meditations on first philosophy-第9部分

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is　manifest　by　the　natural　light　that　there　must　at　least　be　as　much　reality　in　the　efficient　and　total　cause　as　in　its　effect。　　For；　pray；　whence　can　the　effect　derive　its　reality；　if　not　from　its　cause？　　And　in　what　way　can　this　cause　communicate　this　reality　to　it；　unless　it　possessed　it　in　itself？　　And　from　this　it　follows；　not　only　that　something　cannot　proceed　from　nothing；　but　likewise　that　what　is　more　perfect￥that　is　to　say；　which　has　more　reality　within　itself￥cannot　proceed　from　the　less　perfect。　　And　this　is　not　only　evidently　true　of　those　effects　which　possess　actual　or　formal　reality；　but　also　of　the　ideas　in　which　we　consider　merely　what　is　termed　objective　reality。　　To　take　an　example；　the　stone　which　has　not　yet　existed　not　only　cannot　now　commence　to　be　unless　it　has　been　produced　by　something　which　possesses　within　itself；　either　formally　or　eminently；　all　that　enters　into　the　composition　of　the　stone　＇i。e。　it　must　possess　the　same　things　or　other　more　excellent　things　than　those　which　exist　in　the　stone＇　and　heat　can　only　be　produced　in　a　subject　in　which　it　did　not　previously　exist　by　a　cause　that　is　of　an　order　＇degree　or　kind＇　at　least　as　perfect　as　heat；　and　so　in　all　other　cases。　　But　further；　the　idea　of　heat；　or　of　a　stone；　cannot　exist　in　me　unless　it　has　been　placed　within　me　by　some　cause　which　possesses　within　it　at　least　as　much　reality　as　that　which　I　conceive　to　exist　in　the　heat　or　the　stone。　　For　although　this　cause　does　not　transmit　anything　of　its　actual　or　formal　reality　to　my　idea；　we　must　not　for　that　reason　imagine　that　it　is　necessarily　a　less　real　cause；　we　must　remember　that　＇since　every　idea　is　a　work　of　the　mind＇　its　nature　is　such　that　it　demands　of　itself　no　other　formal　reality　than　that　which　it　borrows　from　my　thought；　of　which　it　is　only　a　mode　＇i。e。　a　manner　or　way　of　thinking＇。　　But　in　order　that　an　idea　should　contain　some　one　certain　objective　reality　rather　than　another；　it　must　without　doubt　derive　it　from　some　cause　in　which　there　is　at　least　as　much　formal　reality　as　this　idea　contains　of　objective　reality。　　For　if　we　imagine　that　something　is　found　in　an　idea　which　is　not　found　in　the　cause；　it　must　then　have　been　derived　from　nought；　but　however　imperfect　may　be　this　mode　of　being　by　which　a　thing　is　objectively　＇or　by　representation＇　in　the　understanding　by　its　idea；　we　cannot　certainly　say　that　this　mode　of　being　is　nothing；　nor　consequently；　that　the　idea　derives　its　origin　from　nothing。　　　　　　Nor　must　I　imagine　that；　since　the　reality　that　I　consider　in　these　ideas　is　only　objective；　it　is　not　essential　that　this　reality　should　be　formally　in　the　causes　of　my　ideas；　but　that　it　is　sufficient　that　it　should　be　found　objectively。　　For　just　as　this　mode　of　objective　existence　pertains　to　ideas　by　their　proper　nature；　so　does　the　mode　of　formal　existence　pertain　tot　he　causes　of　those　ideas　（this　is　at　least　true　of　the　first　and　principal）　by　the　nature　peculiar　to　them。　　And　although　it　may　be　the　case　that　one　idea　gives　birth　to　another　idea；　that　cannot　continue　to　be　so　indefinitely；　for　in　the　end　we　must　reach　an　idea　whose　cause　shall　be　so　to　speak　an　archetype；　in　which　the　whole　reality　＇or　perfection＇　which　is　so　to　speak　objectively　＇or　by　representation＇　in　these　ideas　is　contained　formally　＇and　really＇。　　Thus　the　light　of　nature　causes　me　to　know　clearly　that　the　ideas　in　me　are　like　＇pictures　or＇　images　which　can；　in　truth；　easily　fall　short　of　the　perfection　of　the　objects　from　which　they　have　been　derived；　but　which　can　never　contain　anything　greater　or　more　perfect。　　　　　　And　the　longer　and　the　more　carefully　that　I　investigate　these　matters；　the　more　clearly　and　distinctly　do　I　recognise　their　truth。　　But　what　am　I　to　conclude　from　it　all　in　the　end？　　It　is　this；　that　if　the　objective　reality　of　any　one　of　my　ideas　is　of　such　a　nature　as　clearly　to　make　me　recognise　that　it　is　not　in　me　either　formally　or　eminently；　and　that　consequently　I　cannot　myself　be　the　cause　of　it；　it　follows　of　necessity　that　I　am　not　alone　in　the　world；　but　that　there　is　another　being　which　exists；　or　which　is　the　cause　of　this　idea。　　On　the　other　hand；　had　no　such　an　idea　existed　in　me；　I　should　have　had　no　sufficient　argument　to　convince　me　of　the　existence　of　any　being　beyond　myself；　for　I　have　made　very　careful　investigation　everywhere　and　up　to　the　present　time　have　been　able　to　find　no　other　ground。　　　　　　But　of　my　ideas；　beyond　that　which　represents　me　to　myself；　as　to　which　there　can　here　be　no　difficulty；　there　is　another　which　represents　a　God；　and　there　are　others　representing　corporeal　and　inanimate　things；　others　angels；　others　animals；　and　others　again　which　represent　to　me　men　similar　to　myself。　　　　　　As　regards　the　ideas　which　represent　to　me　other　men　or　animals；　or　angels；　I　can　however　easily　conceive　that　they　might　be　formed　by　an　admixture　of　the　other　ideas　which　I　have　of　myself；　of　corporeal　things；　and　of　God；　even　although　there　were　apart　from　me　neither　men　nor　animals；　nor　angels；　in　all　the　world。　　　　　　And　in　regard　to　the　ideas　of　corporeal　objects；　I　do　not　recognise　in　them　anything　so　great　or　so　excellent　that　they　might　not　have　possibly　proceeded　from　myself；　for　if　I　consider　them　more　closely；　and　examine　them　individually；　as　I　yesterday　examined　the　idea　of　wax；　I　find　that　there　is　very　little　in　them　which　I　perceive　clearly　and　distinctly。　Magnitude　or　extension　in　length；　breadth；　or　depth；　I　do　so　perceive；　also　figure　which　results　from　a　termination　of　this　extension；　the　situation　which　bodies　of　different　figure　preserve　in　relation　to　one　another；　and　movement　or　change　of　situation；　to　which　we　may　also　add　substance；　duration　and　number。　　As　to　other　things　such　as　light；　colours；　sounds；　scents；　tastes；　heat；　cold　and　the　other　tactile　qualities；　they　are　thought　by　me　with　so　much　obscurity　and　confusion　that　I　do　not　even　know　if　they　are　true　or　false；　i。e。　whether　the　ideas　which　I　form　of　these　qualities　are　actually　the　ideas　of　real　objects　or　not　＇or　whether　they　only　represent　chimeras　which　cannot　exist　in　fact＇。　　For　although　I　have　before　remarked　that　it　is　only　in　judgments　that　falsity；　properly　speaking；　or　formal　falsity；　can　be　met　with；　a　certain　material　falsity　may　nevertheless　be　found　in　ideas；　i。e。　when　these　ideas　represent　what　is　nothing　as　though　it　were　something。　　For　example；　the　ideas　which　I　have　of　cold　and　heat　are　so　far　from　clear　and　distinct　that　by　their　means　I　cannot　tell　whether　cold　is　merely　a　privation　of　heat；　or　heat　a　privation　of　cold；　or　whether　both　are　real　qualities；　or　are　not　such。　　And　inasmuch　as　＇since　ideas　resemble　images＇　there　cannot　be　any　ideas　which　do　not　appear　to　represent　some　things；　if　it　is　correct　to　say　that　cold　is　merely　a　privation　of　heat；　the　idea　which　represents　it　to　me　as　something　real　and　positive　will　not　be　improperly　termed　false；　and　the　same　holds　good　of　other　similar　ideas。　　　　　　To　these　it　is　certainly　not　necessary　that　I　should　attribute　any　author　other　than　myself。　　For　if　they　are　false；　i。e。　if　they　represent　things　which　do　not　exist；　the　light　of　nature　shows　me　that　they　issue　from　nought；　that　is　to　say；　that　they　are　only　in　me　so　far　as　something　is　lacking　to　the　perfection　of　my　nature。　　But　if　they　are　true；　nevertheless　because　they　exhibit　so　little　reality　to　me　that　I　cannot　even　clearly　distinguish　the　thing　represented　from　non…being；　I　do　not　see　any　reason　why　they　should　not　be　produced　by　myself。　　　　　　As　to　the　clear　and　distinct　idea　which　I　have　of　corporeal　things；　some　of　them　seem　as　though　I　might　have　derived　them　from　the　idea　which　I　possess　of　myself；　as　those　which　I　have　of　substance；　duration；　number；　and　such　like。　For　＇even＇　when　I　think　that　a　stone　is　a　substance；　or　at　least　a　thing　capable　of　existing　of　itself；　and　that　I　am　a　substance　also；　although　I　conceive　that　I　am　a　thing　that　thinks　and　not　one　that　is　extended；　and　that　the　stone　on　the　other　hand　is　an　extended　thing　which　does　not　think；　and　that　thus　there　is　a　notable　difference　between　the　two　conceptions￥they　seem；　nevertheless；　to　agree　in　this；　that　both　represent　substances。　　In　the　same　way；　when　I　perceive　that　I　now　exist　and　further　recollect　that　I　have　in　former　times　existed；　and　when　I　remember　that　I　have　various　thoughts　of　which　I　can　recognise　the　number；　I　acquire　ideas　of　duration　and　number　which　I　can　afterwards　transfer　to　any　object　that　I　please。　　But　as　to　all　the　other　qualities　of　which　the　ideas　of　corporeal　things　are　composed；　to　wit；　extension；　figure；　situation　and　motion；　it　is　true　that　they　are　not　formally　in　me；　since　I　am　only　a　thing　that　thinks；　but　because　they　are　merely　certain　modes　of　substance　＇and　so　to　speak　the　vestments　under　which　corporeal　substance　appears　to　us＇　and　because　I　myself　am　also　a　substance；　it　would　seem　that　they　might　be　contained　in　me　eminently。　　　　　　Hence　there　remains　only　the　idea　of　God；　concerning　which　we　must　consider　whether　it　is　something　which　cannot　have　proceeded　from　me　myself。　　By　the　name　God　I　understand　a　substance　that　is　infinite　＇eternal；　immutable＇；　independent；　all…knowing；　all…powerful；　and　by　which　I　myself　and　everything　else；　if