heretics-第11部分

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He　has　come　to　the　most　dreadful　conclusion　a　literary　man　can



come　to；　the　conclusion　that　the　ordinary　view　is　the　right　one。



It　is　only　the　last　and　wildest　kind　of　courage　that　can　stand



on　a　tower　before　ten　thousand　people　and　tell　them　that　twice



two　is　four。







Mr。　H。　G。　Wells　exists　at　present　in　a　gay　and　exhilarating　progress



of　conservativism。　　He　is　finding　out　more　and　more　that　conventions；



though　silent；　are　alive。　　As　good　an　example　as　any　of　this



humility　and　sanity　of　his　may　be　found　in　his　change　of　view



on　the　subject　of　science　and　marriage。　　He　once　held；　I　believe；



the　opinion　which　some　singular　sociologists　still　hold；



that　human　creatures　could　successfully　be　paired　and　bred　after



the　manner　of　dogs　or　horses。　　He　no　longer　holds　that　view。



Not　only　does　he　no　longer　hold　that　view；　but　he　has　written　about　it



in　〃Mankind　in　the　Making〃　with　such　smashing　sense　and　humour；　that　I



find　it　difficult　to　believe　that　anybody　else　can　hold　it　either。



It　is　true　that　his　chief　objection　to　the　proposal　is　that　it　is



physically　impossible；　which　seems　to　me　a　very　slight　objection；



and　almost　negligible　compared　with　the　others。　　The　one　objection



to　scientific　marriage　which　is　worthy　of　final　attention　is　simply



that　such　a　thing　could　only　be　imposed　on　unthinkable　slaves



and　cowards。　　I　do　not　know　whether　the　scientific　marriage…mongers



are　right　（as　they　say）　or　wrong　（as　Mr。　Wells　says）　in　saying



that　medical　supervision　would　produce　strong　and　healthy　men。



I　am　only　certain　that　if　it　did；　the　first　act　of　the　strong



and　healthy　men　would　be　to　smash　the　medical　supervision。







The　mistake　of　all　that　medical　talk　lies　in　the　very　fact　that　it



connects　the　idea　of　health　with　the　idea　of　care。　　What　has　health



to　do　with　care？　　Health　has　to　do　with　carelessness。　　In　special



and　abnormal　cases　it　is　necessary　to　have　care。　　When　we　are　peculiarly



unhealthy　it　may　be　necessary　to　be　careful　in　order　to　be　healthy。



But　even　then　we　are　only　trying　to　be　healthy　in　order　to　be　careless。



If　we　are　doctors　we　are　speaking　to　exceptionally　sick　men；



and　they　ought　to　be　told　to　be　careful。　　But　when　we　are　sociologists



we　are　addressing　the　normal　man；　we　are　addressing　humanity。



And　humanity　ought　to　be　told　to　be　recklessness　itself。



For　all　the　fundamental　functions　of　a　healthy　man　ought　emphatically



to　be　performed　with　pleasure　and　for　pleasure；　they　emphatically



ought　not　to　be　performed　with　precaution　or　for　precaution。



A　man　ought　to　eat　because　he　has　a　good　appetite　to　satisfy；



and　emphatically　not　because　he　has　a　body　to　sustain。　　A　man　ought



to　take　exercise　not　because　he　is　too　fat；　but　because　he　loves　foils



or　horses　or　high　mountains；　and　loves　them　for　their　own　sake。



And　a　man　ought　to　marry　because　he　has　fallen　in　love；



and　emphatically　not　because　the　world　requires　to　be　populated。



The　food　will　really　renovate　his　tissues　as　long　as　he　is　not　thinking



about　his　tissues。　　The　exercise　will　really　get　him　into　training



so　long　as　he　is　thinking　about　something　else。　　And　the　marriage　will



really　stand　some　chance　of　producing　a　generous…blooded　generation



if　it　had　its　origin　in　its　own　natural　and　generous　excitement。



It　is　the　first　law　of　health　that　our　necessities　should　not　be



accepted　as　necessities；　they　should　be　accepted　as　luxuries。



Let　us；　then；　be　careful　about　the　small　things；　such　as　a　scratch



or　a　slight　illness；　or　anything　that　can　be　managed　with　care。



But　in　the　name　of　all　sanity；　let　us　be　careless　about　the



important　things；　such　as　marriage；　or　the　fountain　of　our　very



life　will　fail。







Mr。　Wells；　however；　is　not　quite　clear　enough　of　the　narrower



scientific　outlook　to　see　that　there　are　some　things　which　actually



ought　not　to　be　scientific。　　He　is　still　slightly　affected　with



the　great　scientific　fallacy；　I　mean　the　habit　of　beginning　not



with　the　human　soul；　which　is　the　first　thing　a　man　learns　about；



but　with　some　such　thing　as　protoplasm；　which　is　about　the　last。



The　one　defect　in　his　splendid　mental　equipment　is　that　he　does



not　sufficiently　allow　for　the　stuff　or　material　of　men。



In　his　new　Utopia　he　says；　for　instance；　that　a　chief　point　of



the　Utopia　will　be　a　disbelief　in　original　sin。　　If　he　had　begun



with　the　human　soulthat　is；　if　he　had　begun　on　himselfhe　would



have　found　original　sin　almost　the　first　thing　to　be　believed　in。



He　would　have　found；　to　put　the　matter　shortly；　that　a　permanent



possibility　of　selfishness　arises　from　the　mere　fact　of　having　a　self；



and　not　from　any　accidents　of　education　or　ill…treatment。　And



the　weakness　of　all　Utopias　is　this；　that　they　take　the　greatest



difficulty　of　man　and　assume　it　to　be　overcome；　and　then　give



an　elaborate　account　of　the　overcoming　of　the　smaller　ones。



They　first　assume　that　no　man　will　want　more　than　his　share；



and　then　are　very　ingenious　in　explaining　whether　his　share



will　be　delivered　by　motor…car　or　balloon。　　And　an　even　stronger



example　of　Mr。　Wells's　indifference　to　the　human　psychology　can



be　found　in　his　cosmopolitanism；　the　abolition　in　his　Utopia　of　all



patriotic　boundaries。　　He　says　in　his　innocent　way　that　Utopia



must　be　a　world…state；　or　else　people　might　make　war　on　it。



It　does　not　seem　to　occur　to　him　that；　for　a　good　many　of　us；　if　it　were



a　world…state　we　should　still　make　war　on　it　to　the　end　of　the　world。



For　if　we　admit　that　there　must　be　varieties　in　art　or　opinion　what



sense　is　there　in　thinking　there　will　not　be　varieties　in　government？



The　fact　is　very　simple。　　Unless　you　are　going　deliberately　to　prevent



a　thing　being　good；　you　cannot　prevent　it　being　worth　fighting　for。



It　is　impossible　to　prevent　a　possible　conflict　of　civilizations；



because　it　is　impossible　to　prevent　a　possible　conflict　between　ideals。



If　there　were　no　longer　our　modern　strife　between　nations；　there　would



only　be　a　strife　between　Utopias。　　For　the　highest　thing　does　not　tend



to　union　only；　the　highest　thing；　tends　also　to　differentiation。



You　can　often　get　men　to　fight　for　the　union；　but　you　can



never　prevent　them　from　fighting　also　for　the　differentiation。



This　variety　in　the　highest　thing　is　the　meaning　of　the　fierce　patriotism；



the　fierce　nationalism　of　the　great　European　civilization。



It　is　also；　incidentally；　the　meaning　of　the　doctrine　of　the　Trinity。







But　I　think　the　main　mistake　of　Mr。　Wells's　philosophy　is　a　somewhat



deeper　one；　one　that　he　expresses　in　a　very　entertaining　manner



in　the　introductory　part　of　the　new　Utopia。　　His　philosophy　in　some



sense　amounts　to　a　denial　of　the　possibility　of　philosophy　itself。



At　least；　he　maintains　that　there　are　no　secure　and　reliable



ideas　upon　which　we　can　rest　with　a　final　mental　satisfaction。



It　will　be　both　clearer；　however；　and　more　amusing　to　quote



Mr。　Wells　himself。







He　says；　〃Nothing　endures；　nothing　is　precise　and　certain



（except　the　mind　of　a　pedant）。　。　。　。　Being　indeed！there　is　no　being；



but　a　universal　becoming　of　individualities；　and　Plato　turned　his　back



on　truth　when　he　turned　towards　his　museum　of　specific　ideals。〃



Mr。　Wells　says；　again；　〃There　is　no　abiding　thing　in　what　we　know。



We　change　from　weaker　to　stronger　lights；　and　each　more　powerful



light　pierces　our　hitherto　opaque　foundations　and　reveals



fresh　and　different　opacities　below。〃　　Now；　when　Mr。　Wells



says　things　like　this；　I　speak　with　all　respect　when　I　say



that　he　does　not　observe　an　evident　mental　distinction。



It　cannot　be　true　that　there　is　nothing　abiding　in　what　we　know。



For　if　that　were　so　we　should　not　know　it　all　and　should　not　call



it　knowledge。　　Our　mental　state　may　be　very　different　from　that



of　somebody　else　some　thousands　of　years　back；　but　it　cannot　be



entirely　different；　or　else　we　should　not　be　conscious　of　a　difference。



Mr。　Wells　must　surely　realize　the　first　and　simplest　of　the　paradoxes



that　sit　by　the　springs　of　truth。　　He　must　surely　see　that　the　fact



of　two　things　being　different　implies　that　they　are　similar。



The　hare　and　the　tortoise　may　differ　in　the　quality　of　swiftness；



but　they　must　agree　in　the　quality　of　motion。　　The　swiftest　hare



cannot　be　swifter　than　an　isosceles　triangle　or　the　idea　of　pinkness。



When　we　say　the　hare　moves　faster；　we　say　that　the　tortoise　moves。



And　when　we　say　of　a　thing　that　it　moves；　we　say；　without　need



of　other　words；　that　there　are　things　that　do　not　move。



And　even　in　the　act　of　saying　that　things　c