the spirit of laws-第58部分

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rnment；　whence　a　diffusive　blessing　is　derived；　which　redounds　even　to　the　prince's　advantage。

13。　In　what　Government　Taxes　are　capable　of　Increase。　Taxes　may　be　increased　in　most　republics；　because　the　citizen；　who　thinks　he　is　paying　himself；　cheerfully　submits　to　them；　and　moreover　is　generally　able　to　bear　their　weight；　from　the　nature　of　the　government。

In　a　monarchy　taxes　may　be　increased；　because　the　moderation　of　the　government　is　capable　of　procuring　opulence：　it　is　a　recompense；　as　it　were；　granted　to　the　prince　for　the　respect　he　shows　to　the　laws。　In　despotic　governments　they　cannot　be　increased；　because　there　can　be　no　increase　of　the　extremity　of　slavery。

14。　That　the　Nature　of　the　Taxes　is　in　Relation　to　the　Government。　A　capitation　is　more　natural　to　slavery；　a　duty　on　merchandise　is　more　natural　to　liberty；　by　reason　it　has　not　so　direct　a　relation　to　the　person。

It　is　natural　in　a　despotic　government　for　the　prince　not　to　give　money　to　his　soldiers；　or　to　those　belonging　to　his　court；　but　to　distribute　lands　amongst　them；　and　of　course　that　there　should　be　very　few　taxes。　But　if　the　prince　gives　money；　the　most　natural　tax　he　can　raise　is　a　capitation；　which　can　never　be　considerable。　For　as　it　is　impossible　to　make　different　classes　of　the　contributors；　because　of　the　abuses　that　might　arise　thence；　considering　the　injustice　and　violence　of　the　government；　they　are　under　an　absolute　necessity　of　regulating　themselves　by　the　rate　of　what　even　the　poorest　and　most　wretched　are　able　to　contribute。

The　natural　tax　of　moderate　governments　is　the　duty　laid　on　merchandise。　As　this　is　really　paid　by　the　consumer；　though　advanced　by　the　merchant；　it　is　a　loan　which　the　latter　has　already　made　to　the　former。　Hence　the　merchant　must　be　considered　on　the　one　side　as　the　general　debtor　of　the　state；　and　on　the　other　as　the　creditor　of　every　individual。　He　advances　to　the　state　the　duty　which　the　consumer　will　sometime　or　other　refund：　and　he　has　paid　for　the　consumer　the　duty　which　he　has　advanced　for　the　merchandise。　It　is　therefore　obvious　that　in　proportion　to　the　moderation　of　the　government；　to　the　prevalence　of　the　spirit　of　liberty；　and　to　the　security　of　private　fortunes；　a　merchant　has　it　in　his　power　to　advance　money　to　the　state；　and　to　pay　considerable　duties　for　individuals。　In　England　a　merchant　lends　really　to　the　government　fifty　or　sixty　pounds　sterling　for　every　tun　of　wine　he　imports。　Where　is　the　merchant　that　would　dare　do　any　such　thing　in　a　country　like　Turkey？　And　were　he　so　presumptuous；　how　could　he　do　it　with　a　crazy　or　shattered　fortune？

15。　Abuse　of　Liberty。　To　these　great　advantages　of　liberty　it　is　owing　that　liberty　itself　has　been　abused。　Because　a　moderate　government　has　been　productive　of　admirable　effects；　this　moderation　has　been　laid　aside；　because　great　taxes　have　been　raised；　they　wanted　to　carry　them　to　excess；　and　ungrateful　to　the　hand　of　liberty；　of　whom　they　received　this　present；　they　addressed　themselves　to　slavery；　who　never　grants　the　least　favour。

Liberty　produces　excessive　taxes；　the　effect　of　excessive　taxes　is　slavery；　and　slavery　produces　a　diminution　of　tribute。

Most　of　the　edicts　of　the　eastern　monarchs　are　to　exempt　every　year　some　province　of　their　empire　from　paying　tribute。＇12＇　The　manifestations　of　their　wills　are　favours。　But　in　Europe　the　edicts　of　princes　are　disagreeable　even　before　they　are　seen；　because　they　always　make　mention　of　their　own　wants；　but　not　a　word　of　ours。

From　an　unpardonable　indolence　in　the　ministers　of　those　countries；　owing　to　the　nature　of　the　government；　and　frequently　to　the　climate；　the　people　derive　this　advantage；　that　they　are　not　incessantly　plagued　with　new　demands。　The　public　expense　does　not　increase；　because　the　ministers　do　not　form　new　projects：　and　if　some　by　chance　are　formed；　they　are　such　as　are　soon　executed。　The　governors　of　the　state　do　not　perpetually　torment　the　people；　for　they　do　not　perpetually。　torment　themselves。　But　it　is　impossible　there　should　be　any　fixed　rule　in　our　finances；　since　we　always　know　that　we　shall　have　something　or　other　to　execute；　without　ever　knowing　what　it　is。

It　is　no　longer　customary　with　us　to　give　the　appellation　of　a　great　minister　to　a　wise　dispenser　of　the　public　revenues；　but　to　a　person　of　dexterity　and　cunning；　who　is　clever　at　finding　out　what　we　call　the　ways　and　means。

16。　Of　the　Conquests　of　the　Mahometans。　It　was　this　excess　of　taxes＇13＇　that　occasioned　the　prodigious　facility　with　which　the　Mahometans　carried　on　their　conquests。　Instead　of　a　continual　series　of　extortions　devised　by　the　subtle　avarice　of　the　Greek　emperors；　the　people　were　subjected　to　a　simple　tribute　which　was　paid　and　collected　with　ease。　Thus　they　were　far　happier　in　obeying　a　barbarous　nation　than　a　corrupt　government；　in　which　they　suffered　every　inconvenience　of　lost　liberty；　with　all　the　horror　of　present　slavery。

17。　Of　the　Augmentation　of　Troops。　A　new　distemper　has　spread　itself　over　Europe；　infecting　our　princes；　and　inducing　them　to　keep　up　an　exorbitant　number　of　troops。　It　has　its　redoublings；　and　of　necessity　becomes　contagious。　For　as　soon　as　one　prince　augments　his　forces；　the　rest　of　course　do　the　same；　so　that　nothing　is　gained　thereby　but　the　public　ruin。　Each　monarch　keeps　as　many　armies　on　foot　as　if　his　people　were　in　danger　of　being　exterminated：　and　they　give　the　name　of　peace＇14＇　to　this　general　effort　of　all　against　all。　Thus　is　Europe　ruined　to　such　a　degree　that　were　private　people　to　be　in　the　same　situation　as　the　three　most　opulent　powers　of　this　part　of　the　globe；　they　would　not　have　necessary　subsistence。　We　are　poor　with　the　riches　and　commerce　of　the　whole　world；　and　soon；　by　thus　augmenting　our　troops；　we　shall　be　all　soldiers；　and　be　reduced　to　the　very　same　situation　as　the　Tartars。＇15＇

Great　princes；　not　satisfied　with　hiring　or　buying　troops　of　petty　states；　make　it　their　business　on　all　sides　to　pay　subsidies　for　alliances；　that　is；　generally　to　throw　away　their　money。

The　consequence　of　such　a　situation　is　the　perpetual　augmentation　of　taxes；　and　the　mischief　which　prevents　all　future　remedy　is　that　they　reckon　no　more　upon　their　revenues；　but　in　waging　war　against　their　whole　capital。　It　is　no　unusual　thing　to　see　governments　mortgage　their　funds　even　in　time　of　peace；　and　to　employ　what　they　call　extraordinary　means　to　ruin　themselves　　means　so　extraordinary　indeed；　that　such　are　hardly　thought　of　by　the　most　extravagant　young　spendthrift。

18。　Of　an　Exemption　from　Taxes。　The　maxim　of　the　great　eastern　empires；　of　exempting　such　provinces　as　have　very　much　suffered　from　taxes；　ought　to　be　extended　to　monarchical　states。　There　are　some；　indeed；　where　this　practice　is　established；　yet　the　country　is　more　oppressed　than　if　no　such　rule　took　place；　because　as　the　prince　levies　still　neither　more　nor　less；　the　state　becomes　bound　for　the　whole。　In　order　to　ease　a　village　that　pays　badly；　they　load　another　that　pays　better；　the　former　is　not　relieved；　and　the　latter　is　ruined。　The　people　grow　desperate；　between　the　necessity　of　paying　for　fear　of　exactions；　and　the　danger　of　paying　for　fear　of　new　burdens。

A　well…regulated　government　ought　to　set　aside；　for　the　first　article　of　its　expense；　a　determinate　sum　to　answer　contingent　cases。　It　is　with　the　public　as　with　individuals；　who　are　ruined　when　they　live　up　exactly　to　their　income。

With　regard　to　an　obligation　for　the　whole　amongst　the　inhabitants　of　the　same　village；　some　pretend＇16＇　that　it　is　but　reasonable；　because　there　is　a　possibility　of　a　fraudulent　combination　on　their　side：　but　was　it　ever　heard　that；　upon　mere　supposition；　we　are　to　establish　a　thing　in　itself　unjust　and　ruinous　to　the　state？

19。　Which　is　more　suitable　to　the　Prince　and　to　the　People；　the　farming　the　Revenues；　or　managing　them　by　Commission。　The　managing　of　the　revenues　by　commission　is　like　the　conduct　of　a　good　father　of　a　family；　who　collects　his　own　rents　himself　with　economy　and　order。

By　this　management　of　the　revenues　the　prince　is　at　liberty　to　press　or　to　retard　the　levy　of　the　taxes；　either　according　to　his　own　wants　or　to　those　of　his　people。　By　this　he　saves　to　the　state　the　immense　profits　of　the　farmers；　who　impoverish　it　in　a　thousand　ways。　By　this　he　prevents　the　people　from　being　mortified　with　the　sight　of　sudden　fortunes。　By　this　the　public　money　passes　through　few　hands；　goes　directly　to　the　treasury；　and　consequently　makes　a　quicker　return　to　the　people。　By　this　the　prince　avoids　an　infinite　number　of　bad　laws　extorted　from　him　by　the　importunate　avarice　of　the　farmers；　who　pretend　to　offer　a　present　advantage　for　regulations　pernicious　to　posterity。

As　the　moneyed　man　is　always　the　most　powerful；　the　farmer　renders　himself　arbitrary　even　over　the　prince　himself；　he　is　not　the　legislator；　but　he　obliges　the　legislator　to　give　laws。

I　acknowledge　that　it　is　sometimes　of　use　to　farm　out　a　new　duty；　for　there　is　an　art　in　preventing　frauds；　which　motives　of　interest　suggest　to　the　farmers；　but　commissioners　never　think　of。　Now　the　manner　of　levying　it　being　once　established　by　the　farmer；　it　may　afterwards　be　safely　entrusted　to　a　commission。　In　England　the　managemen