the spirit of laws-第48部分

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r　not；　whether　an　act　had　been　committed　or　not。　But　as　to　questions　of　law；＇58＇　as　these　required　a　certain　capacity；　they　were　always　carried　before　the　tribunal　of　the　centumvirs。＇59＇

The　kings　reserved　to　themselves　the　judgment　of　criminal　affairs；　and　in　this　were　succeeded　by　the　consuls。　It　was　in　consequence　of　this　authority　that　Brutus　put　his　children　and　all　those　who　were　concerned　in　the　Tarquinian　conspiracy　to　death。　This　was　an　exorbitant　power。　The　consuls　already　invested　with　the　military　command　extended　the　exercise　of　it　even　to　civil　affairs；　and　their　procedures；　being　stripped　of　all　forms　of　justice；　were　rather　exertions　of　violence　than　legal　judgments。

This　gave　rise　to　the　Valerian　law；　by　which　it　was　made　lawful　to　appeal　to　the　people　from　every　decision　of　the　consuls　that　endangered　the　life　of　a　citizen。　The　consuls　had　no　longer　the　power　of　pronouncing　sentence　in　capital　cases　against　a　Roman　citizen；　without　the　consent　of　the　people。＇60＇

We　see　in　the　first　conspiracy　for　the　restoration　of　the　Tarquins　that　the　criminals　were　tried　by　Brutus　the　consul；　in　the　second　the　senate　and　comitia　were　assembled　to　try　them。＇61＇

The　laws　distinguished　by　the　name　of　sacred　allowed　the　plebeians　the　privilege　of　choosing　tribunes；　whence　was　formed　a　body　whose　pretensions　at　first　were　immense。　It　is　hard　to　determine　which　was　greater；　the　insolence　of　the　plebeians　in　demanding；　or　the　condescension　of　the　senate　in　granting。　The　Valerian　law　allowed　appeals　to　the　people；　that　is；　to　the　people　composed　of　senators；　patricians；　and　plebeians。　The　plebeians　made　a　law　that　appeals　should　be　brought　before　their　own　body。　A　question　was　soon　after　started；　whether　the　plebeians　had　a　right　to　try　a　patrician；　this　was　the　subject　of　a　dispute　to　which　the　impeachment　of　Coriolanus　gave　rise；　and　which　ended　with　that　affair。　When　Coriolanus　was　accused　by　the　tribunes　before　the　people；　he　insisted；　contrary　to　the　spirit　of　the　Valerian　law；　that　as　he　was　a　patrician；　none　but　the　consuls　had　the　power　to　try　him；　on　the　other　hand；　the　plebeians；　also　contrary　to　the　spirit　of　that　same　law；　pretended　that　none　but　their　body　were　empowered　to　be　his　judges；　and　accordingly　they　pronounced　sentence　upon　him。

This　was　moderated　by　the　law　of　the　Twelve　Tables；　whereby　it　was　ordained　that　none　but　the　great　assemblies　of　the　people＇62＇　should　try　a　citizen　in　capital　cases。　Hence　the　body　of　the　plebeians；　or；　which　amounts　to　the　very　same；　the　comitia　by　tribes；　had　no　longer　any　power　of　hearing　criminal　causes；　except　such　as　were　punished　with　fines。　To　inflict　a　capital　punishment　a　law　was　requisite；　but　to　condemn　to　a　pecuniary　mulct；　there　was　occasion　only　for　a　plebiscitum。

This　regulation　of　the　law　of　the　Twelve　Tables　was　extremely　prudent。　It　produced　an　admirable　balance　between　the　body　of　the　plebeians　and　the　senate。　For　as　the　full　judiciary　power　of　both　depended　on　the　greatness　of　the　punishment　and　the　nature　of　the　crime；　it　was　necessary　they　should　both　agree。

The　Valerian　law　abolished　all　the　remains　of　the　Roman　government　in　any　way　relating　to　that　of　the　kings　of　the　heroic　times　of　Greece。　The　consuls　were　divested　of　the　power　to　punish　crimes。　Though　all　crimes　are　public；　yet　we　must　distinguish　between　those　which　more　nearly　concern　the　mutual　intercourse　of　the　citizens　and　those　which　more　immediately　interest　the　state　in　the　relation　it　bears　to　its　subjects。　The　first　are　called　private；　the　second　public。　The　latter　were　tried　by　the　people；　and　in　regard　to　the　former；　they　named　by　particular　commission　a　qu？stor　for　the　prosecution　of　each　crime。　The　person　chosen　by　the　people　was　frequently　one　of　the　magistrates；　sometimes　a　private　man。　He　was　called　the　qu？stor　of　parricide；　and　is　mentioned　in　the　law　of　the　Twelve　Tables。＇63＇

The　qu？stor　nominated　the　judge　of　the　question；　who　drew　lots　for　the　judges；　and　regulated　the　tribunal　in　which　he　presided。＇64＇

Here　it　is　proper　to　observe　what　share　the　senate　had　in　the　nomination　of　the　qu？stor；　that　we　may　see　how　far　the　two　powers　were　balanced。　Sometimes　the　senate　caused　a　dictator　to　be　chosen；　in　order　to　exercise　the　office　of　qu？stor；＇65＇　at　other　times　they　ordained　that　the　people　should　be　convened　by　a　tribune；　with　the　view　of　proceeding　to　the　nomination　of　a　qu？stor；＇66＇　and；　in　fine；　the　people　frequently　appointed　a　magistrate　to　make　his　report　to　the　senate　concerning　a　particular　crime；　and　to　desire　them　to　name　a　qu？stor；　as　may　be　seen　in　the　judgment　upon　Lucius　Scipio＇67＇　in　Livy。＇68＇

In　the　year　of　Rome　604；　some　of　these　commissions　were　rendered　permanent。＇69＇　All　criminal　causes　were　gradually　divided　into　different　parts；　to　which　they　gave　the　name　of　perpetual　questions。　Different　pr？tors　were　created；　to　each　of　whom　some　of　those　questions　were　assigned。　They　had　a　power　conferred　upon　them　for　the　term　of　a　year；　of　trying　such　criminal　causes　as　bore　any　relation　to　those　questions；　and　then　they　were　sent　to　govern　their　province。

At　Carthage　the　senate　of　the　hundred　was　composed　of　judges　who　enjoyed　that　dignity　for　life。＇70＇　But　at　Rome　the　pr？tors　were　annual；　and　the　judges　were　not　even　for　so　long　a　term；　but　were　nominated　for　each　cause。　We　have　already　shown　in　the　sixth　chapter　of　this　book　how　favourable　this　regulation　was　to　liberty　in　particular　governments。

The　judges　were　chosen　from　the　order　of　senators；　till　the　time　of　the　Gracchi。　Tiberius　Gracchus　caused　a　law　to　pass　that　they　should　be　taken　from　the　equestrian　order；　a　change　so　very　considerable　that　the　tribune　boasted　of　having　cut；　by　one　rogation　only；　the　sinews　of　the　senatorial　dignity。

It　is　necessary　to　observe　that　the　three　powers　may　be　very　well　distributed　in　regard　to　the　liberty　of　the　constitution；　though　not　so　well　in　respect　to　the　liberty　of　the　subject。　At　Rome　the　people　had　the　greatest　share　of　the　legislative；　a　part　of　the　executive；　and　part　of　the　judiciary　power；　by　which　means　they　had　so　great　a　weight　in　the　government　as　required　some　other　power　to　balance　it。　The　senate　indeed　had　part　of　the　executive　power；　and　some　share　of　the　legislative；＇71＇　but　this　was　not　sufficient　to　counterbalance　the　weight　of　the　people。　It　was　necessary　that　they　should　partake　of　the　judiciary　power：　and　accordingly　they　had　a　share　when　the　judges　were　chosen　from　among　the　senators。　But　when　the　Gracchi　deprived　the　senators　of　the　judicial　power；＇72＇　the　senate　were　no　longer　able　to　withstand　the　people。　To　favour；　therefore；　the　liberty　of　the　subject；　they　struck　at　that　of　the　constitution；　but　the　former　perished　with　the　latter。

Infinite　were　the　mischiefs　that　thence　arose。　The　constitution　was　changed　at　a　time　when　the　fire　of　civil　discord　had　scarcely　left　any　such　thing　as　a　constitution。　The　knights　ceased　to　be　that　middle　order　which　united　the　people　to　the　senate；　and　the　chain　of　the　constitution　was　broken。

There　were　even　particular　reasons　against　transferring　the　judiciary　power　to　the　equestrian　order。　The　constitution　of　Rome　was　founded　on　this　principle；　that　none　should　be　enlisted　as　soldiers　but　such　as　were　men　of　sufficient　property　to　answer　for　their　conduct　to　the　republic。　The　knights；　as　persons　of　the　greatest　property；　formed　the　cavalry　of　the　legions。　But　when　their　dignity　increased；　they　refused　to　serve　any　longer　in　that　capacity；　and　another　kind　of　cavalry　was　obliged　to　be　raised：　thus　Marius　enlisted　all　sorts　of　people　into　his　army；　and　soon　after　the　republic　was　lost。＇73＇

Besides；　the　knights　were　the　farmers　of　the　revenue；　men　whose　great　rapaciousness　increased　the　public　calamities。　Instead　of　giving　to　such　as　those　the　judicial　power；　they　ought　to　have　been　constantly　under　the　eye　of　the　judges。　This　we　must　say　in　commendation　of　the　ancient　French　laws；　that　they　have　acted　towards　the　officers　of　the　revenue　with　as　great　a　diffidence　as　would　be　observed　between　enemies。　When　the　judiciary　power　at　Rome　was　transferred　to　the　publicans；　there　was　then　an　end　of　all　virtue；　polity；　laws；　and　government。

Of　this　we　find　a　very　ingenious　description　in　some　fragments　of　Diodorus　Siculus　and　Dio。　〃Mutius　Sc？vola；〃　says　Diodorus；＇74＇　〃wanted　to　revive　the　ancient　manners；　and　the　laudable　custom　of　sober　and　frugal　living。　For　his　predecessors　having　entered　into　a　contract　with　the　farmers　of　the　revenue；　who　at　that　time　were　possessed　of　the　judiciary　power　at　Rome；　had　infected　the　province　with　all　manner　of　corruption。　But　Sc？vola　made　an　example　of　the　publicans；　and　imprisoned　those　by　whom　others　had　been　confined。〃

Dio　informs　us＇75＇　that　Publius　Rutilius；　his　lieutenant；　was　equally　obnoxious　to　the　equestrian　order；　and　that　upon　his　return　they　accused　him　of　having　received　some　presents；　and　condemned　him　to　a　fine；　upon　which　he　instantly　made　a　cession　of　his　goods。　His　innocence　appeared　in　this；　that　he　was　found　to　be　worth　a　great　deal　less　than　what　he　was　charged　with　having　extorted；　and　he　showed　a　just　title　to　what　he　possessed：　but　he　would　not　live　any　longer　in　the　same　city　with　such　profligate　wretches。

The　Italians；