　lines　full　ten　miles　in　extent。　　Early　the　next　day　（23d）　I　rode　down　to　the　〃Kulp　House；〃　which　was　on　a　road　leading　from　Powder　Springs　to　Marietta；　about　three　miles　distant　from　the　latter。　　On　the　way　I　passed　through　General　Butterfield's　division　of　Hooker's　corps；　which　I　learned　had　not　been　engaged　at　all　in　the　battle　of　the　day　before；　then　I　rode　along　Geary's　and　Williams's　divisions；　which　occupied　the　field　of　battle；　and　the　men　were　engaged　in　burying　the　dead。　　I　found　General　Schofield's　corps　on　the　Powder　Springs　road；　its　head　of　column　abreast　of　Hooker's　right；　therefore　constituting　〃a　strong　right　flank；〃　and　I　met　Generale　Schofield　and　Hooker　together。　　As　rain　was　falling　at　the　moment；　we　passed　into　a　little　church　standing　by　the　road…side；　and　I　there　showed　General　Schofield　Hooker's　signal…message　of　the　day　before。　　He　was　very　angry；　and　pretty　sharp　words　passed　between　them；　Schofield　saying　that　his　head　of　column　（Hascall's　division）　had　been；　at　the　time　of　the　battle；　actually　in　advance　of　Hooker's　line；　that　the　attack　or　sally　of　the　enemy　struck　his　troops　before　it　did　Hooker's；　that　General　Hooker　knew　of　it　at　the　time；　and　he　offered　to　go　out　and　show　me　that　the　dead　men　of　his　advance　division　（Hascall's）　were　lying　farther　out　than　any　of　Hooker's。　　General　Hooker　pretended　not　to　have　known　this　fact。　　I　then　asked　him　why　he　had　called　on　me　for　help；　until　he　had　used　all　of　his　own　troops；　asserting　that　I　had　just　seen　Butterfield's　division；　and　had　learned　from　him　that　he　had　not　been　engaged　the　day　before　at　all；　and　I　asserted　that　the　enemy's　sally　must　have　been　made　by　one　corps　（Hood's）；　in　place　of　three；　and　that　it　had　fallen　on　Geary's　and　Williams's　divisions；　which　had　repulsed　the　attack　handsomely。　　As　we　rode　away　from　that　church　General　Hooker　was　by　my　side；　and　I　told　him　that　such　a　thing　must　not　occur　again；　in　other　words；　I　reproved　him　more　gently　than　the　occasion　demanded；　and　from　that　time　he　began　to　sulk。　　General　Hooker　had　come　from　the　East　with　great　fame　as　a　〃fighter；〃　and　at　Chattanooga　he　was　glorified　by　his　〃battle　above　the　clouds；〃　which　I　fear　turned　his　head。　　He　seemed　jealous　of　all　the　army　commanders；　because　in　years；　former　rank；　and　experience；　he　thought　he　was　our　superior。

On　the　23d　of　June　I　telegraphed　to　General　Halleck　this　summary；　which　I　cannot　again　better　state：

We　continue　to　press　forward　on　the　principle　of　an　advance　against　fortified　positions。　　The　whole　country　is　one　vast　fort；　and　Johnston　must　have　at　least　fifty　miles　of　connected　trenches；　with　abatis　and　finished　batteries。　　We　gain　ground　daily；　fighting　all　the　time。　　On　the　21st　General　Stanley　gained　a　position　near　the　south　end　of　Kenesaw；　from　which　the　enemy　attempted　in　vain　to　drive　him；　and　the　same　day　General　T。　J。　Wood's　division　took　a　hill；　which　the　enemy　assaulted　three　times　at　night　without　success；　leaving　more　than　a　hundred　dead　on　the　ground。　　Yesterday　the　extreme　right　（Hooker　and　Schofield）　advanced　on　the　Powder　Springs　road　to　within　three　miles　of　Marietta。　　The　enemy　made　a　strong　effort　to　drive　them　away；　but　failed　signally；　leaving　more　than　two　hundred　dead　on　the　field。　　Our　lines　are　now　in　close　contact；　and　the　fighting　is　incessant；　with　a　good　deal　of　artillery…fire。　　As　fast　as　we　gain　one　position　the　enemy　has　another　all　ready；　but　I　think　he　will　soon　have　to　let　go　Kenesaw；　which　is　the　key　to　the　whole　country。　　The　weather　is　now　better；　and　the　roads　are　drying　up　faSt。　Our　losses　are　light；　and；　not…　withstanding　the　repeated　breaks　of　the　road　to　our　rear；　supplies　are　ample。

During　the　24th　and　25th　of　June　General　Schofield　extended　his　right　as　far　as　prudent；　so　as　to　compel　the　enemy　to　thin　out　his　lines　correspondingly；　with　the　intention　to　make　two　strong　assaults　at　points　where　success　would　give　us　the　greatest　advantage。　　I　had　consulted　Generals　Thomas；　McPherson；　and　Schofield；　and　we　all　agreed　that　we　could　not　with　prudence　stretch　out　any　more；　and　therefore　there　was　no　alternative　but　to　attack　〃fortified　lines；〃　a　thing　carefully　avoided　up　to　that　time。　　I　reasoned；　if　we　could　make　a　breach　anywhere　near　the　rebel　centre；　and　thrust　in　a　strong　head　of　column；　that　with　the　one　moiety　of　our　army　we　could　hold　in　check　the　corresponding　wing　of　the　enemy；　and　with　the　other　sweep　in　flank　and　overwhelm　the　other　half。　　The　27th　of　June　was　fixed　as　the　day　for　the　attempt；　and　in　order　to　oversee　the　whole；　and　to　be　in　close　communication　with　all　parts　of　the　army；　I　had　a　place　cleared　on　the　top　of　a　hill　to　the　rear　of　Thomas's　centre；　and　had　the　telegraph…wires　laid　to　it。　　The　points　of　attack　were　chosen；　and　the　troops　were　all　prepared　with　as　little　demonstration　as　possible。　　About　9　A。M。　　Of　the　day　appointed；　the　troops　moved　to　the　assault；　and　all　along　our　lines　for　ten　miles　a　furious　fire　of　artillery　and　musketry　was　kept　up。　　At　all　points　the　enemy　met　us　with　determined　courage　and　in　great　force。　　McPherson's　attacking　column　fought　up　the　face　of　the　lesser　Kenesaw；　but　could　not　reach　the　summit。　　About　a　mile　to　the　right　（just　below　the　Dallas　road）　Thomas's　assaulting　column　reached　the　parapet；　where　Brigadier…General　Barker　was　shot　down　mortally　wounded；　and　Brigadier…General　Daniel　McCook　（my　old　law…partner）　was　desperately　wounded；　from　the　effects　of　which　he　afterward　died。　By　11。30　the　assault　was　in　fact　over；　and　had　failed。　　We　had　not　broken　the　rebel　line　at　either　point；　but　our　assaulting　columns　held　their　ground　within　a　few　yards　of　the　rebel　trenches；　and　there　covered　themselves　with　parapet。　　McPherson　lost　about　five　hundred　men　and　several　valuable　officers；　and　Thomas　lost　nearly　two　thousand　men。　　This　was　the　hardest　fight　of　the　campaign　up　to　that　date；　and　it　is　well　described　by　Johnston　in　his　〃Narrative〃　（pages　342；　343）；　where　he　admits　his　loss　in　killed　and　wounded　as

　　　　　　　　Total　。。。。。。。。。。。。。　808

This；　no　doubt；　is　a　true　and　fair　statement；　but；　as　usual；　Johnston　overestimates　our　loss；　putting　it　at　six　thousand；　whereas　our　entire　loss　was　about　twenty…five　hundred；　killed　and　wounded。

While　the　battle　was　in　progress　at　the　centre；　Schofield　crossed　Olley's　Creek　on　the　right；　and　gained　a　position　threatening　Johnston's　line　of　retreat；　and；　to　increase　the　effect；　I　ordered　Stoneman's　cavalry　to　proceed　rapidly　still　farther　to　the　right；　to　Sweetwater。　　Satisfied　of　the　bloody　cost　of　attacking　intrenched　lines；　I　at　once　thought　of　moving　the　whole　army　to　the　railroad　at　a　point　（Fulton）　about　ten　miles　below　Marietta；　or　to　the　Chattahoochee　River　itself；　a　movement　similar　to　the　one　afterward　so　successfully　practised　at　Atlanta。　　All　the　orders　were　issued　to　bring　forward　supplies　enough　to　fill　our　wagons；　intending　to　strip　the　railroad　back　to　Allatoona；　and　leave　that　place　as　our　depot；　to　be　covered　as　well　as　possible　by　Garrard's　cavalry。　　General　Thomas；　as　usual；　shook　his　head；　deeming　it　risky　to　leave　the　railroad；　but　something　had　to　be　done；　and　I　had　resolved　on　this　move；　as　reported　in　my　dispatch　to　General　Halleck　on　July　1st：

General　Schofield　is　now　south　of　Olley's　Creek；　and　on　the　head　of　Nickajack。　　I　have　been　hurrying　down　provisions　and　forage；　and　tomorrow　night　propose　to　move　McPherson　from　the　left　to　the　extreme　right；　back　of　General　Thomas。　　This　will　bring　my　right　within　three　miles　of　the　Chattahoochee　River；　and　about　five　miles　from　the　railroad。　　By　this　movement　I　think　I　can　force　Johnston　to　move　his　whole　army　down　from　Kenesaw　to　defend　his　railroad　and　the　Chattahoochee；　when　I　will　（by　the　left　flank）　reach　the　railroad　below　Marietta；　but　in　this　I　must　cut　loose　from　the　railroad　with　ten　days'　supplies　in　wagons。　　Johnston　may　come　out　of　his　intrenchments　to　attack　Thomas；　which　is　exactly　what　I　want；　for　General　Thomas　is　well　intrenched　on　a　line　parallel　with　the　enemy　south　of　Kenesa