criminal psychology-第36部分

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　after　that　have　been　killed；''if　he　had　said　this；　his　condemnation　would　have　been　impossible；　for　all　the　other　testimony　was　of　subordinate　importance。　Now　suppose　the　man　was　innocent；　what　could　he　have　thought：　‘‘I　have　already　been　examined　once　in　a　murder　case；　I　found　myself　in　financial　difficulties；　I　still　am　in　such　difficultiesif　I　admit　that　I　was　at　the　place　of　the　crime　at　the　time　the　crime　was　committed；　I　will　get　into　serious　trouble；　which　I　won't；　if　I　deny　my　presence。''　So　he　really　denied　having　been　in　the　house　or　in　the　street　for　some　time；　and　inasmuch　as　this　was　shown　by　many　witnesses　to　be　untrue；　his　presence　at　the　place　where　the　crime　was　committed　was　identified　with　the　unproved　fact　that　he　had　committed　it；　and　he　was　condemned。

I　do　not　assert　that　either　one　or　the　other　of　these　persons　was　condemned　guiltlessly；　or　that　such　‘‘side　issues''　have　no　value　and　ought　not　to　be　proved。　I　merely　point　out　that　caution　is　necessary　in　two　directions。　First　of　all；　these　side　issues　must　not　be　identified　with　the　central　issue。　Their　demonstration　is　only　preparatory　work；　the　value　of　which　must　be　established　cautiously　and　without　prejudice。　It　may　be　said　that　the　feeling　of　satisfaction　with　what　has　been　done　causes　jurists　frequently　to　forget　what　must　yet　be　done；　or　to　undervalue　it。　Further；　a　psychological　examination　must　seek　out　the　motives　which　led　or　might　have　led　the　accused　to　deny　some　point　not　particularly　dangerous　to　him。　In　most　cases　an　intelligible　ground　for　such　action　can　be　discovered；　and　if　the　psychologically　prior　conditions　are　conceived　with　sufficient　narrowness　to　keep　us　from　assuming　unconditional　guilt；　we　are　at　least　called　upon　to　be　careful。　

This　curious　danger　of　identification　of　different　issues　as　the　aim　of　presentation　of　evidence；　occurs　much　more　frequently　and　with　comparatively　greater　degree　in　the　cases　of　individual　witnesses　who　are　convinced　of　the　principal　issue　when　a　side　issue　is　proved。　Suppose　a　witness　is　called　on　to　identify　a　man　as　somebody　who　had　stabbed　him　in　a　serious　assault；　and　that　he　has　also　to　explain　whether　the　quarrel　he　had　had　with　this　man　a　short　time　ago　was　of　importance。　If　the　suspect　is　desirous　of　having　the　quarrel　appear　as　harmless；　and　the　wounded　person　asserts　that　the　quarrel　was　serious；　the　latter　will　be　convinced；　the　moment　his　contention　may　be　viewed　as　true；　that　his　opponent　was　really　the　person　who　had　stabbed　him。　There　is；　of　course；　a　certain　logical　justification　for　this　supposition；　but　the　psychological　difficulty　with　it　is　the　fact　that　this　case；　like　many　others；　involves　the　identification　of　what　is　inferred　with　what　is　perceived。　It　is　for　this　reason　that　the　mere　fact　of　arrest　is　to　most　people　a　conviction　of　guilt。　The　witness　who　had　first　identified　A　as　only　the　probable　criminal　becomes　absolutely　convinced　of　it　when　A　is　presented　to　him　in　stripes；　even　though　he　knows　that　A　has　been　arrested　on　his　own　testimony　alone。　The　appearance　and　the　surroundings　of　the　prisoner　influence　many；　and　not　merely　uneducated　people；　against　the　prisoner；　and　they　think；　involuntarily；　‘‘If　he　were　not　the　one；　they　would　not　have　him　here。''


Section　24。　（b）　Causation。＇1＇


If　we　understand　by　the　term　cause　the　axiom　that　every　change　has　an　occasion；　hence　that　every　event　is　bound　up　with　a　number　of　conditions　which　when　lacking　in　whole　or　in　part　would　prevent　the　appearance　of　the　event；　while　their　presence　would　compel　its　appearance；　then　the　whole　business　of　the　criminalist　is　the　study　of　causes。　He　must　indeed　study　not　only　whether　and　how　crime　and　criminal　are　causally　related；　but　also　how　their　individual　elements　are　bound　to　each　other　and　to　the　criminal；　and　finally；　what　causation　in　the　criminal；　considered　with　regard　to　his　individual　characteristics；　inevitably　led　to　the　commission　of　the　crime。　The　fact　that　we　deal　with　the　problem　of　cause　brings　us　close　to　other　sciences　which　have　the　same　task　in　their　own　re…

＇1＇　Max　Mayer：　Der　Kausalzusammenhang　zwischen　Handlung　und　Erfolg　in　Strafrecht。　1899。　　von　Rohland。　Die　Kausallehre　im　Strafreeht。　Leipzig　1903　　H。　Gross's　Archiv；　XV；　191。

　searches；　and　this　is　one　of　the　reasons　for　the　criminalist's　necessary　concern　with　other　disciplines。　Of　course　no　earnest　criminalist　can　pursue　other　studies　for　their　own　sane；　he　has　no　time；　but　he　must　look　about　him　and　study　the　methods　used　in　other　sciences。　In　the　other　sciences　we　learn　method；　but　not　as　method；　and　that　is　all　that　we　need。　And　we　observe　that　the　whole　problem　of　method　is　grounded　on　causation。　Whether　empirically　or　aprioristically　does　not　matter。　We　are　concerned　solely　with　causation。

In　certain　directions　our　task　is　next　to　the　historians'　who　aim　to　bring　men　and　events　into　definite　causal　sequence。　The　causal　law　is　indubitably　the　ideal　and　only　instructive　instrument　in　the　task　of　writing　convincing　history；　and　it　is　likewise　without　question　that　the　same　method　is　specifically　required　in　the　presentation　of　evidence。　Thus：　‘‘This　is　the　causal　chain　of　which　the　last　link　is　the　crime　committed　by　A。　Now　I　present　the　fact　of　the　crime　and　include　only　those　events　which　may　be　exclusively　bound　up　with　A's　criminalityand　the　crime　appears　as　committed。　Now　again；　I　present　the　fact　of　the　crime　and　exclude　all　those　events　which　can　without　exception　be　included　only　if　A　is　not　a　criminal　and　there　is　no　crime。''＇1＇

Evidently　the　finding　of　causes　involves；　according　to　the　complexities　of　the　case；　a　varying　number　of　subordinate　tasks　which　have　to　be　accomplished　for　each　particular　incident；　inasmuch　as　each　suspicion；　each　statement　_pro_　or　_con_　has　to　be　tested。　The　job　is　a　big　one　but　it　is　the　only　way　to　absolute　and　certain　success；　provided　there　is　no　mistake　in　the　work　of　correlating　events。　As　Schell　says：　‘‘Of　all　the　observed　identities　of　effect　in　natural　phenomena　only　one　has　the　complete　strength　of　mathematical　lawthe　general　law　of　causation。　The　fact　that　everything　that　has　a　beginning　has　a　cause　is　as　old　as　human　experience。''　The　application　of　this　proposition　to　our　own　problem　shows　that　we　are　not　to　turn　the　issue　in　any　unnecessary　direction；　once　we　are　convinced　that　every　phenomenon　has　its　occasion。　We　are；　on　the　contrary；　to　demonstrate　this　occasion　and　to　bring　it　into　connection　with　every　problem　set　by　the　testimony　at　any　moment。　In　most　cases　the　task；　though　not　rigidly　divided；　is　double　and　its　quality　depends　upon　the　question　whether　the　criminal　was　known　from　the　beginning　or　not。　The　duality　is　foremost；　and　lasts

＇1＇　Cf。　S。　Strieker：　Studien　ber　die　Assoziation　der　Vorstellungen。　Vienna　1883。

　longest　if　only　the　deed　itself　is　known；　and　if　the　judge　must　limit　himself　entirely　to　its　sole　study　in　order　to　derive　from　it　its　objective　situation。

The　greatest　mistakes　in　a　trial　occur　when　this　derivation　of　the　objective　situation　of　the　crime　is　made　unintelligently；　hastily　or　carelessly；　and　conversely　the　greatest　successes　are　due　to　its　correct　rendering。　But　such　a　correct　rendering　is　no　more　than　the　thoroughgoing　use　of　the　principle　of　causality。　Suppose　a　great　crime　has　been　committed　and　the　personality　of　the　criminal　is　not　revealed　by　the　character　of　the　crime。　The　mistake　regularly　made　in　such　a　case　is　the　immediate　and　superficial　search　for　the　personality　of　the　criminal　instead　of　what　should　properly　proceedthe　study　of　the　causal　conditions　of　the　crime。　For　the　causal　law　does　not　say　that　everything　which　occurs；　taken　as　a　whole　and　in　its　elements；　has　one　groundthat　would　be　simply　categorical　emptiness。　What　is　really　required　is　an　efficient　and　satisfying　cause。　And　this　is　required　not　merely　for　the　deed　as　a　whole　but　for　every　single　detail。　When　causes　are　found　for　all　of　these　they　must　be　brought　together　and　correlated　with　the　crime　as　described；　and　then　integrated　with　the　whole　series　of　events。

The　second　part　of　the　work　turns　upon　the　suspicion　of　a　definite　person　when　his　own　activity　is　interpolated　as　a　cause　of　the　crime。　Under　some　conditions　again；　the　effect　of　the　crime　on　the　criminal　has　to　be　examined；　i。　e。；　enrichment；　deformation；　emotional　state；　etc。　But　the　evidence　of　guilt　is　established　only　when　the　crime　is　accurately　and　explicitly　described　as　the　inevitable　result　of　the　activity　of　the　criminal　and　his　activity　only。　This　systematic　work　of　observing　and　correlating　every　instant　of　the　supposed　activities　of　the　accused　（once　the　situation　of　the　crime　is　defined　as　certainly　as　possible）；　is　as　instructive　as　it　is　promising　of　success。　It　is　the　one　activity　which　brings　us　into　touch　with　bare　perception　and　its　reproduction。　‘‘All　inference　with　regard　to　facts　appears　to　depend　upon　the　relation　of　cause　to　effect；　by　virtue　of　this　relation　alone　may　we　rely　upon　the　evidence　of　our　memories　and　our　senses。''＇1＇　Hume　illustrates　this　remark　with　the　following　example：　If　a　clock　or　some　other　machine　is　found　on　a　desert　island；　the　conclusion　is　drawn　that　men　are　or　were　on　the　island。　The