the spirit of laws-第44部分

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slative　bodies　succeed　one　another；　the　people　who　have　a　bad　opinion　of　that　which　is　actually　sitting　may　reasonably　entertain　some　hopes　of　the　next：　but　were　it　to　be　always　the　same　body；　the　people　upon　seeing　it　once　corrupted　would　no　longer　expect　any　good　from　its　laws；　and　of　course　they　would　either　become　desperate　or　fall　into　a　state　of　indolence。

The　legislative　body　should　not　meet　of　itself。　For　a　body　is　supposed　to　have　no　will　but　when　it　is　met；　and　besides；　were　it　not　to　meet　unanimously；　it　would　be　impossible　to　determine　which　was　really　the　legislative　body；　the　part　assembled；　or　the　other。　And　if　it　had　a　right　to　prorogue　itself；　it　might　happen　never　to　be　prorogued；　which　would　be　extremely　dangerous；　in　case　it　should　ever　attempt　to　encroach　on　the　executive　power。　Besides；　there　are　seasons；　some　more　proper　than　others；　for　assembling　the　legislative　body：　it　is　fit；　therefore；　that　the　executive　power　should　regulate　the　time　of　meeting；　as　well　as　the　duration　of　those　assemblies；　according　to　the　circumstances　and　exigencies　of　a　state　known　to　itself。

Were　the　executive　power　not　to　have　a　right　of　restraining　the　encroachments　of　the　legislative　body；　the　latter　would　become　despotic；　for　as　it　might　arrogate　to　itself　what　authority　it　pleased；　it　would　soon　destroy　all　the　other　powers。

But　it　is　not　proper；　on　the　other　hand；　that　the　legislative　power　should　have　a　right　to　stay　the　executive。　For　as　the　execution　has　its　natural　limits；　it　is　useless　to　confine　it；　besides；　the　executive　power　is　generally　employed　in　momentary　operations。　The　power；　therefore；　of　the　Roman　tribunes　was　faulty；　as　it　put　a　stop　not　only　to　the　legislation；　but　likewise　to　the　executive　part　of　government；　which　was　attended　with　infinite　mischief。

But　if　the　legislative　power　in　a　free　state　has　no　right　to　stay　the　executive；　it　has　a　right　and　ought　to　have　the　means　of　examining　in　what　manner　its　laws　have　been　executed；　an　advantage　which　this　government　has　over　that　of　Crete　and　Sparta；　where　the　Cosmi＇9＇　and　the　Ephori＇10＇　gave　no　account　of　their　administration。

But　whatever　may　be　the　issue　of　that　examination；　the　legislative　body　ought　not　to　have　a　power　of　arraigning　the　person；　nor；　of　course；　the　conduct；　of　him　who　is　entrusted　with　the　executive　power。　His　person　should　be　sacred；　because　as　it　is　necessary　for　the　good　of　the　state　to　prevent　the　legislative　body　from　rendering　themselves　arbitrary；　the　moment　he　is　accused　or　tried　there　is　an　end　of　liberty。

In　this　case　the　state　would　be　no　longer　a　monarchy；　but　a　kind　of　republic；　though　not　a　free　government。　But　as　the　person　entrusted　with　the　executive　power　cannot　abuse　it　without　bad　counsellors；　and　such　as　have　the　laws　as　ministers；　though　the　laws　protect　them　as　subjects；　these　men　may　be　examined　and　punished　　an　advantage　which　this　government　has　over　that　of　Gnidus；　where　the　law　allowed　of　no　such　thing　as　calling　the　Amymones＇11＇　to　an　account；　even　after　their　administration；＇12＇　and　therefore　the　people　could　never　obtain　any　satisfaction　for　the　injuries　done　them。

Though；　in　general；　the　judiciary　power　ought　not　to　be　united　with　any　part　of　the　legislative；　yet　this　is　liable　to　three　exceptions；　founded　on　the　particular　interest　of　the　party　accused。

The　great　are　always　obnoxious　to　popular　envy；　and　were　they　to　be　judged　by　the　people；　they　might　be　in　danger　from　their　judges；　and　would；　moreover；　be　deprived　of　the　privilege　which　the　meanest　subject　is　possessed　of　in　a　free　state；　of　being　tried　by　his　peers。　The　nobility；　for　this　reason；　ought　not　to　be　cited　before　the　ordinary　courts　of　judicature；　but　before　that　part　of　the　legislature　which　is　composed　of　their　own　body。

It　is　possible　that　the　law；　which　is　clearsighted　in　one　sense；　and　blind　in　another；　might；　in　some　cases；　be　too　severe。　But　as　we　have　already　observed；　the　national　judges　are　no　more　than　the　mouth　that　pronounces　the　words　of　the　law；　mere　passive　beings；　incapable　of　moderating　either　its　force　or　rigour。　That　part；　therefore；　of　the　legislative　body；　which　we　have　just　now　observed　to　be　a　necessary　tribunal　on　another　occasion；　is　also　a　necessary　tribunal　in　this；　it　belongs　to　its　supreme　authority　to　moderate　the　law　in　favour　of　the　law　itself；　by　mitigating　the　sentence。

It　might　also　happen　that　a　subject　entrusted　with　the　administration　of　public　affairs　may　infringe　the　rights　of　the　people；　and　be　guilty　of　crimes　which　the　ordinary　magistrates　either　could　not　or　would　not　punish。　But；　in　general；　the　legislative　power　cannot　try　causes：　and　much　less　can　it　try　this　particular　case；　where　it　represents　the　party　aggrieved；　which　is　the　people。　It　can　only；　therefore；　impeach。　But　before　what　court　shall　it　bring　its　impeachment？　Must　it　go　and　demean　itself　before　the　ordinary　tribunals；　which　are　its　inferiors；　and；　being　composed；　moreover；　of　men　who　are　chosen　from　the　people　as　well　as　itself；　will　naturally　be　swayed　by　the　authority　of　so　powerful　an　accuser？　No：　in　order　to　preserve　the　dignity　of　the　people；　and　the　security　of　the　subject；　the　legislative　part　which　represents　the　people　must　bring　in　its　charge　before　the　legislative　part　which　represents　the　nobility；　who　have　neither　the　same　interests　nor　the　same　passions。

Here　is　an　advantage　which　this　government　has　over　most　of　the　ancient　republics；　where　this　abuse　prevailed；　that　the　people　were　at　the　same　time　both　judge　and　accuser。

The　executive　power；　pursuant　of　what　has　been　already　said；　ought　to　have　a　share　in　the　legislature　by　the　power　of　rejecting；　otherwise　it　would　soon　be　stripped　of　its　prerogative。　But　should　the　legislative　power　usurp　a　share　of　the　executive；　the　latter　would　be　equally　undone。　

If　the　prince　were　to　have　a　part　in　the　legislature　by　the　power　of　resolving；　liberty　would　be　lost。　But　as　it　is　necessary　he　should　have　a　share　in　the　legislature　for　the　support　of　his　own　prerogative；　this　share　must　consist　in　the　power　of　rejecting。

The　change　of　government　at　Rome　was　owing　to　this；　that　neither　the　senate；　who　had　one　part　of　the　executive　power；　nor　the　magistrates；　who　were　entrusted　with　the　other；　had　the　right　of　rejecting；　which　was　entirely　lodged　in　the　people。

Here　then　is　the　fundamental　constitution　of　the　government　we　are　treating　of。　The　legislative　body　being　composed　of　two　parts；　they　check　one　another　by　the　mutual　privilege　of　rejecting。　They　are　both　restrained　by　the　executive　power；　as　the　executive　is　by　the　legislative。

These　three　powers　should　naturally　form　a　state　of　repose　or　inaction。　But　as　there　is　a　necessity　for　movement　in　the　course　of　human　affairs；　they　are　forced　to　move；　but　still　in　concert。

As　the　executive　power　has　no　other　part　in　the　legislative　than　the　privilege　of　rejecting；　it　can　have　no　share　in　the　public　debates。　It　is　not　even　necessary　that　it　should　propose；　because　as　it　may　always　disapprove　of　the　resolutions　that　shall　be　taken；　it　may　likewise　reject　the　decisions　on　those　proposals　which　were　made　against　its　will。

In　some　ancient　commonwealths；　where　public　debates　were　carried　on　by　the　people　in　a　body；　it　was　natural　for　the　executive　power　to　propose　and　debate　in　conjunction　with　the　people；　otherwise　their　resolutions　must　have　been　attended　with　a　strange　confusion。

Were　the　executive　power　to　determine　the　raising　of　public　money；　otherwise　than　by　giving　its　consent；　liberty　would　be　at　an　end；　because　it　would　become　legislative　in　the　most　important　point　of　legislation。　

If　the　legislative　power　was　to　settle　the　subsidies；　not　from　year　to　year；　but　for　ever；　it　would　run　the　risk　of　losing　its　liberty；　because　the　executive　power　would　be　no　longer　dependent；　and　when　once　it　was　possessed　of　such　a　perpetual　right；　it　would　be　a　matter　of　indifference　whether　it　held　it　of　itself　or　of　another。　The　same　may　be　said　if　it　should　come　to　a　resolution　of　entrusting；　not　an　annual；　but　a　perpetual　command　of　the　fleets　and　armies　to　the　executive　power。

To　prevent　the　executive　power　from　being　able　to　oppress；　it　is　requisite　that　the　armies　with　which　it　is　entrusted　should　consist　of　the　people；　and　have　the　same　spirit　as　the　people；　as　was　the　case　at　Rome　till　the　time　of　Marius。　To　obtain　this　end；　there　are　only　two　ways；　either　that　the　persons　employed　in　the　army　should　have　sufficient　property　to　answer　for　their　conduct　to　their　fellow…subjects；　and　be　enlisted　only　for　a　year；　as　was　customary　at　Rome：　or　if　there　should　be　a　standing　army；　composed　chiefly　of　the　most　despicable　part　of　the　nation；　the　legislative　power　should　have　a　right　to　disband　them　as　soon　as　it　pleased；　the　soldiers　should　live　in　common　with　the　rest　of　the　people；　and　no　separate　camp；　barracks；　or　fortress　should　be　suffered。

When　once　an　army　is　established；　it　ought　not　to　depend　immediately　on　the　legislative；　but　on　the　executive；　power；　and　this　from　the　very　nature　of　the　thing；　its　business　consisting　more　in　action　than　in　deliberation。

It　is　natural　for　mankind　to　set　a　higher　value　upon　courage　than　timidity；　on　activity　than　prudence；　on　strength　than