the path of the law-第5部分

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from　the　fact　that　the　right　of　action　for　certain　well　known　classes　of　
wrongs　like　trespass　or　slander　has　its　special　history　for　each　class？　　
I　think　that　the　law　regards　the　infliction　of　temporal　damage　by　a　
responsible　person　as　actionable；　if　under　the　circumstances　known　to　
him　the　danger　of　his　act　is　manifest　according　to　common　experience；　or　
according　to　his　own　experience　if　it　is　more　than　common；　except　in　
cases　where　upon　special　grounds　of　policy　the　law　refuses　to　protect　
the　plaintiff　or　grants　a　privilege　to　the　defendant。　　I　think　that　
commonly　malice；　intent；　and　negligence　mean　only　that　the　danger　was　
manifest　to　a　greater　or　less　degree；　under　the　circumstances　known　to　
the　actor；　although　in　some　cases　of　privilege　malice　may　mean　an　actual　
malevolent　motive；　and　such　a　motive　may　take　away　a　permission　
knowingly　to　inflict　harm；　which　otherwise　would　be　granted　on　this　or　
that　ground　of　dominant　public　good。　　But　when　I　stated　my　view　to　a　
very　eminent　English　judge　the　other　day；　he　said；　〃You　are　discussing　
what　the　law　ought　to　be；　as　the　law　is；　you　must　show　a　right。　　A　man　
is　not　liable　for　negligence　unless　he　is　subject　to　a　duty。〃　　If　our　
difference　was　more　than　a　difference　in　words；　or　with　regard　to　the　
proportion　between　the　exceptions　and　the　rule；　then；　in　his　opinion；　
liability　for　an　act　cannot　be　referred　to　the　manifest　tendency　of　the　
act　to　cause　temporal　damage　in　general　as　a　sufficient　explanation；　but　
must　be　referred　to　the　special　nature　of　the　damage；　or　must　be　derived　
from　some　special　circumstances　outside　of　the　tendency　of　the　act；　for　
which　no　generalized　explanation　exists。　　I　think　that　such　a　view　is　
wrong；　but　it　is　familiar；　and　I　dare　say　generally　is　accepted　in　
England。　　

Everywhere　the　basis　of　principle　is　tradition；　to　such　an　extent　that　
we　even　are　in　danger　of　making　the　role　of　history　more　important　than　
it　is。　　The　other　day　Professor　Ames　wrote　a　learned　article　to　show；　
among　other　things；　that　the　common　law　did　not　recognize　the　defence　of　
fraud　in　actions　upon　specialties；　and　the　moral　might　seem　to　be　that　
the　personal　character　of　that　defence　is　due　to　its　equitable　origin。　　
But　if；　as　I　said；　all　contracts　are　formal；　the　difference　is　not　
merely　historical；　but　theoretic；　between　defects　of　form　which　prevent　
a　contract　from　being　made；　and　mistaken　motives　which　manifestly　could　
not　be　considered　in　any　system　that　we　should　call　rational　except　
against　one　who　was　privy　to　those　motives。　　It　is　not　confined　to　
specialties；　but　is　of　universal　application。　　I　ought　to　add　that　I　do　
not　suppose　that　Mr。　Ames　would　disagree　with　what　I　suggest。　　

However；　if　we　consider　the　law　of　contract；　we　find　it　full　of　history。　　
The　distinctions　between　debt；　covenant；　and　assumpsit　are　merely　
historical。　　The　classification　of　certain　obligations　to　pay　money；　
imposed　by　the　law　irrespective　of　any　bargain　as　quasi　contracts；　is　
merely　historical。　　The　doctrine　of　consideration　is　merely　historical。　　
The　effect　given　to　a　seal　is　to　be　explained　by　history　alone。　　
Consideration　is　a　mere　form。　　Is　it　a　useful　form？　　If　so；　why　should　
it　not　be　required　in　all　contracts？　　A　seal　is　a　mere　form；　and　is　
vanishing　in　the　scroll　and　in　enactments　that　a　consideration　must　be　
given；　seal　or　no　seal。　　Why　should　any　merely　historical　distinction　be　
allowed　to　affect　the　rights　and　obligations　of　business　men？　　

Since　I　wrote　this　discourse　I　have　come　on　a　very　good　example　of　the　
way　in　which　tradition　not　only　overrides　rational　policy；　but　overrides　
it　after　first　having　been　misunderstood　and　having　been　given　a　new　and　
broader　scope　than　it　had　when　it　had　a　meaning。　　It　is　the　settled　law　
of　England　that　a　material　alteration　of　a　written　contract　by　a　party　
avoids　it　as　against　him。　　The　doctrine　is　contrary　to　the　general　
tendency　of　the　law。　　We　do　not　tell　a　jury　that　if　a　man　ever　has　lied　
in　one　particular　he　is　to　be　presumed　to　lie　in　all。　　Even　if　a　man　has　
tried　to　defraud；　it　seems　no　sufficient　reason　for　preventing　him　from　
proving　the　truth。　　Objections　of　like　nature　in　general　go　to　the　
weight；　not　to　the　admissibility；　of　evidence。　　Moreover；　this　rule　is　
irrespective　of　fraud；　and　is　not　confined　to　evidence。　　It　is　not　
merely　that　you　cannot　use　the　writing；　but　that　the　contract　is　at　an　
end。　　What　does　this　mean？　　The　existence　of　a　written　contract　depends　
on　the　fact　that　the　offerer　and　offeree　have　interchanged　their　written　
expressions；　not　on　the　continued　existence　of　those　expressions。　　But　
in　the　case　of　a　bond；　the　primitive　notion　was　different。　　The　contract　
was　inseparable　from　the　parchment。　　If　a　stranger　destroyed　it；　or　tore　
off　the　seal；　or　altered　it；　the　obligee　count　not　recover；　however　free　
from　fault；　because　the　defendant's　contract；　that　is；　the　actual　
tangible　bond　which　he　had　sealed；　could　not　be　produced　in　the　form　in　
which　it　bound　him。　　About　a　hundred　years　ago　Lord　Kenyon　undertook　to　
use　his　reason　on　the　tradition；　as　he　sometimes　did　to　the　detriment　of　
the　law；　and；　not　understanding　it；　said　he　could　see　no　reason　why　what　
was　true　of　a　bond　should　not　be　true　of　other　contracts。　　His　decision　
happened　to　be　right；　as　it　concerned　a　promissory　note；　where　again　the　
common　law　regarded　the　contract　as　inseparable　from　the　paper　on　which　
it　was　written；　but　the　reasoning　was　general；　and　soon　was　extended　to　
other　written　contracts；　and　various　absurd　and　unreal　grounds　of　policy　
were　invented　to　account　for　the　enlarged　rule。　　

I　trust　that　no　one　will　understand　me　to　be　speaking　with　disrespect　of　
the　law；　because　I　criticise　it　so　freely。　　I　venerate　the　law；　and　
especially　our　system　of　law；　as　one　of　the　vastest　products　of　the　
human　mind。　　No　one　knows　better　than　I　do　the　countless　number　of　great　
intellects　that　have　spent　themselves　in　making　some　addition　or　
improvement；　the　greatest　of　which　is　trifling　when　compared　with　the　
mighty　whole。　　It　has　the　final　title　to　respect　that　it　exists；　that　it　
is　not　a　Hegelian　dream；　but　a　part　of　the　lives　of　men。　　But　one　may　
criticise　even　what　one　reveres。　　Law　is　the　business　to　which　my　life　
is　devoted；　and　I　should　show　less　than　devotion　if　I　did　not　do　what　in　
me　lies　to　improve　it；　and；　when　I　perceive　what　seems　to　me　the　ideal　
of　its　future；　if　I　hesitated　to　point　it　out　and　to　press　toward　it　
with　all　my　heart。　　

Perhaps　I　have　said　enough　to　show　the　part　which　the　study　of　history　
necessarily　plays　in　the　intelligent　study　of　the　law　as　it　is　today。　　
In　the　teaching　of　this　school　and　at　Cambridge　it　is　in　no　danger　of　
being　undervalued。　　Mr。　Bigelow　here　and　Mr。　Ames　and　Mr。　Thayer　there　
have　made　important　contributions　which　will　not　be　forgotten；　and　in　
England　the　recent　history　of　early　English　law　by　Sir　Frederick　Pollock　
and　Mr。　Maitland　has　lent　the　subject　an　almost　deceptive　charm。　　We　
must　beware　of　the　pitfall　of　antiquarianism；　and　must　remember　that　for　
our　purposes　our　only　interest　in　the　past　is　for　the　light　it　throws　
upon　the　present。　　I　look　forward　to　a　time　when　the　part　played　by　
history　in　the　explanation　of　dogma　shall　be　very　small；　and　instead　of　
ingenious　research　we　shall　spend　our　energy　on　a　study　of　the　ends　
sought　to　be　attained　and　the　reasons　for　desiring　them。　　As　a　step　
toward　that　ideal　it　seems　to　me　that　every　lawyer　ought　to　seek　an　
understanding　of　economics。　　The　present　divorce　between　the　schools　of　
political　economy　and　law　seems　to　me　an　evidence　of　how　much　progress　
in　philosophical　study　still　remains　to　be　made。　　In　the　present　state　
of　political　economy；　indeed；　we　come　again　upon　history　on　a　larger　
scale；　but　there　we　are　called　on　to　consider　and　weigh　the　ends　of　
legislation；　the　means　of　attaining　them；　and　the　cost。　　We　learn　that　
for　everything　we　have　we　give　up　something　else；　and　we　are　taught　to　
set　the　advantage　we　gain　against　the　other　advantage　we　lose；　and　to　
know　what　we　are　doing　when　we　elect。　　

There　is　another　study　which　sometimes　is　undervalued　by　the　practical　
minded；　for　which　I　wish　to　say　a　good　word；　although　I　think　a　good　
deal　of　pretty　poor　stuff　goes　under　that　name。　　I　mean　the　study　of　
what　is　called　jurisprudence。　　Jurisprudence；　as　I　look　at　it；　is　simply　
law　in　its　most　generalized　part。　　Every　effort　to　reduce　a　case　to　a　
rule　is　an　effort　of　jurisprudence；　although　the　name　as　used　in　English　
is　confined　to　the　broadest　rules　and　most　fundamental　conceptions。　　One　
mark　of　a　great　lawyer　is　that　he　sees　the　application　of　the　broadest　
rules。　　There　is　a　story　of　a　Vermont　justice　of　the　peace　before　whom　a　
suit　was　brought　by　one　farmer　against　another　for　breaking　a　churn。　　
The　justice　took　time　to　consider；　and　then　said　that　he　has　looked　
through　the　statutes　and　could　find　nothing　about　churns；　and　gave　
judgment　for　the　defendant。　　The　same　state　of　mind　is　shown　in　all　our　
common　digests　and　textbooks。　　Applications　of　rudimentary　rules　of　
contract　or　tort　are　tucked　away　under　the