the spirit of laws-第43部分

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The　judiciary　power　ought　not　to　be　given　to　a　standing　senate；　it　should　be　exercised　by　persons　taken　from　the　body　of　the　people＇7＇　at　certain　times　of　the　year；　and　consistently　with　a　form　and　manner　prescribed　by　law；　in　order　to　erect　a　tribunal　that　should　last　only　so　long　as　necessity　requires。

By　this　method　the　judicial　power；　so　terrible　to　mankind；　not　being　annexed　to　any　particular　state　or　profession；　becomes；　as　it　were；　invisible。　People　have　not　then　the　judges　continually　present　to　their　view；　they　fear　the　office；　but　not　the　magistrate。

In　accusations　of　a　deep　and　criminal　nature；　it　is　proper　the　person　accused　should　have　the　privilege　of　choosing；　in　some　measure；　his　judges；　in　concurrence　with　the　law；　or　at　least　he　should　have　a　right　to　except　against　so　great　a　number　that　the　remaining　part　may　be　deemed　his　own　choice。

The　other　two　powers　may　be　given　rather　to　magistrates　or　permanent　bodies；　because　they　are　not　exercised　on　any　private　subject；　one　being　no　more　than　the　general　will　of　the　state；　and　the　other　the　execution　of　that　general　will。

But　though　the　tribunals　ought　not　to　be　fixed；　the　judgments　ought；　and　to　such　a　degree　as　to　be　ever　conformable　to　the　letter　of　the　law。　Were　they　to　be　the　private　opinion　of　the　judge；　people　would　then　live　in　society；　without　exactly　knowing　the　nature　of　their　obligations。

The　judges　ought　likewise　to　be　of　the　same　rank　as　the　accused；　or；　in　other　words；　his　peers；　to　the　end　that　he　may　not　imagine　he　is　fallen　into　the　hands　of　persons　inclined　to　treat　him　with　rigour。

If　the　legislature　leaves　the　executive　power　in　possession　of　a　right　to　imprison　those　subjects　who　can　give　security　for　their　good　behaviour；　there　is　an　end　of　liberty；　unless　they　are　taken　up；　in　order　to　answer　without　delay　to　a　capital　crime；　in　which　case　they　are　really　free；　being　subject　only　to　the　power　of　the　law。

But　should　the　legislature　think　itself　in　danger　by　some　secret　conspiracy　against　the　state；　or　by　a　correspondence　with　a　foreign　enemy；　it　might　authorise　the　executive　power；　for　a　short　and　limited　time；　to　imprison　suspected　persons；　who　in　that　case　would　lose　their　liberty　only　for　a　while；　to　preserve　it　for　ever。

And　this　is　the　only　reasonable　method　that　can　be　substituted　to　the　tyrannical　magistracy　of　the　Ephori；　and　to　the　state　inquisitors　of　Venice；　who　are　also　despotic。

As　in　a　country　of　liberty；　every　man　who　is　supposed　a　free　agent　ought　to　be　his　own　governor；　the　legislative　power　should　reside　in　the　whole　body　of　the　people。　But　since　this　is　impossible　in　large　states；　and　in　small　ones　is　subject　to　many　inconveniences；　it　is　fit　the　people　should　transact　by　their　representatives　what　they　cannot　transact　by　themselves。

The　inhabitants　of　a　particular　town　are　much　better　acquainted　with　its　wants　and　interests　than　with　those　of　other　places；　and　are　better　judges　of　the　capacity　of　their　neighbours　than　of　that　of　the　rest　of　their　countrymen。　The　members；　therefore；　of　the　legislature　should　not　be　chosen　from　the　general　body　of　the　nation；　but　it　is　proper　that　in　every　considerable　place　a　representative　should　be　elected　by　the　inhabitants。＇8＇

The　great　advantage　of　representatives　is；　their　capacity　of　discussing　public　affairs。　For　this　the　people　collectively　are　extremely　unfit；　which　is　one　of　the　chief　inconveniences　of　a　democracy。

It　is　not　at　all　necessary　that　the　representatives　who　have　received　a　general　instruction　from　their　constituents　should　wait　to　be　directed　on　each　particular　affair；　as　is　practised　in　the　diets　of　Germany。　True　it　is　that　by　this　way　of　proceeding　the　speeches　of　the　deputies　might　with　greater　propriety　be　called　the　voice　of　the　nation；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　this　would　occasion　infinite　delays；　would　give　each　deputy　a　power　of　controlling　the　assembly；　and；　on　the　most　urgent　and　pressing　occasions；　the　wheels　of　government　might　be　stopped　by　the　caprice　of　a　single　person。

When　the　deputies；　as　Mr。　Sidney　well　observes；　represent　a　body　of　people；　as　in　Holland；　they　ought　to　be　accountable　to　their　constituents；　but　it　is　a　different　thing　in　England；　where　they　are　deputed　by　boroughs。

All　the　inhabitants　of　the　several　districts　ought　to　have　a　right　of　voting　at　the　election　of　a　representative；　except　such　as　are　in　so　mean　a　situation　as　to　be　deemed　to　have　no　will　of　their　own。

One　great　fault　there　was　in　most　of　the　ancient　republics；　that　the　people　had　a　right　to　active　resolutions；　such　as　require　some　execution；　a　thing　of　which　they　are　absolutely　incapable。　They　ought　to　have　no　share　in　the　government　but　for　the　choosing　of　representatives；　which　is　within　their　reach。　For　though　few　can　tell　the　exact　degree　of　men's　capacities；　yet　there　are　none　but　are　capable　of　knowing　in　general　whether　the　person　they　choose　is　better　qualified　than　most　of　his　neighbours。

Neither　ought　the　representative　body　to　be　chosen　for　the　executive　part　of　government；　for　which　it　is　not　so　fit；　but　for　the　enacting　of　laws；　or　to　see　whether　the　laws　in　being　are　duly　executed；　a　thing　suited　to　their　abilities；　and　which　none　indeed　but　themselves　can　properly　perform。

In　such　a　state　there　are　always　persons　distinguished　by　their　birth；　riches；　or　honours：　but　were　they　to　be　confounded　with　the　common　people；　and　to　have　only　the　weight　of　a　single　vote　like　the　rest；　the　common　liberty　would　be　their　slavery；　and　they　would　have　no　interest　in　supporting　it；　as　most　of　the　popular　resolutions　would　be　against　them。　The　share　they　have；　therefore；　in　the　legislature　ought　to　be　proportioned　to　their　other　advantages　in　the　state；　which　happens　only　when　they　form　a　body　that　has　a　right　to　check　the　licentiousness　of　the　people；　as　the　people　have　a　right　to　oppose　any　encroachment　of　theirs。　

The　legislative　power　is　therefore　committed　to　the　body　of　the　nobles；　and　to　that　which　represents　the　people；　each　having　their　assemblies　and　deliberations　apart；　each　their　separate　views　and　interests。

Of　the　three　powers　above　mentioned；　the　judiciary　is　in　some　measure　next　to　nothing：　there　remain；　therefore；　only　two；　and　as　these　have　need　of　a　regulating　power　to　moderate　them；　the　part　of　the　legislative　body　composed　of　the　nobility　is　extremely　proper　for　this　purpose。

The　body　of　the　nobility　ought　to　be　hereditary。　In　the　first　place　it　is　so　in　its　own　nature；　and　in　the　next　there　must　be　a　considerable　interest　to　preserve　its　privileges　　privileges　that　in　themselves　are　obnoxious　to　popular　envy；　and　of　course　in　a　free　state　are　always　in　danger。

But　as　a　hereditary　power　might　be　tempted　to　pursue　its　own　particular　interests；　and　forget　those　of　the　people；　it　is　proper　that　where　a　singular　advantage　may　be　gained　by　corrupting　the　nobility；　as　in　the　laws　relating　to　the　supplies；　they　should　have　no　other　share　in　the　legislation　than　the　power　of　rejecting；　and　not　that　of　resolving。

By　the　power　of　resolving　I　mean　the　right　of　ordaining　by　their　own　authority；　or　of　amending　what　has　been　ordained　by　others。　By　the　power　of　rejecting　I　would　be　understood　to　mean　the　right　of　annulling　a　resolution　taken　by　another；　which　was　the　power　of　the　tribunes　at　Rome。　And　though　the　person　possessed　of　the　privilege　of　rejecting　may　likewise　have　the　right　of　approving；　yet　this　approbation　passes　for　no　more　than　a　declaration　that　he　intends　to　make　no　use　of　his　privilege　of　rejecting；　and　is　derived　from　that　very　privilege。

The　executive　power　ought　to　be　in　the　hands　of　a　monarch；　because　this　branch　of　government；　having　need　of　despatch；　is　better　administered　by　one　than　by　many：　on　the　other　hand；　whatever　depends　on　the　legislative　power　is　oftentimes　better　regulated　by　many　than　by　a　single　person。

But　if　there　were　no　monarch；　and　the　executive　power　should　be　committed　to　a　certain　number　of　persons　selected　from　the　legislative　body；　there　would　be　an　end　then　of　liberty；　by　reason　the　two　powers　would　be　united；　as　the　same　persons　would　sometimes　possess；　and　would　be　always　able　to　possess；　a　share　in　both。

Were　the　legislative　body　to　be　a　considerable　time　without　meeting；　this　would　likewise　put　an　end　to　liberty。　For　of　two　things　one　would　naturally　follow：　either　that　there　would　be　no　longer　any　legislative　resolutions；　and　then　the　state　would　fall　into　anarchy；　or　that　these　resolutions　would　be　taken　by　the　executive　power；　which　would　render　it　absolute。

It　would　be　needless　for　the　legislative　body　to　continue　always　assembled。　This　would　be　troublesome　to　the　representatives；　and；　moreover；　would　cut　out　too　much　work　for　the　executive　power；　so　as　to　take　off　its　attention　to　its　office；　and　oblige　it　to　think　only　of　defending　its　own　prerogatives；　and　the　right　it　has　to　execute。

Again；　were　the　legislative　body　to　be　always　assembled；　it　might　happen　to　be　kept　up　only　by　filling　the　places　of　the　deceased　members　with　new　representatives；　and　in　that　case；　if　the　legislative　body　were　once　corrupted；　the　evil　would　be　past　all　remedy。　When　different　legislative　bodies　succeed　one　another；　the　people　who　have　a　bad　opinion　of　that　w