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posterior analytics-第5部分
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it cannot be proved by geometry that opposites fall under one science;
nor even that the product of two cubes is a cube。 Nor can the
theorem of any one science be demonstrated by means of another
science; unless these theorems are related as subordinate to
superior (e。g。 as optical theorems to geometry or harmonic theorems to
arithmetic)。 Geometry again cannot prove of lines any property which
they do not possess qua lines; i。e。 in virtue of the fundamental
truths of their peculiar genus: it cannot show; for example; that
the straight line is the most beautiful of lines or the contrary of
the circle; for these qualities do not belong to lines in virtue of
their peculiar genus; but through some property which it shares with
other genera。
8
It is also clear that if the premisses from which the syllogism
proceeds are commensurately universal; the conclusion of such i。e。
in the unqualified sense…must also be eternal。 Therefore no
attribute can be demonstrated nor known by strictly scientific
knowledge to inhere in perishable things。 The proof can only be
accidental; because the attribute's connexion with its perishable
subject is not commensurately universal but temporary and special。
If such a demonstration is made; one premiss must be perishable and
not commensurately universal (perishable because only if it is
perishable will the conclusion be perishable; not commensurately
universal; because the predicate will be predicable of some
instances of the subject and not of others); so that the conclusion
can only be that a fact is true at the moment…not commensurately and
universally。 The same is true of definitions; since a definition is
either a primary premiss or a conclusion of a demonstration; or else
only differs from a demonstration in the order of its terms。
Demonstration and science of merely frequent occurrences…e。g。 of
eclipse as happening to the moon…are; as such; clearly eternal:
whereas so far as they are not eternal they are not fully
commensurate。 Other subjects too have properties attaching to them
in the same way as eclipse attaches to the moon。
9
It is clear that if the conclusion is to show an attribute
inhering as such; nothing can be demonstrated except from its
'appropriate' basic truths。 Consequently a proof even from true;
indemonstrable; and immediate premisses does not constitute knowledge。
Such proofs are like Bryson's method of squaring the circle; for
they operate by taking as their middle a common character…a character;
therefore; which the subject may share with another…and consequently
they apply equally to subjects different in kind。 They therefore
afford knowledge of an attribute only as inhering accidentally; not as
belonging to its subject as such: otherwise they would not have been
applicable to another genus。
Our knowledge of any attribute's connexion with a subject is
accidental unless we know that connexion through the middle term in
virtue of which it inheres; and as an inference from basic premisses
essential and 'appropriate' to the subject…unless we know; e。g。 the
property of possessing angles equal to two right angles as belonging
to that subject in which it inheres essentially; and as inferred
from basic premisses essential and 'appropriate' to that subject: so
that if that middle term also belongs essentially to the minor; the
middle must belong to the same kind as the major and minor terms。
The only exceptions to this rule are such cases as theorems in
harmonics which are demonstrable by arithmetic。 Such theorems are
proved by the same middle terms as arithmetical properties; but with a
qualification…the fact falls under a separate science (for the subject
genus is separate); but the reasoned fact concerns the superior
science; to which the attributes essentially belong。 Thus; even
these apparent exceptions show that no attribute is strictly
demonstrable except from its 'appropriate' basic truths; which;
however; in the case of these sciences have the requisite identity
of character。
It is no less evident that the peculiar basic truths of each
inhering attribute are indemonstrable; for basic truths from which
they might be deduced would be basic truths of all that is; and the
science to which they belonged would possess universal sovereignty。
This is so because he knows better whose knowledge is deduced from
higher causes; for his knowledge is from prior premisses when it
derives from causes themselves uncaused: hence; if he knows better
than others or best of all; his knowledge would be science in a higher
or the highest degree。 But; as things are; demonstration is not
transferable to another genus; with such exceptions as we have
mentioned of the application of geometrical demonstrations to theorems
in mechanics or optics; or of arithmetical demonstrations to those
of harmonics。
It is hard to be sure whether one knows or not; for it is hard to be
sure whether one's knowledge is based on the basic truths
appropriate to each attribute…the differentia of true knowledge。 We
think we have scientific knowledge if we have reasoned from true and
primary premisses。 But that is not so: the conclusion must be
homogeneous with the basic facts of the science。
10
I call the basic truths of every genus those clements in it the
existence of which cannot be proved。 As regards both these primary
truths and the attributes dependent on them the meaning of the name is
assumed。 The fact of their existence as regards the primary truths
must be assumed; but it has to be proved of the remainder; the
attributes。 Thus we assume the meaning alike of unity; straight; and
triangular; but while as regards unity and magnitude we assume also
the fact of their existence; in the case of the remainder proof is
required。
Of the basic truths used in the demonstrative sciences some are
peculiar to each science; and some are common; but common only in
the sense of analogous; being of use only in so far as they fall
within the genus constituting the province of the science in question。
Peculiar truths are; e。g。 the definitions of line and straight;
common truths are such as 'take equals from equals and equals remain'。
Only so much of these common truths is required as falls within the
genus in question: for a truth of this kind will have the same force
even if not used generally but applied by the geometer only to
magnitudes; or by the arithmetician only to numbers。 Also peculiar
to a science are the subjects the existence as well as the meaning
of which it assumes; and the essential attributes of which it
investigates; e。g。 in arithmetic units; in geometry points and
lines。 Both the existence and the meaning of the subjects are
assumed by these sciences; but of their essential attributes only
the meaning is assumed。 For example arithmetic assumes the meaning
of odd and even; square and cube; geometry that of incommensurable; or
of deflection or verging of lines; whereas the existence of these
attributes is demonstrated by means of the axioms and from previous
conclusions as premisses。 Astronomy too proceeds in the same way。
For indeed every demonstrative science has three elements: (1) that
which it posits; the subject genus whose essential attributes it
examines; (2) the so…called axioms; which are primary premisses of its
demonstration; (3) the attributes; the meaning of which it assumes。
Yet some sciences may very well pass over some of these elements; e。g。
we might not expressly posit the existence of the genus if its
existence were obvious (for instance; the existence of hot and cold is
more evident than that of number); or we might omit to assume
expressly the meaning of the attributes if it were well understood。 In
the way the meaning of axioms; such as 'Take equals from equals and
equals remain'; is well known and so not expressly assumed。
Nevertheless in the nature of the case the essential elements of
demonstration are three: the subject; the attributes; and the basic
premisses。
That which expresses necessary self…grounded fact; and which we must
necessarily believe; is distinct both from the hypotheses of a science
and from illegitimate postulate…I say 'must believe'; because all
syllogism; and therefore a fortiori demonstration; is addressed not to
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