the prince-第21部分

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The　choice　of　servants　is　of　no　little　importance　to　a　prince；　and　they　are　good　or　not　according　to　the　discrimination　of　the　prince。　And　the　first　opinion　which　one　forms　of　a　prince；　and　of　his　understanding；　is　by　observing　the　men　he　has　around　him；　and　when　they　are　capable　and　faithful　he　may　always　be　considered　wise；　because　he　has　known　how　to　recognize　the　capable　and　to　keep　them　faithful。　But　when　they　are　otherwise　one　cannot　form　a　good　opinion　of　him；　for　the　prime　error　which　he　made　was　in　choosing　them。

There　were　none　who　knew　Messer　Antonio　da　Venafro　as　the　servant　of　Pandolfo　Petrucci；　Prince　of　Siena；　who　would　not　consider　Pandolfo　to　be　a　very　clever　man　in　having　Venafro　for　his　servant。　Because　there　are　three　classes　of　intellects：　one　which　comprehends　by　itself；　another　which　appreciates　what　others　comprehended；　and　a　third　which　neither　comprehends　by　itself　nor　by　the　showing　of　others；　the　first　is　the　most　excellent；　the　second　is　good；　the　third　is　useless。　Therefore；　it　follows　necessarily　that；　if　Pandolfo　was　not　in　the　first　rank；　he　was　in　the　second；　for　whenever　one　has　judgment　to　know　good　and　bad　when　it　is　said　and　done；　although　he　himself　may　not　have　the　initiative；　yet　he　can　recognize　the　good　and　the　bad　in　his　servant；　and　the　one　he　can　praise　and　the　other　correct；　thus　the　servant　cannot　hope　to　deceive　him；　and　is　kept　honest。

But　to　enable　a　prince　to　form　an　opinion　of　his　servant　there　is　one　test　which　never　fails；　when　you　see　the　servant　thinking　more　of　his　own　interests　than　of　yours；　and　seeking　inwardly　his　own　profit　in　everything；　such　a　man　will　never　make　a　good　servant；　nor　will　you　ever　be　able　to　trust　him；　because　he　who　has　the　state　of　another　in　his　hands　ought　never　to　think　of　himself；　but　always　of　his　prince；　and　never　pay　any　attention　to　matters　in　which　the　prince　is　not　concerned。

On　the　other　hand；　to　keep　his　servant　honest　the　prince　ought　to　study　him；　honouring　him；　enriching　him；　doing　him　kindnesses；　sharing　with　him　the　honours　and　cares；　and　at　the　same　time　let　him　see　that　he　cannot　stand　alone；　so　that　many　honours　may　not　make　him　desire　more；　many　riches　make　him　wish　for　more；　and　that　many　cares　may　make　him　dread　chances。　When；　therefore；　servants；　and　princes　towards　servants；　are　thus　disposed；　they　can　trust　each　other；　but　when　it　is　otherwise；　the　end　will　always　be　disastrous　for　either　one　or　the　other。



CHAPTER　XXIII

HOW　FLATTERERS　SHOULD　BE　AVOIDED

I　do　not　wish　to　leave　out　an　important　branch　of　this　subject；　for　it　is　a　danger　from　which　princes　are　with　difficulty　preserved；　unless　they　are　very　careful　and　discriminating。　It　is　that　of　flatterers；　of　whom　courts　are　full；　because　men　are　so　self…complacent　in　their　own　affairs；　and　in　a　way　so　deceived　in　them；　that　they　are　preserved　with　difficulty　from　this　pest；　and　if　they　wish　to　defend　themselves　they　run　the　danger　of　falling　into　contempt。　Because　there　is　no　other　way　of　guarding　oneself　from　flatterers　except　letting　men　understand　that　to　tell　you　the　truth　does　not　offend　you；　but　when　every　one　may　tell　you　the　truth；　respect　for　you　abates。

Therefore　a　wise　prince　ought　to　hold　a　third　course　by　choosing　the　wise　men　in　his　state；　and　giving　to　them　only　the　liberty　of　speaking　the　truth　to　him；　and　then　only　of　those　things　of　which　he　inquires；　and　of　none　others；　but　he　ought　to　question　them　upon　everything；　and　listen　to　their　opinions；　and　afterwards　form　his　own　conclusions。　With　these　councillors；　separately　and　collectively；　he　ought　to　carry　himself　in　such　a　way　that　each　of　them　should　know　that；　the　more　freely　he　shall　speak；　the　more　he　shall　be　preferred；　outside　of　these；　he　should　listen　to　no　one；　pursue　the　thing　resolved　on；　and　be　steadfast　in　his　resolutions。　He　who　does　otherwise　is　either　overthrown　by　flatterers；　or　is　so　often　changed　by　varying　opinions　that　he　falls　into　contempt。

I　wish　on　this　subject　to　adduce　a　modern　example。　Fra　Luca；　the　man　of　affairs　to　Maximilian；＇*＇　the　present　emperor；　speaking　of　his　majesty；　said：　He　consulted　with　no　one；　yet　never　got　his　own　way　in　anything。　This　arose　because　of　his　following　a　practice　the　opposite　to　the　above；　for　the　emperor　is　a　secretive　manhe　does　not　communicate　his　designs　to　any　one；　nor　does　he　receive　opinions　on　them。　But　as　in　carrying　them　into　effect　they　become　revealed　and　known；　they　are　at　once　obstructed　by　those　men　whom　he　has　around　him；　and　he；　being　pliant；　is　diverted　from　them。　Hence　it　follows　that　those　things　he　does　one　day　he　undoes　the　next；　and　no　one　ever　understands　what　he　wishes　or　intends　to　do；　and　no　one　can　rely　on　his　resolutions。

＇*＇　Maximilian　I；　born　in　1459；　died　1519；　Emperor　of　the　Holy　Roman　　　　　Empire。　He　married；　first；　Mary；　daughter　of　Charles　the　Bold；　　　　　after　her　death；　Bianca　Sforza；　and　thus　became　involved　in　　　　　Italian　politics。

A　prince；　therefore；　ought　always　to　take　counsel；　but　only　when　he　wishes　and　not　when　others　wish；　he　ought　rather　to　discourage　every　one　from　offering　advice　unless　he　asks　it；　but；　however；　he　ought　to　be　a　constant　inquirer；　and　afterwards　a　patient　listener　concerning　the　things　of　which　he　inquired；　also；　on　learning　that　nay　one；　on　any　consideration；　has　not　told　him　the　truth；　he　should　let　his　anger　be　felt。

And　if　there　are　some　who　think　that　a　prince　who　conveys　an　impression　of　his　wisdom　is　not　so　through　his　own　ability；　but　through　the　good　advisers　that　he　has　around　him；　beyond　doubt　they　are　deceived；　because　this　is　an　axiom　which　never　fails：　that　a　prince　who　is　not　wise　himself　will　never　take　good　advice；　unless　by　chance　he　has　yielded　his　affairs　entirely　to　one　person　who　happens　to　be　a　very　prudent　man。　In　this　case　indeed　he　may　be　well　governed；　but　it　would　not　be　for　long；　because　such　a　governor　would　in　a　short　time　take　away　his　state　from　him。

But　if　a　prince　who　is　not　inexperienced　should　take　counsel　from　more　than　one　he　will　never　get　united　counsels；　nor　will　he　know　how　to　unite　them。　Each　of　the　counsellors　will　think　of　his　own　interests；　and　the　prince　will　not　know　how　to　control　them　or　to　see　through　them。　And　they　are　not　to　found　otherwise；　because　men　will　always　prove　untrue　to　you　unless　they　are　kept　honest　by　constraint。　Therefore　it　must　be　inferred　that　good　counsels；　whencesoever　they　come；　are　born　of　the　wisdom　of　the　prince；　and　not　the　wisdom　of　the　prince　from　good　counsels。



CHAPTER　XXIV

WHY　THE　PRINCES　OF　ITALY　HAVE　LOST　THEIR　STATES

The　previous　suggestions；　carefully　observed；　will　enable　a　new　prince　to　appear　well　established；　and　render　him　at　once　more　secure　and　fixed　in　the　state　than　if　he　had　been　long　seated　there。　For　the　actions　of　a　new　prince　are　more　narrowly　observed　than　those　of　an　hereditary　one；　and　when　they　are　seen　to　be　able　they　gain　more　men　and　bind　far　tighter　than　ancient　blood；　because　men　are　attracted　more　by　the　present　than　by　the　past；　and　when　they　find　the　present　good　they　enjoy　it　and　seek　no　further；　they　will　also　make　the　utmost　defence　of　a　prince　if　he　fails　them　not　in　other　things。　Thus　it　will　be　a　double　glory　for　him　to　have　established　a　new　principality；　and　adorned　and　strengthened　it　with　good　laws；　good　arms；　good　allies；　and　with　a　good　example；　so　will　it　be　a　double　disgrace　to　him　who；　born　a　prince；　shall　lose　his　state　by　want　of　wisdom。

And　if　those　seigniors　are　considered　who　have　lost　their　states　in　Italy　in　our　times；　such　as　the　King　of　Naples；　the　Duke　of　Milan；　and　others；　there　will　be　found　in　them；　firstly；　one　common　defect　in　regard　to　arms　from　the　causes　which　have　been　discussed　at　length；　in　the　next　place；　some　one　of　them　will　be　seen；　either　to　have　had　the　people　hostile；　or　if　he　has　had　the　people　friendly；　he　has　not　known　how　to　secure　the　nobles。　In　the　absence　of　these　defects　states　that　have　power　enough　to　keep　an　army　in　the　field　cannot　be　lost。

Philip　of　Macedon；　not　the　father　of　Alexander　the　Great；　but　he　who　was　conquered　by　Titus　Quintius；　had　not　much　territory　compared　to　the　greatness　of　the　Romans　and　of　Greece　who　attacked　him；　yet　being　a　warlike　man　who　knew　how　to　attract　the　people　and　secure　the　nobles；　he　sustained　the　war　against　his　enemies　for　many　years；　and　if　in　the　end　he　lost　the　dominion　of　some　cities；　nevertheless　he　retained　the　kingdom。

Therefore；　do　not　let　our　princes　accuse　fortune　for　the　loss　of　their　principalities　after　so　many　years'　possession；　but　rather　their　own　sloth；　because　in　quiet　times　they　never　thought　there　could　be　a　change　（it　is　a　common　defect　in　man　not　to　make　any　provision　in　the　calm　against　the　tempest）；　and　when　afterwards　the　bad　times　came　they　thought　of　flight　and　not　of　defending　themselves；　and　they　hoped　that　the　people；　disgusted　with　the　insolence　of　the　conquerors；　would　recall　them。　This　course；　when　others　fail；　may　be　good；　but　it　is　very　bad　to　have　neglected　all　other　expedients　for　that；　since　you　would　never　wish　to　fall　because　you　trusted　to　be　able　to　find　someone　later　on　to　restore　you。　This　again　either　does　not　happen；　or；　if　it　does；　it　will　not　be　for　your　security；　because　that　deli