criminal psychology-第53部分

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The　examination　of　manuscripts　is　still　more　difficult。　What　is　written　has　a　certain　convincing　power；　not　only　on　others　but　on　the　writer；　and　much　as　we　may　be　willing　to　doubt　and　to　improve　what　has　been　written　immediately　or　at　most　a　short　time　ago；　a　manuscript　of　some　age　has　always　a　kind　of　authority　and　we　　give　it　correctness　cheaply　when　that　is　in　question。　In　any　event　there　regularly　arises　in　such　a　case　the　problem　whether　the　written　description　is　quite　correct；　and　as　regularly　the　answer　is　a　convinced　affirmative。　It　is　impossible　to　give　any　general　rule　for　testing　such　affirmation。　Ordinarily　some　clearness　may　be　attained　by　paying　attention　to　the　purpose　of　the　manuscript；　especially　in　order　to　ascertain　its　sources　and　the　personality　of　the　writer。　There　is　much　in　the　external　form　of　the　manuscript。　Not　that　especial　care　and　order　in　the　notes　are　particularly　significant；　I　once　published　the　accounts　of　an　old　peasant　who　could　neither　read　nor　write；　and　his　accounts　with　a　neighbor　were　done　in　untrained　but　very　clear　fashion；　and　were　accepted　as　indubitable　in　a　civil　case。　The　purposiveness；　order；　and　continuity　of　a　manuscript　indicate　that　it　was　not　written　after　the　event；　and　are　therefore；　together　with　the　reason　for　having　written　it　and　obviously　with　the　personality　of　the　writer；　determinative　of　its　value。


Section　32。　（j）　Mistaken　Inferences。

It　is　true；　as　Huxley　says；　that　human　beings　would　have　made　fewer　mistakes　if　they　had　kept　in　mind　their　tendency　to　false　judgments　which　depend　upon　extraordinary　combinations　of　real　experiences。　When　people　say：　I　felt；　I　heard；　I　saw　this　or　that；　in　99　cases　out　of　100　they　mean　only　that　they　have　been　aware　of　some　kind　of　sensation　the　nature　of　which　they　determine　in　a　_*judgment_。　Most　erroneous　inferences　ensue　in　this　fashion。　They　are　rarely　formal　and　rarely　arise　by　virtue　of　a　failure　to　use　logical　principles；　their　ground　is　the　inner　paucity　of　a　premise；　which　itself　is　erroneous　because　of　an　erroneous　perception　or　conception。＇1＇　As　Mill　rightly　points　out；　a　large　portion　of　mankind　make　mistakes　because　of　tacit　assumptions　that　the　order　of　nature　and　the　order　of　knowledge　are　identical　and　that　things　must　exist　as　they　are　thought；　so　that　when　two　things　can　not　be　thought　together　they　are　supposed　not　to　exist　together；　and　the　inconceivable　is　supposed　to　be　identical　with　the　non…existent。　But　what　they　do　not　succeed　in　conceiving　must　not　be　confused　with　the　absolutely　inconceivable。　The　difficulty　or　impossibility　of　conceiving　may　be　subjective　and　conditional；　and　may　prevent　us　from　understanding　the　relation　of　a　series　of　events　only　because　some　otherwise　proxi…　　mate　condition　is　unknown　or　overlooked。　Very　often　in　criminal　cases　when　I　can　make　no　progress　in　some　otherwise　simple　matter；　I　recall　the　well　known　story　of　an　old　peasant　woman　who　saw　the　tail　of　a　horse　through　an　open　stable　door　and　the　head　of　another　through　another　door　several　yards　away；　and　because　the　colors　of　both　head　and　tail　were　similar；　was　moved　to　cry　out：　‘‘Dear　Lord；　what　a　long　horse！''　The　old　lady　started　with　the　presupposition　that　the　rump　and　the　head　of　the　two　horses　belonged　to　one；　and　could　make　no　use　of　the　obvious　solution　of　the　problem　of　the　inconceivably　long　horse　by　breaking　it　in　two。

＇1＇　Cf。　O。　Gross：　Soziale　Hemmungsvorstellungen。　II　Gross's　Archiv：　VII；　123。


Such　mistakes　may　be　classified　under　five　heads。＇1＇


＇1＇　A　paragraph　is　here　omitted。　Translator。


（1）　Aprioristic　mistakes。　（Natural　prejudices）。

（2）　Mistakes　in　observation。

（3）　Mistakes　in　generalization。　（When　the　facts　are　right　and　the　inferences　wrong）。

（4）　Mistakes　of　confusion。　（Ambiguity　of　terms　or　mistakes　by　association）。

（5）　Logical　fallacies。

All　five　fallacies　play　important　rles　in　the　lawyer's　work。

We　have　very　frequently　to　fight　natural　prejudices。　We　take　certain　classes　of　people　to　be　better　and　others　to　be　worse　than　the　average；　and　without　clearly　expressing　it　we　expect　that　the　first　class　will　not　easily　do　evil　nor　the　other　good。　We　have　prejudices　about　some　one　or　another　view　of　life；　some　definition　of　justice；　or　point　of　view；　although　we　have　sufficient　opportunity　to　be　convinced　of　their　incorrectness。　We　have　a　similar　prejudice　in　trusting　our　human　knowledge；　judgment　of　impressions；　facts；　etc。；　far　too　much；　so　far　indeed；　that　certain　relations　and　accidents　occurring　to　any　person　we　like　or　dislike　will　determine　his　advantage　or　disadvantage　at　our　hands。

Of　importance　under　this　heading；　too；　are　those　inferences　which　are　made　in　spite　of　the　knowledge　that　the　case　is　different；　the　power　of　sense　is　more　vigorous　than　that　of　reflection。　As　Hartmann　expresses　it：　‘‘The　prejudices　arising　from　sensation；　are　not　conscious　judgments　of　the　understanding　but　instinctively　practical　postulates；　and　are；　therefore；　very　difficult　to　destroy；　or　even　set　aside　by　means　of　conscious　consideration。　You　may　tell　yourself　a　thousand　times　that　the　moon　at　the　horizon　is　as　big　as　at　the　zenithnevertheless　you　see　it　smaller　at　the　zenith。''　Such　fixed　　impressions　we　meet　in　every　criminal　trial；　and　if　once　we　have　considered　how　the　criminal　had　committed　a　crime　we　no　longer　get　free　of　the　impression；　even　when　we　have　discovered　quite　certainly　that　he　had　no　share　in　the　deed。　The　second　type　of　fallacymistakes　in　observationwill　be　discussed　later　under　sense　perception　and　similar　matters。

Under　mistakes　of　generalization　the　most　important　processes　are　those　of　arrangement；　where　the　environment　or　accompanying　circumstances　exercise　so　determinative　an　influence　that　the　inference　is　often　made　from　them　alone　and　without　examination　of　the　object　in　question。　The　Tanagra　in　the　house　of　an　art…connoisseur　I　take　to　be　genuine　without　further　examination；　the　golden　watch　in　the　pocket　of　a　tramp　to　be　stolen；　a　giant　meteor；　the　skeleton　of　an　iguana；　a　twisted…looking　Nerva　in　the　Royal　Museum　of　Berlin；　I　take　to　be　indubitably　original；　and　indubitably　imitations　in　the　college　museum　of　a　small　town。　The　same　is　true　of　events：　I　hear　a　child　screeching　in　the　house　of　the　surly　wife　of　the　shoemaker　so　I　do　not　doubt　that　she　is　spanking　it；　in　the　mountains　I　infer　from　certain　whistles　the　presence　of　chamois；　and　a　single　long　drawn　tone　that　might　be　due　to　anything　I　declare　to　have　come　from　an　organ；　if　a　church　is　near　by。

All　such　processes　are　founded　upon　experience；　synthesis；　and；　if　you　like；　prejudices。　They　will　often　lead　to　proper　conclusions；　but　in　many　cases　they　will　have　the　opposite　effect。　It　is　a　frequently　recurring　fact　that　in　such　cases　careful　examination　is　most　of　all　necessary；　because　people　are　so　much　inclined　to　depend　upon　‘‘the　first；　always　indubitably　true　impression。''　The　understanding　has　generalized　simply　and　hastily；　without　seeking　for　justification。

The　only　way　of　avoiding　great　damage　is　to　extract　the　fact　in　itself　from　its　environment　and　accompanying　circumstance；　and　to　study　it　without　them。　The　environment　is　only　a　means　of　proof；　but　no　proof；　and　only　when　the　object　or　event　has　been　validated　in　itself　may　we　adduce　one　means　of　proof　after　another　and　modify　our　point　of　view　accordingly。　Not　to　do　so；　means　always　to　land　upon　false　inferences；　and　what　is　worse；　to　find　it　impossible　upon　the　recognition　of　an　error　later　on；　to　discover　at　what　point　it　has　occurred。　By　that　time　it　has　been　buried　too　deep　in　the　heap　of　our　inferential　system　to　be　discoverable。

The　error　of　confusion　Mill　reduces　especially　to　the　unclear　　representation　of　_*what_　proof　is；　i。　e。；　to　the　ambiguity　of　words。　We　rarely　meet　such　cases；　but　when　we　do；　they　occur　after　we　have　compounded　concepts　and　have　united　rather　carelessly　some　symbol　with　an　object　or　an　event　which　ought　not　to　have　been　united；　simply　because　we　were　mistaken　about　its　importance。　A　warning　example　may　be　found　in　the　inference　which　is　made　from　the　sentence　given　a　criminal　because　of　‘‘identical　motive。''　The　Petitio；　the　Ignorantia；　etc。；　belong　to　this　class。　The　purely　logical　mistakes　or　mistakes　of　syllogism　do　not　enter　into　these　considerations。


Section　33。　（k）　Statistics　of　the　Moral　Situation。

Upon　the　first　glance　it　might　be　asserted　that　statistics　and　psychology　have　nothing　to　do　with　each　other。　If；　however；　it　is　observed　that　the　extraordinary　and　inexplicable　results　presented　by　statistics　of　morals　and　general　statistics　influence　our　thought　and　reflection　unconditionally；　its　importance　for　criminal　psychology　can　not　be　denied。　Responsibility；　abundance　of　criminals；　their　distribution　according　to　time；　place；　personality；　and　circumstances；　the　regularity　of　their　appearance；　all　these　have　so　profound　an　influence　upon　us　both　essentially　and　circumstantially　that　even　our　judgments　and　resolutions；　no　less　than　the　conduct　and　thought　of　other　people　whom　we　judge；　are　certainly　altered　by　them。＇1＇　Moreover；　probability　and　statistics　are　in　such　close　and　inseparable　connection　that　we　may　not　make　use　of　or　int