the prince-第17部分

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aintain　himself　in　such　reputation　that　no　one　can　hope　either　to　deceive　him　or　to　get　round　him。

That　prince　is　highly　esteemed　who　conveys　this　impression　of　himself；　and　he　who　is　highly　esteemed　is　not　easily　conspired　against；　for；　provided　it　is　well　known　that　he　is　an　excellent　man　and　revered　by　his　people；　he　can　only　be　attacked　with　difficulty。　For　this　reason　a　prince　ought　to　have　two　fears；　one　from　within；　on　account　of　his　subjects；　the　other　from　without；　on　account　of　external　powers。　From　the　latter　he　is　defended　by　being　well　armed　and　having　good　allies；　and　if　he　is　well　armed　he　will　have　good　friends；　and　affairs　will　always　remain　quiet　within　when　they　are　quiet　without；　unless　they　should　have　been　already　disturbed　by　conspiracy；　and　even　should　affairs　outside　be　disturbed；　if　he　has　carried　out　his　preparations　and　has　lived　as　I　have　said；　as　long　as　he　does　not　despair；　he　will　resist　every　attack；　as　I　said　Nabis　the　Spartan　did。

But　concerning　his　subjects；　when　affairs　outside　are　disturbed　he　has　only　to　fear　that　they　will　conspire　secretly；　from　which　a　prince　can　easily　secure　himself　by　avoiding　being　hated　and　despised；　and　by　keeping　the　people　satisfied　with　him；　which　it　is　most　necessary　for　him　to　accomplish；　as　I　said　above　at　length。　And　one　of　the　most　efficacious　remedies　that　a　prince　can　have　against　conspiracies　is　not　to　be　hated　and　despised　by　the　people；　for　he　who　conspires　against　a　prince　always　expects　to　please　them　by　his　removal；　but　when　the　conspirator　can　only　look　forward　to　offending　them；　he　will　not　have　the　courage　to　take　such　a　course；　for　the　difficulties　that　confront　a　conspirator　are　infinite。　And　as　experience　shows；　many　have　been　the　conspiracies；　but　few　have　been　successful；　because　he　who　conspires　cannot　act　alone；　nor　can　he　take　a　companion　except　from　those　whom　he　believes　to　be　malcontents；　and　as　soon　as　you　have　opened　your　mind　to　a　malcontent　you　have　given　him　the　material　with　which　to　content　himself；　for　by　denouncing　you　he　can　look　for　every　advantage；　so　that；　seeing　the　gain　from　this　course　to　be　assured；　and　seeing　the　other　to　be　doubtful　and　full　of　dangers；　he　must　be　a　very　rare　friend；　or　a　thoroughly　obstinate　enemy　of　the　prince；　to　keep　faith　with　you。

And；　to　reduce　the　matter　into　a　small　compass；　I　say　that；　on　the　side　of　the　conspirator；　there　is　nothing　but　fear；　jealousy；　prospect　of　punishment　to　terrify　him；　but　on　the　side　of　the　prince　there　is　the　majesty　of　the　principality；　the　laws；　the　protection　of　friends　and　the　state　to　defend　him；　so　that；　adding　to　all　these　things　the　popular　goodwill；　it　is　impossible　that　any　one　should　be　so　rash　as　to　conspire。　For　whereas　in　general　the　conspirator　has　to　fear　before　the　execution　of　his　plot；　in　this　case　he　has　also　to　fear　the　sequel　to　the　crime；　because　on　account　of　it　he　has　the　people　for　an　enemy；　and　thus　cannot　hope　for　any　escape。

Endless　examples　could　be　given　on　this　subject；　but　I　will　be　content　with　one；　brought　to　pass　within　the　memory　of　our　fathers。　Messer　Annibale　Bentivogli；　who　was　prince　in　Bologna　（grandfather　of　the　present　Annibale）；　having　been　murdered　by　the　Canneschi；　who　had　conspired　against　him；　not　one　of　his　family　survived　but　Messer　Giovanni；＇*＇　who　was　in　childhood：　immediately　after　his　assassination　the　people　rose　and　murdered　all　the　Canneschi。　This　sprung　from　the　popular　goodwill　which　the　house　of　Bentivogli　enjoyed　in　those　days　in　Bologna；　which　was　so　great　that；　although　none　remained　there　after　the　death　of　Annibale　who　was　able　to　rule　the　state；　the　Bolognese；　having　information　that　there　was　one　of　the　Bentivogli　family　in　Florence；　who　up　to　that　time　had　been　considered　the　son　of　a　blacksmith；　sent　to　Florence　for　him　and　gave　him　the　government　of　their　city；　and　it　was　ruled　by　him　until　Messer　Giovanni　came　in　due　course　to　the　government。

＇*＇　Giovanni　Bentivogli；　born　in　Bologna　1438；　died　at　Milan　1508。　He　　　　　ruled　Bologna　from　1462　to　1506。　Machiavelli's　strong　condemnation　　　　　of　conspiracies　may　get　its　edge　from　his　own　very　recent　　　　　experience　（February　1513）；　when　he　had　been　arrested　and　tortured　　　　　for　his　alleged　complicity　in　the　Boscoli　conspiracy。

For　this　reason　I　consider　that　a　prince　ought　to　reckon　conspiracies　of　little　account　when　his　people　hold　him　in　esteem；　but　when　it　is　hostile　to　him；　and　bears　hatred　towards　him；　he　ought　to　fear　everything　and　everybody。　And　well…ordered　states　and　wise　princes　have　taken　every　care　not　to　drive　the　nobles　to　desperation；　and　to　keep　the　people　satisfied　and　contented；　for　this　is　one　of　the　most　important　objects　a　prince　can　have。

Among　the　best　ordered　and　governed　kingdoms　of　our　times　is　France；　and　in　it　are　found　many　good　institutions　on　which　depend　the　liberty　and　security　of　the　king；　of　these　the　first　is　the　parliament　and　its　authority；　because　he　who　founded　the　kingdom；　knowing　the　ambition　of　the　nobility　and　their　boldness；　considered　that　a　bit　to　their　mouths　would　be　necessary　to　hold　them　in；　and；　on　the　other　side；　knowing　the　hatred　of　the　people；　founded　in　fear；　against　the　nobles；　he　wished　to　protect　them；　yet　he　was　not　anxious　for　this　to　be　the　particular　care　of　the　king；　therefore；　to　take　away　the　reproach　which　he　would　be　liable　to　from　the　nobles　for　favouring　the　people；　and　from　the　people　for　favouring　the　nobles；　he　set　up　an　arbiter；　who　should　be　one　who　could　beat　down　the　great　and　favour　the　lesser　without　reproach　to　the　king。　Neither　could　you　have　a　better　or　a　more　prudent　arrangement；　or　a　greater　source　of　security　to　the　king　and　kingdom。　From　this　one　can　draw　another　important　conclusion；　that　princes　ought　to　leave　affairs　of　reproach　to　the　management　of　others；　and　keep　those　of　grace　in　their　own　hands。　And　further；　I　consider　that　a　prince　ought　to　cherish　the　nobles；　but　not　so　as　to　make　himself　hated　by　the　people。

It　may　appear；　perhaps；　to　some　who　have　examined　the　lives　and　deaths　of　the　Roman　emperors　that　many　of　them　would　be　an　example　contrary　to　my　opinion；　seeing　that　some　of　them　lived　nobly　and　showed　great　qualities　of　soul；　nevertheless　they　have　lost　their　empire　or　have　been　killed　by　subjects　who　have　conspired　against　them。　Wishing；　therefore；　to　answer　these　objections；　I　will　recall　the　characters　of　some　of　the　emperors；　and　will　show　that　the　causes　of　their　ruin　were　not　different　to　those　alleged　by　me；　at　the　same　time　I　will　only　submit　for　consideration　those　things　that　are　noteworthy　to　him　who　studies　the　affairs　of　those　times。

It　seems　to　me　sufficient　to　take　all　those　emperors　who　succeeded　to　the　empire　from　Marcus　the　philosopher　down　to　Maximinus；　they　were　Marcus　and　his　son　Commodus；　Pertinax；　Julian；　Severus　and　his　son　Antoninus　Caracalla；　Macrinus；　Heliogabalus；　Alexander；　and　Maximinus。

There　is　first　to　note　that；　whereas　in　other　principalities　the　ambition　of　the　nobles　and　the　insolence　of　the　people　only　have　to　be　contended　with；　the　Roman　emperors　had　a　third　difficulty　in　having　to　put　up　with　the　cruelty　and　avarice　of　their　soldiers；　a　matter　so　beset　with　difficulties　that　it　was　the　ruin　of　many；　for　it　was　a　hard　thing　to　give　satisfaction　both　to　soldiers　and　people；　because　the　people　loved　peace；　and　for　this　reason　they　loved　the　unaspiring　prince；　whilst　the　soldiers　loved　the　warlike　prince　who　was　bold；　cruel；　and　rapacious；　which　qualities　they　were　quite　willing　he　should　exercise　upon　the　people；　so　that　they　could　get　double　pay　and　give　vent　to　their　own　greed　and　cruelty。　Hence　it　arose　that　those　emperors　were　always　overthrown　who；　either　by　birth　or　training；　had　no　great　authority；　and　most　of　them；　especially　those　who　came　new　to　the　principality；　recognizing　the　difficulty　of　these　two　opposing　humours；　were　inclined　to　give　satisfaction　to　the　soldiers；　caring　little　about　injuring　the　people。　Which　course　was　necessary；　because；　as　princes　cannot　help　being　hated　by　someone；　they　ought；　in　the　first　place；　to　avoid　being　hated　by　every　one；　and　when　they　cannot　compass　this；　they　ought　to　endeavour　with　the　utmost　diligence　to　avoid　the　hatred　of　the　most　powerful。　Therefore；　those　emperors　who　through　inexperience　had　need　of　special　favour　adhered　more　readily　to　the　soldiers　than　to　the　people；　a　course　which　turned　out　advantageous　to　them　or　not；　accordingly　as　the　prince　knew　how　to　maintain　authority　over　them。

From　these　causes　it　arose　that　Marcus；　Pertinax；　and　Alexander；　being　all　men　of　modest　life；　lovers　of　justice；　enemies　to　cruelty；　humane；　and　benignant；　came　to　a　sad　end　except　Marcus；　he　alone　lived　and　died　honoured；　because　he　had　succeeded　to　the　throne　by　hereditary　title；　and　owed　nothing　either　to　the　soldiers　or　the　people；　and　afterwards；　being　possessed　of　many　virtues　which　made　him　respected；　he　always　kept　both　orders　in　their　places　whilst　he　lived；　and　was　neither　hated　nor　despised。

But　Pertinax　was　created　emperor　against　the　wishes　of　the　soldiers；　who；　being　accustomed　to　live　licentiously　under　Commodus；　could　not　endure　the　honest　life　to　which　Pertinax　wished　to　reduce　them；　thus；　having　given　cause　for　hatred；　to　which