the prince-第6部分

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ze　them　as　lords　and　hold　them　in　natural　affection。　Those　states　that　are　governed　by　a　prince　and　his　servants　hold　their　prince　in　more　consideration；　because　in　all　the　country　there　is　no　one　who　is　recognized　as　superior　to　him；　and　if　they　yield　obedience　to　another　they　do　it　as　to　a　minister　and　official；　and　they　do　not　bear　him　any　particular　affection。

The　examples　of　these　two　governments　in　our　time　are　the　Turk　and　the　King　of　France。　The　entire　monarchy　of　the　Turk　is　governed　by　one　lord；　the　others　are　his　servants；　and；　dividing　his　kingdom　into　sanjaks；　he　sends　there　different　administrators；　and　shifts　and　changes　them　as　he　chooses。　But　the　King　of　France　is　placed　in　the　midst　of　an　ancient　body　of　lords；　acknowledged　by　their　own　subjects；　and　beloved　by　them；　they　have　their　own　prerogatives；　nor　can　the　king　take　these　away　except　at　his　peril。　Therefore；　he　who　considers　both　of　these　states　will　recognize　great　difficulties　in　seizing　the　state　of　the　Turk；　but；　once　it　is　conquered；　great　ease　in　holding　it。　The　causes　of　the　difficulties　in　seizing　the　kingdom　of　the　Turk　are　that　the　usurper　cannot　be　called　in　by　the　princes　of　the　kingdom；　nor　can　he　hope　to　be　assisted　in　his　designs　by　the　revolt　of　those　whom　the　lord　has　around　him。　This　arises　from　the　reasons　given　above；　for　his　ministers；　being　all　slaves　and　bondmen；　can　only　be　corrupted　with　great　difficulty；　and　one　can　expect　little　advantage　from　them　when　they　have　been　corrupted；　as　they　cannot　carry　the　people　with　them；　for　the　reasons　assigned。　Hence；　he　who　attacks　the　Turk　must　bear　in　mind　that　he　will　find　him　united；　and　he　will　have　to　rely　more　on　his　own　strength　than　on　the　revolt　of　others；　but；　if　once　the　Turk　has　been　conquered；　and　routed　in　the　field　in　such　a　way　that　he　cannot　replace　his　armies；　there　is　nothing　to　fear　but　the　family　of　this　prince；　and；　this　being　exterminated；　there　remains　no　one　to　fear；　the　others　having　no　credit　with　the　people；　and　as　the　conqueror　did　not　rely　on　them　before　his　victory；　so　he　ought　not　to　fear　them　after　it。

The　contrary　happens　in　kingdoms　governed　like　that　of　France；　because　one　can　easily　enter　there　by　gaining　over　some　baron　of　the　kingdom；　for　one　always　finds　malcontents　and　such　as　desire　a　change。　Such　men；　for　the　reasons　given；　can　open　the　way　into　the　state　and　render　the　victory　easy；　but　if　you　wish　to　hold　it　afterwards；　you　meet　with　infinite　difficulties；　both　from　those　who　have　assisted　you　and　from　those　you　have　crushed。　Nor　is　it　enough　for　you　to　have　exterminated　the　family　of　the　prince；　because　the　lords　that　remain　make　themselves　the　heads　of　fresh　movements　against　you；　and　as　you　are　unable　either　to　satisfy　or　exterminate　them；　that　state　is　lost　whenever　time　brings　the　opportunity。

Now　if　you　will　consider　what　was　the　nature　of　the　government　of　Darius；　you　will　find　it　similar　to　the　kingdom　of　the　Turk；　and　therefore　it　was　only　necessary　for　Alexander；　first　to　overthrow　him　in　the　field；　and　then　to　take　the　country　from　him。　After　which　victory；　Darius　being　killed；　the　state　remained　secure　to　Alexander；　for　the　above　reasons。　And　if　his　successors　had　been　united　they　would　have　enjoyed　it　securely　and　at　their　ease；　for　there　were　no　tumults　raised　in　the　kingdom　except　those　they　provoked　themselves。

But　it　is　impossible　to　hold　with　such　tranquillity　states　constituted　like　that　of　France。　Hence　arose　those　frequent　rebellions　against　the　Romans　in　Spain；　France；　and　Greece；　owing　to　the　many　principalities　there　were　in　these　states；　of　which；　as　long　as　the　memory　of　them　endured；　the　Romans　always　held　an　insecure　possession；　but　with　the　power　and　long　continuance　of　the　empire　the　memory　of　them　passed　away；　and　the　Romans　then　became　secure　possessors。　And　when　fighting　afterwards　amongst　themselves；　each　one　was　able　to　attach　to　himself　his　own　parts　of　the　country；　according　to　the　authority　he　had　assumed　there；　and　the　family　of　the　former　lord　being　exterminated；　none　other　than　the　Romans　were　acknowledged。

When　these　things　are　remembered　no　one　will　marvel　at　the　ease　with　which　Alexander　held　the　Empire　of　Asia；　or　at　the　difficulties　which　others　have　had　to　keep　an　acquisition；　such　as　Pyrrhus　and　many　more；　this　is　not　occasioned　by　the　little　or　abundance　of　ability　in　the　conqueror；　but　by　the　want　of　uniformity　in　the　subject　state。



CHAPTER　V

CONCERNING　THE　WAY　TO　GOVERN　CITIES　OR　PRINCIPALITIES　WHICH　LIVED　UNDER　THEIR　OWN　LAWS　BEFORE　THEY　WERE　ANNEXED

Whenever　those　states　which　have　been　acquired　as　stated　have　been　accustomed　to　live　under　their　own　laws　and　in　freedom；　there　are　three　courses　for　those　who　wish　to　hold　them：　the　first　is　to　ruin　them；　the　next　is　to　reside　there　in　person；　the　third　is　to　permit　them　to　live　under　their　own　laws；　drawing　a　tribute；　and　establishing　within　it　an　oligarchy　which　will　keep　it　friendly　to　you。　Because　such　a　government；　being　created　by　the　prince；　knows　that　it　cannot　stand　without　his　friendship　and　interest；　and　does　it　utmost　to　support　him；　and　therefore　he　who　would　keep　a　city　accustomed　to　freedom　will　hold　it　more　easily　by　the　means　of　its　own　citizens　than　in　any　other　way。

There　are；　for　example；　the　Spartans　and　the　Romans。　The　Spartans　held　Athens　and　Thebes；　establishing　there　an　oligarchy；　nevertheless　they　lost　them。　The　Romans；　in　order　to　hold　Capua；　Carthage；　and　Numantia；　dismantled　them；　and　did　not　lose　them。　They　wished　to　hold　Greece　as　the　Spartans　held　it；　making　it　free　and　permitting　its　laws；　and　did　not　succeed。　So　to　hold　it　they　were　compelled　to　dismantle　many　cities　in　the　country；　for　in　truth　there　is　no　safe　way　to　retain　them　otherwise　than　by　ruining　them。　And　he　who　becomes　master　of　a　city　accustomed　to　freedom　and　does　not　destroy　it；　may　expect　to　be　destroyed　by　it；　for　in　rebellion　it　has　always　the　watchword　of　liberty　and　its　ancient　privileges　as　a　rallying　point；　which　neither　time　nor　benefits　will　ever　cause　it　to　forget。　And　whatever　you　may　do　or　provide　against；　they　never　forget　that　name　or　their　privileges　unless　they　are　disunited　or　dispersed；　but　at　every　chance　they　immediately　rally　to　them；　as　Pisa　after　the　hundred　years　she　had　been　held　in　bondage　by　the　Florentines。

But　when　cities　or　countries　are　accustomed　to　live　under　a　prince；　and　his　family　is　exterminated；　they；　being　on　the　one　hand　accustomed　to　obey　and　on　the　other　hand　not　having　the　old　prince；　cannot　agree　in　making　one　from　amongst　themselves；　and　they　do　not　know　how　to　govern　themselves。　For　this　reason　they　are　very　slow　to　take　up　arms；　and　a　prince　can　gain　them　to　himself　and　secure　them　much　more　easily。　But　in　republics　there　is　more　vitality；　greater　hatred；　and　more　desire　for　vengeance；　which　will　never　permit　them　to　allow　the　memory　of　their　former　liberty　to　rest；　so　that　the　safest　way　is　to　destroy　them　or　to　reside　there。



CHAPTER　VI

CONCERNING　NEW　PRINCIPALITIES　WHICH　ARE　ACQUIRED　BY　ONE'S　OWN　ARMS　AND　ABILITY

Let　no　one　be　surprised　if；　in　speaking　of　entirely　new　principalities　as　I　shall　do；　I　adduce　the　highest　examples　both　of　prince　and　of　state；　because　men；　walking　almost　always　in　paths　beaten　by　others；　and　following　by　imitation　their　deeds；　are　yet　unable　to　keep　entirely　to　the　ways　of　others　or　attain　to　the　power　of　those　they　imitate。　A　wise　man　ought　always　to　follow　the　paths　beaten　by　great　men；　and　to　imitate　those　who　have　been　supreme；　so　that　if　his　ability　does　not　equal　theirs；　at　least　it　will　savour　of　it。　Let　him　act　like　the　clever　archers　who；　designing　to　hit　the　mark　which　yet　appears　too　far　distant；　and　knowing　the　limits　to　which　the　strength　of　their　bow　attains；　take　aim　much　higher　than　the　mark；　not　to　reach　by　their　strength　or　arrow　to　so　great　a　height；　but　to　be　able　with　the　aid　of　so　high　an　aim　to　hit　the　mark　they　wish　to　reach。

I　say；　therefore；　that　in　entirely　new　principalities；　where　there　is　a　new　prince；　more　or　less　difficulty　is　found　in　keeping　them；　accordingly　as　there　is　more　or　less　ability　in　him　who　has　acquired　the　state。　Now；　as　the　fact　of　becoming　a　prince　from　a　private　station　presupposes　either　ability　or　fortune；　it　is　clear　that　one　or　other　of　these　things　will　mitigate　in　some　degree　many　difficulties。　Nevertheless；　he　who　has　relied　least　on　fortune　is　established　the　strongest。　Further；　it　facilitates　matters　when　the　prince；　having　no　other　state；　is　compelled　to　reside　there　in　person。

But　to　come　to　those　who；　by　their　own　ability　and　not　through　fortune；　have　risen　to　be　princes；　I　say　that　Moses；　Cyrus；　Romulus；　Theseus；　and　such　like　are　the　most　excellent　examples。　And　although　one　may　not　discuss　Moses；　he　having　been　a　mere　executor　of　the　will　of　God；　yet　he　ought　to　be　admired；　if　only　for　that　favour　which　made　him　worthy　to　speak　with　God。　But　in　considering　Cyrus　and　others　who　have　acquired　or　founded　kingdoms；　all　will　be　found　admirable；　and　if　their　particular　deeds　and　conduct　shall　be　considered；　they　will　not　be　found　inferior　to　those　of　Moses；　although　he　had　so　great　a　preceptor。　And　in　examining　their　actions　and　lives　one　cannot　see　that　they　owed　anything