meditations on first philosophy-第17部分

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ng；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　they　cannot　be　so　conceived　apart　from　me；　that　is　without　an　intelligent　substance　in　which　they　reside；　for　＇in　the　notion　we　have　of　these　faculties；　or；　to　use　the　language　of　the　Schools＇　in　their　formal　concept；　some　kind　of　intellection　is　comprised；　from　which　I　infer　that　they　are　distinct　from　me　as　its　modes　are　from　a　thing。　　I　observe　also　in　me　some　other　faculties　such　as　that　of　change　of　position；　the　assumption　of　different　figures　and　such　like；　which　cannot　be　conceived；　any　more　than　can　the　preceding；　apart　from　some　substance　to　which　they　are　attached；　and　consequently　cannot　exist　without　it；　but　it　is　very　clear　that　these　faculties；　if　it　be　true　that　they　exist；　must　be　attached　to　some　corporeal　or　extended　substance；　and　not　to　an　intelligent　substance；　since　in　the　clear　and　distinct　conception　of　these　there　is　some　sort　of　extension　found　to　be　present；　but　no　intellection　at　all。　　There　is　certainly　further　in　me　a　certain　passive　faculty　of　perception；　that　is；　of　receiving　and　recognising　the　ideas　of　sensible　things；　but　this　would　be　useless　to　me　＇and　I　could　in　no　way　avail　myself　of　it＇；　if　there　were　not　either　in　me　or　in　some　other　thing　another　active　faculty　capable　of　forming　and　producing　these　ideas。　　But　this　active　faculty　cannot　exist　in　me　＇inasmuch　as　I　am　a　thing　that　thinks＇　seeing　that　it　does　not　presuppose　thought；　and　also　that　those　ideas　are　often　produced　in　me　without　my　contributing　in　any　way　to　the　same；　and　often　even　against　my　will；　it　is　thus　necessarily　the　case　that　the　faculty　resides　in　some　substance　different　from　me　in　which　all　the　reality　which　is　objectively　in　the　ideas　that　are　produced　by　this　faculty　is　formally　or　eminently　contained；　as　I　remarked　before。　　And　this　substance　is　either　a　body；　that　is；　a　corporeal　nature　in　which　there　is　contained　formally　＇and　really＇　all　that　which　is　objectively　＇and　by　representation＇　in　those　ideas；　or　it　is　God　Himself；　or　some　other　creature　more　noble　than　body　in　which　that　same　is　contained　eminently。　　But；　since　God　is　no　deceiver；　it　is　very　manifest　that　He　does　not　communicate　to　me　these　ideas　immediately　and　by　Himself；　nor　yet　by　the　intervention　of　some　creature　in　which　their　reality　is　not　formally；　but　only　eminently；　contained。　　For　since　He　has　given　me　no　faculty　to　recognise　that　this　is　the　case；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　a　very　great　inclination　to　believe　＇that　they　are　sent　to　me　or＇　that　they　are　conveyed　to　me　by　corporeal　objects；　I　do　not　see　how　He　could　be　defended　from　the　accusation　of　deceit　if　these　ideas　were　produced　by　causes　other　than　corporeal　objects。　　Hence　we　must　allow　that　corporeal　things　exist。　However；　they　are　perhaps　not　exactly　what　we　perceive　by　the　senses；　since　this　comprehension　by　the　senses　is　in　many　instances　very　obscure　and　confused；　but　we　must　at　least　admit　that　all　things　which　I　conceive　in　them　clearly　and　distinctly；　that　is　to　say；　all　things　which；　speaking　generally；　are　comprehended　in　the　object　of　pure　mathematics；　are　truly　to　be　recognised　as　external　objects。　　　　　　As　to　other　things；　however；　which　are　either　particular　only；　as；　for　example；　that　the　sun　is　of　such　and　such　a　figure；　etc。；　or　which　are　less　clearly　and　distinctly　conceived；　such　as　light；　sound；　pain　and　the　like；　it　is　certain　that　although　they　are　very　dubious　and　uncertain；　yet　on　the　sole　ground　that　God　is　not　a　deceiver；　and　that　consequently　He　has　not　permitted　any　falsity　to　exist　in　my　opinion　which　He　has　not　likewise　given　me　the　faculty　of　correcting；　I　may　assuredly　hope　to　conclude　that　I　have　within　me　the　means　of　arriving　at　the　truth　even　here。　　And　first　of　all　there　is　no　doubt　that　in　all　things　which　nature　teaches　me　there　is　some　truth　contained；　for　by　nature；　considered　in　general；　I　now　understand　no　other　thing　than　either　God　Himself　or　else　the　order　and　disposition　which　God　has　established　in　created　things；　and　by　my　nature　in　particular　I　understand　no　other　thing　than　the　complexus　of　all　the　things　which　God　has　given　me。　　　　　　But　there　is　nothing　which　this　nature　teaches　me　more　expressly　＇nor　more　sensibly＇　than　that　I　have　a　body　which　is　adversely　affected　when　I　feel　pain；　which　has　need　of　food　or　drink　when　I　experience　the　feelings　of　hunger　and　thirst；　and　so　on；　nor　can　I　doubt　there　being　some　truth　in　all　this。　　　　　　Nature　also　teaches　me　by　these　sensations　of　pain；　hunger；　thirst；　etc。；　that　I　am　not　only　lodged　in　my　body　as　a　pilot　in　a　vessel；　but　that　I　am　not　only　lodged　in　my　body　as　a　pilot　in　a　vessel；　but　that　I　am　very　closely　united　to　it；　and　so　to　speak　so　intermingled　with　it　that　I　seem　to　compose　with　it　one　whole。　　For　if　that　were　not　the　case；　when　my　body　is　hurt；　I；　who　am　merely　a　thinking　thing；　should　not　feel　pain；　for　I　should　perceive　this　wound　by　the　understanding　only；　just　as　the　sailor　perceives　by　sight　when　something　is　damaged　in　his　vessel；　and　when　my　body　has　need　of　drink　or　food；　I　should　clearly　understand　the　fact　without　being　warned　of　it　by　confused　feelings　of　hunger　and　thirst。　For　all　these　sensations　of　hunger；　thirst；　pain；　etc。　are　in　truth　none　other　than　certain　confused　modes　of　thought　which　are　produced　by　the　union　and　apparent　intermingling　of　mind　and　body。　　　　　　Moreover；　nature　teaches　me　that　many　other　bodies　exist　around　mine；　of　which　some　are　to　be　avoided；　and　others　sought　after。　　And　certainly　from　the　fact　that　I　am　sensible　of　different　sorts　of　colours；　sounds；　scents；　tastes；　heat；　hardness；　etc。；　I　very　easily　conclude　that　there　are　in　the　bodies　from　which　all　these　diverse　sense…perceptions　proceed　certain　variations　which　answer　to　them；　although　possibly　these　are　not　really　at　all　similar　to　them。　　And　also　from　the　fact　that　amongst　these　different　sense…perceptions　some　are　very　agreeable　to　me　and　others　disagreeable；　it　is　quite　certain　that　my　body　（or　rather　myself　in　my　entirety；　inasmuch　as　I　am　formed　of　body　and　soul）　may　receive　different　impressions　agreeable　and　disagreeable　from　the　other　bodies　which　surround　it。　　　　　　But　there　are　many　other　things　which　nature　seems　to　have　taught　me；　but　which　at　the　same　time　I　have　never　really　received　from　her；　but　which　have　been　brought　about　in　my　mind　by　a　certain　habit　which　I　have　of　forming　inconsiderate　judgments　on　things；　and　thus　it　may　easily　happen　that　these　judgments　contain　some　error。　　Take；　for　example；　the　opinion　which　I　hold　that　all　space　in　which　there　is　nothing　that　affects　＇or　makes　an　impression　on＇　my　senses　is　void；　that　in　a　body　which　is　warm　there　is　something　entirely　similar　to　the　idea　of　heat　which　is　in　me；　that　in　a　white　or　green　body　there　is　the　same　whiteness　or　greenness　that　I　perceive；　that　in　a　bitter　or　sweet　body　there　is　the　same　taste；　and　so　on　in　other　instances；　that　the　stars；　the　towers；　and　all　other　distant　bodies　are　of　the　same　figure　and　size　as　they　appear　from　far　off　to　our　eyes；　etc。　　But　in　order　that　in　this　there　should　be　nothing　which　I　do　not　conceive　distinctly；　I　should　define　exactly　what　I　really　understand　when　I　say　that　I　am　taught　somewhat　by　nature。　　For　here　I　take　nature　in　a　more　limited　signification　than　when　I　term　it　the　sum　of　all　the　things　given　me　by　God；　since　in　this　sum　many　things　are　comprehended　which　only　pertain　to　mind　（and　to　these　I　do　not　refer　in　speaking　of　nature）　such　as　the　notion　which　I　have　of　the　fact　that　what　has　once　been　done　cannot　ever　be　undone　and　an　infinitude　of　such　things　which　I　know　by　the　light　of　nature　＇without　the　help　of　the　body＇；　and　seeing　that　it　comprehends　many　other　matters　besides　which　only　pertain　to　body；　and　are　no　longer　here　contained　under　the　name　of　nature；　such　as　the　quality　of　weight　which　it　possesses　and　the　like；　with　which　I　also　do　not　deal；　for　in　talking　of　nature　I　only　treat　of　those　things　given　by　God　to　me　as　a　being　composed　of　mind　and　body。　　But　the　nature　here　described　truly　teaches　me　to　flee　from　things　which　cause　the　sensation　of　pain；　and　seek　after　the　things　which　communicate　to　me　the　sentiment　of　pleasure　and　so　forth；　but　I　do　not　see　that　beyond　this　it　teaches　me　that　from　those　diverse　sense…　perceptions　we　should　ever　form　any　conclusion　regarding　things　outside　of　us；　without　having　＇carefully　and　maturely＇　mentally　examined　them　beforehand。　　For　it　seems　to　me　that　it　is　mind　alone；　and　not　mind　and　body　in　conjunction；　that　is　requisite　to　a　knowledge　of　the　truth　in　regard　to　such　things。　　Thus；　although　a　star　makes　no　larger　an　impression　on　my　eye　than　the　flame　of　a　little　candle　there　is　yet　in　me　no　real　or　positive　propensity　impelling　me　to　believe　that　it　is　not　greater　than　that　flame；　but　I　have　judged　it　to　be　so　from　my　earliest　years；　without　any　rational　foundation。　　And　although　in　approaching　fire　I　feel　heat；　and　in　approaching　it　a　little　too　near　I　even　feel　pain；　there　is　at　the　same　time　no　reason　in　this　which　could　persuade　me　that　there　is　in　the　fire　something　resembling　this　heat　any　more　than　there　is　in　it　something　resembling　the　pain；　all　that　I　have　any　reason　to　believe　from　this　is；　that　there　is　something　in　it；　whatever　it　may　be；　which　excit