criminal psychology-第52部分

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ond　proposition。


Suppose　that　we　take　these　propositions　concretely：

（1）　I　have　discovered　that　bread　made　of　corn　has　a　nourishing　effect。

（2）　I　foresee　that　other　apparently　similar　objects；　e。　g。；　wheat；　will　have　a　like　effect。

I　could　not　make　various　experiments　with　the　same　corn　in　case　（1）。　I　could　handle　corn　taken　as　such　from　one　point　of　view；　or　considered　as　such　from　another；　i。　e。；　I　could　only　experiment　with　very　similar　objects。　I　can　therefore　make　these　experiments　with　corn　from　progressively　remoter　starting　points；　or　soils；　and　finally　with　corn　from　Barbary　and　East　Africa；　so　that　there　can　no　longer　be　any　question　of　identity　but　only　of　similarity。　And　finally　I　can　compare　two　harvests　of　corn　which　have　less　similarity　than　certain　species　of　corn　and　certain　species　of　wheat。　I　am　therefore　entitled　to　speak　of　identical　or　similar　in　the　first　proposition　as　much　as　in　the　second。　One　proposition　has　led　into　another　and　the　connection　between　them　has　been　discovered。

The　criminological　importance　of　this　‘‘connection''　lies　in　the　fact　that　the　correctness　of　our　inferences　depends　upon　its　discovery。　We　work　continuously　with　these　two　Humian　propositions；　and　we　always　make　our　assertion；　first；　that　some　things　are　related　as　cause　and　effect；　and　we　join　the　present　case　to　that　because　we　consider　it　similar。　If　it　is　really　similar；　and　the　connection　of　the　first　and　the　second　proposition　are　actually　correct；　the　truth　of　the　inference　is　attained。　We　need　not　count　the　unexplained　wonders　of　numerical　relations　in　the　result。　D'Alembert　　asserts：　‘‘It　seems　as　if　there　were　some　law　of　nature　which　more　frequently　prevents　the　occurrence　of　regular　than　irregular　combinations；　those　of　the　first　kind　are　mathematically；　but　not　physically；　more　probable。　When　we　see　that　high　numbers　are　thrown　with　some　one　die；　we　are　immediately　inclined　to　call　that　die　false。''　And　John　Stuart　Mill　adds；　that　d'Alembert　should　have　set　the　problem　in　the　form　of　asking　whether　he　would　believe　in　the　die　if；　after　having　examined　it　and　found　it　right；　somebody　announced　that　ten　sixes　had　been　cast　with　it。

We　may　go　still　further　and　assert　that　we　are　generally　inclined　to　consider　an　inference　wrong　which　indicates　that　accidental　matters　have　occurred　in　regular　numerical　relation。　Who　believes　the　hunter's　story　that　he　has　shot　100　hares　in　the　past　week；　or　the　gambler's　that　he　has　won　1000　dollars；　or　the　sick　man's；　that　he　was　sick　ten　times？　It　will　be　supposed　at　the　very　least　that　each　is　merely　indicating　an　approximately　round　sum。　Ninety…six　hares；　987　dollars；　and　eleven　illnesses　will　sound　more　probable。　And　this　goes　so　far　that　during　examinations；　witnesses　are　shy　of　naming　such　‘‘improbable　ratios；''　if　they　at　all　care　to　have　their　testimony　believed。　Then　again；　many　judges　are　in　no　wise　slow　to　jump　at　such　a　number　and　to　demand　an　‘‘accurate　statement；''　or　eves　immediately　to　decide　that　the　witness　is　talking　only　‘‘about。''　How　deep…rooted　such　views　are　is　indicated　by　the　circumstance　that　bankers　and　other　merchants　of　lottery　tickets　find　that　tickets　with　‘‘pretty　numbers''　are　difficult　to　sell。　A　ticket　of　series　1000；　number　100　is　altogether　unsalable；　for　such　a　number　‘‘can　not　possibly　be　sold。''　Then　again；　if　one　has　to　count　up　a　column　of　accidental　figures　and　the　sum　is　1000；　the　correctness　of　the　sum　is　always　doubted。

Here　are　facts　which　are　indubitable　and　unexplained。　We　must　therefore　agree　neither　to　distrust　so…called　round　numbers；　nor　to　place　particular　reliance　on　quite　irregular　figures。　Both　should　be　examined。

It　may　be　that　the　judgment　of　the　correctness　of　an　inference　is　made　analogously　to　that　of　numbers　and　that　the　latter　exercise　an　influence　on　the　judgment　which　is　as　much　conceded　popularly　as　it　is　actually　combated。　Since　Kant；　it　has　been　quite　discovered　that　the　judgment　that　fools　are　in　the　majority　must　lead　through　many　more　such　truths　in　judgingand　it　is　indifferent　whether　the　judgment　dealt　with　is　that　of　the　law　court　or　of　a　voting　legislature　or　mere　judgments　as　such。　

Schiel　says；　‘‘It　has　been　frequently　asserted　that　a　judgment　is　more　probably　correct　according　to　the　number　of　judges　and　jury。　Quite　apart　from　the　fact　that　the　judge　is　less　careful；　makes　less　effort；　and　feels　less　responsibility　when　he　has　associates；　this　is　a　false　inference　from　an　enormous　average　of　cases　which　are　necessarily　remote　from　any　average　whatever。　And　when　certain　prejudices　or　weaknesses　of　mind　are　added；　the　mistake　multiplies。　Whoever　accurately　follows；　if　he　can　avoid　getting　bored；　the　voting　of　bodies；　and　considers　by　themselves　individual　opinions　about　the　subject；　they　having　remained　individual　against　large　majorities　and　hence　worthy　of　being　subjected　to　a　cold　and　unprejudiced　examination；　will　learn　some　rare　facts。　It　is　especially　interesting　to　study　the　judgment　of　the　full　bench　with　regard　to　a　case　which　has　been　falsely　judged；　surprisingly　often　only　a　single　individual　voice　has　spoken　correctly。　This　fact　is　a　warning　to　the　judge　in　such　cases　carefully　to　listen　to　the　individual　opinion　and　to　consider　that　it　is　very　likely　to　deserve　study　just　because　it　is　so　significantly　in　the　minority。

The　same　thing　is　to　be　kept　in　mind　when　a　thing　is　asserted　by　a　large　number　of　witnesses。　Apart　from　the　fact　that　they　depend　upon　one　another；　that　they　suggest　to　one　another；　it　is　also　easily　possible；　especially　if　any　source　of　error　is　present；　that　the　latter　shall　have　influenced　all　the　witnesses。

Whether　a　judgment　has　been　made　by　a　single　judge　or　is　the　verdict　of　any　number　of　jurymen　is　quite　indifferent　since　the　correctness　of　a　judgment　does　not　lie　in　numbers。　Exner　says；　‘‘The　degree　of　probability　of　a　judgment's　correctness　depends　upon　the　richness　of　the　field　of　the　associations　brought　to　bear　in　establishing　it。　The　value　of　knowledge　is　judicially　constituted　in　this　fact；　for　it　is　in　essence　the　expansion　of　the　scope　of　association。　And　the　value　is　proportional　to　the　richness　of　the　associations　between　the　present　fact　and　the　knowledge　required。''　This　is　one　of　the　most　important　of　the　doctrines　we　have　to　keep　in　mind；　and　it　controverts　altogether　those　who　suppose　that　we　ought　to　be　satisfied　with　the　knowledge　of　some　dozens　of　statutes；　a　few　commentaries；　and　so　and　so　many　precedents。

If　we　add　that　‘‘every　judgment　is　an　identification　and　that　in　every　judgment　we　assert　that　the　content　represented　is　identical　in　spite　of　two　different　associative　relationships；''＇1＇　it　must　become　clear　what　dangers　we　undergo　if　the　associative　relationships　of　　a　judge　are　too　poor　and　narrow。　As　Mittermaier　said　seventy　years　ago：　‘‘There　are　enough　cases　in　which　the　weight　of　the　evidence　is　so　great　that　all　judges　are　convinced　of　the　truth　in　the　same　way。　But　in　itself　what　determines　the　judgment　is　the　essential　character　of　him　who　makes　it。''　What　he　means　by　essential　character　has　already　been　indicated。


＇1＇　H。　Mnsterberg：　Beitrge　zur　experimentellen　Psychologie；　III。　Freiburg。


We　have　yet　to　consider　the　question　of　the　value　of　inferences　made　by　a　witness　from　his　own　combinations　of　facts；　or　his　descriptions。　The　necessity；　in　such　cases；　of　redoubled　and　numerous　examinations　is　often　overlooked。　Suppose；　for　example；　that　the　witness　does　not　know　a　certain　important　date；　but　by　combining　what　he　does　know；　infers　it　to　have　been　the　second　of　June；　on　which　day　the　event　under　discussion　took　place。　He　makes　the　inference　because　at　the　time　he　had　a　call　from　A；　who　was　in　the　habit　of　coming　on　Wednesdays；　but　there　could　be　no　Wednesday　after　June　seventh　because　the　witness　had　gone　on　a　long　journey　on　that　day；　and　it　could　not　have　been　May　26　because　this　day　preceded　a　holiday　and　the　shop　was　open　late；　a　thing　not　done　on　the　day　A　called。　Nor；　moreover；　could　the　date　have　been　May　20；　because　it　was　very　warm　on　the　day　in　question；　and　the　temperature　began　to　rise　only　after　May　20。　In　view　of　these　facts　the　event　under　discussion　must　have　occurred　upon　June　2nd　and　only　on　that　day。

As　a　rule；　such　combinations　are　very　influential　because　they　appear　cautious；　wise　and　convincing。　They　impose　upon　people　without　inclination　toward　such　processes。　More　so　than　they　have　a　right　to；　inasmuch　as　they　present　little　difficulty　to　anybody　who　is　accustomed　to　them　and　to　whom　they　occur　almost　spontaneously。　As　usually　a　thing　that　makes　a　great　impression　upon　us　is　not　especially　examined；　but　is　accepted　as　astounding　and　indubitable；　so　here。　But　how　very　necessary　it　is　carefully　to　examine　such　things　and　to　consider　whether　the　single　premises　are　sound；　the　example　in　question　or　any　other　example　will　show。　The　individual　dates；　the　facts　and　assumptions　may　easily　be　mistaken；　and　the　smallest　oversight　may　render　the　result　false；　or　at　least　not　convincing。

The　examination　of　manuscripts　is　still　more　difficult。　What　is　written　has　a　certain　convincing　power；　not　only　on　others　but　on　the　writer；　and　much　as　we　may　be　will