meditations on first philosophy-第12部分

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d　non…being；　that　there　is　in　truth　nothing　in　me　that　can　lead　to　error　in　so　far　as　a　sovereign　Being　has　formed　me；　but　that；　as　I　in　some　degree　participate　likewise　in　nought　or　in　non…being；　i。e。　in　so　far　as　I　am　not　myself　the　supreme　Being；　and　as　I　find　myself　subject　to　an　infinitude　of　imperfections；　I　ought　not　to　be　astonished　if　I　should　fall　into　error。　　Thus　do　I　recognise　that　error；　in　so　far　as　it　is　such；　is　not　a　real　thing　depending　on　God；　but　simply　a　defect；　and　therefore；　in　order　to　fall　into　it；　that　I　have　no　need　to　possess　a　special　faculty　given　me　by　God　for　this　very　purpose；　but　that　I　fall　into　error　from　the　fact　that　the　power　given　me　by　God　for　the　purpose　of　distinguishing　truth　from　error　is　not　infinite。　　　　　　Nevertheless　this　does　not　quite　satisfy　me；　for　error　is　not　a　pure　negation　＇i。e。　is　not　the　dimple　defect　or　want　of　some　perfection　which　ought　not　to　be　mine＇；　but　it　is　a　lack　of　some　knowledge　which　it　seems　that　I　ought　to　possess。　　And　on　considering　the　nature　of　God　it　does　not　appear　to　me　possible　that　He　should　have　given　me　a　faculty　which　is　not　perfect　of　its　kind；　that　is；　which　is　wanting　in　some　perfection　due　to　it。　　For　if　it　is　true　that　the　more　skilful　the　artizan；　the　more　perfect　is　the　work　of　his　hands；　what　can　have　been　produced　by　this　supreme　Creator　of　all　things　that　is　not　in　all　its　parts　perfect？　　And　certainly　there　is　no　doubt　that　God　could　have　created　me　so　that　I　could　never　have　been　subject　to　error；　it　is　also　certain　that　He　ever　wills　what　is　best；　is　it　then　better　that　I　should　be　subject　to　err　than　that　I　should　not？　　　　　　In　considering　this　more　attentively；　it　occurs　to　me　in　the　first　place　that　I　should　not　be　astonished　if　my　intelligence　is　not　capable　of　comprehending　why　God　acts　as　He　does；　and　that　there　is　thus　no　reason　to　doubt　of　His　existence　from　the　fact　that　I　may　perhaps　find　many　other　things　besides　this　as　to　which　I　am　able　to　understand　neither　for　what　reason　nor　how　God　has　produced　them。　　For；　in　the　first　place；　knowing　that　my　nature　is　extremely　feeble　and　limited；　and　that　the　nature　of　God　is　on　the　contrary　immense；　incomprehensible；　and　infinite；　I　have　no　further　difficulty　in　recognising　that　there　is　an　infinitude　of　matter　in　His　power；　the　causes　of　which　transcend　my　knowledge；　and　this　reason　suffices　to　convince　me　that　the　species　of　cause　termed　final；　finds　no　useful　employment　in　physical　＇or　natural＇　things；　for　it　does　not　appear　to　me　that　I　can　without　temerity　seek　to　investigate　the　＇inscrutable＇　ends　of　God。　　　　　　It　further　occurs　to　me　that　we　should　not　consider　one　single　creature　separately；　when　we　inquire　as　to　whether　the　works　of　God　are　perfect；　but　should　regard　all　his　creations　together。　　For　the　same　thing　which　might　possibly　seem　very　imperfect　with　some　semblance　of　reason　if　regarded　by　itself；　is　found　to　be　very　perfect　if　regarded　as　part　of　the　whole　universe；　and　although；　since　I　resolved　to　doubt　all　things；　I　as　yet　have　only　known　certainly　my　own　existence　and　that　of　God；　nevertheless　since　I　have　recognised　the　infinite　power　of　God；　I　cannot　deny　that　He　may　have　produced　many　other　things；　or　at　least　that　He　has　the　power　of　producing　them；　so　that　I　may　obtain　a　place　as　a　part　of　a　great　universe。　　　　　　Whereupon；　regarding　myself　more　closely；　and　considering　what　are　my　errors　（for　they　alone　testify　to　there　being　any　imperfection　in　me）；　I　answer　that　they　depend　on　a　combination　of　two　causes；　to　wit；　on　the　faculty　of　knowledge　that　rests　in　me；　and　on　the　power　of　choice　or　of　free　will￥that　is　to　say；　of　the　understanding　and　at　the　same　time　of　the　will。　　For　by　the　understanding　alone　I　＇neither　assert　nor　deny　anything；　but＇　apprehend19　the　ideas　of　things　as　to　which　I　can　form　a　judgment。　　But　no　error　is　properly　speaking　found　in　it；　provided　the　word　error　is　taken　in　its　proper　signification；　and　though　there　is　possibly　an　infinitude　of　things　in　the　world　of　which　I　have　no　idea　in　my　understanding；　we　cannot　for　all　that　say　that　it　is　deprived　of　these　ideas　＇as　we　might　say　of　something　which　is　required　by　its　nature＇；　but　simply　it　does　not　possess　these；　because　in　truth　there　is　no　reason　to　prove　that　God　should　have　given　me　a　greater　faculty　of　knowledge　than　He　has　given　me；　and　however　skillful　a　workman　I　represent　Him　to　be；　I　should　not　for　all　that　consider　that　He　was　bound　to　have　placed　in　each　of　His　works　all　the　perfections　which　He　may　have　been　able　to　place　in　some。　　I　likewise　cannot　complain　that　God　has　not　given　me　a　free　choice　or　a　will　which　is　sufficient；　ample　and　perfect；　since　as　a　matter　of　fact　I　am　conscious　of　a　will　so　extended　as　to　be　subject　to　no　limits。　And　what　seems　to　me　very　remarkable　in　this　regard　is　that　of　all　the　qualities　which　I　possess　there　is　no　one　so　perfect　and　so　comprehensive　that　I　do　not　very　clearly　recognise　that　it　might　be　yet　greater　and　more　perfect。　　For；　to　take　an　example；　if　I　consider　the　faculty　of　comprehension　which　I　possess；　I　find　that　it　is　of　very　small　extent　and　extremely　limited；　and　at　the　same　time　I　find　the　idea　of　another　faculty　much　more　ample　and　even　infinite；　and　seeing　that　I　can　form　the　idea　of　it；　I　recognise　from　this　very　fact　that　it　pertains　to　the　nature　of　God。　　If　in　the　same　way　I　examine　the　memory；　the　imagination；　or　some　other　faculty；　I　do　not　find　any　which　is　not　small　and　circumscribed；　while　in　God　it　is　immense　＇or　infinite＇。　　It　is　free…will　alone　or　liberty　of　choice　which　I　find　to　be　so　great　in　me　that　I　can　conceive　no　other　idea　to　be　more　great；　it　is　indeed　the　case　that　it　is　for　the　most　part　this　will　that　causes　me　to　know　that　in　some　manner　I　bear　the　image　and　similitude　of　God。　For　although　the　power　of　will　is　incomparably　greater　in　God　than　in　me；　both　by　reason　of　the　knowledge　and　the　power　which；　conjoined　with　it；　render　it　stronger　and　more　efficacious；　and　by　reason　of　its　object；　inasmuch　as　in　God　it　extends　to　a　great　many　things；　it　nevertheless　does　not　seem　to　me　greater　if　I　consider　it　formally　and　precisely　in　itself：　　for　the　faculty　of　will　consists　alone　in　our　having　the　power　of　choosing　to　do　a　thing　or　choosing　not　to　do　it　（that　is；　to　affirm　or　deny；　to　pursue　or　to　shun　it）；　or　rather　it　consists　alone　in　the　fact　that　in　order　to　affirm　or　deny；　pursue　or　shun　those　things　placed　before　us　by　the　understanding；　we　act　so　that　we　are　unconscious　that　any　outside　force　constrains　us　in　doing　so。　　For　in　order　that　I　should　be　free　it　is　not　necessary　that　I　should　be　indifferent　as　to　the　choice　of　one　or　the　other　of　two　contraries；　but　contrariwise　the　more　I　lean　to　the　one￥whether　I　recognise　clearly　that　the　reasons　of　the　good　and　true　are　to　be　found　in　it；　or　whether　God　so　disposes　my　inward　thought￥the　more　freely　do　I　choose　and　embrace　it。　And　undoubtedly　both　divine　grace　and　natural　knowledge；　far　from　diminishing　my　liberty；　rather　increase　it　and　strengthen　it。　　Hence　this　indifference　which　I　feel；　when　I　am　not　swayed　to　one　side　rather　than　to　the　other　by　lack　of　reason；　is　the　lowest　grade　of　liberty；　and　rather　evinces　a　lack　or　negation　in　knowledge　than　a　perfection　of　will：　　for　if　I　always　recognised　clearly　what　was　true　and　good；　I　should　never　have　trouble　in　deliberating　as　to　what　judgment　or　choice　I　should　make；　and　then　I　should　be　entirely　free　without　ever　being　indifferent。　　　　　　From　all　this　I　recognise　that　the　power　of　will　which　I　have　received　from　God　is　not　of　itself　the　source　of　my　errors￥for　it　is　very　ample　and　very　perfect　of　its　kind￥any　more　than　is　the　power　of　understanding；　for　since　I　understand　nothing　but　by　the　power　which　God　has　given　me　for　understanding；　there　is　no　doubt　that　all　that　I　understand；　I　understand　as　I　ought；　and　it　is　not　possible　that　I　err　in　this。　　Whence　then　come　my　errors？　　They　come　from　the　sole　fact　that　since　the　will　is　much　wider　in　its　range　and　compass　than　the　understanding；　I　do　not　restrain　it　within　the　same　bounds；　but　extend　it　also　to　things　which　I　do　not　understand：　　and　as　the　will　is　of　itself　indifferent　to　these；　it　easily　falls　into　error　and　sin；　and　chooses　the　evil　for　the　good；　or　the　false　for　the　true。　　　　　　For　example；　when　I　lately　examined　whether　anything　existed　in　the　world；　and　found　that　from　the　very　fact　that　I　considered　this　question　it　followed　very　clearly　that　I　myself　existed；　I　could　not　prevent　myself　from　believing　that　a　thing　I　so　clearly　conceived　was　true：　　not　that　I　found　myself　compelled　to　do　so　by　some　external　cause；　but　simply　because　from　great　clearness　in　my　mind　there　followed　a　great　inclination　of　my　will；　and　I　believed　this　with　so　much　the　greater　freedom　or　spontaneity　as　I　possessed　the　less　indifference　towards　it。　　Now；　on　the　contrary；　I　not　only　know　that　I　exist；　inasmuch　as　I　am　a　thinking　thing；　but　a　certain　representation　of　corporeal　nature　is　also　presented　to　my　mind；　and　it　comes　to　pass　that　I　doubt　whether　this　thinking　nature　which　is　in　me；　or　rather　by　which　I　am　what　I　am；　differs　from　this　corporeal　nature；　or　whether　both　are　not　simply　the　same　thing；　and　I　here　suppose　that　I　do　not　yet　know　any