the spirit of laws-第98部分

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　thousand　marks　upon　their　debtors　in　Holland；　or　else　by　sending　specie　to　the　value　of　ten　thousand　marks　to　Spain。

Hence　it　follows　that　when　a　state　has　occasion　to　remit　a　sum　of　money　to　another　country；　it　is　indifferent；　in　the　nature　of　the　thing；　whether　specie　be　conveyed　thither　or　they　take　bills　of　exchange。　The　advantage　or　disadvantage　of　these　two　methods　solely　depends　on　actual　circumstances。　We　must　inquire　which　will　yield　most　gros　in　Holland…money　carried　thither　in　specie；　or　a　bill　upon　Holland　for　the　like　sum。＇13＇

When　money　of　the　same　standard　and　weight　in　France　yields　money　of　the　same　standard　and　weight　in　Holland；　we　say　that　the　exchange　is　at　par。　In　the　actual　state　of　specie＇14＇　the　par　is　nearly　at　fifty…four　gros　to　the　crown。　When　the　exchange　is　above　fifty…four　gros；　we　say　it　is　high；　when　beneath；　we　say　it　is　low。

In　order　to　know　the　loss　and　gain　of　a　state　in　a　particular　situation　of　exchange；　it　must　be　considered　as　debtor　and　creditor；　as　buyer　and　seller。　When　the　exchange　is　below　par；　it　loses　as　a　debtor；　and　gains　as　a　creditor；　it　loses　as　a　buyer　and　gains　as　a　seller。　It　is　obvious　it　loses　as　debtor；　suppose；　for　example；　France　owes　Holland　a　certain　number　of　gros；　the　fewer　gros　there　are　in　a　crown　the　more　crowns　she　has　to　pay。　On　the　contrary；　if　France　is　creditor　for　a　certain　number　of　gros；　the　less　number　of　gros　there　are　in　a　crown　the　more　crowns　she　will　receive。　The　state　loses　also　as　buyer；　for　there　must　be　the　same　number　of　gros　to　purchase　the　same　quantity　of　merchandise；　and　while　the　exchange　is　low；　every　French　crown　is　worth　fewer　gros。　For　the　same　reason　the　state　gains　as　a　seller。　I　sell　my　merchandise　in　Holland　for　a　certain　number　of　gros；　I　receive　then　more　crowns　in　France；　when　for　every　fifty　gros　I　receive　a　crown；　than　I　should　do　if　I　received　only　the　same　crown　for　every　fifty…four。　The　contrary　to　this　takes　place　in　the　other　state。　If　the　Dutch　are　indebted　a　certain　number　of　crowns　to　France；　they　will　gain；　if　this　money　is　owing　to　them；　they　will　lose；　if　they　sell；　they　lose；　and　if　they　buy；　they　gain。

It　is　proper　to　pursue　this　somewhat　further。　When　the　exchange　is　below　par；　for　example；　if　it　be　at　fifty　instead　of　fifty…four；　it　should　follow　that　France；　on　sending　bills　of　exchange　to　Holland　for　fifty…four　thousand　crowns；　could　buy　merchandise　only　to　the　value　of　fifty　thousand；　and　that　on　the　other　hand；　the　Dutch　sending　the　value　of　fifty　thousands　crowns　to　France　might　buy　fifty…four　thousand；　which　makes　a　difference　of　8/54；　that　is；　a　loss　to　France　of　more　than　one…seventh；　so　that　France　would　be　obliged　to　send　to　Holland　one…seventh　more　in　specie　or　merchandise　than　she　would　do　were　the　exchange　at　par。　And　as　the　mischief　must　constantly　increase；　because　a　debt　of　this　kind　would　bring　the　exchange　still　lower；　France　would　in　the　end　be　ruined。　It　seems；　I　say；　as　if　this　should　certainly　follow；　and　yet　it　does　not；　because　of　the　principle　which　I　have　elsewhere　established；＇15＇　which　is　that　states　constantly　lean　towards　a　balance；　in　order　to　preserve　their　independency。　Thus　they　borrow　only　in　proportion　to　their　ability　to　pay；　and　measure　their　buying　by　what　they　sell；　and　taking　the　example　from　above；　if　the　exchange　falls　in　France　from　fifty…four　to　fifty；　the　Dutch　who　buy　merchandise　in　France　to　the　value　of　a　thousand　crowns；　for　which　they　used　to　pay　fifty…four　thousand　gros；　would　now　pay　only　fifty　thousand；　if　the　French　would　consent　to　it。　But　the　merchandise　of　France　will　rise　insensibly；　and　the　profit　will　be　shared　between　the　French　and　the　Dutch；　for　when　a　merchant　can　gain；　he　easily　shares　his　profit；　there　arises　then　a　communication　of　profit　between　the　French　and　the　Dutch。　In　the　same　manner　the　French；　who　bought　merchandise　of　Holland　for　fifty…four　thousand　gros；　and　who；　when　the　exchange　was　at　fifty…four；　paid　for　them　a　thousand　crowns；　will　be　obliged　to　add　one…seventh　more　in　French　crowns　to　buy　the　same　merchandise。　But　the　French　merchant；　being　sensible　of　the　loss　he　suffers；　will　take　up　less　of　the　merchandise　of　Holland。　The　French　and　the　Dutch　merchant　will　then　both　be　losers；　the　state　will　insensibly　fall　into　a　balance；　and　the　lowering　of　the　exchange　will　not　be　attended　with　all　those　inconveniences　which　we　had　reason　to　fear。

A　merchant　may　send　his　stock　into　a　foreign　country　when　the　exchange　is　below　par　without　injuring　his　fortune；　because；　when　it　returns；　he　recovers　what　he　had　lost；　but　a　prince　who　sends　only　specie　into　a　foreign　country　which　never　can　return；　is　always　a　loser。

When　the　merchants　have　great　dealings　in　any　country；　the　exchange　there　infallibly　rises。　This　proceeds　from　their　entering　into　many　engagements；　buying　great　quantities　of　merchandise；　and　drawing　upon　foreign　countries　to　pay　for　them。

A　prince　may　amass　great　wealth　in　his　dominions；　and　yet　specie　may　be　really　scarce；　and　relatively　common；　for　instance；　if　the　state　is　indebted　for　much　merchandise　to　a　foreign　country；　the　exchange　will　be　low；　though　specie　be　scarce。

The　exchange　of　all　places　constantly　tends　to　a　certain　proportion；　and　that　in　the　very　nature　of　things。　If　the　course　of　exchange　from　Ireland　to　England　is　below　par；　and　that　of　England　to　Holland　is　also　under　par；　that　of　Ireland　to　Holland　will　be　still　lower；　that　is；　in　the　compound　ratio　of　that　of　Ireland　to　England；　and　that　of　England　to　Holland；　for　a　Dutch　merchant　who　can　have　his　specie　indirectly　from　Ireland；　by　way　of　England；　will　not　choose　to　pay　dearer　by　having　it　in　the　direct　way。　This；　I　say；　ought　naturally　to　be　the　case；　but；　however；　it　is　not　exactly　so。　There　are　always　circumstances　which　vary　these　things；　and　the　different　profit　of　drawing　by　one　place；　or　of　drawing　by　another；　constitutes　the　particular　art　and　dexterity　of　the　bankers；　which　does　not　belong　to　the　present　subject。

When　a　state　raises　its　specie；　for　instance；　when　it　gives　the　name　of　six　livres；　or　two　crowns；　to　what　was　before　called　three　livres；　or　one　crown；　this　new　denomination；　which　adds　nothing　real　to　the　crown；　ought　not　to　procure　a　single　gros　more　by　the　exchange。　We　ought　only　to　have　for　the　two　new　crowns　the　same　number　of　gros　which　we　before　received　for　the　old　one。　If　this　does　not　happen；　it　must　not　be　imputed　as　an　effect　of　the　regulation　itself；　but　to　the　novelty　and　suddenness　of　the　affair。　The　exchange　adheres　to　what　is　already　established；　and　is　not　altered　till　after　a　certain　time。

When　a　state；　instead　of　only　raising　the　specie　by　a　law；　calls　it　in；　in　order　to　diminish　its　size；　it　frequently　happens　that　during　the　time　taken　up　in　passing　again　through　the　mint　there　are　two　kinds　of　money　　the　large；　which　is　the　old；　and　the　small；　which　is　the　new；　and　as　the　large　is　cried　down　as　not　to　be　received　as　money；　and　bills　of　exchange　must　consequently　be　paid　in　the　new；　one　would　imagine　then　that　the　exchange　should　be　regulated　by　the　new。　If；　for　example；　in　France；　the　ancient　crown　of　three　livres；　being　worth　in　Holland　sixty　gros；　was　reduced　one…half；　the　new　crown　ought　to　be　valued　only　at　thirty。　On　the　other　hand；　it　seems　as　if　the　exchange　ought　to　be　regulated　by　the　old　coin；　because　the　banker　who　has　specie；　and　receives　bills；　is　obliged　to　carry　the　old　coin　to　the　mint　in　order　to　change　it　for　the　new；　by　which　he　must　be　a　loser。　The　exchange　then　ought　to　be　fixed　between　the　value　of　the　old　coin　and　that　of　the　new。　The　value　of　the　old　is　decreased；　if　we　may　call　it　so；　both　because　there　is　already　some　of　the　new　in　trade；　and　because　the　bankers　cannot　keep　up　to　the　rigour　of　the　law；　having　an　interest　in　letting　loose　the　old　coin　from　their　chests；　and　being　sometimes　obliged　to　make　payments　with　it。　Again；　the　value　of　the　new　specie　must　rise；　because　the　banker　having　this　finds　himself　in　a　situation　in　which；　as　we　shall　immediately　prove；　he　will　reap　great　advantage　by　procuring　the　old。　The　exchange　should　then　be　fixed；　as　I　have　already　said；　between　the　new　and　the　old　coin。　For　then　the　bankers　find　it　to　their　interest　to　send　the　old　out　of　the　kingdom；　because　by　this　method　they　procure　the　same　advantage　as　they　could　receive　from　a　regular　exchange　of　the　old　specie；　that　is；　a　great　many　gros　in　Holland；　and　in　return；　a　regular　exchange　a　little　lower；　between　the　old　and　the　new　specie；　which　would　bring　many　crowns　to　France。

Suppose　that　three　livres　of　the　old　coin　yield　by　the　actual　exchange　forty…five　gros；　and　that　by　sending　this　same　crown　to　Holland　they　receive　sixty；　but　with　a　bill　of　forty…five　gros；　they　procure　a　crown　of　three　livres　in　France；　which　being　sent　in　the　old　specie　to　Holland；　still　yields　sixty　gros；　thus　all　the　old　specie　would　be　sent　out　of　the　kingdom；　and　the　bankers　would　run　away　with　the　whole　profit。

To　remedy　this；　new　measures　must　be　taken。　The　state　which　coined　the　new　specie　would　itself　be　obliged　to　send　great　quantities　of　the　old　to　the　nation　which　regulates　the　exchange；　and；　by　thus　gaining　credit　there；　raise　the　exchange　pretty　nearly　to　as　many　gros　for　a　crown