second epilogue-第7部分

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relation　between　those　who　command　and　those　who　execute；　we　find　that

by　the　very　nature　of　the　case　those　who　command　take　the　smallest

part　in　the　action　itself　and　that　their　activity　is　exclusively

directed　to　commanding。

EP2｜CH7

　　CHAPTER　VII



　　When　an　event　is　taking　place　people　express　their　opinions　and

wishes　about　it；　and　as　the　event　results　from　the　collective　activity

of　many　people；　some　one　of　the　opinions　or　wishes　expressed　is　sure

to　be　fulfilled　if　but　approximately。　When　one　of　the　opinions

expressed　is　fulfilled；　that　opinion　gets　connected　with　the　event

as　a　command　preceding　it。

　　Men　are　hauling　a　log。　Each　of　them　expresses　his　opinion　as　to

how　and　where　to　haul　it。　They　haul　the　log　away；　and　it　happens

that　this　is　done　as　one　of　them　said。　He　ordered　it。　There　we　have

command　and　power　in　their　primary　form。　The　man　who　worked　most

with　his　hands　could　not　think　so　much　about　what　he　was　doing；　or

reflect　on　or　command　what　would　result　from　the　common　activity；

while　the　man　who　commanded　more　would　evidently　work　less　with　his

hands　on　account　of　his　greater　verbal　activity。

　　When　some　larger　concourse　of　men　direct　their　activity　to　a

common　aim　there　is　a　yet　sharper　division　of　those　who；　because　their

activity　is　given　to　directing　and　commanding；　take　less　less　part

in　the　direct　work。

　　When　a　man　works　alone　he　always　has　a　certain　set　of　reflections

which　as　it　seems　to　him　directed　his　past　activity；　justify　his

present　activity；　and　guide　him　in　planning　his　future　actions。　Just

the　same　is　done　by　a　concourse　of　people；　allowing　those　who　do　not

take　a　direct　part　in　the　activity　to　devise　considerations；

justifications；　and　surmises　concerning　their　collective　activity。

　　For　reasons　known　or　unknown　to　us　the　French　began　to　drown　and

kill　one　another。　And　corresponding　to　the　event　its　justification

appears　in　people's　belief　that　this　was　necessary　for　the　welfare

of　France；　for　liberty；　and　for　equality。　People　ceased　to　kill　one

another；　and　this　event　was　accompanied　by　its　justification　in　the

necessity　for　a　centralization　of　power；　resistance　to　Europe；　and

so　on。　Men　went　from　the　west　to　the　east　killing　their　fellow　men；

and　the　event　was　accompanied　by　phrases　about　the　glory　of　France；

the　baseness　of　England；　and　so　on。　History　shows　us　that　these

justifications　of　the　events　have　no　common　sense　and　are　all

contradictory；　as　in　the　case　of　killing　a　man　as　the　result　of

recognizing　his　rights；　and　the　killing　of　millions　in　Russia　for

the　humiliation　of　England。　But　these　justifications　have　a　very

necessary　significance　in　their　own　day。

　　These　justifications　release　those　who　produce　the　events　from　moral

responsibility。　These　temporary　aims　are　like　the　broom　fixed　in　front

of　a　locomotive　to　clear　the　snow　from　the　rails　in　front：　they

clear　men's　moral　responsibilities　from　their　path。

　　Without　such　justification　there　would　be　no　reply　to　the　simplest

question　that　presents　itself　when　examining　each　historical　event。

How　is　it　that　millions　of　men　commit　collective　crimes…　make　war；

commit　murder；　and　so　on？

　　With　the　present　complex　forms　of　political　and　social　life　in

Europe　can　any　event　that　is　not　prescribed；　decreed；　or　ordered　by

monarchs；　ministers；　parliaments；　or　newspapers　be　imagined？　Is

there　any　collective　action　which　cannot　find　its　justification　in

political　unity；　in　patriotism；　in　the　balance　of　power；　or　in

civilization？　So　that　every　event　that　occurs　inevitably　coincides

with　some　expressed　wish　and；　receiving　a　justification；　presents

itself　as　the　result　of　the　will　of　one　man　or　of　several　men。

　　In　whatever　direction　a　ship　moves；　the　flow　of　the　waves　it　cuts

will　always　be　noticeable　ahead　of　it。　To　those　on　board　the　ship

the　movement　of　those　waves　will　be　the　only　perceptible　motion。

　　Only　by　watching　closely　moment　by　moment　the　movement　of　that

flow　and　comparing　it　with　the　movement　of　the　ship　do　we　convince

ourselves　that　every　bit　of　it　is　occasioned　by　the　forward　movement

of　the　ship；　and　that　we　were　led　into　error　by　the　fact　that　we

ourselves　were　imperceptibly　moving。

　　We　see　the　same　if　we　watch　moment　by　moment　the　movement　of

historical　characters　（that　is；　re…establish　the　inevitable

condition　of　all　that　occurs…　the　continuity　of　movement　in　time）

and　do　not　lose　sight　of　the　essential　connection　of　historical

persons　with　the　masses。

　　When　the　ship　moves　in　one　direction　there　is　one　and　the　same

wave　ahead　of　it；　when　it　turns　frequently　the　wave　ahead　of　it　also

turns　frequently。　But　wherever　it　may　turn　there　always　will　be　the

wave　anticipating　its　movement。

　　Whatever　happens　it　always　appears　that　just　that　event　was　foreseen

and　decreed。　Wherever　the　ship　may　go；　the　rush　of　water　which　neither

directs　nor　increases　its　movement　foams　ahead　of　it；　and　at　a

distance　seems　to　us　not　merely　to　move　of　itself　but　to　govern　the

ship's　movement　also。



　　Examining　only　those　expressions　of　the　will　of　historical　persons

which；　as　commands；　were　related　to　events；　historians　have　assumed

that　the　events　depended　on　those　commands。　But　examining　the　events

themselves　and　the　connection　in　which　the　historical　persons　stood　to

the　people；　we　have　found　that　they　and　their　orders　were　dependent　on

events。　The　incontestable　proof　of　this　deduction　is　that；　however

many　commands　were　issued；　the　event　does　not　take　place　unless

there　are　other　causes　for　it；　but　as　soon　as　an　event　occurs…　be　it

what　it　may…　then　out　of　all　the　continually　expressed　wishes　of

different　people　some　will　always　be　found　which　by　their　meaning

and　their　time　of　utterance　are　related　as　commands　to　the　events。

　　Arriving　at　this　conclusion　we　can　reply　directly　and　positively

to　these　two　essential　questions　of　history：

　　（1）　What　is　power？

　　（2）　What　force　produces　the　movement　of　the　nations？

　　（1）　Power　is　the　relation　of　a　given　person　to　other　individuals；　in

which　the　more　this　person　expresses　opinions；　predictions；　and

justifications　of　the　collective　action　that　is　performed；　the　less　is

his　participation　in　that　action。

　　（2）　The　movement　of　nations　is　caused　not　by　power；　nor　by

intellectual　activity；　nor　even　by　a　combination　of　the　two　as

historians　have　supposed；　but　by　the　activity　of　all　the　people　who

participate　in　the　events；　and　who　always　combine　in　such　a　way　that

those　taking　the　largest　direct　share　in　the　event　take　on

themselves　the　least　responsibility　and　vice　versa。

　　Morally　the　wielder　of　power　appears　to　cause　the　event；

physically　it　is　those　who　submit　to　the　power。　But　as　the　moral

activity　is　inconceivable　without　the　physical；　the　cause　of　the　event

is　neither　in　the　one　nor　in　the　other　but　in　the　union　of　the　two。

　　Or　in　other　words；　the　conception　of　a　cause　is　inapplicable　to

the　phenomena　we　are　examining。

　　In　the　last　analysis　we　reach　the　circle　of　infinity…　that　final

limit　to　which　in　every　domain　of　thought　man's　reason　arrives　if　it

is　not　playing　with　the　subject。　Electricity　produces　heat；　heat

produces　electricity。　Atoms　attract　each　other　and　atoms　repel　one

another。

　　Speaking　of　the　interaction　of　heat　and　electricity　and　of　atoms；　we

cannot　say　why　this　occurs；　and　we　say　that　it　is　so　because　it　is

inconceivable　otherwise；　because　it　must　be　so　and　that　it　is　a　law。

The　same　applies　to　historical　events。　Why　war　and　revolution　occur　we

do　not　know。　We　only　know　that　to　produce　the　one　or　the　other　action；

people　combine　in　a　certain　formation　in　which　they　all　take　part；　and

we　say　that　this　is　so　because　it　is　unthinkable　otherwise；　or　in

other　words　that　it　is　a　law。

EP2｜CH8

　　CHAPTER　VIII



　　If　history　dealt　only　with　external　phenomena；　the　establishment

of　this　simple　and　obvious　law　would　suffice　and　we　should　have

finished　our　argument。　But　the　law　of　history　relates　to　man。　A

particle　of　matter　cannot　tell　us　that　it　does　not　feel　the　law　of

attraction　or　repulsion　and　that　that　law　is　untrue；　but　man；　who　is

the　subject　of　history；　says　plainly：　I　am　free　and　am　therefore　not

subject　to　the　law。

　　The　presence　of　the　problem　of　man's　free　will；　though

unexpressed；　is　felt　at　every　step　of　history。

　　All　seriously　thinking　historians　have　involuntarily　encountered

this　question。　All　the　contradictions　and　obscurities　of　history　and

the　false　path　historical　science　has　followed　are　due　solely　to　the

lack　of　a　solution　of　that　question。

　　If　the　will　of　every　man　were　free；　that　is；　if　each　man　could　act

as　he　pleased；　all　history　would　be　a　series　of　disconnected

incidents。

　　If　in　a　thousand　years　even　one　man　in　a　million　could　act　freely；

that　is；　as　he　chose；　it　is　evident　that　one　single　free　act　of　that

man's　in　violation　of　the　laws　governing　human　action　would　destroy

the　possibility　of　the　existence　of　any　laws　for　the　whole　of

humanity。

　　If　there　be　a　single　law　governing　the　actions　of　men；　free　will

cannot　exist；　for　then　man's　will　is　subject　to　that　law。

　　In