criminal psychology-第68部分

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mportant　question　of　how　the　break　was　made；　what　the　impression　of　the　damaging　tool　was；　etc。　Most　of　us　have　had　such　experiences　with　expert　witnesses；　and　most　of　us　have　also　observed　that　they　often　give　false　evidence　because　they　treat　the　event　in　terms　of　their　own　interest　and　are　convinced　that　things　must　happen　according　to　the　principles　of　their　trades。　However　the　event　shapes　itself；　they　model　it　and　alter　it　so　much　that　it　finally　implies　their　own　apprehension。

‘‘Subconscious　perceptions；''　somewhat　altered；　play　another　rle；　according　to　Exner；　in　so…called　orientation。　If　anybody　is　able　to　orient　himself；　i。　e。；　know　where　he　is　at　any　time　and　keep　in　mind　the　general　direction；　it　is　important　to　be　aware　of　the　fact　when　he　serves　as　witness；　for　his　information　will；　in　consequence；　take　a　different　form　and　assume　a　different　value。　Exner　says　of　himself；　that　he　knows　at　each　moment　of　his　climb　of　the　Marcus'　tower　in　what　direction　he　goes。　As　for　me；　once　I　have　turned　around；　I　am　lost。　Our　perceptions　of　location　and　their　value　would　be　very　different　if　we　had　to　testify　concerning　relations　of　places；　in　court。　But　hardly　anybody　will　assure　the　court　that　in　general　he　orients　himself　well　or　ill。

As　Exner　says；　‘‘If；　when　walking；　I　suddenly　stop　in　front　of　a　house　to　look　at　it；　I　am　definitely　in　possession；　also；　of　the　feeling　of　its　distance　from　where　I　left　the　roadthe　unconscious　perception　of　the　road　beyond　is　here　at　work。''　It　might；　indeed；　be　compared　with　pure　subconsciousness　in　which　series　of　processes　occur　without　our　knowing　it。

But　local　orientation　does　not　end　with　the　feeling　for　place。　It　is　at　work　even　in　the　cases　of　small　memories　of　location；　e。　g。；　　in　learning　things　by　heart；　in　knowing　on　what　page　and　on　what　line　anything　is　printed；　in　finding　unobserved　things；　etc。　These　questions　of　perception…orientation　are　important；　for　there　are　people　all　of　whose　perceptions　are　closely　related　to　their　sense　of　location。　Much　may　be　learned　from　such　people　by　use　of　this　specialty　of　theirs；　while　oversight　thereof　may　render　them　hopeless　as　witnesses。　How　far　this　goes　with　some　peopleas　a　rule　people　with　a　sense　of　location　are　the　more　intelligentI　saw　some　time　ago　when　the　Germanist　Bernhardt　Seuffert　told　me　that　when　he　did　not　know　how　anything　is　spelled　he　imagined　its　appearance；　and　when　that　did　not　help　he　wrote　both　the　forms　between　which　he　was　vacillating　and　then　knew　which　one　was　the　correct　one。　When　I　asked　him　whether　the　chirographic　image　appeared　printed　or　written　and　in　what　type；　he　replied　significantly　enough；　‘‘As　my　writing…teacher　wrote　it。''　He　definitely　localized　the　image　on　his　writing　book　of　many　years　ago　and　read　it　off　in　his　mind。　Such　specialties　must　be　remembered　in　examining　witnesses。

In　conclusion；　there　is　a　word　to　say　concerning　Cattell's＇1＇　investigations　of　the　time　required　for　apprehension。　The　better　a　man　knows　the　language　the　more　rapidly　can　he　repeat　and　read　its　words。　It　is　for　this　reason　that　we　believe　that　foreigners　speak　more　rapidly　than　we。　Cattell　finds　this　so　indubitable；　that　he　wants　to　use　speed　as　a　test　in　the　examinations　in　foreign　languages。


＇1＇　J。　M。　Cattell：　ber　die　Zeit　der　Erkennung　u。　Benemlung　von　Schrift　etc。　（in　Wundt's：　Philosophischen　Studien　II；　1883）。


The　time　used　in　order　to　identify　a　single　letter　is　a　quarter　of　a　second；　the　time　to　pronounce　it　one…tenth　of　a　second。　Colors　and　pictures　require　noticeably　more；　not　because　they　are　not　recognized；　but　because　it　is　necessary　to　think　what　the　right　name　is。　We　are　much　more　accustomed　to　reading　words。

These　observations　might　be　carried　a　step　further。　The　more　definitely　an　event　to　be　described　is　conceived；　the　clearer　the　deduction　and　the　more　certain　the　memory　of　it；　the　more　rapidly　may　it　be　reproduced。　It　follows　that；　setting　aside　individual　idiosyncrasies；　the　rapidity　of　speech　of　a　witness　will　be　of　importance　when　we　want　to　know　how　much　he　has　thought　on　a　question　and　is　certain　what　he　is　going　to　say。　It　is　conceivable　that　a　person　who　is　trying　to　remember　the　event　accurately　will　speak　slowly　and　stutteringly；　or　at　least　with　hesitation　at　the　moment。　The　same　will　occur　if　he　tries　to　conceive　of　various　　possibilities；　to　eliminate　some；　and　to　avoid　contradiction　and　improbability。　If；　however；　the　witness　is　convinced　and　believes　truly　what　he　is　telling；　so　that　he　may　go　over　it　in　his　mind　easily　and　without　interruption；　he　will　tell　his　story　as　quickly　as　he　can。　This　may　indeed　be　observed　in　public　speakers；　even　judges；　prosecutors；　and　defense；　if　anyone　of　them　is　not　clear　with　regard　to　the　case　he　represents；　or　not　convinced　of　its　correctness；　he　will　speak　slowly；　if　the　situation　is　reversed　he　will　speak　rapidly。　Court　and　other　public　stenographers　confirm　this　observation。


Topic　3。　IMAGINATION。　Section　45。

The　things　witnesses　tell　us　have　formerly　existed　in　their　imaginations；　and　the　_*how_　of　this　existence　determines　in　a　large　degree　the　_quale_　of　what　they　offer　us。　Hence；　the　nature　of　imagination　must　be　of　interest　to　us；　and　the　more　so；　as　we　need　not　concern　ourselves　with　the　relation　between　being　and　imagination。　It　may　be　that　things　may　exist　in　forms　quite　different　from　those　in　which　we　know　them；　perhaps　even　in　unknowable　forms。　The　idealist；　according　to　some　authorities；　has　set　this　possibility　aside　and　given　a　scientific　reply　to　those　who　raised　it。

So　far　as　we　lawyers　are　concerned；　the　‘‘scientific　reply''　does　not　matter。　We　are　interested　in　the　reliability　of　the　imagination　and　in　its　identification　with　what　we　assume　to　exist　and　to　occur。　Some　writers　hold　that　sensory　objects　are　in　sense…perception　both　external　and　internal；　external　with　regard　to　each　other；　and　internal　with　regard　to　consciousness。　Attention　is　called　to　the　fact　that　the　distinction　between　image　and　object　constitutes　no　part　of　the　act　of　perception。　But　those　who　remark　this　fact　assume　that　the　act　does　contain　an　image。　According　to　St。　Augustine　the　image　serves　as　the　knowledge　of　the　object；　according　to　Erdmann　the　object　is　the　image　objectified。

Of　great　importance　is　the　substitutional　adequacy　of　images。　E。　g。；　I　imagine　my　absent　dog；　Bismarck's　dog；　whom　I　know　only　pictorially；　and　finally；　the　dog　of　Alcibiades；　whose　appearance　is　known　only　by　the　fact　that　he　was　pretty　and　that　his　master　had　cut　off　his　tail。　In　this　case；　the　representative　value　of　these　images　will　be　definite；　for　everybody　knows　that　I　can　imagine　my　own　dog　very　correctly；　that　the　image　of　Bismarck's　beast　will　also　be　comparatively　good　inasmuch　as　this　animal　has　been　fre…　　quently　pictured　and　described；　while　the　image　of　Alcibiades'　dog　will　want　much　in　the　way　of　reliabilityalthough　I　have　imagined　this　historic　animal　quite　vividly　since　boyhood。　When；　therefore；　I　speak　of　any　one　of　these　three　animals　everybody　will　be　able　properly　to　value　the　correctness　of　my　images　because　he　knows　their　conditions。　When　we　speak　with　a　witness；　however；　we　rarely　know　the　conditions　under　which　he　has　obtained　his　images；　and　we　learn　them　only　from　him。　Now　it　happens　that　the　description　offered　by　the　witness　adds　another　image；　i。　e。；　our　own　image　of　the　matter；　and　this；　and　that　of　the　witness；　have　to　be　placed　in　specific　relation　to　each　other。　Out　of　the　individual　images　of　all　concerned　an　image　should　be　provided　which　implies　the　image　of　the　represented　event。　Images　can　be　compared　only　with　images；　or　images　are　only　pictures　of　images。＇1＇


＇1＇　Cf。　Windelband：　‘‘Prludien。''


The　difficulty　of　this　transmutation　lies　fundamentally　in　the　nature　of　representation。　Representation　can　never　be　identical　with　its　object。　Helmholtz　has　made　this　most　clear：　‘‘Our　visions　and　representations　are　effects；　objects　seen　and　represented　have　worked　on　our　nervous　system　and　on　our　consciousness。　The　nature　of　each　effect　depends　necessarily　upon　the　nature　of　its　cause；　and　the　nature　of　the　individual　upon　whom　the　cause　was　at　work。　To　demand　an　image　which　should　absolutely　reproduce　its　object　and　therefore　be　absolutely　true；　would　be　to　demand　an　effect　which　should　be　absolutely　independent　of　the　nature　of　that　object　on　which　the　effect　is　caused。　And　this　is　an　obvious　contradiction。''

What　the　difference　between　image　and　object　consists　of；　whether　it　is　merely　formal　or　material；　how　much　it　matters；　has　not　yet　been　scientifically　proved　and　may　never　be　so。　We　have　to　assume　only　that　the　validity　of　this　distinction　is　universally　known；　and　that　everybody　possesses　an　innate　corrective　with　which　he　assigns　proper　place　to　image　and　object；　i。　e。；　he　knows　approximately　the　distinction　between　them。　The　difficulty　lies　in　the　fact　that　not　all　people　possess　an　identical　standard；　and　that　upon　the　creation　of　the　latter　practically　all　human　qualities　exert　an　influence。　This　variety　in　standards；　again；　is　double…edged。　On　the　one　side　it　depends　on　the　essence　of　image　and　of　object；　on　the　other　it　depends　on　the　alteration　which　the　imag