the spirit of laws-第133部分

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　an　affair　of　courtesy　and　loyalty；　and　there　is　no　such　thing　as　evasion　or　delay。　Hence；　I　imagine；　arose　the　custom　still　followed　in　England　of　obliging　the　jury　to　be　all　unanimous　in　their　verdict　in　cases　relating　to　life　and　death。

Judgment　was　therefore　given；　according　to　the　opinion　of　the　majority；　and　if　there　was　an　equal　division；　sentence　was　pronounced；　in　criminal　cases；　in　favour　of　the　accused；　in　cases　of　debt；　in　favour　of　the　debtor；　and　in　cases　of　inheritance；　in　favour　of　the　defendant。

Défontaines　observes＇188＇　that　a　peer　could　not　excuse　himself　by　saying　that　he　would　not　sit　in　court　if　there　were　only　four；＇189＇　or　if　the　whole　number；　or　at　least　the　wisest　part；　were　not　present。　This　is　just　as　if　he　were　to　say；　in　the　heat　of　an　engagement；　that　he　would　not　assist　his　lord　because　he　had　not　all　his　vassals　with　him。　But　it　was　the　lord's　business　to　cause　his　court　to　be　respected；　and　to　choose　the　bravest　and　most　knowing　of　his　tenants。　This　I　mention；　in　order　to　show　the　duty　of　vassals；　which　was　to　fight；　and　to　give　judgment：　and　such；　indeed；　was　this　duty；　that　to　give　judgment　was　all　the　same　as　to　fight。

It　was　lawful　for　a　lord；　who　went　to　law　with　his　vassal　in　his　own　court；　and　was　cast；　to　challenge　one　of　his　tenants　with　false　judgment。　But　as　the　latter　owed　a　respect　to　his　lord　for　the　fealty　he　had　vowed；　and　the　lord；　on　the　other　hand；　owed　benevolence　to　his　vassal　for　the　fealty　accepted；　it　was　customary　to　make　a　distinction　between　the　lord's　affirming　in　general　that　the　judgment　was　false　and　unjust；＇190＇　and　imputing　personal　prevarications　to　his　tenant。＇191＇　In　the　former　case　he　affronted　his　own　court；　and　in　some　measure　himself；　so　that　there　was　no　room　for　pledges　of　battle。　But　there　was　room　in　the　latter；　because　he　attacked　his　vassal's　honour；　and　the　person　overcome　was　deprived　of　life　and　property；　in　order　to　maintain　the　public　tranquillity。

This　distinction；　which　was　necessary　in　that　particular　case；　had　afterwards　a　greater　extent。　Beaumanoir　says　that　when　the　challenger　of　false　judgment　attacked　one　of　the　peers　by　personal　imputation；　battle　ensued；　but　if　he　attacked　only　the　judgment；　the　peer　challenged　was　at　liberty　to　determine　the　dispute　either　by　battle　or　by　law。＇192＇　But　as　the　prevailing　spirit　in　Beaumanoir's　time　was　to　restrain　the　usage　of　judicial　combats；　and　as　this　liberty；　which　had　been　granted　to　the　peer　challenged；　of　defending　the　judgment　by　combat　or　not　is　equally　contrary　to　the　ideas　of　honour　established　in　those　days；　and　to　the　obligation　the　vassal　lay　under　of　defending　his　lord's　jurisdiction；　I　am　apt　to　think　that　this　distinction　of　Beaumanoir's　was　a　novelty　in　French　jurisprudence。

I　would　not　have　it　thought　that　all　appeals　of　false　judgment　were　decided　by　battle；　it　fared　with　this　appeal　as　with　all　others。　The　reader　may　recollect　the　exceptions　mentioned　in　the　25th　chapter。　Here　it　was　the　business　of　the　superior　court　to　examine　whether　it　was　proper　to　withdraw　the　pledges　of　battle　or　not。

There　could　be　no　appeal　of　false　judgment　against　the　king's　court；　because；　as　there　was　no　one　equal　to　the　king；　no　one　could　challenge　him；　and　as　the　king　had　no　superior；　none　could　appeal　from　his　court。

This　fundamental　regulation；　which　was　necessary　as　a　political　law；　diminished　also　as　a　civil　law　the　abuses　of　the　judicial　proceedings　of　those　times。　When　a　lord　was　afraid　that　his　court　would　be　challenged　with　false　judgment；　or　perceived　that　they　were　determined　to　challenge；　if　the　interests　of　justice　required　that　it　should　not　be　challenged；　he　might　demand　from　the　king's　court　men　whose　judgment　could　not　be　set　aside。＇193＇　Thus　King　Philip；　says　Défontaines；＇194＇　sent　his　whole　council　to　judge　an　affair　in　the　court　of　the　Abbot　of　Corbey。

But　if　the　lord　could　not　have　judges　from　the　king；　he　might　remove　his　court　into　the　king's；　if　he　held　immediately　of　him；　and　if　there　were　intermediate　lords；　he　had　recourse　to　his　suzerain；　removing　from　one　lord　to　another　till　he　came　to　the　sovereign。

Thus；　notwithstanding　they　had　in　those　days　neither　the　practice　nor　even　the　idea　of　our　modern　appeals；　yet　they　had　recourse　to　the　king；　who　was　the　source　whence　all　those　rivers　flowed；　and　the　sea　into　which　they　returned。

28。　Of　the　Appeal　of　Default　of　Justice。　The　appeal　of　default　of　justice　was；　when　the　court　of　a　particular　lord　deferred；　evaded；　or　refused　to　do　justice　to　the　parties。

During　the　time　of　our　princes　of　the　second　race；　though　the　count　had　several　officers　under　him；　their　person　was　subordinate；　but　not　their　jurisdiction。　These　officers　in　their　court　days；　assizes；　or　Placita；　gave　judgment　in　the　last　resort　as　the　count　himself；　all　the　difference　consisted　in　the　division　of　the　jurisdiction。　For　instance；　the　count　had　the　power　of　condemning　to　death；　of　judging　of　liberty；　and　of　the　restitution　of　goods；　which　the　centenarii　had　not。＇195＇

For　the　same　reason　there　were　greater　cases　which　were　reserved　to　the　king；　namely；　those　which　directly　concerned　the　political　order　of　the　state。＇196＇　Such　were　the　disputes　between　bishops；　abbots；　counts；　and　other　grandees；　which　were　determined　by　the　king　together　with　the　great　vassals。＇197＇

What　some　authors　have　advanced；　namely；　that　an　appeal　lay　from　the　count　to　the　king's　commissary；　or　Missus　Dominicus；　is　not　well…grounded。　The　count　and　the　Missus　had　an　equal　jurisdiction；　independent　of　each　other。＇198＇　The　whole　difference　was　that　the　Missus　held　his　Placita；　or　assizes；　four　months　in　the　year；＇199＇　and　the　count　the　other　eight。

If　a　person；　who　had　been　condemned　at　an　assize；　demanded　to　have　his　cause　tried　over　again；　and　was　afterwards　cast；　he　paid　a　fine　of　fifteen　sous；　or　received　fifteen　blows　from　the　judges　who　had　decided　the　affair。＇200＇

When　the　counts；　or　the　king's　commissaries　did　not　find　themselves　able　to　bring　the　great　lords　to　reason；　they　made　them　give　bail　or　security＇201＇　that　they　would　appear　in　the　king's　court：　this　was　to　try　the　cause；　and　not　to　rejudge　it。　I　find　in　the　capitulary　of　Metz＇202＇　a　law　by　which　the　appeal　of　false　judgment　to　the　king's　court　is　established；　and　all　other　kinds　of　appeal　are　proscribed　and　punished。

If　they　refused　to　submit　to　the　judgment　of　the　sheriffs＇203＇　and　made　no　complaint；　they　were　imprisoned　till　they　had　submitted；　but　if　they　complained；　they　were　conducted　under　a　proper　guard　before　the　king；　and　the　affair　was　examined　in　his　court。

There　could　be　hardly　any　room　then　for　an　appeal　of　default　of　justice。　For　instead　of　its　being　usual　in　those　days　to　complain　that　the　counts　and　others　who　had　a　right　of　holding　assizes　were　not　exact　in　discharging　this　duty；＇204＇　it　was　a　general　complaint　that　they　were　too　exact。　Hence　we　find　such　numbers　of　ordinances；　by　which　the　counts　and　all　other　officers　of　justice　are　forbidden　to　hold　their　assizes　above　thrice　a　year。　It　was　not　so　necessary　to　chastise　their　indolence；　as　to　check　their　activity。

But；　after　an　infinite　number　of　petty　lordships　had　been　formed；　and　different　degrees　of　vassalage　established；　the　neglect　of　certain　vassals　in　holding　their　courts　gave　rise　to　this　kind　of　appeal；＇205＇　especially　as　very　considerable　profits　accrued　to　the　lord　paramount　from　the　several　fines。

As　the　custom　of　judicial　combats　gained　every　day　more　ground；　there　were　places；　cases；　and　times；　in　which　it　was　difficult　to　assemble　the　peers；　and　consequently　in　which　justice　was　delayed。　The　appeal　of　default　of　justice　was　therefore　introduced；　an　appeal　that　has　been　often　a　remarkable　era　in　our　history；　because　most　of　the　wars　of　those　days　were　imputed　to　a　violation　of　the　political　law；　as　the　cause；　or　at　least　the　pretence；　of　our　modern　wars　is　the　infringement　of　the　laws　of　nations。

Beaumanoir　says＇206＇　that；　in　case　of　default　of　justice；　battle　was　not　allowed：　the　reasons　are　these：　1。　They　could　not　challenge　the　lord　himself；　because　of　the　respect　due　to　his　person；　neither　could　they　challenge　the　lord's　peers；　because　the　case　was　clear；　and　they　had　only　to　reckon　the　days　of　the　summons；　or　of　the　other　delays；　there　had　been　no　judgment　passed；　consequently　there　could　be　no　appeal　of　false　judgment：　in　fine；　the　crime　of　the　peers　offended　the　lord　as　well　as　the　party；　and　it　was　against　rule　that　there　should　be　battle　between　the　lord　and　his　peers。

But　as　the　default　was　proved　by　witnesses　before　the　superior　court；＇207＇　the　witnesses　might　be　challenged；　and　then　neither　the　lord　nor　his　court　were　offended。

In　case　the　default　was　owing　to　the　lord's　tenants　or　peers；　who　had　delayed　to　administer　justice；　or　had　avoided　giving　judgment　after　past　delays；　then　these　peers　were　appealed　of　default　of　justice　before　the　paramount；　and　if　they　were　cast；　they　paid　a　fine　to　their　lord。＇208＇　The　latter　could　not　give　them　any　assistance；　on　the　contrary；　he　seized　their　fief；　till　they　had　each　paid　a　fine　of　sixty　livres。

2。　When　the　default　was　owing　to　the　lord；　which　was　the　case　whenever　there　happened　not　to　be　a　sufficient　number　of　peers　in　hi