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posterior analytics-第24部分

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knowledge are not innate but come to be in us; or are innate but at



first unnoticed。 Now it is strange if we possess them from birth;



for it means that we possess apprehensions more accurate than



demonstration and fail to notice them。 If on the other hand we acquire



them and do not previously possess them; how could we apprehend and



learn without a basis of pre…existent knowledge? For that is



impossible; as we used to find in the case of demonstration。 So it



emerges that neither can we possess them from birth; nor can they come



to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent of



having no such developed state at all。 Therefore we must possess a



capacity of some sort; but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than



these developed states。 And this at least is an obvious characteristic



of all animals; for they possess a congenital discriminative



capacity which is called sense…perception。 But though sense…perception



is innate in all animals; in some the sense…impression comes to



persist; in others it does not。 So animals in which this persistence



does not come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of



perceiving; or no knowledge of objects of which no impression



persists; animals in which it does come into being have perception and



can continue to retain the sense…impression in the soul: and when such



persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once



arises between those which out of the persistence of such



sense…impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those



which do not。 So out of sense…perception comes to be what we call



memory; and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing



develops experience; for a number of memories constitute a single



experience。 From experience again…i。e。 from the universal now



stabilized in its entirety within the soul; the one beside the many



which is a single identity within them all…originate the skill of



the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science; skill in the



sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being。



  We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a



determinate form; nor developed from other higher states of knowledge;



but from sense…perception。 It is like a rout in battle stopped by



first one man making a stand and then another; until the original



formation has been restored。 The soul is so constituted as to be



capable of this process。



  Let us now restate the account given already; though with



insufficient clearness。 When one of a number of logically



indiscriminable particulars has made a stand; the earliest universal



is present in the soul: for though the act of sense…perception is of



the particular; its content is universal…is man; for example; not



the man Callias。 A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary



universals; and the process does not cease until the indivisible



concepts; the true universals; are established: e。g。 such and such a



species of animal is a step towards the genus animal; which by the



same process is a step towards a further generalization。



  Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premisses by



induction; for the method by which even sense…perception implants



the universal is inductive。 Now of the thinking states by which we



grasp truth; some are unfailingly true; others admit of error…opinion;



for instance; and calculation; whereas scientific knowing and



intuition are always true: further; no other kind of thought except



intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge; whereas



primary premisses are more knowable than demonstrations; and all



scientific knowledge is discursive。 From these considerations it



follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary



premisses; and since except intuition nothing can be truer than



scientific knowledge; it will be intuition that apprehends the primary



premisses…a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration



cannot be the originative source of demonstration; nor;



consequently; scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge。If;



therefore; it is the only other kind of true thinking except



scientific knowing; intuition will be the originative source of



scientific knowledge。 And the originative source of science grasps the



original basic premiss; while science as a whole is similarly



related as originative source to the whole body of fact。











                                   …THE END…




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