cratylus-第15部分

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gives　a　complete　paradigm　of　the　verb；　without　suggesting　that　the　double

or　treble　forms　of　Perfects；　Aorists；　etc。　are　hardly　ever　contemporaneous。　

It　distinguishes　Moods　and　Tenses；　without　observing　how　much　of　the　nature

of　one　passes　into　the　other。　　It　makes　three　Voices；　Active；　Passive；　and

Middle；　but　takes　no　notice　of　the　precarious　existence　and　uncertain

character　of　the　last　of　the　three。　　Language　is　a　thing　of　degrees　and

relations　and　associations　and　exceptions：　　grammar　ties　it　up　in　fixed

rules。　　Language　has　many　varieties　of　usage：　　grammar　tries　to　reduce　them

to　a　single　one。　　Grammar　divides　verbs　into　regular　and　irregular：　　it

does　not　recognize　that　the　irregular；　equally　with　the　regular；　are

subject　to　law；　and　that　a　language　which　had　no　exceptions　would　not　be　a

natural　growth：　　for　it　could　not　have　been　subjected　to　the　influences　by

which　language　is　ordinarily　affected。　　It　is　always　wanting　to　describe

ancient　languages　in　the　terms　of　a　modern　one。　　It　has　a　favourite　fiction

that　one　word　is　put　in　the　place　of　another；　the　truth　is　that　no　word　is

ever　put　for　another。　　It　has　another　fiction；　that　a　word　has　been

omitted：　　words　are　omitted　because　they　are　no　longer　needed；　and　the

omission　has　ceased　to　be　observed。　　The　common　explanation　of　kata　or　some

other　preposition　'being　understood'　in　a　Greek　sentence　is　another　fiction

of　the　same　kind；　which　tends　to　disguise　the　fact　that　under　cases　were

comprehended　originally　many　more　relations；　and　that　prepositions　are　used

only　to　define　the　meaning　of　them　with　greater　precision。　　These　instances

are　sufficient　to　show　the　sort　of　errors　which　grammar　introduces　into

language。　　We　are　not　considering　the　question　of　its　utility　to　the

beginner　in　the　study。　　Even　to　him　the　best　grammar　is　the　shortest　and

that　in　which　he　will　have　least　to　unlearn。　　It　may　be　said　that　the

explanations　here　referred　to　are　already　out　of　date；　and　that　the　study

of　Greek　grammar　has　received　a　new　character　from　comparative　philology。　

This　is　true；　but　it　is　also　true　that　the　traditional　grammar　has　still　a

great　hold　on　the　mind　of　the　student。



Metaphysics　are　even　more　troublesome　than　the　figments　of　grammar；　because

they　wear　the　appearance　of　philosophy　and　there　is　no　test　to　which　they

can　be　subjected。　　They　are　useful　in　so　far　as　they　give　us　an　insight

into　the　history　of　the　human　mind　and　the　modes　of　thought　which　have

existed　in　former　ages；　or　in　so　far　as　they　furnish　wider　conceptions　of

the　different　branches　of　knowledge　and　of　their　relation　to　one　another。　

But　they　are　worse　than　useless　when　they　outrun　experience　and　abstract

the　mind　from　the　observation　of　facts；　only　to　envelope　it　in　a　mist　of

words。　　Some　philologers；　like　Schleicher；　have　been　greatly　influenced　by

the　philosophy　of　Hegel；　nearly　all　of　them　to　a　certain　extent　have　fallen

under　the　dominion　of　physical　science。　　Even　Kant　himself　thought　that　the

first　principles　of　philosophy　could　be　elicited　from　the　analysis　of　the

proposition；　in　this　respect　falling　short　of　Plato。　　Westphal　holds　that

there　are　three　stages　of　language：　　（1）　in　which　things　were　characterized

independently；　（2）　in　which　they　were　regarded　in　relation　to　human

thought；　and　（3）　in　relation　to　one　another。　　But　are　not　such　distinctions

an　anachronism？　for　they　imply　a　growth　of　abstract　ideas　which　never

existed　in　early　times。　　Language　cannot　be　explained　by　Metaphysics；　for

it　is　prior　to　them　and　much　more　nearly　allied　to　sense。　　It　is　not　likely

that　the　meaning　of　the　cases　is　ultimately　resolvable　into　relations　of

space　and　time。　　Nor　can　we　suppose　the　conception　of　cause　and　effect　or

of　the　finite　and　infinite　or　of　the　same　and　other　to　be　latent　in

language　at　a　time　when　in　their　abstract　form　they　had　never　entered　into

the　mind　of　man。。。If　the　science　of　Comparative　Philology　had　possessed

'enough　of　Metaphysics　to　get　rid　of　Metaphysics；'　it　would　have　made　far

greater　progress。



（4）　Our　knowledge　of　language　is　almost　confined　to　languages　which　are

fully　developed。　　They　are　of　several　patterns；　and　these　become　altered　by

admixture　in　various　degrees；they　may　only　borrow　a　few　words　from　one

another　and　retain　their　life　comparatively　unaltered；　or　they　may　meet　in

a　struggle　for　existence　until　one　of　the　two　is　overpowered　and　retires

from　the　field。　　They　attain　the　full　rights　and　dignity　of　language　when

they　acquire　the　use　of　writing　and　have　a　literature　of　their　own；　they

pass　into　dialects　and　grow　out　of　them；　in　proportion　as　men　are　isolated

or　united　by　locality　or　occupation。　　The　common　language　sometimes　reacts

upon　the　dialects　and　imparts　to　them　also　a　literary　character。　　The　laws

of　language　can　be　best　discerned　in　the　great　crises　of　language；

especially　in　the　transitions　from　ancient　to　modern　forms　of　them；　whether

in　Europe　or　Asia。　　Such　changes　are　the　silent　notes　of　the　world's

history；　they　mark　periods　of　unknown　length　in　which　war　and　conquest　were

running　riot　over　whole　continents；　times　of　suffering　too　great　to　be

endured　by　the　human　race；　in　which　the　masters　became　subjects　and　the

subject　races　masters；　in　which　driven　by　necessity　or　impelled　by　some

instinct；　tribes　or　nations　left　their　original　homes　and　but　slowly　found

a　resting…place。　　Language　would　be　the　greatest　of　all　historical

monuments；　if　it　could　only　tell　us　the　history　of　itself。



（5）　There　are　many　ways　in　which　we　may　approach　this　study。　　The　simplest

of　all　is　to　observe　our　own　use　of　language　in　conversation　or　in　writing；

how　we　put　words　together；　how　we　construct　and　connect　sentences；　what　are

the　rules　of　accent　and　rhythm　in　verse　or　prose；　the　formation　and

composition　of　words；　the　laws　of　euphony　and　sound；　the　affinities　of

letters；　the　mistakes　to　which　we　are　ourselves　most　liable　of　spelling　or

pronunciation。　　We　may　compare　with　our　own　language　some　other；　even　when

we　have　only　a　slight　knowledge　of　it；　such　as　French　or　German。　　Even　a

little　Latin　will　enable　us　to　appreciate　the　grand　difference　between

ancient　and　modern　European　languages。　　In　the　child　learning　to　speak　we

may　note　the　inherent　strength　of　language；　which　like　'a　mountain　river'

is　always　forcing　its　way　out。　　We　may　witness　the　delight　in　imitation　and

repetition；　and　some　of　the　laws　by　which　sounds　pass　into　one　another。　　We

may　learn　something　also　from　the　falterings　of　old　age；　the　searching　for

words；　and　the　confusion　of　them　with　one　another；　the　forgetfulness　of

proper　names　（more　commonly　than　of　other　words　because　they　are　more

isolated）；　aphasia；　and　the　like。　　There　are　philological　lessons　also　to

be　gathered　from　nicknames；　from　provincialisms；　from　the　slang　of　great

cities；　from　the　argot　of　Paris　（that　language　of　suffering　and　crime；　so

pathetically　described　by　Victor　Hugo）；　from　the　imperfect　articulation　of

the　deaf　and　dumb；　from　the　jabbering　of　animals；　from　the　analysis　of

sounds　in　relation　to　the　organs　of　speech。　　The　phonograph　affords　a

visible　evidence　of　the　nature　and　divisions　of　sound；　we　may　be　truly　said

to　know　what　we　can　manufacture。　　Artificial　languages；　such　as　that　of

Bishop　Wilkins；　are　chiefly　useful　in　showing　what　language　is　not。　　The

study　of　any　foreign　language　may　be　made　also　a　study　of　Comparative

Philology。　　There　are　several　points；　such　as　the　nature　of　irregular

verbs；　of　indeclinable　parts　of　speech；　the　influence　of　euphony；　the　decay

or　loss　of　inflections；　the　elements　of　syntax；　which　may　be　examined　as

well　in　the　history　of　our　own　language　as　of　any　other。　　A　few　well…

selected　questions　may　lead　the　student　at　once　into　the　heart　of　the

mystery：　　such　as；　Why　are　the　pronouns　and　the　verb　of　existence　generally

more　irregular　than　any　other　parts　of　speech？　　Why　is　the　number　of　words

so　small　in　which　the　sound　is　an　echo　of　the　sense？　　Why　does　the　meaning

of　words　depart　so　widely　from　their　etymology？　　Why　do　substantives　often

differ　in　meaning　from　the　verbs　to　which　they　are　related；　adverbs　from

adjectives？　　Why　do　words　differing　in　origin　coalesce　in　the　same　sound

though　retaining　their　differences　of　meaning？　　Why　are　some　verbs

impersonal？　　Why　are　there　only　so　many　parts　of　speech；　and　on　what

principle　are　they　divided？　　These　are　a　few　crucial　questions　which　give

us　an　insight　from　different　points　of　view　into　the　true　nature　of

language。



（6）　Thus　far　we　have　been　endeavouring　to　strip　off　from　language　the　false

appearances　in　which　grammar　and　philology；　or　the　love　of　system

generally；　have　clothed　it。　　We　have　also　sought　to　indicate　the　sources　of

our　knowledge　of　it　and　the　spirit　in　which　we　should　approach　it；　we　may

now　proceed　to　consider　some　of　the　principles　or　natural　laws　which　have

created　or　modified　it。



i。　　The　first　and　simplest　of　all　the　principles　of　language；　c