the origin of the distinction of ranks-第36部分

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ns。　Money；　therefore；　becomes　more　and　more　the　only　means　of　procuring　honours　and　dignities；　and　the　sordid　pursuits　of　avarice　are　made　subservient　to　the　nobler　purposes　of　ambition。　　　　　It　cannot　be　doubted　that　these　circumstances　have　a　tendency　to　introduce　a　democratical　government。　As　persons　of　inferior　rank　are　placed　in　a　situation　which；　in　point　of　subsistence；　renders　them　little　dependent　upon　their　superiors；　as　no　one　order　of　men　continues　in　the　exclusive　possession　of　opulence；　and　as　every　man　who　is　industrious　may　entertain　the　hope　of　gaining　a　fortune；　it　is　to　be　expected　that　the　prerogatives　of　the　monarch　and　of　the　ancient　nobility　will　be　gradually　undermined；　that　the　privileges　of　the　people　will　be　extended　in　the　same　proportion；　and　that　power；　the　usual　attendant　of　wealth；　will　be　in　some　measure　diffused　over　all　the　members　of　the　community。

Section　III　Result　of　the　opposition　between　these　different　principles　　　　　So　widely　different　are　the　effects　of　opulence　and　refinement；　which；　at　the　same　time　that　they　furnish　the　king　with　a　standing　army；　the　great　engine　of　tyranny　and　oppression；　have　also　a　tendency　to　inspire　the　people　with　notions　of　liberty　and　independence。　It　may　thence　be　expected　that　a　conflict　will　arise　between　these　two　opposite　parties；　in　which　a　variety　of　accidents　may　contribute　to　cast　the　balance　upon　either　side。　　　　　With　respect　to　the　issue　of　such　a　contest；　it　may　be　remarked　that；　in　a　small　state；　the　people　have　been　commonly　successful　in　their　efforts　to　establish　a　free　constitution。　When　a　state　consists　only　of　a　small　territory；　and　the　bulk　of　the　inhabitants　live　in　one　city；　they　have　frequently　occasion　to　converse　together；　and　to　communicate　their　sentiments　upon　every　subject　of　importance。　Their　attention　therefore　is　roused　by　every　instance　of　oppression　in　the　government；　and　as　they　easily　take　the　alarm；　so　they　are　capable　of　quickly　uniting　their　forces　in　order　to　demand　redress　of　their　grievances。　By　repeated　experiments　they　become　sensible　of　their　strength；　and　are　enabled　by　degrees　to　enlarge　their　privileges；　and　to　assume　a　greater　share　of　the　public　administration。　　　　　In　large　and　extensive　nations；　the　struggles　between　the　sovereign　and　his　people　are；　on　the　contrary；　more　likely　to　terminate　in　favour　of　despotism。　In　a　wide　country；　the　encroachments　of　the　government　are　frequently　over…looked；　and；　even　when　the　indignation　of　the　people　has　been　roused　by　flagrant　injustice；　they　find　it　difficult　to　combine　in　uniform　and　vigorous　measures　for　the　defence　of　their　rights。　It　is　also　difficult；　in　a　great　nation；　to　bring　out　the　militia　with　that　quickness　which　is　requisite　in　case　of　a　sudden　invasion；　and　it　becomes　necessary；　even　before　the　country　has　been　much　civilized；　to　maintain　such　a　body　of　mercenaries　as　is　capable　of　supporting　the　regal　authority。　　　　　It　is　farther　to　be　considered　that　the　revenue　of　the　monarch　is　commonly　a　more　powerful　engine　of　authority　in　a　great　nation　than　in　a　small　one。　The　influence　of　a　sovereign　seems　to　depend；　not　so　much　upon　his　absolute　wealth；　as　upon　the　proportion　which　it　bears　to　that　of　the　other　members　of　the　community。　So　far　as　the　estate　of　the　king　does　not　exceed　that　of　the　richest　of　his　subjects；　it　is　no　more　than　sufficient　to　supply　the　ordinary　expense　of　living；　in　a　manner　suitable　to　the　splendour　and　dignity　of　the　crown；　and　it　is　only　the　surplus　of　that　estate　which　can　be　directly　applied　to　the　purposes　of　creating　dependence。　In　this　view　the　public　revenue　of　the　king　will　be　productive　of　greater　influence　according　to　the　extent　and　populousness　of　the　country　in　which　it　is　raised。　Suppose　in　a　country；　like　that　of　ancient　Attica；　containing　about　twenty　thousand　inhabitants；　the　people　were；　by　assessment　or　otherwise；　to　pay　at　the　rate　of　twenty　shillings　each　person；　this　would　produce　only　twenty　thousand　pounds；　a　revenue　that　would　probably　not　exalt　the　chief　magistrate　above　many　private　citizens。　But　in　a　kingdom；　containing　ten　millions　of　people；　the　taxes；　being　paid　in　the　same　proportion；　would　in　all　probability　render　the　estate　of　the　monarch　superior　to　the　united　wealth　of　many　hundreds　of　the　most　opulent　individuals。　In　these　two　cases　therefore；　the　disproportion　of　the　armies　maintained　in　each　kingdom　should　be　greater　than　that　of　their　respective　revenues；　and　if　in　the　one；　the　king　was　enabled　to　maintain　two　hundred　and　fifty　thousand　men；　he　would　in　the　other；　be　incapable　of　supporting　the　expense　of　five　hundred。　it　is　obvious；　however；　that　even　five　hundred　regular　and　well　disciplined　troops　will　not　strike　the　same　terror　into　twenty　thousand　people；　that　will　be　created；　by　an　army　of　two　hundred　and　fifty　thousand；　over　a　nation　composed　often　millions。　　　　　Most　of　the　ancient　republics；　with　which　we　are　acquainted；　appear　to　have　owed　their　liberty　to　the　narrowness　of　their　territories。　From　the　small　number　of　people；　and　from　the　close　intercourse　among　all　the　individuals　in　the　same　community；　they　imbibed　a　spirit　of　freedom　even　before　they　had　made　considerable　progress　in　arts；　and　they　found　means　to　repress　or　abolish　the　power　of　their　petty　princes；　before　their　effeminacy　or　industry　had　introduced　the　practice　of　maintaining　mercenary　troops。　　　　　The　same　observation　is　applicable　to　the　modern　states　of　Italy；　who；　after　the　decay　of　the　western　empire；　began　to　flourish　in　trade；　and　among　whom　a　republican　form　of　government　was　early　established。　　　　　In　France；　on　the　other　hand；　the　introduction　of　a　great　mercenary　army；　during　the　administration　of　Cardinal　Richelieu；　which　was　necessary　for　the　defence　of　the　country；　enabled　the　monarch　to　establish　a　despotical　power。　In　the　beginning　of　the　reign　of　Lewis　XIII　was　called　the　last　convention　of　the　states　general　which　has　ever　been　held　in　that　country：　and　the　monarch　has；　from　that　period；　been　accustomed　to　exercise　almost　all　the　different　powers　of　government。　Similar　effects　have　arisen　from　the　establishment　of　standing　forces　in　most　of　the　great　kingdoms　of　Europe。　　　　　The　fortunate　situation　of　Great　Britain；　after　the　accession　of　James　I；　gave　her　little　to　fear　from　any　foreign　invasion；　and　superseded　the　necessity　of　maintaining　a　standing　army；　when　the　service　of　the　feudal　militia　had　gone　into　disuse。　The　weakness　and　bigotry　of　her　monarchs；　at　that　period；　prevented　them　from　employing　the　only　expedient　capable　of　securing　an　absolute　authority。　Charles　I　saw　the　power　exercised；　about　his　time；　by　the　other　princes　of　Europe；　but　he　did　not　discover　the　means　by　which　it　was　obtained。　He　seem　to　have　been　so　much　convinced　of　his　divine　indefeasible　right　as；　at　first；　to　think　that　no　force　was　necessary；　and　afterwards；　that　every　sort　of　duplicity　was　excuseable；　in　support　of　it。　When　at　the　point　of　a　rupture　with　his　parliament；　he　had　no　military　force　upon　which　he　could　depend；　and　he　was　therefore　obliged　to　yield　to　the　growing　power　of　the　commons。　　　　　The　boldness　and　dexterity；　joined　to　the　want　of　public　spirit；　and　the　perfidy　of　Oliver　Cromwell；　rendered　abortive　the　measures　of　that　party；　of　which　he　obtained　the　direction；　but　the　blood　that　had　been　shed；　and　the　repeated　efforts　that　were　made　by　the　people　in　defence　of　their　privileges；　cherished　and　spread　the　love　of　liberty；　and　at　last　produced　a　popular　government；　after　the　best　model；　perhaps；　which　is　practicable　in　an　extensive　country。　　　　　Many　writers　appear　to　take　pleasure　in　remarking　that；　as　the　love　of　liberty　is　natural　to　man；　it　is　to　be　found　in　the　greatest　perfection　among　barbarians；　and　is　apt　to　be　impaired　according　as　people　make　progress　in　civilization　and　in　the　arts　of　life。　That　mankind；　in　the　state　of　mere　savages；　are　in　great　measure　unacquainted　with　government；　and　unaccustomed　to　any　sort　of　constraint；　is　sufficiently　evident。　But　their　independence；　in　that　case；　is　owing　to　the　wretchedness　of　their　circumstances；　which　afford　nothing　that　can　tempt　any　one　man　to　become　subject　to　another。　The　moment　they　have　quitted　this　primitive　situation；　and；　by　endeavouring　to　supply　their　natural　wants；　have　been　led　to　accumulate　property；　they　are　presented　with　very　different　motives　of　action；　and　acquire　a　new　set　of　habits　and　principles。　In　those　rude　ages　when　the　inhabitants　of　the　earth　are　divided　into　tribes　of　shepherds；　or　of　husbandmen；　the　usual　distribution　of　property　renders　the　bulk　of　the　people　dependent　upon　a　few　chiefs；　to　whom　fidelity　and　submission　becomes　the　principal　point　of　honour；　and　makes　a　distinguishing　part　of　the　national　character。　The　ancient　Germans；　whose　high　notions　of　freedom　have　been　the　subject　of　many　a　well…turned　period；　were　accustomed；　as　we　learn　from　Tacitus；　to　stake　their　persons　upon　the　issue　of　a　game　of　hazard；　and　after　an　unlucky　turn　of　fortune；　to　yield　themselves　up　to　a　voluntary　servitude。　Where…ever　men　of　inferior　condition　are　enabled　to　live　in　affluence　by　their　own　industry；　and；　in　procuring　their　livelihood；　have　little　occasion　to　court　the　favour　of　their　superiors；　there　we　may　expect　that　ideas