criminal psychology-第45部分

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roof。　Es…　　pecially　remarkable　is　the　fact　that　the　concept　of　_*the　proved_　is　very　various　in　various　sciences；　and　it　would　be　absorbing　to　establish　the　difference　between　what　is　called　proved　and　what　only　probable　in　a　number　of　given　examples　by　the　mathematician；　the　physicist；　the　chemist；　the　physician；　the　naturalist；　the　philologist；　the　historian；　the　philosopher；　the　lawyer；　the　theologian；　etc。　But　this　is　no　task　for　us　and　nobody　is　called　upon　to　determine　who　knows　what　‘‘Proved''　means。　It　is　enough　to　observe　that　the　differences　are　great　and　to　understand　why　we　criminalists　have　such　various　answers　to　the　question：　Is　this　proved　or　only　probable？　The　varieties　may　be　easily　divided　into　groups　according　to　the　mathematical；　philosophic；　historical　or　naturalistic　inclinations　of　the　answerer。　Indeed；　if　the　individual　is　known；　what　he　means　by　‘‘proved''　can　be　determined　beforehand。　Only　those　minds　that　have　no　especial　information　remain　confused　in　this　regard；　both　to　others　and　to　themselves。


＇1＇　B。　Petronievics：　Der　Satz　vom　Grunde。　Leipzig　1898。


Sharply　to　define　the　notion　of　‘‘proved''　would　require　at　least　to　establish　its　relation　to　usage　and　to　say：　What　we　desire　leads　us　to　an　_*assumption_；　what　is　possible　gives　us　_*probability_；　what　appears　certain；　we　call　_*proved_。　In　this　regard　the　second　is　always；　in　some　degree；　the　standard　for　the　first　（desires；　e。　g。；　cause　us　to　act；　one　becomes　predominant　and　is　fixed　as　an　assumption　which　later　on　becomes　clothed　with　a　certain　amount　of　reliability　by　means　of　this　fixation）。

The　first　two　fixations；　the　assumption　and　the　probability；　have　in　contrast　to　their　position　among　other　sciences　only　a　heuristic　interest　to　us　criminalists。　Even　assumptions；　when　they　become　hypotheses；　have　in　various　disciplines　a　various　value；　and　the　greatest　lucidity　and　the　best　work　occur　mainly　in　the　quarrel　about　an　acutely　constructed　hypothesis。

_*Probability_　has　a　similar　position　in　the　sciences。　The　scholar　who　has　discovered　a　new　thought；　a　new　order；　explanation　or　solution；　etc。；　will　find　it　indifferent　whether　he　has　made　it　only　highly　probable　or　certain。　He　is　concerned　only　with　the　idea；　and　a　scholar　who　is　dealing　with　the　idea　for　its　own　sake　will　perhaps　prefer　to　bring　it　to　a　great　probability　rather　than　to　indubitable　certainty；　for　where　conclusive　proof　is　presented　there　is　no　longer　much　interest　in　further　research；　while　probability　permits　and　requires　further　study。　But　our　aim　is　certainty　and　proof　only；　and　even　a　high　degree　of　probability　is　no　better　than　untruth　and　can　not　count。　In　passing　judgment　and　for　the　purpose　of　judgment　　a　high　degree　of　probability　can　have　only　corroborative　weight；　and　then　it　is　probability　only　when　taken　in　itself；　and　proof　when　taken　with　regard　to　the　thing　it　corroborates。　If；　for　example；　it　is　most　probable　that　X　was　recognized　at　the　place　of　a　crime；　and　if　at　the　same　time　his　evidence　of　alibi　has　failed；　his　footmarks　are　corroborative；　so　are　the　stolen　goods　which　have　been　seen　in　his　possession；　and　something　he　had　lost　at　the　place　of　the　crime　which　is　recognized　as　his　property；　etc。　ln　short；　when　all　these　indices　are　in　themselves　established　only　as　highly　probable；　they　give　under　certain　circumstances；　when　taken　together；　complete　certainty；　because　the　coincidence　of　so　many　high　probabilities　must　be　declared　impossible　if　X　were　not　the　criminal。

In　all　other　cases；　as　we　have　already　pointed　out；　_*assumption_　and　probability　have　only　a　heuristic　value　for　us　lawyers。　With　the　assumption；　we　must　of　course　count；　many　cases　can　not　be　begun　without　the　assistance　of　assumption。　Every　only　half…　confused　case；　the　process　of　which　is　unknown；　requires　first　of　all　and　as　early　as　possible　the　application　of　some　assumption　to　its　material。　As　soon　as　the　account　is　inconsistent　the　assumption　must　be　abandoned　and　a　fresh　one　and　yet　again　a　fresh　one　assumed；　until　finally　one　holds　its　own　and　may　be　established　as　probable。　It　then　remains　the　center　of　operation；　until　it　becomes　of　itself　a　proof　or；　as　we　have　explained；　until　so　many　high　probabilities　in　various　directions　have　been　gathered；　that；　taken　in　their　order；　they　serve　evidentially。　A　very　high　degree　of　probability　is　sufficient　in　making　complaints；　but　sentencing　requires　‘‘certainty；''　and　in　most　cases　the　struggle　between　the　prosecution　and　the　defense；　and　the　doubt　of　the　judge；　turns　upon　the　question　of　probability　as　against　proof。＇1＇


＇1＇　Of　course　we　mean　by　‘‘proof''　as　by　‘‘certainty''　only　the　highest　possible　degree　of　probability。


That　probability　is　in　this　way　and　in　a　number　of　relations；　of　great　value　to　the　criminalist　can　not　appear　doubtful。　Mittermaier　defines　its　significance　briefly：　‘‘Probability　naturally　can　never　lead　to　sentence。　It　is；　however；　important　as　a　guide　for　the　conduct　of　the　examiner；　as　authorizing　him　to　take　certain　measures；　it　shows　how　to　attach　certain　legal　processes　in　various　directions。''

Suppose　that　we　review　the　history　of　the　development　of　the　theory　of　probability。　The　first　to　have　attempted　a　sharp　distinction　between　demonstrable　and　probable　knowledge　was　Locke。　Leibnitz　was　the　first　to　recognize　the　importance　of　the　theory　　of　probability　for　inductive　logic。　He　was　succeeded　by　the　mathematician　Bernoulli　and　the　revolutionist　Condorcet。　The　theory　in　its　modern　form　was　studied　by　Laplace；　Quetelet；　Herschel；　von　Kirchmann；　J。　von　Kries；　Venn；　Cournot；　Fick；　von　Bortkiewicz；　etc。　The　concept　that　is　called　probability　varies　with　different　authorities。　Locke＇1＇　divides　all　fundamentals　into　demonstrative　and　probable。　According　to　this　classification　it　is　probable　that　‘‘all　men　are　mortal；''　and　that　‘‘the　sun　will　rise　to…morrow。''　But　to　be　consistent　with　ordinary　speech　the　fundamentals　must　be　classified　as　evidence；　certainties；　and　probabilities。　By　certainties　I　understand　such　fundamentals　as　are　supported　by　experience　and　leave　no　room　for　doubt　or　considerationeverything　else；　especially　as　it　permits　of　further　proof；　is　more　or　less　probable。


＇1＇　Locke：　Essay　on　the　Human　Understanding。


Laplace＇2＇　spoke　more　definitely‘‘Probability　depends　in　part　on　our　ignorance；　in　part　on　our　knowledge　。　。　。


＇2＇　Laplace：　Essay　Philosophique　sur　les　Probabilit