the path of the law-第4部分

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longer　hope　to　control　the　legislatures　to　look　to　the　courts　as　
expounders　of　the　constitutions；　and　that　in　some　courts　new　principles　
have　been　discovered　outside　the　bodies　of　those　instruments；　which　may　
be　generalized　into　acceptance　of　the　economic　doctrines　which　prevailed　
about　fifty　years　ago；　and　a　wholesale　prohibition　of　what　a　tribunal　of　
lawyers　does　not　think　about　right。　　I　cannot　but　believe　that　if　the　
training　of　lawyers　led　them　habitually　to　consider　more　definitely　and　
explicitly　the　social　advantage　on　which　the　rule　they　lay　down　must　be　
justified；　they　sometimes　would　hesitate　where　now　they　are　confident；　
and　see　that　really　they　were　taking　sides　upon　debatable　and　often　
burning　questions。　　

So　much　for　the　fallacy　of　logical　form。　　Now　let　us　consider　the　
present　condition　of　the　law　as　a　subject　for　study；　and　the　ideal　
toward　which　it　tends。　　We　still　are　far　from　the　point　of　view　which　I　
desire　to　see　reached。　　No　one　has　reached　it　or　can　reach　it　as　yet。　　
We　are　only　at　the　beginning　of　a　philosophical　reaction；　and　of　a　
reconsideration　of　the　worth　of　doctrines　which　for　the　most　part　still　
are　taken　for　granted　without　any　deliberate；　conscious；　and　systematic　
questioning　of　their　grounds。　　The　development　of　our　law　has　gone　on　
for　nearly　a　thousand　years；　like　the　development　of　a　plant；　each　
generation　taking　the　inevitable　next　step；　mind；　like　matter；　simply　
obeying　a　law　of　spontaneous　growth。　　It　is　perfectly　natural　and　right　
that　it　should　have　been　so。　　Imitation　is　a　necessity　of　human　nature；　
as　has　been　illustrated　by　a　remarkable　French　writer；　M。　Tard；　in　an　
admirable　book；　Les　Lois　de　l'Imitation。　　Most　of　the　things　we　do；　we　
do　for　no　better　reason　than　that　our　fathers　have　done　them　or　that　our　
neighbors　do　them；　and　the　same　is　true　of　a　larger　part　than　we　suspect　
of　what　we　think。　　The　reason　is　a　good　one；　because　our　short　life　
gives　us　no　time　for　a　better；　but　it　is　not　the　best。　　It　does　not　
follow；　because　we　all　are　compelled　to　take　on　faith　at　second　hand　
most　of　the　rules　on　which　we　base　our　action　and　our　thought；　that　each　
of　us　may　not　try　to　set　some　corner　of　his　world　in　the　order　of　
reason；　or　that　all　of　us　collectively　should　not　aspire　to　carry　reason　
as　far　as　it　will　go　throughout　the　whole　domain。　　In　regard　to　the　law；　
it　is　true；　no　doubt；　that　an　evolutionist　will　hesitate　to　affirm　
universal　validity　for　his　social　ideals；　or　for　the　principles　which　he　
thinks　should　be　embodied　in　legislation。　　He　is　content　if　he　can　prove　
them　best　for　here　and　now。　　He　may　be　ready　to　admit　that　he　knows　
nothing　about　an　absolute　best　in　the　cosmos；　and　even　that　he　knows　
next　to　nothing　about　a　permanent　best　for　men。　　Still　it　is　true　that　a　
body　of　law　is　more　rational　and　more　civilized　when　every　rule　it　
contains　is　referred　articulately　and　definitely　to　an　end　which　it　
subserves；　and　when　the　grounds　for　desiring　that　end　are　stated　or　are　
ready　to　be　stated　in　words。　　

At　present；　in　very　many　cases；　if　we　want　to　know　why　a　rule　of　law　has　
taken　its　particular　shape；　and　more　or　less　if　we　want　to　know　why　it　
exists　at　all；　we　go　to　tradition。　　We　follow　it　into　the　Year　Books；　
and　perhaps　beyond　them　to　the　customs　of　the　Salian　Franks；　and　
somewhere　in　the　past；　in　the　German　forests；　in　the　needs　of　Norman　
kings；　in　the　assumptions　of　a　dominant　class；　in　the　absence　of　
generalized　ideas；　we　find　out　the　practical　motive　for　what　now　best　is　
justified　by　the　mere　fact　of　its　acceptance　and　that　men　are　accustomed　
to　it。　　The　rational　study　of　law　is　still　to　a　large　extent　the　study　
of　history。　　History　must　be　a　part　of　the　study；　because　without　it　we　
cannot　know　the　precise　scope　of　rules　which　it　is　our　business　to　know。　　
It　is　a　part　of　the　rational　study；　because　it　is　the　first　step　toward　
an　enlightened　scepticism；　that　is；　towards　a　deliberate　reconsideration　
of　the　worth　of　those　rules。　　When　you　get　the　dragon　out　of　his　cave　on　
to　the　plain　and　in　the　daylight；　you　can　count　his　teeth　and　claws；　and　
see　just　what　is　his　strength。　　But　to　get　him　out　is　only　the　first　
step。　　The　next　is　either　to　kill　him；　or　to　tame　him　and　make　him　a　
useful　animal。　　For　the　rational　study　of　the　law　the　blackletter　man　
may　be　the　man　of　the　present；　but　the　man　of　the　future　is　the　man　of　
statistics　and　the　master　of　economics。　　It　is　revolting　to　have　no　
better　reason　for　a　rule　of　law　than　that　so　it　was　laid　down　in　the　
time　of　Henry　IV。　　It　is　still　more　revolting　if　the　grounds　upon　which　
it　was　laid　down　have　vanished　long　since；　and　the　rule　simply　persists　
from　blind　imitation　of　the　past。　　I　am　thinking　of　the　technical　rule　
as　to　trespass　ab　initio；　as　it　is　called；　which　I　attempted　to　explain　
in　a　recent　Massachusetts　case。　　

Let　me　take　an　illustration；　which　can　be　stated　in　a　few　words；　to　show　
how　the　social　end　which　is　aimed　at　by　a　rule　of　law　is　obscured　and　
only　partially　attained　in　consequence　of　the　fact　that　the　rule　owes　
its　form　to　a　gradual　historical　development；　instead　of　being　reshaped　
as　a　whole；　with　conscious　articulate　reference　to　the　end　in　view。　　We　
think　it　desirable　to　prevent　one　man's　property　being　misappropriated　
by　another；　and　so　we　make　larceny　a　crime。　　The　evil　is　the　same　
whether　the　misappropriation　is　made　by　a　man　into　whose　hands　the　owner　
has　put　the　property；　or　by　one　who　wrongfully　takes　it　away。　　But　
primitive　law　in　its　weakness　did　not　get　much　beyond　an　effort　to　
prevent　violence；　and　very　naturally　made　a　wrongful　taking；　a　trespass；　
part　of　its　definition　of　the　crime。　　In　modem　times　the　judges　enlarged　
the　definition　a　little　by　holding　that；　if　the　wrong…doer　gets　
possession　by　a　trick　or　device；　the　crime　is　committed。　　This　really　
was　giving　up　the　requirement　of　trespass；　and　it　would　have　been　more　
logical；　as　well　as　truer　to　the　present　object　of　the　law；　to　abandon　
the　requirement　altogether。　　That；　however；　would　have　seemed　too　bold；　
and　was　left　to　statute。　　Statutes　were　passed　making　embezzlement　a　
crime。　　But　the　force　of　tradition　caused　the　crime　of　embezzlement　to　
be　regarded　as　so　far　distinct　from　larceny　that　to　this　day；　in　some　
jurisdictions　at　least；　a　slip　corner　is　kept　open　for　thieves　to　
contend；　if　indicted　for　larceny；　that　they　should　have　been　indicted　
for　embezzlement；　and　if　indicted　for　embezzlement；　that　they　should　
have　been　indicted　for　larceny；　and　to　escape　on　that　ground。　　

Far　more　fundamental　questions　still　await　a　better　answer　than　that　we　
do　as　our　fathers　have　done。　　What　have　we　better　than　a　blind　guess　to　
show　that　the　criminal　law　in　its　present　form　does　more　good　than　harm？　　
I　do　not　stop　to　refer　to　the　effect　which　it　has　had　in　degrading　
prisoners　and　in　plunging　them　further　into　crime；　or　to　the　question　
whether　fine　and　imprisonment　do　not　fall　more　heavily　on　a　criminal's　
wife　and　children　than　on　himself。　　I　have　in　mind　more　far…reaching　
questions。　　Does　punishment　deter？　　Do　we　deal　with　criminals　on　proper　
principles？　　A　modern　school　of　Continental　criminalists　plumes　itself　
on　the　formula；　first　suggested；　it　is　said；　by　Gall；　that　we　must　
consider　the　criminal　rather　than　the　crime。　　The　formula　does　not　carry　
us　very　far；　but　the　inquiries　which　have　been　started　look　toward　an　
answer　of　my　questions　based　on　science　for　the　first　time。　　If　the　
typical　criminal　is　a　degenerate；　bound　to　swindle　or　to　murder　by　as　
deep　seated　an　organic　necessity　as　that　which　makes　the　rattlesnake　
bite；　it　is　idle　to　talk　of　deterring　him　by　the　classical　method　of　
imprisonment。　　He　must　be　got　rid　of；　he　cannot　be　improved；　or　
frightened　out　of　his　structural　reaction。　　If；　on　the　other　hand；　
crime；　like　normal　human　conduct；　is　mainly　a　matter　of　imitation；　
punishment　fairly　may　be　expected　to　help　to　keep　it　out　of　fashion。　　
The　study　of　criminals　has　been　thought　by　some　well　known　men　of　
science　to　sustain　the　former　hypothesis。　　The　statistics　of　the　
relative　increase　of　crime　in　crowded　places　like　large　cities；　where　
example　has　the　greatest　chance　to　work；　and　in　less　populated　parts；　
where　the　contagion　spreads　more　slowly；　have　been　used　with　great　force　
in　favor　of　the　latter　view。　　But　there　is　weighty　authority　for　the　
belief　that；　however　this　may　be；　〃not　the　nature　of　the　crime；　but　the　
dangerousness　of　the　criminal；　constitutes　the　only　reasonable　legal　
criterion　to　guide　the　inevitable　social　reaction　against　the　criminal。〃

The　impediments　to　rational　generalization；　which　I　illustrated　from　the　
law　of　larceny；　are　shown　in　the　other　branches　of　the　law；　as　well　as　
in　that　of　crime。　　Take　the　law　of　tort　or　civil　liability　for　damages　
apart　from　contract　and　the　like。　　Is　there　any　general　theory　of　such　
liability；　or　are　the　cases　in　which　it　exists　simply　to　be　enumerated；　
and　to　be　explained　each　on　its　special　ground；　as　is　easy　to　believe　
from　the　fact　that　the　right　of　action　for　certain　well　known　classes　of　
wrongs　like　trespass　or　slander　has　its　special