the spirit of laws-第56部分

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the　two　houses；　and　have　the　king's　consent；　otherwise　it　is　not　a　bill：　that　is；　a　sentence　of　the　legislature。　The　person　accused　may　plead　against　the　hill　by　counsel；　and　the　members　of　the　house　may　speak　in　defence　of　the　bill。

55。　Legem　de　singulari　aliquo　rogato；　nisi　sex　millibus　ita　visum。　　From　Andocidis；De　Mysteriis。　This　is　what　they　call　Ostracism。

56。　De　privis　hominibus　lat？。　　Cicero；De　Leg。；　iii。　19。

57。　Scitum　est　jussum　in　omnes。　　Ibid。

58。　See　Philostratus；　i：　Lives　of　the　Sophists：　？schines。　See　likewise　Plutarch　and　Phocius。

59。　By　the　Remnian　law。

60。　Plutarch；　in　a　treatise　entitled。　How　a　Person　May　Reap　Advantage　from　his　Enemies。

61。　〃A　great　many　sold　their　children　to　pay　their　debts。〃　　Plutarch；　Solon。

62。　Ibid。

63。　It　appears　from　history　that　this　custom　was　established　among　the　Romans　before　the　Law　of　the　Twelve　Tables。　　Livy；　dec。　1；　ii。　23；　24。

64。　Dionysius　Halicarnassus。　Roman　Antiquities；　vi。

65。　Plutarch；　Furius　Camillas。

66。　See　below；　xxii。　22。

67。　One　hundred　and　twenty　years　after　the　law　of　the　Twelve　Tables：　Eo　anno　plebi　Roman？；　velut　aliud　initium　libertatis　factum　est；　quod　necti　desierunt。　　Livy；　viii。　38。

68。　Bona　debitoris；　non　corpus　obnoxium　esset。　　Ibid。

69。　The　year　of　Rome　465。

70。　That　of　Plautius　who　made　an　attempt　upon　the　body　of　Veturius。　　Valerius　Maximus；　vi；　1；　art。　9。　These　two　events　ought　not　to　be　confounded；　they　are　neither　the　same　persons　nor　the　same　times。

71。　See　a　fragment　of　Dionysius　Halicarnassus　in　the　extract　of　Virtues　and　Vices　＇Historica＇；　Livy's　Epitome；　ii。；　and　Freinshemius；　ii。

72。　Plutarch；　Comparison　of　some　Roman　and　Greek　Histories；　ii；　p。　487。

73。　Leg。　6；　Cod。　Theod。　de　famosis　libellis。

74。　〃Nerva；〃　says　Tacitus；　〃increased　the　ease　of　government。〃

75。　State　of　Russia；　p。　173；　Paris；　1717。

76。　The　Caliphs。

77。　History　of　the　Tartars；　part　III；　p。　277；　in　the　remarks。

78。　See　Francis　Pirard。

79。　As　at　present　in　Persia；　according　to　Sir　John　Chardin；　this　custom　is　very　ancient。　〃They　put　Cavades；〃　says　Procopius；　〃into　the　castle　of　oblivion；　there　is　a　law　which　forbids　any　one　to　speak　of　those　who　are　shut　up；　or　even　to　mention　their　name。〃

80。　The　fifth　law　in　the　Cod。　ad　leg。　Jul。　Majest。

81。　In　the　8th　chapter　of　this　book。

82。　Frederick　copied　this　law　in　the　Constitutions　of　Naples；　i。

83。　In　monarchies　there　is　generally　a　law　which　forbids　those　who　are　invested　with　public　employments　to　go　out　of　the　kingdom　without　the　prince's　leave。　This　law　ought　to　be　established　also　in　republics。　But　in　those　that　have　particular　institutions　the　prohibition　ought　to　be　general；　in　order　to　prevent　the　introduction　of　foreign　manners。




Book　XIII。　Of　the　Relation　Which　the　Levying　of　Taxes　and　the　Greatness　of　the　Public　Revenues　Bear　to　Liberty

1。　Of　the　Public　Revenues。　The　public　revenues　are　a　portion　that　each　subject　gives　of　his　property；　in　order　to　secure　or　enjoy　the　remainder。

To　fix　these　revenues　in　a　proper　manner；　regard　should　be　had　both　to　the　necessities　of　the　state　and　to　those　of　the　subject。　The　real　wants　of　the　people　ought　never　to　give　way　to　the　imaginary　wants　of　the　state。

Imaginary　wants　are　those　which　flow　from　the　passions　and　the　weakness　of　the　governors；　from　the　vain　conceit　of　some　extraordinary　project；　from　the　inordinate　desire　of　glory；　and　from　a　certain　impotence　of　mind　incapable　of　withstanding　the　impulse　of　fancy。　Often　have　ministers　of　a　restless　disposition　imagined　that　the　wants　of　their　own　mean　and　ignoble　souls　were　those　of　the　state。

Nothing　requires　more　wisdom　and　prudence　than　the　regulation　of　that　portion　of　which　the　subject　is　deprived；　and　that　which　he　is　suffered　to　retain。

The　public　revenues　should　not　be　measured　by　the　people's　abilities　to　give；　but　by　what　they　ought　to　give；　and　if　they　are　measured　by　their　abilities　to　give；　it　should　be　considered　what　they　are　able　to　give　for　a　constancy。

2。　That　it　is　bad　Reasoning　to　say　that　the　Greatness　of　Taxes　is　good　in　its　own　Nature。　There　have　been　instances　in　particular　monarchies　of　petty　states　exempt　from　taxes　that　have　been　as　miserable　as　the　circumjacent　places　which　groaned　under　the　weight　of　exactions。　The　chief　reason　of　this　is；　that　the　petty　state　can　hardly　have　any　such　thing　as　industry；　arts；　or　manufactures；　because　of　its　being　subject　to　a　thousand　restraints　from　the　great　state　by　which　it　is　environed。　The　great　state　is　blessed　with　industry；　manufactures；　and　arts；　and　establishes　laws　by　which　those　several　advantages　are　procured。　The　petty　state　becomes；　therefore；　necessarily　poor；　let　it　pay　never　so　few　taxes。

And　yet　some　have　concluded　from　the　poverty　of　those　petty　states　that　in　order　to　render　the　people　industrious　they　should　be　loaded　with　taxes。　But　it　would　be　a　juster　inference；　that　they　ought　to　pay　no　taxes　at　all。　None　live　here　but　wretches　who　retire　from　the　neighbouring　parts　to　avoid　working　　wretches　who；　disheartened　by　labour；　make　their　whole　felicity　consist　in　idleness。

The　effect　of　wealth　in　a　country　is　to　inspire　every　heart　with　ambition：　that　of　poverty　is　to　give　birth　to　despair。　The　former　is　excited　by　labour；　the　latter　is　soothed　by　indolence。

Nature　is　just　to　all　mankind；　and　repays　them　for　their　industry：　she　renders　them　industrious　by　annexing　rewards　in　proportion　to　their　labour。　But　if　an　arbitrary　prince　should　attempt　to　deprive　the　people　of　nature's　bounty；　they　would　fall　into　a　disrelish　of　industry；　and　then　indolence　and　inaction　must　be　their　only　happiness。

3。　Of　Taxes　in　Countries　where　Part　of　the　People　are　Villains　or　Bondmen。　The　state　of　villainage　is　sometimes　established　after　a　conquest。　In　that　case；　the　bondman　or　villain　that　tills　the　land　ought　to　have　a　kind　of　partnership　with　his　master。　Nothing　but　a　communication　of　loss　or　profit　can　reconcile　those　who　are　doomed　to　labour　to　such　as　are　blessed　with　a　state　of　affluence。

4。　Of　a　Republic　in　the　like　Case。　When　a　republic　has　reduced　a　nation　to　the　drudgery　of　cultivating　her　lands；　she　ought　never　to　suffer　the　free　subject　to　have　the　power　of　increasing　the　tribute　of　the　bondman。　This　was　not　permitted　at　Sparta。　Those　brave　people　thought　the　Helotes＇1＇　would　be　more　industrious　in　cultivating　their　lands；　and　knowing　that　their　servitude　was　not　to　increase；　they　imagined；　likewise；　that　the　masters　would　be　better　citizens；　when　they　desired　no　more　than　what　they　were　accustomed　to　enjoy。

5。　Of　a　Monarchy　in　the　like　Case。　When　the　nobles　of　a　monarchical　state　cause　the　lands　to　be　cultivated　for　their　own　use　by　a　conquered　people；　they　ought　never　to　have　the　power　of　increasing　the　service　or　tribute。＇2＇　Besides；　it　is　right　the　prince　should　be　satisfied　with　his　own　demesne　and　the　military　service。　But　if　he　wants　to　raise　taxes　on　the　vassals　of　his　nobility；　the　lords　of　the　several　districts　ought　to　be　answerable　for　the　tax；＇3＇　and　be　obliged　to　pay　it　for　the　vassals；　by　whom　they　may　be　afterwards　reimbursed。　If　this　rule　be　not　followed；　the　lord　and　the　collectors　of　the　public　taxes　will　harass　the　poor　vassal　by　turns　till　he　perishes　with　misery　or　flies　into　the　woods。

6。　Of　a　despotic　Government　in　the　like　Case。　The　foregoing　rule　is　still　more　indispensably　necessary　in　a　despotic　government。　The　lord　who　is　every　moment　liable　to　be　stripped　of　his　lands　and　his　vassals　is　not　so　eager　to　preserve　them。

When　Peter　I　thought　proper　to　follow　the　custom　of　Germany；　and　to　demand　his　taxes　in　money；　he　made　a　very　prudent　regulation；　which　is　still　followed　in　Russia。　The　gentleman　levies　the　tax　on　the　peasant；　and　pays　it　to　the　Czar。　If　the　number　of　peasants　diminishes；　he　pays　all　the　same；　if　it　increases；　he　pays　no　more；　so　that　it　is　his　interest　not　to　worry　or　oppress　his　vassals。

7。　Of　Taxes　in　Countries　where　Villainage　is　not　established。　When　the　inhabitants　of　a　state　are　all　free　subjects；　and　each　man　enjoys　his　property　with　as　much　right　as　the　prince　his　sovereignty；　taxes　may　then　be　laid　either　on　persons；　on　lands；　on　merchandise；　on　two　of　these；　or　on　all　three　together。

In　the　taxing　of　persons；　it　would　be　an　unjust　proportion　to　conform　exactly　to　that　of　property。　At　Athens　the　people　were　divided　into　four　classes。＇4＇　Those　who　drew　five　hundred　measures　of　liquid　or　dried　fruit　from　their　estates　paid　a　talent＇5＇　to　the　public；　those　who　drew　three　hundred　measures　paid　half　a　talent；　those　who　had　two　hundred　measures　paid　ten　min？；　those　of　the　fourth　class　paid　nothing　at　all。　The　tax　was　fair；　though　it　was　not　proportionable：　if　it　did　not　follow　the　measure　of　people's　property；　it　followed　that　of　their　wants。　It　was　judged　that　every　man　had　an　equal　share　of　what　was　necessary　for　nature；　that　whatsoever　was　necessary　for　nature　ought　not　to　be　taxed；　that　to　this　succeeded　the　useful；　which　ought　to　be　taxed；　but　less　than　the　superfluous；　and　that　the　largeness　of　the　taxes　on　what　was　superfluous　prevented　superfluity。

In　the　taxing　of　lands　it　is　customary　to　make　lists　or　registers；　in　which　the　different　classes　of　estates　are　ranged。　But