an enquiry concerning human understanding-第17部分

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suspicion　concerning　every　conclusion　which　is　new　and
extraordinary。　No　conclusions　can　be　more　agreeable　to
scepticism　than　such　as　make　discoveries　concerning　the
weakness　and　narrow　limits　of　human　reason　and　capacity。

　　　　　And　what　stronger　instance　can　be　produced　of　the
surprising　ignorance　and　weakness　of　the　understanding　than
the　present。　For　surely；　if　there　be　any　relation　among
objects　which　it　imports　to　us　to　know　perfectly；　it　is　that
of　cause　and　effect。　On　this　are　founded　all　our　reasonings
concerning　matter　of　fact　or　existence。　By　means　of　it　alone
we　attain　any　assurance　concerning　objects　which　are　removed
from　the　present　testimony　of　our　memory　and　senses。　The
only　immediate　utility　of　all　sciences；　is　to　teach　us；　how
to　control　and　regulate　future　events　by　their　causes。　Our
thoughts　and　enquiries　are；　therefore；　every　moment；
employed　about　this　relation：　Yet　so　imperfect　are　the　ideas
which　we　form　concerning　it；　that　it　is　impossible　to　give
any　just　definition　of　cause；　except　what　is　drawn　from
something　extraneous　and　foreign　to　it。　Similar　objects　are
always　conjoined　with　similar。　Of　this　we　have　experience。
Suitably　to　this　experience；　therefore；　we　may　define　a
cause　to　be　。　Or　in　other　words　。
The　appearance　of　a　cause　always　conveys　the　mind；　by　a
customary　transition；　to　the　idea　of　the　effect。　Of　this
also　we　have　experience。　We　may；　therefore；　suitably　to　this
experience；　form　another　definition　of　cause；　and　call　it；
。　But　though　both　these
definitions　be　drawn　from　circumstances　foreign　to　the
cause；　we　cannot　remedy　this　inconvenience；　or　attain　any
more　perfect　definition；　which　may　point　out　that
circumstances　in　the　cause；　which　gives　it　a　connexion　with
its　effect。　We　have　no　idea　of　this　connexion；　nor　even　any
distant　notion　what　it　is　we　desire　to　know；　when　we
endeavour　at　a　conception　of　it。　We　say；　for　instance；　that
the　vibration　of　this　string　is　the　cause　of　this　particular
sound。　But　what　do　we　mean　by　that　affirmation？　We　either
mean　。　We　may
consider　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect　in　either　of　these
two　lights；　but　beyond　these；　we　have　no　idea　of　it。＇21＇

　　　　　To　recapitulate；　therefore；　the　reasonings　of　this
section：　Every　idea　is　copied　from　some　preceding　impression
or　sentiment；　and　where　we　cannot　find　any　impression；　we
may　be　certain　that　there　is　no　idea。　In　all　single
instances　of　the　operation　of　bodies　or　minds；　there　is
nothing　that　produces　any　impression；　nor　consequently　can
suggest　any　idea　of　power　or　necessary　connexion。　But　when
many　uniform　instances　appear；　and　the　same　object　is　always
followed　by　the　same　event；　we　then　begin　to　entertain　the
notion　of　cause　and　connexion。　We　then　　a　new
sentiment　or　impression；　to　wit；　a　customary　connexion　in
the　thought　or　imagination　between　one　object　and　its　usual
attendant；　and　this　sentiment　is　the　original　of　that　idea
which　we　seek　for。　For　as　this　idea　arises　from　a　number　of
similar　instances；　and　not　from　any　single　instance；　it　must
arise　from　that　circumstance；　in　which　the　number　of
instances　differ　from　every　individual　instance。　But　this
customary　connexion　or　transition　of　the　imagination　is　the
only　circumstance　in　which　they　differ。　In　every　other
particular　they　are　alike。　The　first　instance　which　we　saw
of　motion　communicated　by　the　shock　of　two　billiard　balls
（to　return　to　this　obvious　illustration）　is　exactly　similar
to　any　instance　that　may；　at　present；　occur　to　us；　except
only；　that　we　could　not；　at　first；　　one　event　from
the　other；　which　we　are　enabled　to　do　at　present；　after　so
long　a　course　of　uniform　experience。　I　know　not　whether　the
reader　will　readily　apprehend　this　reasoning。　I　am　afraid
that；　should　I　multiply　words　about　it；　or　throw　it　into　a
greater　variety　of　lights；　it　would　only　become　more　obscure
and　intricate。　In　all　abstract　reasonings　there　is　one　point
of　view　which；　if　we　can　happily　hit；　we　shall　go　farther
towards　illustrating　the　subject　than　by　all　the　eloquence
and　copious　expression　in　the　world。　This　point　of　view　we
should　endeavour　to　reach；　and　reserve　the　flowers　of
rhetoric　for　subjects　which　are　more　adapted　to　them。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　VIII。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Liberty　and　Necessity。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　I。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　I/T　might　reasonably　be　expected　in　questions　which
have　been　canvassed　and　disputed　with　great　eagerness；　since
the　first　origin　of　science；　and　philosophy；　that　the
meaning　of　all　the　terms；　at　least；　should　have　been　agreed
upon　among　the　disputants；　and　our　enquiries；　in　the　course
of　two　thousand　years；　been　able　to　pass　from　words　to　the
true　and　real　subject　of　the　controversy。　For　how　easy　may
it　seem　to　give　exact　definitions　of　the　terms　employed　in
reasoning；　and　make　these　definitions；　not　the　mere　sound　of
words；　the　object　of　future　scrutiny　and　examination？　But　if
we　consider　the　matter　more　narrowly；　we　shall　be　apt　to
draw　a　quite　opposite　conclusion。　From　this　circumstance
alone；　that　a　controversy　has　been　long　kept　on　foot；　and
remains　still　undecided；　we　may　presume　that　there　is　some
ambiguity　in　the　expression；　and　that　the　disputants　affix
different　ideas　to　the　terms　employed　in　the　controversy。
For　as　the　faculties　of　the　mind　are　supposed　to　be
naturally　alike　in　every　individual；　otherwise　nothing　could
be　more　fruitless　than　to　reason　or　dispute　together；　it
were　impossible；　if　men　affix　the　same　ideas　to　their　terms；
that　they　could　so　long　form　different　opinions　of　the　same
subject；　especially　when　they　communicate　their　views；　and
each　party　turn　themselves　on　all　sides；　in　search　of
arguments　which　may　give　them　the　victory　over　their
antagonists。　It　is　true；　if　men　attempt　the　discussion　of
questions　which　lie　entirely　beyond　the　reach　of　human
capacity；　such　as　those　concerning　the　origin　of　worlds；　or
the　economy　of　the　intellectual　system　or　region　of　spirits；
they　may　long　beat　the　air　in　their　fruitless　contests；　and
never　arrive　at　any　determinate　conclusion。　But　if　the
question　regard　any　subject　of　common　life　and　experience；
nothing；　one　would　think；　could　preserve　the　dispute　so　long
undecided　but　some　ambiguous　expressions；　which　keep　the
antagonists　still　at　a　distance；　and　hinder　them　from
grappling　with　each　other。

　　　　　This　has　been　the　case　in　the　long　disputed　question
concerning　liberty　and　necessity；　and　to　so　remarkable　a
degree　that；　if　I　be　not　much　mistaken；　we　shall　find；　that
all　mankind；　both　learned　and　ignorant；　have　always　been　of
the　same　opinion　with　regard　to　this　subject；　and　that　a　few
intelligible　definitions　would　immediately　have　put　an　end
to　the　whole　controversy。　I　own　that　this　dispute　has　been
so　much　canvassed　on　all　hands；　and　has　led　philosophers
into　such　a　labyrinth　of　obscure　sophistry；　that　it　is　no
wonder；　if　a　sensible　reader　indulge　his　ease　so　far　as　to
turn　a　deaf　ear　to　the　proposal　of　such　a　question；　from
which　he　can　expect　neither　instruction　or　entertainment。
But　the　state　of　the　argument　here　proposed　may；　perhaps；
serve　to　renew　his　attention；　as　it　has　more　novelty；
promises　at　least　some　decision　of　the　controversy；　and　will
not　much　disturb　his　ease　by　any　intricate　or　obscure
reasoning。

　　　　　I　hope；　therefore；　to　make　it　appear　that　all　men　have
ever　agreed　in　the　doctrine　both　of　necessity　and　of
liberty；　according　to　any　reasonable　sense；　which　can　be　put
on　these　terms；　and　that　the　whole　controversy；　has　hitherto
turned　merely　upon　words。　We　shall　begin　with　examining　the
doctrine　of　necessity。

　　　　　It　is　universally　allowed　that　matter；　in　all　its
operations；　is　actuated　by　a　necessary　force；　and　that　every
natural　effect　is　so　precisely　determined　by　the　energy　of
its　cause　that　no　other　effect；　in　such　particular
circumstances；　could　possibly　have　resulted　from　it。　The
degree　and　direction　of　every　motion　is；　by　the　laws　of
nature；　prescribed　with　such　exactness　that　a　living
creature　may　as　soon　arise　from　the　shock　of　two　bodies　as
motion　in　any　other　degree　or　direction　than　what　is
actually　produced　by　it。　Would　we；　therefore；　form　a　just
and　precise　idea　of　；　we　must　consider　whence
that　idea　arises　when　we　apply　it　to　the　operation　of
bodies。

　　　　　It　seems　evident　that；　if　all　the　scenes　of　nature　were
continually　shifted　in　such　a　manner　that　no　two　events　bore
any　resemblance　to　each　other；　but　every　obj