second treatise of government-第23部分

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ve）　may　assemble；　and　exercise　their　　legislature；　at　the　times　that　either　their　original　　constitution；　or　their　own　adjournment；　appoints；　or　when　they　　please；　if　neither　of　these　hath　appointed　any　time；　or　there　be　　no　other　way　prescribed　to　convoke　them：　for　the　supreme　power　　being　placed　in　them　by　the　people；　it　is　always　in　them；　and　　they　may　exercise　it　when　they　please；　unless　by　their　original　　constitution　they　are　limited　to　certain　seasons；　or　by　an　act　of　　their　supreme　power　they　have　adjourned　to　a　certain　time；　and　　when　that　time　comes；　they　have　a　right　to　assemble　and　act　　again。　　　　　　Sec。　154。　　If　the　legislative；　or　any　part　of　it；　be　made　up　　of　representatives　chosen　for　that　time　by　the　people；　which　　afterwards　return　into　the　ordinary　state　of　subjects；　and　have　　no　share　in　the　legislature　but　upon　a　new　choice；　this　power　of　　chusing　must　also　be　exercised　by　the　people；　either　at　certain　　appointed　seasons；　or　else　when　they　are　summoned　to　it；　and　in　　this　latter　case　'　the　power　of　convoking　the　legislative　is　　ordinarily　placed　in　the　executive；　and　has　one　of　these　two　　limitations　in　respect　of　time：　that　either　the　original　　constitution　requires　their　assembling　and　acting　at　certain　　intervals；　and　then　the　executive　power　does　nothing　but　　ministerially　issue　directions　for　their　electing　and　assembling；　　according　to　due　forms；　or　else　it　is　left　to　his　prudence　to　　call　them　by　new　elections；　when　the　occasions　or　exigencies　of　　the　public　require　the　amendment　of　old；　or　making　of　new　laws；　　or　the　redress　or　prevention　of　any　inconveniencies；　that　lie　on；　　or　threaten　the　people。　　　　　　Sec。　155。　　It　may　be　demanded　here；　What　if　the　executive　　power；　being　possessed　of　the　force　of　the　common…wealth；　shall　　make　use　of　that　force　to　hinder　the　meeting　and　acting　of　the　　legislative；　when　the　original　constitution；　or　the　public　　exigencies　require　it？　　I　say；　using　force　upon　the　people　　without　authority；　and　contrary　to　the　trust　put　in　him　that　does　　so；　is　a　state　of　war　with　the　people；　who　have　a　right　to　　reinstate　their　legislative　in　the　exercise　of　their　power：　for　　having　erected　a　legislative；　with　an　intent　they　should　exercise　　the　power　of　making　laws；　either　at　certain　set　times；　or　when　　there　is　need　of　it；　when　they　are　hindered　by　any　force　from　　what　is　so　necessary　to　the　society；　and　wherein　the　safety　and　　preservation　of　the　people　consists；　the　people　have　a　right　to　　remove　it　by　force。　　In　all　states　and　conditions；　the　true　　remedy　of　force　without　authority；　is　to　oppose　force　to　it。　　The　　use　of　force　without　authority；　always　puts　him　that　uses　it　into　　a　state　of　war；　as　the　aggressor；　and　renders　him　liable　to　be　　treated　accordingly。　　　　　　Sec。　156。　　The　power　of　assembling　and　dismissing　the　　legislative；　placed　in　the　executive；　gives　not　the　executive　a　　superiority　over　it；　but　is　a　fiduciary　trust　placed　in　him；　for　　the　safety　of　the　people；　in　a　case　where　the　uncertainty　and　　variableness　of　human　affairs　could　not　bear　a　steady　fixed　rule：　　for　it　not　being　possible；　that　the　first　framers　of　the　　government　should；　by　any　foresight；　be　so　much　masters　of　future　　events；　as　to　be　able　to　prefix　so　just　periods　of　return　and　　duration　to　the　assemblies　of　the　legislative；　in　all　times　to　　come；　that　might　exactly　answer　all　the　exigencies　of　the　common…　wealth；　the　best　remedy　could　be　found　for　this　defect；　was　to　　trust　this　to　the　prudence　of　one　who　was　always　to　be　present；　　and　whose　business　it　was　to　watch　over　the　public　good。　　　　Constant　frequent　meetings　of　the　legislative；　and　long　　continuations　of　their　assemblies；　without　necessary　occasion；　　could　not　but　be　burdensome　to　the　people；　and　must　necessarily　　in　time　produce　more　dangerous　inconveniencies；　and　yet　the　quick　

turn　of　affairs　might　be　sometimes　such　as　to　need　their　present　　help：　any　delay　of　their　convening　might　endanger　the　public；　and　　sometimes　too　their　business　might　be　so　great；　that　the　limited　　time　of　their　sitting　might　be　too　short　for　their　work；　and　rob　　the　public　of　that　benefit　which　could　be　had　only　from　their　　mature　deliberation。　　What　then　could　be　done　in　this　case　to　　prevent　the　community　from　being　exposed　some　time　or　other　to　　eminent　hazard；　on　one　side　or　the　other；　by　fixed　intervals　and　　periods；　set　to　the　meeting　and　acting　of　the　legislative；　but　to　　intrust　it　to　the　prudence　of　some；　who　being　present；　and　　acquainted　with　the　state　of　public　affairs；　might　make　use　of　　this　prerogative　for　the　public　good？　and　where　else　could　this　　be　so　well　placed　as　in　his　hands；　who　was　intrusted　with　the　　execution　of　the　laws　for　the　same　end？　　Thus　supposing　the　　regulation　of　times　for　the　assembling　and　sitting　of　the　　legislative；　not　settled　by　the　original　constitution；　it　　naturally　fell　into　the　hands　of　the　executive；　not　as　an　　arbitrary　power　depending　on　his　good　pleasure；　but　with　this　　trust　always　to　have　it　exercised　only　for　the　public　weal；　as　　the　occurrences　of　times　and　change　of　affairs　might　require。　　　Whether　settled　periods　of　their　convening；　or　a　liberty　left　to　　the　prince　for　convoking　the　legislative；　or　perhaps　a　mixture　of　　both；　hath　the　least　inconvenience　attending　it；　it　is　not　my　　business　here　to　inquire；　but　only　to　shew；　that　though　the　　executive　power　may　have　the　prerogative　of　convoking　and　　dissolving　such　conventions　of　the　legislative；　yet　it　is　not　　thereby　superior　to　it。　　　　　　Sec。　157。　　Things　of　this　world　are　in　so　constant　a　flux；　　that　nothing　remains　long　in　the　same　state。　　Thus　people；　　riches；　trade；　power；　change　their　stations；　flourishing　mighty　　cities　come　to　ruin；　and　prove　in　times　neglected　desolate　　corners；　whilst　other　unfrequented　places　grow　into　populous　　countries；　filled　with　wealth　and　inhabitants。　　But　things　not　　always　changing　equally；　and　private　interest　often　keeping　up　　customs　and　privileges；　when　the　reasons　of　them　are　ceased；　it　　often　comes　to　pass；　that　in　governments；　where　part　of　the　　legislative　consists　of　representatives　chosen　by　the　people；　　that　in　tract　of　time　this　representation　becomes　very　unequal　　and　disproportionate　to　the　reasons　it　was　at　first　established　　upon。　　　To　what　gross　absurdities　the　following　of　custom；　when　　reason　has　left　it；　may　lead；　we　may　be　satisfied；　when　we　see　　the　bare　name　of　a　town；　of　which　there　remains　not　so　much　as　　the　ruins；　where　scarce　so　much　housing　as　a　sheepcote；　or　more　　inhabitants　than　a　shepherd　is　to　be　found；　sends　as　many　　representatives　to　the　grand　assembly　of　law…makers；　as　a　whole　　county　numerous　in　people；　and　powerful　in　riches。　　This　　strangers　stand　amazed　at；　and　every　one　must　confess　needs　a　　remedy；　tho'　most　think　it　hard　to　find　one；　because　the　　constitution　of　the　legislative　being　the　original　and　supreme　　act　of　the　society；　antecedent　to　all　positive　laws　in　it；　and　　depending　wholly　on　the　people；　no　inferior　power　can　alter　it。　　　　And　therefore　the　people；　when　the　legislative　is　once　　constituted；　having；　in　such　a　government　as　we　have　been　　speaking　of；　no　power　to　act　as　long　as　the　government　stands；　　this　inconvenience　is　thought　incapable　of　a　remedy。　　　　　　Sec。　158。　　Salus　populi　suprema　lex；　is　certainly　so　just　　and　fundamental　a　rule；　that　he；　who　sincerely　follows　it；　cannot　　dangerously　err。　　If　therefore　the　executive；　who　has　the　power　　of　convoking　the　legislative；　observing　rather　the　true　　proportion；　than　fashion　of　representation；　regulates；　not　by　old　　custom；　but　true　reason；　the　number　of　members；　in　all　places　　that　have　a　right　to　be　distinctly　represented；　which　no　part　of　　the　people　however　incorporated　can　pretend　to；　but　in　proportion　　to　the　assistance　which　it　affords　to　the　public；　it　cannot　be　　judged　to　have　set　up　a　new　legislative；　but　to　have　restored　the　　old　and　true　one；　and　to　have　rectified　the　disorders　which　

succession　of　time　had　insensibly；　as　well　as　inevitably　　introduced：　For　it　being　the　interest　as　well　as　intention　of　the　　people；　to　have　a　fair　and　equal　representative；　whoever　brings　　it　nearest　to　that；　is　an　undoubted　friend　to；　and　establisher　of　　the　government；　and　cannot　miss　the　consent　and　approbation　of　　the　community；　prerogative　being　nothing　but　a　power；　in　the　　hands　of　the　prince；　to　provide　for　the　public　good；　in　such　　cases；　which　depending　upon　unforeseen　and　uncertain　occurrences；　　certain　and　unalterable　laws　could　not　safely　direct；　whatsoever　　shall　be　done　manifestly　for　the　good　of　the　people；　and　the　　establishing　the　government　upon　its　true　foundations；　is；　and　　always　will　be；　just　prerogative；　The　power　of　erecting　new　　corporations；　and　therewith　new　representatives；　carries　with　it　　a　supposition；　that　in　time　the　measures　of　representation　might　　vary；　and　those　places　have　a　just　right　to　be　represented　which　　before　had　none；　and　by　the　same　reason；　those　cease　to　have　a　　right；　and　be　too　inconsiderable　for　such　a　privilege；　which　　before　had　it。　　'Tis　not　a　change　from　the　present　state；　which　　perhaps　corruption　or　decay　has　introduced；　that　makes　an　inroad　　upon　the　government；　but　the　tendency　of　it　to　injure　or　oppress　　the　people；　and　to　set　up　one　part　or　party；　with　a