criminal psychology-第9部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！

l　he　at　one　time　thought　of　was　won　away　from　him　without　making　him　quarrelsome；　nobody　had　ever　told　him　of　the　pangs　and　passions　of　other　people；　he　had　had　no　occasion　to　consider　the　theoretic　possibility　of　such　a　thing；　and　so　‘‘jealousy''　remained　utterly　foreign　to　him。　It　is　clear　that　his　hearing　now　took　quite　another　turn。　All　I　thought　I　heard　from　him　was　essentially　wrong；　his　‘‘funded　thought''　concerning　a　very　important；　in　this　case　a　regulative　concept；　had　been　too　poor。

The　discovery　of　the　‘‘funded　thought''　is　indubitably　not　easy。　But　its　objective　possibility　with　witness　and　accused　is　at　least　a　fact。　It　is　excluded　only　where　it　is　most　obviously　necessary　in　the　case　of　the　jury；　and　the　impossibility　in　this　case　turns　the　institution　of　trial　by　jury　into　a　Utopian　dream。　The　presiding　officer　of　a　jury　court　is　in　the　best　instances　acquainted　with　a　few　of　the　jurymen；　but　never　so　far　as　to　have　been　entrusted　with　their　‘‘funded　thought。''　Now　and　then；　when　a　juryman　asks　a　question；　one　gets　a　glimpse　of　it；　and　when　the　public　prosecutor　and　the　attorney　for　the　defence　make　their　speeches　one　catches　something　from　the　jury's　expressions；　and　then　it　is　generally　too　late。　Even　if　it　be　discovered　earlier　nothing　can　be　done　with　it。　Some　success　is　likely　in　the　case　of　single　individuals；　but　it　is　simply　impossible　to　define　the　mental　habits　of　twelve　men　with　whom　one　has　no　particular　relations。

The　third　part　of　the　Frbelian　rule；　‘‘To　presuppose　as　little　as　possible；''　must　be　rigidly　adhered　to。　I　do　not　say　this　pessimistically；　but　simply　because　we　lawyers；　through　endless　practice；　arrange　the　issue　so　much　more　easily；　conceive　its　history　better　and　know　what　to　exclude　and　what；　with　some　degree　of　certainty；　to　retain。　In　consequence　we　often　forget　our　powers　and　present　the　unskilled　laity；　even　when　persons　of　education；　too　much　of　the　material。　Then　it　must　be　considered　that　most　witnesses　are　uneducated；　that　we　can　not　actually　descend　to　their　level；　and　their　unhappiness　under　a　flood　of　strange　material　we　can　grasp　only　with　difficulty。　Because　we　do　not　know　the　witness's　point　of　view　we　ask　too　much　of　him；　and　therefore　fail　in　our　purpose。　And　if；　in　some　exceptional　case；　an　educated　man　is　on　the　stand；　we　fail　again；　since；　having　the　habit　of　dealing　with　the　uneducated；　　we　suppose　this　man　to　know　our　own　specialties　because　he　has　a　little　education。　Experience　does　not　dispel　this　illusion。　Whether　actual　training　in　another　direction　dulls　the　natural　and　free　outlook　we　desire　in　the　witness；　or　whether；　in　our　profession；　education　presupposes　tendencies　too　ideal；　whatever　be　the　reasons；　it　is　a　fact　that　our　hardest　work　is　generally　with　the　most　highly　educated　witnesses。　I　once　had　to　write　a　protocol　based　on　the　testimony　of　a　famous　scholar　who　was　witness　in　a　small　affair。　It　was　a　slow　job。　Either　he　did　not　like　the　terms　as　I　dictated　them；　or　he　was　doubtful　of　the　complete　certainty　of　this　or　that　assertion。　Let　alone　that　I　wasted　an　hour　or　two；　that　protocol；　though　rewritten；　was　full　of　corrections　and　erasures。　And　the　thing　turned　out　to　be　nonsense　at　the　end。　The　beginning　contradicted　the　conclusion；　it　was　unintelligible；　and　still　worse；　untrue。　As　became　manifest　later；　through　the　indubitable　testimony　of　many　witnesses；　the　scholar　had　been　so　conscientious；　careful　and　accurate　that　he　simply　did　not　know　what　he　had　seen。　His　testimony　was　worthless。　I　have　had　such　experiences　repeatedly　and　others　have　confessed　them。　To　the　question：　Where　not　presuppose　too　much？　the　answer　is：　everywhere。　First　of　all；　little　must　be　presupposed　concerning　people's　powers　of　observation。　They　claim　to　have　heard；　seen　or　felt　so　and　so；　and　they　have　not　seen；　heard；　or　felt　it　at　all；　or　quite　differently。　They　assent　vigorously　that　they　have　grasped；　touched；　counted　or　examined　something；　and　on　closer　examination　it　is　demonstrated　that　it　was　only　a　passing　glance　they　threw　on　it。　And　it　is　still　worse　where　something　more　than　ordinary　perception　is　being　considered；　when　exceptionally　keen　senses　or　information　are　necessary。　People　trust　the　conventional　and　when　close　observation　is　required　often　lack　the　knowledge　proper　to　their　particular　status。　In　this　way；　by　presupposing　especial　professional　knowledge　in　a　given　witness；　great　mistakes　are　made。　Generally　he　hasn't　such　knowledge；　or　has　not　made　any　particular　use　of　it。

In　the　same　way　too　much　attention　and　interest　are　often　presupposed；　only　to　lead　later　to　the　astonishing　discovery　of　how　little　attention　men　really　pay　to　their　own　affairs。　Still　less；　therefore；　ought　knowledge　in　less　personal　things　be　presupposed；　for　in　the　matter　of　real　understanding；　the　ignorance　of　men　far　exceeds　all　presuppositions。　Most　people　know　the　looks　of　all　sorts　of　things；　and　think　they　know　their　essences；　and　when　questioned；　invariably　assert　it；　quite　in　good　faith。　But　if　you　depend　　on　such　knowledge　bad　results　arise　that　are　all　the　more　dangerous　because　there　is　rarely　later　opportunity　to　recognize　their　badness。

As　often　as　any　new　matter　is　discussed　with　a　witness；　it　is　necessary；　before　all；　to　find　out　his　general　knowledge　of　it；　what　he　considers　it　to　be；　and　what　ideas　he　connects　with　it。　If　you　judge　that　he　knows　nothing　about　it　and　appraise　his　questions　and　conclusions　accordingly；　you　will　at　least　not　go　wrong　in　the　matter；　and　all　in　all　attain　your　end　most　swiftly。

At　the　same　time　it　is　necessary　to　proceed　as　slowly　as　possible。　It　is　Carus＇1＇　who　points　out　that　a　scholar　ought　not　to　be　shown　any　object　unless　he　can　not　discover　it　or　its　like　for　himself。　Each　power　must　have　developed　before　it　can　be　used。　Difficult　as　this　procedure　generally　is；　it　is　necessary　in　the　teaching　of　children；　and　is　there　successful。　It　is　a　form　of　education　by　examples。　The　child　is　taught　to　assimilate　to　its　past　experience　the　new　fact；　e。　g。：　in　a　comparison　of　some　keen　suffering　of　the　child　with　that　it　made　an　animal　suffer。　Such　parallels　rarely　fail；　whether　in　the　education　of　children　or　of　witnesses。　The　lengthy　description　of　an　event　in　which；　e。　g。；　somebody　is　manhandled；　may　become　quite　different　if　the　witness　is　brought　to　recall　his　own　experience。　At　first　he　speaks　of　the　event　as　perhaps　a　‘‘splendid　joke；''　but　as　soon　as　he　is　brought　to　speak　of　a　similar　situation　of　his　own；　and　the　two　stories　are　set　side　by　side；　his　description　alters。　This　exemplification　may　be　varied　in　many　directions　and　is　always　useful。　It　is　applicable　even　to　accused；　inasmuch　as　the　performer　himself　begins　to　understand　his　deed；　when　it　can　be　attached　to　his　fully　familiar　inner　life。

The　greatest　skill　in　this　matter　may　be　exercised　in　the　case　of　the　jury。　Connect　the　present　new　facts　with　similar　ones　they　already　know　and　so　make　the　matter　intelligible　to　them。　The　difficulty　here；　is　again　the　fact　that　the　jury　is　composed　of　strangers　and　twelve　in　number。　Finding　instances　familiar　to　them　all　and　familiar　in　such　wise　that　they　may　easily　link　them　with　the　case　under　consideration；　is　a　rare　event。　If　it　does　happen　the　success　is　both　significant　and　happy。

It　is　not；　however；　sufficient　to　seek　out　a　familiar　case　analogous　to　that　under　consideration。　The　analogy　should　be　discovered　for　each　event；　each　motive；　each　opinion；　each　reaction；　each　appearance；　if　people　are　to　understand　and　follow　the　case。　Ideas；　like

＇1＇　Carus：　Psychologie。　Leipzig　1823。

　men；　have　an　ancestry；　and　a　knowledge　of　the　ancestors　leads　to　a　discovery　of　the　cousins。


Section　7。　（e）　Egoism。


It　is　possible　that　the　inner　character　of　egoism　shall　be　as　profoundly　potent　in　legal　matters　as　in　the　daily　life。　Goethe　has　experienced　its　effect　with　unparalleled　keenness。　‘‘Let　me　tell　you　something；''　he　writes　（Conversations　with　Eckermann。　Vol。　1）。　‘‘All　periods　considered　regressive　or　transitional　are　subjective。　Conversely　all　progressive　periods　look　outward。　The　whole　of　contemporary　civilization　is　reactionary；　because　subjective。。。。　The　thing　of　importance　is　everywhere　the　individual　who　is　trying　to　show　off　his　lordliness。　Nowhere　is　any　mentionable　effort　to　be　found　that　subordinates　itself　through　love　of　the　whole。''

These　unmistakable　terms　contain　a　‘‘discovery''　that　is　applicable　to　our　days　even　better　than　to　Goethe's。　_It　is　characteristic　of　our　time　that　each　man　has　an　exaggerated　interest　in　himself_。　Consequently；　he　is　concerned　only　with　himself　or　with　his　immediate　environment；　he　understands　only　what　he　already　knows　and　feels；　and　he　works　only　where　he　can　attain　some　personal　advantage。　It　is　hence　to　be　concluded　that　we　may　proceed　with　certainty　only　when　we　count　on　this　exaggerated　egoism　and　use　it　as　a　prime　factor。　The　most　insignificant　little　things　attest　this。　A　man　who　gets　a　printed　directory　will　look　his　own　name　up；　though　he　knows　it　is　there；　and　contemplate　it　with　pleasure；　he　does　the　same　with　the　photograph　of　a　group　of　which　his　worthy　self　is　one　of　the　immortalized。　If　personal　qualities　are　under　discussion；　h