thoughts on man-第69部分

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s；　going　on　according　to　what　Leibnitz　calls　a　'preestablished　harmony；'　and　thus　furnishing　the　ground　of　the　speculations　which　mortals　cherish；　and　the　motives　of　their　proceeding。　　But；　if　thus；　in　the　ordinary　process　of　human　affairs；　we　believe　in　matter；　when　in　reality　there　is　no　such　thing　as　matter；　how　shall　we　pronounce　of　mind；　and　the　things　which　happen　to　us　in　our　seeming　intercourse　with　our　fellow…men；　and　in　the　complexities　of　love　and　hatred；　of　kindred　and　friendship；　of　benevolence　and　misanthropy；　of　robbery　and　murder；　and　of　the　wholesale　massacre　of　thousands　of　human　beings　which　are　recorded　in　the　page　of　history？　　We　absolutely　know　nothing　of　the　lives　and　actions　of　others　but　through　the　medium　of　material　impulse。　　And；　if　you　take　away　matter；　the　bodies　of　our　fellow…men；　does　it　not　follow　by　irresistible　consequence　that　all　knowledge　of　their　minds　is　taken　away　also？　　Am　not　I　therefore　（the　person　engaged　in　reading　the　present　Essay）　the　only　being　in　existence；　an　entire　universe　to　myself？〃

Certainly　this　is　a　very　different　conclusion　from　any　that　Berkeley　ever　contemplated。　　In　the　very　title　of　the　Treatise　in　which　his　notions　on　this　subject　are　unfolded；　he　professes　his　purpose　to　be　to　remove　〃the　grounds　of　scepticism；　atheism　and　irreligion。〃　　Berkeley　was　a　sincere　Christian；　and　a　man　of　the　most　ingenuous　dispositions。　　Pope；　in　the　Epilogue　to　his　Satires；　does　not　hesitate　to　ascribe　to　him　〃every　virtue　under　heaven。〃　　He　was　for　twenty　years　a　prelate　of　the　Protestant　church。　　And；　though　his　personal　sentiments　were　in　the　highest　degree　philanthropical　and　amiable；　yet；　in　his　most　diffusive　production；　entitled　The　Minute　Philosopher；　he　treats　〃those　who　are　called　Free　Thinkers〃　with　a　scorn　and　disdain；　scarcely　to　be　reconciled　with　the　spirit　of　Christian　meekness。

There　are　examples　however；　especially　in　the　fields　of　controversy；　where　an　adventurous　speculatist　has　been　known　to　lay　down　premises　and　principles；　from　which　inferences　might　be　fairly　deduced；　incompatible　with　the　opinions　entertained　by　him　who　delivered　them。　　It　may　therefore　be　no　unprofitable　research　to　enquire　how　far　the　creed　of　the　non…existence　of　matter　is　to　be　regarded　as　in　truth　and　reality　countenancing　the　inference　which　has　just　been　recited。

The　persons　then；　who　refine　with　Berkeley　upon　the　system　of　things　so　far；　as　to　deny　that　there　is　any　such　thing　as　matter　in　the　sense　in　which　it　is　understood　by　the　writers　on　natural　philosophy；　proceed　on　the　ground　of　affirming　that　we　have　no　reason　to　believe　that　the　causes　of　our　sensations　have　an　express　resemblance　to　the　sensations　themselves＇81＇。　　That　which　gives　us　a　sensation　of　colour　is　not　itself　coloured：　　and　the　same　may　be　affirmed　of　the　sensations　of　hot　and　cold；　of　sweet　and　bitter；　and　of　odours　offensive　or　otherwise。　　The　immaterialist　proceeds　to　say；　that　what　we　call　matter　has　been　strewn　to　be　so　exceedingly　porous；　that；　for　any　thing　we　know；　all　the　solid　particles　in　the　universe　might　be　contained　in　a　nutshell；　that　there　is　no　such　thing　in　the　external　world　as　actual　contact；　and　that　no　two　particles　of　matter　were　ever　so　near　to　each　other；　but　that　they　might　be　brought　nearer；　if　a　sufficient　force　could　be　applied　for　that　purpose。　　From　these　premises　it　seems　to　follow　with　sufficient　evidence；　that　the　causes　of　our　sensations；　so　far　as　the　material　universe　is　concerned；　bear　no　express　resemblance　to　the　sensations　themselves。

＇81＇　See　above；　Essay　XXI。


How　then　does　the　question　stand　with　relation　to　mind？　　Are　those　persons　who　deny　the　existence　of　matter；　reduced；　if　they　would　be　consistent　in　their　reasonings；　to　deny；　each　man　for　himself；　that　he　has　any　proper　evidence　of　the　existence　of　other　minds　than　his　own？

He　denies；　while　he　has　the　sensation　of　colour；　that　there　exists　colour　out　of　himself；　unless　in　thinking　and　percipient　beings　constituted　in　a　manner　similar　to　that　in　which　he　is　constituted。　　And　the　same　of　the　sensations　of　hot　and　cold；　sweet　and　bitter；　and　odours　offensive　or　otherwise。　　He　affirms；　while　he　has　the　sensation　of　length；　breadth　and　thickness；　that　there　is　no　continuous　substance　out　of　himself；　possessing　the　attributes　of　length；　breadth　and　thickness　in　any　way　similar　to　the　sensation　of　which　he　is　conscious。　　He　professes　therefore　that　he　has　no　evidence；　arising　from　his　observation　of　what　we　call　matter；　of　the　actual　existence　of　a　material　world。　　He　looks　into　himself；　and　all　he　finds　is　sensation；　but　sensation　cannot　be　a　property　of　inert　matter。　　There　is　therefore　no　assignable　analogy　between　the　causes　of　his　sensations；　whatever　they　may　be；　and　the　sensations　themselves；　and　the　material　world；　such　as　we　apprehend　it；　is　the　mere　creature　of　his　own　mind。

Let　us　next　consider　how　this　question　stands　as　to　the　conceptions　he　entertains　respecting　the　minds　of　other　men。　　That　which　gives　him　the　sensation　of　colour；　is　not　any　thing　coloured　out　of　himself；　and　that　which　gives　him　the　sensation　of　length；　breadth　and　thickness；　is　not　any　thing　long；　broad　and　thick　in　a　manner　corresponding　with　the　impression　he　receives。　　There　is　nothing　in　the　nature　of　a　parallel；　a　type　and　its　archetype；　between　that　which　is　without　him　and　that　which　is　within；　the　impresser　and　the　impression。　　This　is　the　point　supposed　to　be　established　by　Locke　and　Newton；　and　by　those　who　have　followed　the　reasonings　of　these　philosophers　into　their　remotest　consequences。

But　the　case　is　far　otherwise　in　the　impressions　we　receive　respecting　the　minds　of　other　men。　　In　colour　it　has　been　proved　by　these　authors　that　there　is　no　express　correspondence　and　analogy　between　the　cause　of　the　sensation　and　the　sensation。　　They　are　not　part　and　counterpart。　　But　in　mind　there　is　a　precise　resemblance　and　analogy　between　the　conceptions　we　are　led　to　entertain　respecting　other　men；　and　what　we　know　of　ourselves。　　I　and　my　associate；　or　fellow…man；　are　like　two　instruments　of　music　constructed　upon　the　same　model。　　We　have　each　of　us；　so　to　speak；　the　three　great　divisions　of　sound；　base；　tenor　and　treble。　　We　have　each　the　same　number　of　keys；　capable　of　being　struck；　consecutively　or　with　alternations；　at　the　will　of　the　master。　　We　can　utter　the　same　sound　or　series　of　sounds；　or　sounds　of　a　different　character；　but　which　respond　to　each　other。　　My　neighbour　therefore　being　of　the　same　nature　as　myself；　what　passes　within　me　may　be　regarded　as　amounting　to　a　commanding　evidence　that　he　is　a　real　being；　having　a　proper　and　independent　existence。

There　is　further　something　still　more　impressive　and　irresistible　in　the　notices　I　receive　respecting　the　minds　of　other　men。　　The　sceptics　whose　reasonings　I　am　here　taking　into　consideration；　admit；　each　man　for　himself；　the　reality　of　his　own　existence。　　There　is　such　a　thing　therefore　as　human　nature；　for　he　is　a　specimen　of　it。　　Now　the　idea　of　human　nature；　or　of　man；　is　a　very　complex　thing。　　He　is　in　the　first　place　the　subject　of　sensible　impressions；　however　these　impressions　are　communicated　to　him。　　He　has　the　faculties　of　thinking　and　feeling。　　He　is　subject　to　the　law　of　the　association　of　ideas；　or；　in　other　words；　any　one　idea　existing　in　his　mind　has　a　tendency　to　call　up　the　ideas　of　other　things　which　have　been　connected　with　it　in　his　first　experience。　　He　has；　be　it　delusive　or　otherwise；　the　sense　of　liberty　of　action。

But　we　will　go　still　further　into　detail　as　to　the　nature　of　man。

Our　lives　are　carried　forward　by　the　intervention　of　what　we　call　meat；　drink　and　sleep。　　We　are　liable　to　the　accidents　of　health　and　sickness。　　We　are　alternately　the　recipients　of　joy　and　sorrow；　of　cheerfulness　and　melancholy。　　Our　passions　are　excited　by　similar　means；　whether　of　love　or　hatred；　complacency　or　indignation；　sympathy　or　resentment。　　I　could　fill　many　pages　with　a　description　of　the　properties　or　accidents；　which　belong　to　man　as　such；　or　to　which　he　is　liable。

Now　with　all　these　each　man　is　acquainted　in　the　sphere　of　his　inward　experience；　whether　he　is　a　single　being　standing　by　himself；　or　is　an　individual　belonging　to　a　numerous　species。

Observe　then　the　difference　between　my　acquaintance　with　the　phenomena　of　the　material　universe；　and　with　the　individuals　of　my　own　species。　　The　former　say　nothing　to　me；　they　are　a　series　of　events　and　no　more；　I　cannot　penetrate　into　their　causes；　that　which　gives　rise　to　my　sensations；　may　or　may　not　be　similar　to　the　sensations　themselves。　　The　follower　of　Berkeley　or　Newton　has　satisfied　himself　in　the　negative。

But　the　case　is　very　different　in　my　intercourse　with　my　fellow…men。　　Agreeably　to　the　statement　already　made　I　know　the　reality　of　human　nature；　for　I　feel　the　particulars　that　constitute　it　within　myself。　　The　impressions　I　receive　from　that　intercourse　say　something　to　me；　for　they　talk　to　me　of　beings　like　myself。　　My　own　existence　becomes　multiplied　in　infinitum。　　Of　the　possibility　of　matter　I　know　nothing；　but　with　the　possibility　of　mind　I　am　acquainted；　for　I　am　myself　an　example。　　I　am　amazed　at　the　consistency　and　systematic　succession　of　the　phenomena　of　the　m