the spirit of laws-第49部分

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：　but　he　would　not　live　any　longer　in　the　same　city　with　such　profligate　wretches。

The　Italians；　says　Diodorus　again；＇76＇　bought　up　whole　droves　of　slaves　in　Sicily；　to　till　their　lands　and　to　take　care　of　their　cattle；　but　refused　them　a　necessary　subsistence。　These　wretches　were　then　forced　to　go　and　rob　on　the　highways；　armed　with　lances　and　clubs；　covered　with　beasts'　skins；　and　followed　by　large　mastiffs。　Thus　the　whole　province　was　laid　waste；　and　the　inhabitants　could　not　call　anything　their　own　but　what　was　secured　by　fortresses。　There　was　neither　proconsul　nor　pr？tor　that　could　or　would　oppose　this　disorder；　or　that　presumed　to　punish　these　slaves；　because　they　belonged　to　the　knights；　who　at　Rome　were　possessed　of　the　judiciary　power。＇77＇　And　yet　this　was　one　of　the　causes　of　the　war　of　the　slaves。　But　I　shall　add　only　one　word　more。　A　profession　deaf　and　inexorable；　that　can　have　no　other　view　than　lucre；　that　was　always　asking　and　never　granting；　that　impoverished　the　rich　and　increased　even　the　misery　of　the　poor　　such　a　profession；　I　say；　should　never　have　been　entrusted　with　the　judiciary　power　at　Rome。

19。　Of　the　Government　of　the　Roman　Provinces。　Such　was　the　distribution　of　the　three　powers　in　Rome。　But　they　were　far　from　being　thus　distributed　in　the　provinces。　Liberty　prevailed　in　the　centre　and　tyranny　in　the　extreme　parts。

While　Rome　extended　her　dominions　no　farther　than　Italy；　the　people　were　governed　as　confederates；　and　the　laws　of　each　republic　were　preserved。　But　when　she　enlarged　her　conquests；　and　the　senate　had　no　longer　an　immediate　inspection　over　the　provinces；　nor　the　magistrates　residing　at　Rome　were　any　longer　capable　of　governing　the　empire；　they　were　obliged　to　send　pr？tors　and　proconsuls。　Then　it　was　that　the　harmony　of　the　three　powers　was　lost。　The　persons　appointed　to　that　office　were　entrusted　with　a　power　which　comprehended　that　of　all　the　Roman　magistracies；　nay；　even　that　of　the　people。＇78＇　They　were　despotic　magistrates；　extremely　well　adapted　to　the　distance　of　the　places　to　which　they　were　destined。　They　exercised　the　three　powers；　and　were；　if　I　may　presume　to　use　the　expression；　the　bashaws　of　the　republic。

We　have　elsewhere　observed＇79＇　that　in　a　commonwealth　the　same　magistrate　ought　to　be　possessed　of　the　executive　power；　as　well　civil　as　military。　Hence　a　conquering　republic　can　hardly　communicate　her　government；　and　rule　the　conquered　state　according　to　her　own　constitution。　And　indeed　as　the　magistrate　she　sends　to　govern　is　invested　with　the　executive　power；　both　civil　and　military；　he　must　also　have　the　legislative：　for　who　is　it　that　could　make　laws　without　him？　It　is　necessary；　therefore；　that　the　governor　she　sends　be　entrusted　with　the　three　powers；　as　was　practised　in　the　Roman　provinces。

It　is　more　easy　for　a　monarchy　to　communicate　its　government；　because　the　officers　it　sends　have；　some　the　civil　executive；　and　others　the　military　executive　power；　which　does　not　necessarily　imply　a　despotic　authority。

It　was　a　privilege　of　the　utmost　consequence　to　a　Roman　citizen　to　have　none　but　the　people　for　his　judge。　Were　it　not　for　this；　he　would　have　been　subject　in　the　provinces　to　the　arbitrary　power　of　a　proconsul　or　of　a　propr？tor。　The　city　never　felt　the　tyranny　which　was　exercised　only　on　conquered　nations。

Thus；　in　the　Roman　world；　as　at　Sparta；　the　freemen　enjoyed　the　highest　degree　of　liberty；　while　those　who　were　slaves　laboured　under　the　extremity　of　servitude。

While　the　citizens　paid　taxes；　they　were　raised　with　great　justice　and　equality。　The　regulation　of　Servius　Tullius　was　observed；　who　had　distributed　the　people　into　six　classes；　according　to　their　difference　of　property；　and　fixed　the　several　shares　of　the　public　imposts　in　proportion　to　that　which　each　person　had　in　the　government。　Hence　they　bore　with　the　greatness　of　the　tax　because　of　their　proportionable　greatness　of　credit；　and　consoled　themselves　for　the　smallness　of　their　credit　because　of　the　smallness　of　the　tax。

There　was　also　another　thing　worthy　of　ad　miration；　which　is；　that　as　Servius　Tullius's　division　into　classes　was　in　some　measure　the　fundamental　principle　of　the　constitution；　it　thence　followed　that　an　equal　levying　of　the　taxes　was　so　connected　with　this　fundamental　principle　that　the　one　could　not　be　abolished　without　the　other。

But　while　the　city　paid　the　taxes　as　she　pleased；　or　paid　none　at　all；＇80＇　the　provinces　were　plundered　by　the　knights；　who　were　the　farmers　of　the　public　revenue。　We　have　already　made　mention　of　their　oppressive　extortions；　with　which　all　history　abounds。

〃All　Asia；〃　says　Mithridates；＇81＇　〃expects　me　as　her　deliverer；　so　great　is　the　hatred　which　the　rapaciousness　of　the　proconsuls；＇82＇　the　confiscations　made　by　the　officers　of　the　revenue；　and　the　quirks　and　cavils　of　judicial　proceedings；＇83＇　have　excited　against　the　Romans。〃

Hence　it　was　that　the　strength　of　the　provinces　did　not　increase；　but　rather　weakened；　the　strength　of　the　republic。　Hence　it　was　that　the　provinces　looked　upon　the　loss　of　the　liberty　of　Rome　as　the　epoch　of　their　own　freedom。

20。　The　End　of　this　Book。　I　should　be　glad　to　inquire　into　the　distribution　of　the　three　powers；　in　all　the　moderate　governments　we　are　acquainted　with；　in　order　to　calculate　the　degrees　of　liberty　which　each　may　enjoy。　But　we　must　not　always　exhaust　a　subject；　so　as　to　leave　no　work　at　all　for　the　reader。　My　business　is　not　to　make　people　read；　but　to　make　them　think。

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1。　〃I　have　copied；〃　says　Cicero；　〃Sc？vola's　edict；　which　permits　the　Greeks　to　terminate　their　difference　among　themselves　according　to　their　own　laws；　this　makes　them　consider　themselves　a　free　people。〃

2。　The　Russians　could　not　bear　that　Czar　Peter　should　make　them　cut　it　off。

3。　The　Cappadocians　refused　the　condition　of　a　republican　state；　which　was　offered　them　by　the　Romans。

4。　The　natural　end　of　a　state　that　has　no　foreign　enemies；　or　that　thinks　itself　secured　against　them　by　barriers。

5。　Inconvenience　of　the　Liberum　veto。

6。　At　Venice。

7。　As　at　Athens。

8。　See　Aristotle；　Politics；　iv。　4。

9。　See　Aristotle；　Politics；　ii；　10。

10。　Ibid。；　9。

11。　These　were　magistrates　chosen　annually　by　the　people。　See　Stephen　of　Byzantium。

12。　It　was　lawful　to　accuse　the　Roman　magistrates　after　the　expiration　of　their　several　offices。　See　in　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　ix；　the　affair　of　Genutius　the　tribune。

13。　De　minoribus　rebus　principes　consultant；　de　majoribus　omnes；　ita　tamen　lit　ea　quoque　quorum　penes　plebem　arbitrium　est；　apud　principes　pertractentur。　　ix。

14。　Politics；　iii。　14。

15。　See　Justin；　xvii。　3。

16。　Aristotle；　Politics；　v。　11。

17。　Ibid。；　iii。　14。

18。　Ibid。

19。　See　what　Plutarch　says　in　the　Theseus。　See　likewise　Thucydides；　i。

20。　Aristotle；　Politics；　iv。　8。

21。　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　ii；　p。　120；　and　iv；　pp。　242；　243。

22。　See　Tanaquil's　Discourse　on　Livy；　i　dec。　l；　and　the　regulations　of　Servius　Tullius　in　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　iv。　p。　229。

23。　See　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　ii；　p。　118；　and　iii；　p。　171。

24。　It　was　by　virtue　of　a　senatus…consultum　that　Tullius　Hostilius　ordered　Alba　to　be　destroyed。　　Ibid。；　iii；　pp。　167　and　172。

25。　Ibid。；　iv；　p。　276。

26。　Ibid。；　ii。　And　yet　they　could　not　have　the　nomination　of　all　offices；　since　Valerius　Publicola　made　that　famous　law　by　which　every　citizen　was　forbidden　to　exercise　any　employment；　unless　he　had　obtained　it　by　the　suffrage　of　the　people。

27。　Ibid。；　iii；　p。　159。

28。　Ibid。；　iv。

29。　He　divested　himself　of　half　the　regal　power；　says　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　iv；　p。　229。

30。　It　was　thought　that　if　he　had　not　been　prevented　by　Tarquin　he　would　have　established　a　popular　government。　　Ibid。；　iv；　p。　243。

31。　Ibid。；　iv。

32。　Livy；　dec。　1；　vi。

33。　Qu？stores　parricidii。　　Pomponius；　Leg。　2；§　23；　ff。　de　orig。　jur。

34。　Plutarch；　Poplicola。

35。　Comitiis　centuriatis。

36。　See　Livy；　i；　43；　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　iv；　vii。

37。　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　ix；　p。　598。

38。　Ibid。；　vii。

39。　Contrary　to　the　ancient　custom；　as　may　be　seen：　ibid。；　v；　p。　320。

40。　Ibid。；　pp。　410；　411。

41。　Ibid。；　ix；　p。　605。

42。　Ibid。；　xi；　p。　725。

43。　By　the　sacred　laws；　the　plebeians　had　the　power　of　making　the　plebiscita　by　themselves；　without　admitting　the　patricians　into　their　assembly　　Ibid。；　vi；　p。　410；　vii；　p。　430。

44。　By　the　law　enacted　after　the　expulsion　of　the　decemvirs；　the　patricians　were　made　subject　to　the　plebiscita；　though　they　had　not　a　right　of　voting　there。　Livy；　iii。　55；　and　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　xi；　p。　725。　This　law　was　confirmed　by　that　of　Publius　Philo　the　dictator；　in　the　year　of　Rome　416。　Livy；　viii。　12。

45。　In　the　year　312　of　Rome　the　consuls　performed　still　the　business　of　surveying　the　people　and　their　estates；　as　appears　by　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　ix。

46。　Such　as　those　by　which　it　was　allowed　to　appeal　from　the　decisions　of　all　the　magistrates　to　the　people。

47。　Book　vi。

48。　In　the　year　of　Rome　444；　Livy；　dec。　1；　ix。　30。　As　the　war　against　Perseus　appeared　somewhat　dangerous；　it　was　ordained　by　a　senatus…consultum　that　this　law　should　be　suspended；　and　the　people　agreed　to　it。　Livy；　dec。　5；　ii。

49。　They　extorted　it　from　the　sen