the path of empire-第23部分

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fighting　strength。　Had　the　Spanish　commander　possessed　more　nerve　and　held　out　a　little　longer；　he　might　well　have　seen　his　victorious　enemies　wither　before　his　eyes；　as　the　British　had　before　Cartagena　in　1741。　On　the　3d　of　August　a　large　number　of　the　officers　of　the　Santiago　army；　including　Generals　Wheeler；　Sumner；　and　Lawton；　and　Colonel　Roosevelt；　addressed　a　round　robin　to　General　Shafter　on　the　alarming　condition　of　the　army。　Its　substance　is　indicated　in　the　following　sentences：　〃This　army　must　be　moved　at　once　or　it　will　perish。　As　an　army　it　can　be　safely　moved　now。　Persons　responsible　for　preventing　such　a　move　will　be　responsible　for　the　unnecessary　loss　of　many　thousands　of　lives。〃　Already　on　the　1st　of　August；　General　Shafter　had　reported　4255　sick；　of　whom　3164　were　cases　of　yellow　fever；　that　deadly　curse　of　Cuba；　which　the　lack　of　proper　quarantine　had　so　often　allowed　to　invade　the　shores　of　the　United　States。　On　the　3d　of　August；　even　before　General　Shafter　had　received　the　round　robin；　the　Secretary　of　War　authorized　the　withdrawal　of　at　least　a　portion　of　the　army；　which　was　to　be　replaced　by　supposedly　immune　regiments。　By　the　middle　of　August；　the　soldiers　began　to　arrive　at　Camp　Wikoff　at　Montauk　Point；　on　the　eastern　end　of　Long　Island。　Through　this　camp；　which　had　been　hastily　put　into　condition　to　receive　them；　there　passed　about　thirty…five　thousand　soldiers；　of　whom　twenty　thousand　were　sick。　When　the　public　saw　those　who　a　few　weeks　before　had　been　healthy　and　rollicking　American　boys；　now　mere　skeletons；　borne　helpless　in　stretchers　and　looking　old　and　shriveled；　a　wave　of　righteous　indignation　against　Secretary　Alger　swept　over　the　country；　and　eventually　accomplished　enough　to　prevent　such　catastrophes　in　the　future。

The　distressing　experience　of　the　army　was　too　real　not　to　have　its　constructive　effect。　Men　like　William　Crawford　Gorgas　were　inspired　to　study　the　sanitation　and　the　diseases　of　the　tropics　and　have　now　made　it　possible　for　white　men　to　live　there　safely。　Men　of　affairs　like　Elihu　Root　were　stimulated　to　give　their　talents　to　army　administration。　Fortunately　the　boys　were　brought　north　just　in　time　to　save　their　lives；　and　the　majority；　after　a　recuperation　of　two　or　three　years；　regained　their　normal　health。

The　primary　responsibility　for　this　gamble　with　death　rested　with　those　who　sent　an　expedition　from　the　United　States　to　the　tropics　in　midsummer　when　the　measures　necessary　to　safeguard　its　health　were　not　yet　known。　This　responsibility　rested　immediately　upon　the　American　people　themselves；　all　too　eager　for　a　war　for　which　they　were　not　prepared　and　for　a　speedy　victory　at　all　costs。　For　this　national　impatience　they　had　to　pay　dearly。　The　striking　contrast；　however；　between　the　efficiency　of　the　navy　and　the　lack　of　preparation　on　the　part　of　the　army　shows　that　the　people　as　a　whole　would　have　supported　a　more　thorough　preparation　of　the　army；　had　the　responsible　officials　possessed　sufficient　courage　and　intelligence　to　have　demanded　it；　nor　would　the　people　have　been　unwilling　to　defer　victory　until　autumn；　had　they　been　honestly　informed　of　the　danger　of　tropical　disease　into　which　they　were　sending　the　flower　of　their　youth。　Such　a　postponement　would　not　only　have　meant　better　weather　but　it　would　have　given　time　to　teach　the　new　officers　their　duty　in　safeguarding　the　health　of　their　men　as　far　as　possible；　and　this　precaution　alone　would　have　saved　many　lives。　Owing　to　the　greater　practical　experience　of　the　officers　in　the　regular　regiments；　the　death　rate　among　the　men　in　their　ranks　fell　far　below　that　among　the　volunteers；　even　though　many　of　the　men　with　the　regulars　had　enlisted　after　the　declaration　of　war。　On　the　other　hand；　speed　as　well　as　sanitation　was　an　element　in　the　war；　and　the　soldier　who　was　sacrificed　to　lack　of　preparation　may　be　said　to　have　served　his　country　no　less　than　he　who　died　in　battle。　Strategy　and　diplomacy　in　this　instance　were　enormously　facilitated　by　the　immediate　invasion　of　Cuba；　and　perhaps　the　outcome　justified　the　cost。　The　question　of　relative　values　is　a　difficult　one。

No　such　equation　of　values；　however；　can　hold　the　judgment　in　suspense　in　the　case　of　the　host　of　secondary　errors　that　grew　out　of　the　indolence　of　Secretary　Alger　and　his　worship　of　politics。　Probably　General　Miles　was　mistaken　in　his　charges　concerning　embalmed　beef；　and　possibly　the　canned　beef　was　not　so　bad　as　it　tasted；　but　there　can　be　no　excuse　for　a　Secretary　of　War　who　did　not　consider　it　his　business　to　investigate　the　question　of　proper　rations　for　an　army　in　the　tropics　simply　because　Congress　had；　years　before；　fixed　a　ration　for　use　within　the　United　States。　There　was　no　excuse　for　sending　many　of　the　men　clad　in　heavy　army　woolens。　There　was　no　excuse　for　not　providing　a　sufficient　number　of　surgeons　and　abundant　hospital　service。　There　was　little　excuse　for　the　appointment　of　General　Shafter；　which　was　made　in　part　for　political　reasons。　There　was　no　excuse　for　keeping　at　the　head　of　the　army　administration　General　Nelson　A。　Miles；　with　whom；　whatever　his　abilities；　the　Secretary　of　War　was　unable　to　work。

The　navy　did　not　escape　controversy。　In　fact；　a　war　fought　under　the　eyes　of　hundreds　of　uncensored　newspaper　correspondents　unskilled　in　military　affairs　could　not　fail　to　supply　a　daily　grist　of　scandal　to　an　appreciative　public。　The　controversy　between　Sampson　and　Schley；　however；　grew　out　of　incompatible　personalities　stirred　to　rivalry　by　indiscreet　friends　and　a　quarrelsome　public。　Captain　Sampson　was　chosen　to　command；　and　properly　so；　because　of　his　recognized　abilities。　Commodore　Schley；　a　genial　and　open…hearted　man；　too　much　given　to　impulse；　though　he　outranked　Sampson；　was　put　under　his　command。　Sampson　was　not　gracious　in　his　treatment　of　the　Commodore；　and　ill　feeling　resulted。　When　the　time　came　to　promote　both　officers　for　their　good　conduct；　Secretary　Long　by　recommending　that　Sampson　be　raised　eight　numbers　and　Schley　six；　reversed　their　relative　positions　as　they　had　been　before　the　war。　This　recommendation；　in　itself　proper；　was　sustained　by　the　Senate；　and　all　the　vitality　the　controversy　ever　had　then　disappeared；　though　it　remains　a　bone　of　contention　to　be　gnawed　by　biographers　and　historians。



CHAPTER　XII。　The　Close　Of　The　War

While　the　American　people　were　concentrating　their　attention　upon　the　blockade　of　Santiago　near　their　own　shores；　the　situation　in　the　distant　islands　of　the　Pacific　was　rapidly　becoming　acute。　All　through　June；　Dewey　had　been　maintaining　himself；　with　superb　nerve；　in　Manila　Harbor；　in　the　midst　of　uncertain　neutrals。　A　couple　of　unwieldy　United　States　monitors　were　moving　slowly　to　his　assistance　from　the　one　side；　while　a　superior　Spanish　fleet　was　approaching　from　the　other。　On　the　26th　of　June；　the　Spanish　Admiral　Camara　had　reached　Port　Said；　but　he　was　not　entirely　happy。　Several　of　his　vessels　proved　to　be　in　that　ineffective　condition　which　was　characteristic　of　the　Spanish　Navy。　The　Egyptian　authorities　refused　him　permission　to　refit　his　ships　or　to　coal；　and　the　American　consul　had　with　foresight　bought　up　much　of　the　coal　which　the　Spanish　Admiral　had　hoped　to　secure　and　take　aboard　later　from　colliers。　Nevertheless　the　fleet　passed　through　the　Suez　Canal　and　entered　the　Red　Sea。

Fully　alive　to　the　danger　of　the　situation；　the　Naval　War　Board　gave　orders　on　the　29th　of　June　for　a　squadron　under　Commodore　Watson　to　start　for　the　Spanish　coast　in　hope　of　drawing　Camara　back。

The　alarm　which　had　previously　been　created　on　the　American　coast　by　the　shrouded　approach　of　Cervera　naturally　suggested　that　the　Americans　themselves　might　win　one　of　those　psychological　victories　now　recognized　as　such　an　important　factor　in　modern　warfare。　The　chief　purpose　of　future　operations　was　to　convince　the　Spanish　people　that　they　were　defeated；　and　nothing　would　more　conduce　to　this　result　than　to　bring　war　to　their　doors。　This　was；　moreover；　an　operation　particularly　suited　to　the　conditions　under　which　the　United　States　was　waging　war；　for　publicity　was　here　a　helping　factor。　Admiral　Sampson；　more　intent　on　immediate　business　than　on　psychological　pressure；　was　not　enthusiastically　in　favor　of　the　plan。　Nevertheless　preparation　proceeded　with　that　deliberation　which　in　this　case　was　part　of　the　game；　and　presently　the　shadow　of　an　impending　American　attack　hung　heavy　over　the　coasts　of　Spain。　The　Spanish　Government　at　first　perhaps　considered　the　order　a　bluff　which　the　United　States　would　not　dare　to　carry　out　while　Cervera's　fleet　was　so　near　its　own　shores；　but　with　the　destruction　of　Cervera's　ships　the　plan　became　plainly　possible；　and　on　the　8th　of　July　the　Spanish　Government　ordered　Camara　back　to　parade　his　vessels　before　the　Spanish　cities　to　assure　them　of　protection。

But；　before　Camara　was　called　home；　the　public　were　watching　his　advance　against　the　little　American　fleet　at　Manila；　with　an　anxiety　perhaps　greater　than　Dewey's　own。　Nothing　in　modern　war　equals　in　dramatic　tension　the　deadly；　slow；　inevitable　approach　of　a　fleet　from　one　side　of　the　world　against　its　enemy　on　the　other。　Both　beyond　the　reach　of　friendly　help；　each　all　powerful　until　it　meets　its　f