gorgias-第13部分

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as　I　was　just　now　saying；　is　the　life　of　a　stone：　he　has　neither　joy　nor　sorrow　after　he　is　once　filled；　but　the　pleasure　depends　on　the　superabundance　of　the　influx。　　　Soc。　But　the　more　you　pour　in；　the　greater　the　waste；　and　the　holes　must　be　large　for　the　liquid　to　escape。　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　The　life　which　you　are　now　depicting　is　not　that　of　a　dead　man；　or　of　a　stone；　but　of　a　cormorant；　you　mean　that　he　is　to　be　hungering　and　eating？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　he　is　to　be　thirsting　and　drinking？　　　Cal。　Yes；　that　is　what　I　mean；　he　is　to　have　all　his　desires　about　him；　and　to　be　able　to　live　happily　in　the　gratification　of　them。　　　Soc。　Capital；　excellent；　go　on　as　you　have　begun；　and　have　no　shame；　I；　too；　must　disencumber　myself　of　shame：　and　first；　will　you　tell　me　whether　you　include　itching　and　scratching；　provided　you　have　enough　of　them　and　pass　your　life　in　scratching；　in　your　notion　of　happiness？　　　Cal。　What　a　strange　being　you　are；　Socrates！　a　regular　mob…orator。　　　Soc。　That　was　the　reason；　Callicles；　why　I　scared　Polus　and　Gorgias；　until　they　were　too　modest　to　say　what　they　thought；　but　you　will　not　be　too　modest　and　will　not　be　scared；　for　you　are　a　brave　man。　And　now；　answer　my　question。　　　Cal。　I　answer；　that　even　the　scratcher　would　live　pleasantly。　　　Soc。　And　if　pleasantly；　then　also　happily？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　But　what　if　the　itching　is　not　confined　to　the　head？　Shall　I　pursue　the　question？　And　here；　Callicles；　I　would　have　you　consider　how　you　would　reply　if　consequences　are　pressed　upon　you；　especially　if　in　the　last　resort　you　are　asked；　whether　the　life　of　a　catamite　is　not　terrible；　foul；　miserable？　Or　would　you　venture　to　say；　that　they　too　are　happy；　if　they　only　get　enough　of　what　they　want？　　　Cal。　Are　you　not　ashamed；　Socrates；　of　introducing　such　topics　into　the　argument？　　　Soc。　Well；　my　fine　friend；　but　am　I　the　introducer　of　these　topics；　or　he　who　says　without　any　qualification　that　all　who　feel　pleasure　in　whatever　manner　are　happy；　and　who　admits　of　no　distinction　between　good　and　bad　pleasures？　And　I　would　still　ask；　whether　you　say　that　pleasure　and　good　are　the　same；　or　whether　there　is　some　pleasure　which　is　not　a　good？　　　Cal。　Well；　then；　for　the　sake　of　consistency；　I　will　say　that　they　are　the　same。　　　Soc。　You　are　breaking　the　original　agreement；　Callicles；　and　will　no　longer　be　a　satisfactory　companion　in　the　search　after　truth；　if　you　say　what　is　contrary　to　your　real　opinion。　　　Cal。　Why；　that　is　what　you　are　doing　too；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　Then　we　are　both　doing　wrong。　Still；　my　dear　friend；　I　would　ask　you　to　consider　whether　pleasure；　from　whatever　source　derived；　is　the　good；　for；　if　this　be　true；　then　the　disagreeable　consequences　which　have　been　darkly　intimated　must　follow；　and　many　others。　　　Cal。　That；　Socrates；　is　only　your　opinion。　　　Soc。　And　do　you；　Callicles；　seriously　maintain　what　you　are　saying？　　　Cal。　Indeed　I　do。　　　Soc。　Then；　as　you　are　in　earnest；　shall　we　proceed　with　the　argument？　　　Cal。　By　all　means。　　　Soc。　Well；　if　you　are　willing　to　proceed；　determine　this　question　for　me：…There　is　something；　I　presume；　which　you　would　call　knowledge？

　　Cal。　There　is。　　　Soc。　And　were　you　not　saying　just　now；　that　some　courage　implied　knowledge？　　　Cal。　I　was。　　　Soc。　And　you　were　speaking　of　courage　and　knowledge　as　two　things　different　from　one　another？　　　Cal。　Certainly　I　was。　　　Soc。　And　would　you　say　that　pleasure　and　knowledge　are　the　same；　or　not　the　same？　　　Cal。　Not　the　same；　O　man　of　wisdom。　　　Soc。　And　would　you　say　that　courage　differed　from　pleasure？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Well；　then；　let　us　remember　that　Callicles；　the　Acharnian；　says　that　pleasure　and　good　are　the　same；　but　that　knowledge　and　courage　are　not　the　same；　either　with　one　another；　or　with　the　good。　　　Cal。　And　what　does　our　friend　Socrates；　of　Foxton；　say　…does　he　assent　to　this；　or　not？　　　Soc。　He　does　not　assent；　neither　will　Callicles；　when　he　sees　himself　truly。　You　will　admit；　I　suppose；　that　good　and　evil　fortune　are　opposed　to　each　other？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　if　they　are　opposed　to　each　other；　then；　like　health　and　disease；　they　exclude　one　another；　a　man　cannot　have　them　both；　or　be　without　them　both；　at　the　same　time？　　　Cal。　What　do　you　mean？　　　Soc。　Take　the　case　of　any　bodily　affection：…a　man　may　have　the　complaint　in　his　eyes　which　is　called　ophthalmia？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　But　he　surely　cannot　have　the　same　eyes　well　and　sound　at　the　same　time？　　　Cal。　Certainly　not。　　　Soc。　And　when　he　has　got　rid　of　his　ophthalmia；　has　he　got　rid　of　the　health　of　his　eyes　too？　Is　the　final　result；　that　he　gets　rid　of　them　both　together？　　　Cal。　Certainly　not。　　　Soc。　That　would　surely　be　marvellous　and　absurd？　　　Cal。　Very。　　　Soc。　I　suppose　that　he　is　affected　by　them；　and　gets　rid　of　them　in　turns？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　he　may　have　strength　and　weakness　in　the　same　way；　by　fits？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Or　swiftness　and　slowness？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　does　he　have　and　not　have　good　and　happiness；　and　their　opposites；　evil　and　misery；　in　a　similar　alternation？　　　Cal。　Certainly　he　has。　　　Soc。　If　then　there　be　anything　which　a　man　has　and　has　not　at　the　same　time；　clearly　that　cannot　be　good　and　evil…do　we　agree？　Please　not　to　answer　without　consideration。　　　Cal。　I　entirely　agree。　　　Soc。　Go　back　now　to　our　former　admissions。…Did　you　say　that　to　hunger；　I　mean　the　mere　state　of　hunger；　was　pleasant　or　painful？　　　Cal。　I　said　painful；　but　that　to　eat　when　you　are　hungry　is　pleasant。　　　Soc。　I　know；　but　still　the　actual　hunger　is　painful：　am　I　not　right？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　thirst；　too；　is　painful？　　　Cal。　Yes；　very。　　　Soc。　Need　I　adduce　any　more　instances；　or　would　you　agree　that　all　wants　or　desires　are　painful？　　　Cal。　I　agree；　and　therefore　you　need　not　adduce　any　more　instances。　　　　Soc。　Very　good。　And　you　would　admit　that　to　drink；　when　you　are　thirsty；　is　pleasant？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　in　the　sentence　which　you　have　just　uttered；　the　word　〃thirsty〃　implies　pain？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　the　word　〃drinking〃　is　expressive　of　pleasure；　and　of　the　satisfaction　of　the　want？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　There　is　pleasure　in　drinking？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　When　you　are　thirsty？　　　Soc。　And　in　pain？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Do　you　see　the　inference：…that　pleasure　and　pain　are　simultaneous；　when　you　say　that　being　thirsty；　you　drink？　For　are　they　not　simultaneous；　and　do　they　not　affect　at　the　same　time　the　same　part；　whether　of　the　soul　or　the　body？…which　of　them　is　affected　cannot　be　supposed　to　be　of　any　consequence：　Is　not　this　true？　　　Cal。　It　is。　　　Soc。　You　said　also；　that　no　man　could　have　good　and　evil　fortune　at　the　same　time？　　　Cal。　Yes；　I　did。　　　Soc。　But；　you　admitted　that　when　in　pain　a　man　might　also　have　pleasure？　　　Cal。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　Then　pleasure　is　not　the　same　as　good　fortune；　or　pain　the　same　as　evil　fortune；　and　therefore　the　good　is　not　the　same　as　the　pleasant？　　　Cal。　I　wish　I　knew；　Socrates；　what　your　quibbling　means。　　　Soc。　You　know；　Callicles；　but　you　affect　not　to　know。　　　Cal。　Well；　get　on；　and　don't　keep　fooling：　then　you　will　know　what　a　wiseacre　you　are　in　your　admonition　of　me。　　　Soc。　Does　not　a　man　cease　from　his　thirst　and　from　his　pleasure　in　drinking　at　the　same　time？　　　Cal。　I　do　not　understand　what　you　are　saying。　　　Gor。　Nay；　Callicles；　answer；　if　only　for　our　sakes；…we　should　like　to　hear　the　argument　out。　　　Cal。　Yes；　Gorgias；　but　I　must　complain　of　the　habitual　trifling　of　Socrates；　he　is　always　arguing　about　little　and　unworthy　questions。　　　Gor。　What　matter？　Your　reputation；　Callicles；　is　not　at　stake。　Let　Socrates　argue　in　his　own　fashion。　　　Cal。　Well；　then；　Socrates；　you　shall　ask　these　little　peddling　questions；　since　Gorgias　wishes　to　have　them。　　　Soc。　I　envy　you；　Callicles；　for　having　been　initiated　into　the　great　mysteries　before　you　were　initiated　into　the　lesser。　I　thought　that　this　was　not　allowable；　But　to　return　to　our　argument：…Does　not　a　man　cease　from　thirsting　and　from　pleasure　of　drinking　at　the　same　moment？　　　Cal。　True。　　　Soc。　And　if　he　is　hungry；　or　has　any　other　desire；　does　he　not　cease　from　the　desire　and　the　pleasure　at　the　same　moment？　　　Cal。　Very　true。　　　Soc。　Then　he　ceases　from　pain　and　pleasure　at　the　same　moment？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　But　he　does　not　cease　from　good　and　evil　at　the　same　moment；　as　you　have　admitted：　do　you　still　adhere　to　what　you　said？　　　Cal。　Yes；　I　do；　but　what　is　the　inference？　　　Soc。　Why；　my　friend；　the　inference　is　that　the　good　is　not　the　same　as　the　pleasant；　or　the　evil　the　same　as　the　painful；　there　is　a　cessation　of　pleasure　and　pain　at　the　same　moment；　but　not　of　good　and　evil；　for　they　are　different。　How　then　can　pleasure　be　the　same　as　good；　or　pain　as　evil？　And　I　would　have　you　look　at　the　matter　in　another　light；　which　could　hardly；　I　think；　have　been　considered　by　you　identified　them：　Are　not　the　good　they　have　good　present　with　them；　as　the　beautiful　are　those　who　have　beauty　present　with　them？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　do　you　call　the　fools　and　cowards　good　men？　For　you　were　saying　just　now　that　the　courageous　and　the　wise　are　the　good　would　you　not　say　so？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　did　you　never　see　a　foolish　child　rejoicing？　　　Cal。　Yes；　I　have。　　　Soc。　And　a　foolish　man　too？　　　Cal。　Yes；　certainly；　but　what　is　your　drift？　　　Soc。　Nothing　p