meditations on first philosophy-第1部分

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditations　on　First　Philosophy

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　by　Rene　Descartes

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1641




　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Prefatory　Note　To　The　Meditations。

　　　　　The　first　edition　of　the　Meditations　was　published　in　Latin　by　Michael　Soly　of　Paris　〃at　the　Sign　of　the　Phoenix〃　in　1641　cum　Privilegio　et　Approbatione　Doctorum。　　The　Royal　〃privilege〃　was　indeed　given；　but　the　〃approbation〃　seems　to　have　been　of　a　most　indefinite　kind。　　The　reason　of　the　book　being　published　in　France　and　not　in　Holland；　where　Descartes　was　living　in　a　charming　country　house　at　Endegeest　near　Leiden；　was　apparently　his　fear　that　the　Dutch　ministers　might　in　some　way　lay　hold　of　it。　　His　friend；　Pere　Mersenne；　took　charge　of　its　publication　in　Paris　and　wrote　to　him　about　any　difficulties　that　occurred　in　the　course　of　its　progress　through　the　press。　　The　second　edition　was　however　published　at　Amsterdam　in　1642　by　Louis　Elzevir；　and　this　edition　was　accompanied　by　the　now　completed　〃Objections　and　Replies。〃2　The　edition　from　which　the　present　translation　is　made　is　the　second　just　mentioned；　and　is　that　adopted　by　MM。　Adam　and　Tannery　as　the　more　correct；　for　reasons　that　they　state　in　detail　in　the　preface　to　their　edition。　　The　work　was　translated　into　French　by　the　Duc　de　Luynes　in　1642　and　Descartes　considered　the　translation　so　excellent　that　he　had　it　published　some　years　later。　　Clerselier；　to　complete　matters；　had　the　〃Objections〃　also　published　in　French　with　the　〃Replies；〃　and　this；　like　the　other；　was　subject　to　Descartes'　revision　and　correction。　　This　revision　renders　the　French　edition　specially　valuable。　　Where　it　seems　desirable　an　alternative　reading　from　the　French　is　given　in　square　brackets。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Elizabeth　S。　Haldane


　　　　　　　　　　　　　TO　THE　MOST　WISE　AND　ILLUSTRIOUS　THE　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　DEAN　AND　DOCTORS　OF　THE　SACRED　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FACULTY　OF　THEOLOGY　IN　PARIS。

　　　　　The　motive　which　induces　me　to　present　to　you　this　Treatise　is　so　excellent；　and；　when　you　become　acquainted　with　its　design；　I　am　convinced　that　you　will　also　have　so　excellent　a　motive　for　taking　it　under　your　protection；　that　I　feel　that　I　cannot　do　better；　in　order　to　render　it　in　some　sort　acceptable　to　you；　than　in　a　few　words　to　state　what　I　have　set　myself　to　do。　　　　　　I　have　always　considered　that　the　two　questions　respecting　God　and　the　Soul　were　the　chief　of　those　that　ought　to　be　demonstrated　by　philosophical　rather　than　theological　argument。　　For　although　it　is　quite　enough　for　us　faithful　ones　to　accept　by　means　of　faith　the　fact　that　the　human　soul　does　not　perish　with　the　body；　and　that　God　exists；　it　certainly　does　not　seem　possible　ever　to　persuade　infidels　of　any　religion；　indeed；　we　may　almost　say；　of　any　moral　virtue；　unless；　to　begin　with；　we　prove　these　two　facts　by　means　of　the　natural　reason。　　And　inasmuch　as　often　in　this　life　greater　rewards　are　offered　for　vice　than　for　virtue；　few　people　would　prefer　the　right　to　the　useful；　were　they　restrained　neither　by　the　fear　of　God　nor　the　expectation　of　another　life；　and　although　it　is　absolutely　true　that　we　must　believe　that　there　is　a　God；　because　we　are　so　taught　in　the　Holy　Scriptures；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　that　we　must　believe　the　Holy　Scriptures　because　they　come　from　God　（the　reason　of　this　is；　that；　faith　being　a　gift　of　God；　He　who　gives　the　grace　to　cause　us　to　believe　other　things　can　likewise　give　it　to　cause　us　to　believe　that　He　exists）；　we　nevertheless　could　not　place　this　argument　before　infidels；　who　might　accuse　us　of　reasoning　in　a　circle。　　And；　in　truth；　I　have　noticed　that　you；　along　with　all　the　theologians；　did　not　only　affirm　that　the　existence　of　God　may　be　proved　by　the　natural　reason；　but　also　that　it　may　be　inferred　from　the　Holy　Scriptures；　that　knowledge　about　Him　is　much　clearer　than　that　which　we　have　of　many　created　things；　and；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　is　so　easy　to　acquire；　that　those　who　have　it　not　are　culpable　in　their　ignorance。　　This　indeed　appears　from　the　Wisdom　of　Solomon；　chapter　xiii。；　where　it　is　said　〃Howbeit　they　are　not　to　be　excused；　for　if　their　understanding　was　so　great　that　they　could　discern　the　world　and　the　creatures；　why　did　they　not　rather　find　out　the　Lord　thereof？〃　　and　in　Romans；　chapter　i。；　it　is　said　that　they　are　〃without　excuse〃；　and　again　in　the　same　place；　by　these　words　〃that　which　may　be　known　of　God　is　manifest　in　them；〃　it　seems　as　through　we　were　shown　that　all　that　which　can　be　known　of　God　may　be　made　manifest　by　means　which　are　not　derived　from　anywhere　but　from　ourselves；　and　from　the　simple　consideration　of　the　nature　of　our　minds。　Hence　I　thought　it　not　beside　my　purpose　to　inquire　how　this　is　so；　and　how　God　may　be　more　easily　and　certainly　known　than　the　things　of　the　world。　　　　　　And　as　regards　the　soul；　although　many　have　considered　that　it　is　not　easy　to　know　its　nature；　and　some　have　even　dared　to　say　that　human　reasons　have　convinced　us　that　it　would　perish　with　the　body；　and　that　faith　alone　could　believe　the　contrary；　nevertheless；　inasmuch　as　the　Lateran　Council　held　under　Leo　X　（in　the　eighth　session）　condemns　these　tenets；　and　as　Leo　expressly　ordains　Christian　philosophers　to　refute　their　arguments　and　to　employ　all　their　powers　in　making　known　the　truth；　I　have　ventured　in　this　treatise　to　undertake　the　same　task。　　　　　　More　than　that；　I　am　aware　that　the　principal　reason　which　causes　many　impious　persons　not　to　desire　to　believe　that　there　is　a　God；　and　that　the　human　soul　is　distinct　from　the　body；　is　that　they　declare　that　hitherto　no　one　has　been　able　to　demonstrate　these　two　facts；　and　although　I　am　not　of　their　opinion　but；　on　the　contrary；　hold　that　the　greater　part　of　the　reasons　which　have　been　brought　forward　concerning　these　two　questions　by　so　many　great　men　are；　when　they　are　rightly　understood；　equal　to　so　many　demonstrations；　and　that　it　is　almost　impossible　to　invent　new　ones；　it　is　yet　in　my　opinion　the　case　that　nothing　more　useful　can　be　accomplished　in　philosophy　than　once　for　all　to　seek　with　care　for　the　best　of　these　reasons；　and　to　set　them　forth　in　so　clear　and　exact　a　manner；　that　it　will　henceforth　be　evident　to　everybody　that　they　are　veritable　demonstrations。　　And；　finally；　inasmuch　as　it　was　desired　that　I　should　undertake　this　task　by　many　who　were　aware　that　I　had　cultivated　a　certain　Method　for　the　resolution　of　difficulties　of　every　kind　in　the　Sciences；　a　method　which　it　is　true　is　not　novel；　since　there　is　nothing　more　ancient　than　the　truth；　but　of　which　they　were　aware　that　I　had　made　use　successfully　enough　in　other　matters　of　difficulty　I　have　thought　that　it　was　my　duty　also　to　make　trial　of　it　in　the　present　matter。　　　　　　Now　all　that　I　could　accomplish　in　the　matter　is　contained　in　this　Treatise。　　Not　that　I　have　here　drawn　together　all　the　different　reasons　which　might　be　brought　forward　to　serve　as　proofs　of　this　subject：　　for　that　never　seemed　to　be　necessary　excepting　when　there　was　no　one　single　proof　that　was　certain。　　But　I　have　treated　the　first　and　principal　ones　in　such　a　manner　that　I　can　venture　to　bring　them　forward　as　very　evident　and　very　certain　demonstrations。　And　more　than　that；　I　will　say　that　these　proofs　are　such　that　I　do　not　think　that　there　is　any　way　open　to　the　human　mind　by　which　it　can　ever　succeed　in　discovering　better。　　For　the　importance　of　the　subject；　and　the　glory　of　God　to　which　all　this　relates；　constrain　me　to　speak　here　somewhat　more　freely　of　myself　than　is　my　habit。　　Nevertheless；　whatever　certainty　and　evidence　I　find　in　my　reasons；　I　cannot　persuade　myself　that　all　the　world　is　capable　of　understanding　them。　　Still；　just　as　in　Geometry　there　are　many　demonstrations　that　have　been　left　to　us　by　Archimedes；　by　Apollonius；　by　Pappus；　and　others；　which　are　accepted　by　everyone　as　perfectly　certain　and　evident　（because　they　clearly　contain　nothing　which；　considered　by　itself；　is　not　very　easy　to　understand；　and　as　all　through　that　which　follows　has　an　exact　connection　with；　and　dependence　on　that　which　precedes）；　nevertheless；　because　they　are　somewhat　lengthy；　and　demand　a　mind　wholly　devoted　to　their　consideration；　they　are　only　taken　in　and　understood　by　a　very　limited　number　of　persons。　　Similarly；　although　I　judge　that　those　of　which　I　here　make　use　are　equal　to；　or　even　surpass　in　certainty　and　evidence；　the　demonstrations　of　Geometry；　I　yet　apprehend　that　they　cannot　be　adequately　understood　by　many；　both　because　they　are　also　a　little　lengthy　and　dependent　the　one　on　the　other；　and　principally　because　they　demand　a　mind　wholly　free　of　prejudices；　and　one　which　can　be　easily　detached　from　the　affairs　of　the　senses。　And；　truth　to　say；　there　are　not　so　many　in　the　world　who　are　fitted　for　metaphysical　speculations　as　there　are　for　those　of　Geometry。　　And　more　than　that；　there　is　still　this　difference；　that　in　Geometry；　since　each　one　is　persuaded　that　nothing　must　be　advanced　of　which　there　is　not　a　certain　demonstration；　those　who　are　not　entirely　adepts　more　frequently　err　in　approving　what　is　false；　in　order　to　give　the　impression　that　they　understand　it；　than　in　refuting　the　true。　　But　the　case　is　different　in　philosophy　where　everyone　believes　that　all　is　problematical