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　re…elected　for　a　second　term。　　Of　the　first　seven　Presidents　five　were　sent　back　to　the　White　House　for　a　second　period　of　four　years。　　But　this　has　never　been　done　since　the　days　of　General　Jackson；　nor　will　it　be　done；　unless　a　stronger　conservative　reaction　takes　place　than　the　country　even　as　yet　seems　to　promise。　　As　things　have　lately　ordered　themselves；　it　may　almost　be　said　that　no　man　in　the　Union　would　be　so　improbable　a　candidate　for　the　Presidency　as　the　outgoing　President。　　And　it　has　been　only　natural　that　it　should　be　so。　Looking　at　the　men　themselves　who　have　lately　been　chosen；　the　fault　has　not　consisted　in　their　non…re…election；　but　in　their　original　selection。　　There　has　been　no　desire　for　great　men；　no　search　after　a　man　of　such　a　nature　that；　when　tried；　the　people　should　be　anxious　to　keep　him。　　〃It　will　not　be　in　my　time；〃　says　the　expiring　President。　　And　so；　without　dismay；　he　sees　the　empire　of　his　country　slide　away　from　him。　A　President；　with　the　possibility　of　re…election　before　him；　would　be　as　a　minister　who　goes　out　knowing　that　he　may　possibly　come　in　again　before　the　session　is　over；　and；　perhaps；　believing　that　the　chances　of　his　doing　so　are　in　his　favor。　　Under　the　existing　political　phase　of　things　in　the　United　States；　no　President　has　any　such　prospect；　but　the　ministers　of　the　President　have　that　chance。　It　is　no　uncommon　thing　at　present　for　a　minister　under　one　President　to　reappear　as　a　minister　under　another；　but　a　statesman　has　no　assurance　that　he　will　do　so　because　he　has　shown　ministerial　capacity。　　We　know　intimately　the　names　of　all　our　possible　ministerstoo　intimately　as　some　of　us　thinkand　would　be　taken　much　by　surprise　if　a　gentleman　without　an　official　reputation　were　placed　at　the　head　of　a　high　office。　　If　something　of　this　feeling　prevailed　as　to　the　President's　cabinet；　if　there　were　some　assurance　that　competent　statesmen　would　be　appointed　as　Secretaries　of　State；　a　certain　amount　of　national　responsibility　would　by　degrees　attach　itself　to　them；　and　the　President's　shoulders　would；　to　that　amount；　be　lightened。　　As　it　is；　the　President　pretends　to　bear　a　burden　which；　if　really　borne；　would　indicate　the　possession　of　Herculean　shoulders。　　But；　in　fact；　the　burden　at　present　is　borne　by　no　one。　　The　government　of　the　United　States　is　not　in　truth　responsible　either　to　the　people　or　to　Congress。　But　these　ministers；　if　it　be　desired　that　they　shall　have　weight　in　the　country；　should　sit　in　Congress　either　as　Senators　or　as　Representatives。　　That　they　cannot　so　sit　without　an　amendment　of　the　Constitution；　I　have　explained　in　the　previous　chapter；　and　any　such　amendment　cannot　be　very　readily　made。　　Without　such　seats　they　cannot　really　share　the　responsibility　of　the　President；　or　be　in　any　degree　amenable　to　public　opinion　for　the　advice　which　they　give　in　their　public　functions。　　It　will　be　said　that　the　Constitution　has　expressly　intended　that　they　should　not　be　responsible；　and　such；　no　doubt；　has　been　the　case。　　But　the　Constitution；　good　as　it　is；　cannot　be　taken　as　perfect。　　The　government　has　become　greater　than　seems　to　have　been　contemplated　when　that　code　was　drawn　up。　It　has　spread　itself　as　it　were　over　a　wider　surface；　and　has　extended　to　matters　which　it　was　not　necessary　then　to　touch。　　That　theory　of　governing　by　the　means　of　little　men　was　very　well　while　the　government　itself　was　small。　　A　President　and　his　clerks　may　have　sufficed　when　there　were　from　thirteen　to　eighteen　States；　while　there　were　no　Territories；　or　none　at　least　that　required　government；　while　the　population　was　still　below　five　millions；　while　a　standing　army　was　an　evil　not　known　and　not　feared；　while　foreign　politics　was　a　troublesome　embroglio　in　which　it　was　quite　unnecessary　that　the　United　States　should　take　a　part。　　Now　there　are　thirty…four　States。　　The　territories　populated　by　American　citizens　stretch　from　the　States　on　the　Atlantic　to　those　on　the　Pacific。　　There　is　a　population　of　thirty　million　souls。　　At　the　present　moment　the　United　States　are　employing　more　soldiers　than　any　other　nation；　and　have　acknowledged　the　necessity　of　maintaining　a　large　army　even　when　the　present　troubles　shall　be　over。　　In　addition　to　this　the　United　States　have　occasion　for　the　use　of　statecraft　with　all　the　great　kingdoms　of　Europe。　　That　theory　of　ruling　by　little　men　will　not　do　much　longer。　　It　will　be　well　that　they　should　bring　forth　their　big　men　and　put　them　in　the　place　of　rulers。　The　President　has　at　present　seven　ministers。　　They　are　the　Secretary　of　State；　who　is　supposed　to　have　the　direction　of　foreign　affairs；　the　Secretary　of　the　Treasury；　who　answers　to　our　Chancellor　of　the　Exchequer；　the　Secretaries　of　the　Army　and　of　the　Navy；　the　Minister　of　the　Interior；　the　Attorney…General；　and　the　Postmaster…General。　　If　these　officers　were　allowed　to　hold　seats　in　one　House　or　the　otheror　rather　if　the　President　were　enjoined　to　place　in　these　offices　men　who　were　known　as　members　of　Congress；　not　only　would　the　position　of　the　President's　ministers　be　enhanced　and　their　weight　increased；　but　the　position　also　of　Congress　would　be　enhanced　and　the　weight　of　Congress　would　be　increased。　　I　may；　perhaps；　best　exemplify　this　by　suggesting　what　would　be　the　effect　on　our　Parliament　by　withdrawing　from　it　the　men　who　at　the　present　momentor　at　any　momentform　the　Queen's　cabinet。　　I　will　not　say　that　by　adding　to　Congress　the　men　who　usually　form　the　President's　cabinet；　a　weight　would　be　given　equal　to　that　which　the　withdrawal　of　the　British　cabinet　would　take　from　the　British　Parliament。　　I　cannot　pay　that　compliment　to　the　President's　choice　of　servants。　But　the　relationship　between　Congress　and　the　President's　ministers　would　gradually　come　to　resemble　that　which　exists　between　Parliament　and　the　Queen's　ministers。　　The　Secretaries　of　State　and　of　the　Treasury　would　after　awhile　obtain　that　honor　of　leading　the　Houses　which　is　exercised　by　our　high　political　officers；　and　the　dignity　added　to　the　positions　would　make　the　places　worthy　of　the　acceptance　of　great　men。　　It　is　hardly　so　at　present。　　The　career　of　one　of　the　President's　ministers　is　not　a　very　high　career　as　things　now　stand；　nor　is　the　man　supposed　to　have　achieved　much　who　has　achieved　that　position。　　I　think　it　would　be　otherwise　if　the　ministers　were　the　leaders　of　the　legislative　houses。　　To　Congress　itself　would　be　given　the　power　of　questioning　and　ultimately　of　controlling　these　ministers。　　The　power　of　the　President　would　no　doubt　be　diminished　as　that　of　Congress　would　be　increased。　　But　an　alteration　in　that　direction　is　in　itself　desirable。　　It　is　the　fault　of　the　present　system　of　government　in　the　United　States　that　the　President　has　too　much　of　power　and　weight；　while　the　Congress　of　the　nation　lacks　power　and　weight。　　As　matters　now　stand；　Congress　has　not　that　dignity　of　position　which　it　should　hold；　and　it　is　without　it　because　it　is　not　endowed　with　that　control　over　the　officers　of　the　government　which　our　Parliament　is　enabled　to　exercise。　The　want　of　this　close　connection　with　Congress　and　the　President's　ministers　has　been　so　much　felt　that　it　has　been　found　necessary　to　create　a　medium　of　communication。　　This　has　been　done　by　a　system　which　has　now　become　a　recognized　part　of　the　machinery　of　the　government；　but　which　is；　I　believe；　founded　on　no　regularly　organized　authority；　at　any　rate；　no　provision　is　made　for　it　in　the　Constitution；　nor；　as　far　as　I　am　aware；　has　it　been　established　by　any　special　enactment　or　written　rule。　　Nevertheless；　I　believe　I　am　justified　in　saying　that　it　has　become　a　recognized　link　in　the　system　of　government　adopted　by　the　United　States。　　In　each　House　standing　committees　are　named；　to　which　are　delegated　the　special　consideration　of　certain　affairs　of　State。　　There　are；　for　instance；　Committees　of　Foreign　Affairs；　of　Finance；　the　Judiciary　Committee；　and　others　of　a　similar　nature。　　To　these　committees　are　referred　all　questions　which　come　before　the　House　bearing　on　the　special　subject　to　which　each　is　devoted。　　Questions　of　taxation　are　referred　to　the　Finance　Committee　before　they　are　discussed　in　the　House；　and　the　House；　when　it　goes　into　such　discussion；　has　before　it　the　report　of　the　committee。　　In　this　way　very　much　of　the　work　of　the　legislature　is　done　by　branches　of　each　House；　and　by　selected　men　whose　time　and　intellects　are　devoted　to　special　subjects。　　It　is　easy　to　see　that　much　time　and　useless　debate　may　be　thus　saved；　and　I　am　disposed　to　believe　that　this　system　of　committees　has　worked　efficiently　and　beneficially。　　The　mode　of　selection　of　the　members　has　been　so　contrived　as　to　give　to　each　political　party　that　amount　of　preponderance　in　each　committee　which　such　party　holds　in　the　House。　　If　the　Democrats　have　in　the　Senate　a　majority；　it　would　be　within　their　power　to　vote　none　but　Democrats　into　the　Committee　on　Finance；　but　this　would　be　manifestly　unjust　to　the　Republican　party；　and　the　injustice　would　itself　frustrate　the　object　of　the　party　in　power；　therefore　the　Democrats　simply　vote　to　themselves　a　majority　in　each　committee；　keeping　to　themselves　as　great　a　preponderance　in　the　committee　as　they　have　in　the　whole　House；　and　arrangin