the spirit of laws-第42部分

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8。　See　Pufendorff's　Universal　History。

9。　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　vii。

10。　See　Arrian；　De　Expedit。　Alex。；　i。

11。　Ibid。

12。　Ibid。

13。　Ibid。；　iii。

14。　This　was　Aristotle's　advice。　Plutarch；　Of　the　Fortune　and　Virtue　of　Alexander。

15。　Arrian；　De　Expedit。　Alex。；　vii。

16。　See　the　Law　of　the　Burgundians；　tit。　12；　art。　5。

17。　See　the　Law　of　the　Visigoths；　iii；　tit。　1；　§　1；　which　abrogates　the　ancient　law　that　had　more　regard；　it　says；　to　the　difference　of　nations　than　to　that　of　people's　conditions。

18。　See　the　Law　of　the　Lombards；　ii；　tit。　7；　§§　1；　2。

19。　The　kings　of　Syria；　abandoning　the　plan　laid　down　by　the　founder　of　the　empire；　resolved　to　oblige　the　Jews　to　conform　to　the　manners　of　the　Greeks　　a　resolution　that　gave　the　most　terrible　shock　to　their　government。

20。　See　Arrian；　De　Expedit。　Alex。；　iii；　and　others。

21。　Ibid。

22。　Ibid。；　vii。

23。　Tacitus；　Life　of　Agricola；　14。




Book　XI。　Of　the　Laws　Which　Establish　Political　Liberty；　with　Regard　to　the　Constitution

1。　A　general　Idea。　I　make　a　distinction　between　the　laws　that　establish　political　liberty；　as　it　relates　to　the　constitution；　and　those　by　which　it　is　established；　as　it　relates　to　the　citizen。　The　former　shall　be　the　subject　of　this　book；　the　latter　I　shall　examine　in　the　next。

2。　Different　Significations　of　the　word　Liberty。　There　is　no　word　that　admits　of　more　various　significations；　and　has　made　more　varied　impressions　on　the　human　mind；　than　that　of　liberty。　Some　have　taken　it　as　a　means　of　deposing　a　person　on　whom　they　had　conferred　a　tyrannical　authority；　others　for　the　power　of　choosing　a　superior　whom　they　are　obliged　to　obey；　others　for　the　right　of　bearing　arms；　and　of　being　thereby　enabled　to　use　violence；　others；　in　fine；　for　the　privilege　of　being　governed　by　a　native　of　their　own　country；　or　by　their　own　laws。＇1＇　A　certain　nation　for　a　long　time　thought　liberty　consisted　in　the　privilege　of　wearing　a　long　beard。＇2＇　Some　have　annexed　this　name　to　one　form　of　government　exclusive　of　others：　those　who　had　a　republican　taste　applied　it　to　this　species　of　polity；　those　who　liked　a　monarchical　state　gave　it　to　monarchy。＇3＇　Thus　they　have　all　applied　the　name　of　liberty　to　the　government　most　suitable　to　their　own　customs　and　inclinations：　and　as　in　republics　the　people　have　not　so　constant　and　so　present　a　view　of　the　causes　of　their　misery；　and　as　the　magistrates　seem　to　act　only　in　conformity　to　the　laws；　hence　liberty　is　generally　said　to　reside　in　republics；　and　to　be　banished　from　monarchies。　In　fine；　as　in　democracies　the　people　seem　to　act　almost　as　they　please；　this　sort　of　government　has　been　deemed　the　most　free；　and　the　power　of　the　people　has　been　confounded　with　their　liberty。

3。　In　what　Liberty　consists。　It　is　true　that　in　democracies　the　people　seem　to　act　as　they　please；　but　political　liberty　does　not　consist　in　an　unlimited　freedom。　In　governments；　that　is；　in　societies　directed　by　laws；　liberty　can　consist　only　in　the　power　of　doing　what　we　ought　to　will；　and　in　not　being　constrained　to　do　what　we　ought　not　to　will。

We　must　have　continually　present　to　our　minds　the　difference　between　independence　and　liberty。　Liberty　is　a　right　of　doing　whatever　the　laws　permit；　and　if　a　citizen　could　do　what　they　forbid　he　would　be　no　longer　possessed　of　liberty；　because　all　his　fellow…citizens　would　have　the　same　power。

4。　The　same　Subject　continued。　Democratic　and　aristocratic　states　are　not　in　their　own　nature　free。　Political　liberty　is　to　be　found　only　in　moderate　governments；　and　even　in　these　it　is　not　always　found。　It　is　there　only　when　there　is　no　abuse　of　power。　But　constant　experience　shows　us　that　every　man　invested　with　power　is　apt　to　abuse　it；　and　to　carry　his　authority　as　far　as　it　will　go。　Is　it　not　strange；　though　true；　to　say　that　virtue　itself　has　need　of　limits？

To　prevent　this　abuse；　it　is　necessary　from　the　very　nature　of　things　that　power　should　be　a　check　to　power。　A　government　may　be　so　constituted；　as　no　man　shall　be　compelled　to　do　things　to　which　the　law　does　not　oblige　him；　nor　forced　to　abstain　from　things　which　the　law　permits。

5。　Of　the　End　or　View　of　different　Governments。　Though　all　governments　have　the　same　general　end；　which　is　that　of　preservation；　yet　each　has　another　particular　object。　Increase　of　dominion　was　the　object　of　Rome；　war；　that　of　Sparta；　religion；　that　of　the　Jewish　laws；　commerce；　that　of　Marseilles；　public　tranquillity；　that　of　the　laws　of　China：＇4＇　navigation；　that　of　the　laws　of　Rhodes；　natural　liberty；　that　of　the　policy　of　the　Savages；　in　general；　the　pleasures　of　the　prince；　that　of　despotic　states；　that　of　monarchies；　the　prince's　and　the　kingdom's　glory；　the　independence　of　individuals　is　the　end　aimed　at　by　the　laws　of　Poland；　thence　results　the　oppression　of　the　whole。＇5＇

One　nation　there　is　also　in　the　world　that　has　for　the　direct　end　of　its　constitution　political　liberty。　We　shall　presently　examine　the　principles　on　which　this　liberty　is　founded；　if　they　are　sound；　liberty　will　appear　in　its　highest　perfection。

To　discover　political　liberty　in　a　constitution；　no　great　labour　is　requisite。　If　we　are　capable　of　seeing　it　where　it　exists；　it　is　soon　found；　and　we　need　not　go　far　in　search　of　it。

6。　Of　the　Constitution　of　England。　In　every　government　there　are　three　sorts　of　power：　the　legislative；　the　executive　in　respect　to　things　dependent　on　the　law　of　nations；　and　the　executive　in　regard　to　matters　that　depend　on　the　civil　law。

By　virtue　of　the　first；　the　prince　or　magistrate　enacts　temporary　or　perpetual　laws；　and　amends　or　abrogates　those　that　have　been　already　enacted。　By　the　second；　he　makes　peace　or　war；　sends　or　receives　embassies；　establishes　the　public　security；　and　provides　against　invasions。　By　the　third；　he　punishes　criminals；　or　determines　the　disputes　that　arise　between　individuals。　The　latter　we　shall　call　the　judiciary　power；　and　the　other　simply　the　executive　power　of　the　state。

The　political　liberty　of　the　subject　is　a　tranquillity　of　mind　arising　from　the　opinion　each　person　has　of　his　safety。　In　order　to　have　this　liberty；　it　is　requisite　the　government　be　so　constituted　as　one　man　need　not　be　afraid　of　another。

When　the　legislative　and　executive　powers　are　united　in　the　same　person；　or　in　the　same　body　of　magistrates；　there　can　be　no　liberty；　because　apprehensions　may　arise；　lest　the　same　monarch　or　senate　should　enact　tyrannical　laws；　to　execute　them　in　a　tyrannical　manner。

Again；　there　is　no　liberty；　if　the　judiciary　power　be　not　separated　from　the　legislative　and　executive。　Were　it　joined　with　the　legislative；　the　life　and　liberty　of　the　subject　would　be　exposed　to　arbitrary　control；　for　the　judge　would　be　then　the　legislator。　Were　it　joined　to　the　executive　power；　the　judge　might　behave　with　violence　and　oppression。

There　would　be　an　end　of　everything；　were　the　same　man　or　the　same　body；　whether　of　the　nobles　or　of　the　people；　to　exercise　those　three　powers；　that　of　enacting　laws；　that　of　executing　the　public　resolutions；　and　of　trying　the　causes　of　individuals。

Most　kingdoms　in　Europe　enjoy　a　moderate　government　because　the　prince　who　is　invested　with　the　two　first　powers　leaves　the　third　to　his　subjects。　In　Turkey；　where　these　three　powers　are　united　in　the　Sultan's　person；　the　subjects　groan　under　the　most　dreadful　oppression。

In　the　republics　of　Italy；　where　these　three　powers　are　united；　there　is　less　liberty　than　in　our　monarchies。　Hence　their　government　is　obliged　to　have　recourse　to　as　violent　methods　for　its　support　as　even　that　of　the　Turks；　witness　the　state　inquisitors；＇6＇　and　the　lion's　mouth　into　which　every　informer　may　at　all　hours　throw　his　written　accusations。

In　what　a　situation　must　the　poor　subject　be　in　those　republics！　The　same　body　of　magistrates　are　possessed；　as　executors　of　the　laws；　of　the　whole　power　they　have　given　themselves　in　quality　of　legislators。　They　may　plunder　the　state　by　their　general　determinations；　and　as　they　have　likewise　the　judiciary　power　in　their　hands；　every　private　citizen　may　be　ruined　by　their　particular　decisions。

The　whole　power　is　here　united　in　one　body；　and　though　there　is　no　external　pomp　that　indicates　a　despotic　sway；　yet　the　people　feel　the　effects　of　it　every　moment。

Hence　it　is　that　many　of　the　princes　of　Europe；　whose　aim　has　been　levelled　at　arbitrary　power；　have　constantly　set　out　with　uniting　in　their　own　persons　all　the　branches　of　magistracy；　and　all　the　great　offices　of　state。

I　allow　indeed　that　the　mere　hereditary　aristocracy　of　the　Italian　republics　does　not　exactly　answer　to　the　despotic　power　of　the　Eastern　princes。　The　number　of　magistrates　sometimes　moderates　the　power　of　the　magistracy；　the　whole　body　of　the　nobles　do　not　always　concur　in　the　same　design；　and　different　tribunals　are　erected；　that　temper　each　other。　Thus　at　Venice　tlie　legislative　power　is　in　the　council；　the　executive　in　the　pregadi；　and　the　judiciary　in　the　quarantia。　But　the　mischief　is；　that　these　different　tribunals　are　composed　of　magistrates　all　belonging　to　the　same　body；　which　constitutes　almost　one　and　the　same　power。

The　judiciary　power　ought　not　to　be　given　to　a　standing　senate；　it　should　be　exercised　by