second treatise of government-第25部分

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w　the　actions　of　those　good　　rulers　into　precedent；　and　make　them　the　standard　of　their　　prerogative；　as　if　what　had　been　done　only　for　the　good　of　the　　people　was　a　right　in　them　to　do；　for　the　harm　of　the　people；　if　　they　so　pleased；　it　has　often　occasioned　contest；　and　sometimes　　public　disorders；　before　the　people　could　recover　their　original　　right；　and　get　that　to　be　declared　not　to　be　prerogative；　which　　truly　was　never　so；　since　it　is　impossible　that　any　body　in　the　　society　should　ever　have　a　right　to　do　the　people　harm；　though　it　　be　very　possible；　and　reasonable；　that　the　people　should　not　go　　about　to　set　any　bounds　to　the　prerogative　of　those　kings；　or　　rulers；　who　themselves　transgressed　not　the　bounds　of　the　public　　good：　for　prerogative　is　nothing　but　the　power　of　doing　public　　good　without　a　rule。　　　　　　　　　Sec。　167。　　The　power　of　calling　parliaments　in　England；　as　　to　precise　time；　place；　and　duration；　is　certainly　a　prerogative　　of　the　king；　but　still　with　this　trust；　that　it　shall　be　made　use　　of　for　the　good　of　the　nation；　as　the　exigencies　of　the　times；　　and　variety　of　occasions；　shall　require：　for　it　being　impossible　　to　foresee　which　should　always　be　the　fittest　place　for　them　to　　assemble　in；　and　what　the　best　season；　the　choice　of　these　was　　left　with　the　executive　power；　as　might　be　most　subservient　to　　the　public　good；　and　best　suit　the　ends　of　parliaments。　　　　　　Sec。　168。　　The　old　question　will　be　asked　in　this　matter　of　　prerogative；　But　who　shall　be　judge　when　this　power　is　made　a　　right　use　of　？　　1　answer：　between　an　executive　power　in　being；　

with　such　a　prerogative；　and　a　legislative　that　depends　upon　his　　will　for　their　convening；　there　can　be　no　judge　on　earth；　as　　there　can　be　none　between　the　legislative　and　the　people；　should　　either　the　executive；　or　the　legislative；　when　they　have　got　the　　power　in　their　hands；　design；　or　go　about　to　enslave　or　destroy　　them。　　The　people　have　no　other　remedy　in　this；　as　in　all　other　　cases　where　they　have　no　judge　on　earth；　but　to　appeal　to　heaven：　　for　the　rulers；　in　such　attempts；　exercising　a　power　the　people　　never　put　into　their　hands；　（who　can　never　be　supposed　to　consent　　that　any　body　should　rule　over　them　for　their　harm）　do　that　which　　they　have　not　a　right　to　do。　　And　where　the　body　of　the　people；　　or　any　single　man；　is　deprived　of　their　right；　or　is　under　the　　exercise　of　a　power　without　right；　and　have　no　appeal　on　earth；　　then　they　have　a　liberty　to　appeal　to　heaven；　whenever　they　judge　　the　cause　of　sufficient　moment。　　And　therefore；　though　the　people　　cannot　be　judge；　so　as　to　have；　by　the　constitution　of　that　　society；　any　superior　power；　to　determine　and　give　effective　　sentence　in　the　case；　yet　they　have；　by　a　law　antecedent　and　　paramount　to　all　positive　laws　of　men；　reserved　that　ultimate　　determination　to　themselves　which　belongs　to　all　mankind；　where　　there　lies　no　appeal　on　earth；　viz。　　to　judge；　whether　they　have　　just　cause　to　make　their　appeal　to　heaven。　　And　this　judgment　　they　cannot　part　with；　it　being　out　of　a　man's　power　so　to　submit　　himself　to　another；　as　to　give　him　a　liberty　to　destroy　him；　God　　and　nature　never　allowing　a　man　so　to　abandon　himself；　as　to　　neglect　his　own　preservation：　and　since　he　cannot　take　away　his　　own　life；　neither　can　he　give　another　power　to　take　it。　　Nor　let　　any　one　think；　this　lays　a　perpetual　foundation　for　disorder；　for　　this　operates　not；　till　the　inconveniency　is　so　great；　that　the　　majority　feel　it；　and　are　weary　of　it；　and　find　a　necessity　to　　have　it　amended。　　But　this　the　executive　power；　or　wise　princes；　　never　need　come　in　the　danger　of：　and　it　is　the　thing；　of　all　　others；　they　have　most　need　to　avoid；　as　of　all　others　the　most　　perilous。




　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAP。　　XV。

　　　　　　　　Of　Paternal；　Political；　and　Despotical　Power；　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　considered　together。

　　　　　Sec。　169。　　THOUGH　I　have　had　occasion　to　speak　of　these　　separately　before；　yet　the　great　mistakes　of　late　about　　government；　having；　as　I　suppose；　arisen　from　confounding　these　　distinct　powers　one　with　another；　it　may　not；　perhaps；　be　amiss　　to　consider　them　here　together。　　　　　　Sec。　170。　　First；　then；　Paternal　or　parental　power　is　　nothing　but　that　which　parents　have　over　their　children；　to　　govern　them　for　the　children's　good；　till　they　come　to　the　use　of　　reason；　or　a　state　of　knowledge；　wherein　they　may　be　supposed　　capable　to　understand　that　rule；　whether　it　be　the　law　of　nature；　　or　the　municipal　law　of　their　country；　they　are　to　govern　　themselves　by：　capable；　I　say；　to　know　it；　as　well　as　several　　others；　who　live　as　freemen　under　that　law。　　The　affection　and　　tenderness　which　God　hath　planted　in　the　breast　of　parents　　towards　their　children；　makes　it　evident；　that　this　is　not　　intended　to　be　a　severe　arbitrary　government；　but　only　for　the　　help；　instruction；　and　preservation　of　their　offspring。　　But　　happen　it　as　it　will；　there　is；　as　I　have　proved；　no　reason　why　　it　should　be　thought　to　extend　to　life　and　death；　at　any　time；　　over　their　children；　more　than　over　any　body　else；　neither　can　　there　be　any　pretence　why　this　parental　power　should　keep　the　　child；　when　grown　to　a　man；　in　subjection　to　the　will　of　his　　parents；　any　farther　than　having　received　life　and　education　from　

his　parents；　obliges　him　to　respect；　honour；　gratitude；　　assistance　and　support；　all　his　life；　to　both　father　and　mother。　　　And　thus；　'tis　true；　the　paternal　is　a　natural　government；　but　　not　at　all　extending　itself　to　the　ends　and　jurisdictions　of　that　　which　is　political。　　The　power　of　the　father　doth　not　reach　at　　all　to　the　property　of　the　child；　which　is　only　in　his　own　　disposing。　　　　　　Sec。　171。　　Secondly；　Political　power　is　that　power；　which　　every　man　having　in　the　state　of　nature；　has　given　up　into　the　　hands　of　the　society；　and　therein　to　the　governors；　whom　the　　society　hath　set　over　itself；　with　this　express　or　tacit　trust；　　that　it　shall　be　employed　for　their　good；　and　the　preservation　of　　their　property：　now　this　power；　which　every　man　has　in　the　state　　of　nature；　and　which　he　parts　with　to　the　society　in　all　such　　cases　where　the　society　can　secure　him；　is　to　use　such　means；　for　　the　preserving　of　his　own　property；　as　he　thinks　good；　and　nature　　allows　him；　and　to　punish　the　breach　of　the　law　of　nature　in　　others；　so　as　（according　to　the　best　of　his　reason）　may　most　　conduce　to　the　preservation　of　himself；　and　the　rest　of　mankind。　　　So　that　the　end　and　measure　of　this　power；　when　in　every　man's　　hands　in　the　state　of　nature；　being　the　preservation　of　all　of　　his　society；　that　is；　all　mankind　in　general；　it　can　have　no　　other　end　or　measure；　when　in　the　hands　of　the　magistrate；　but　to　　preserve　the　members　of　that　society　in　their　lives；　liberties；　　and　possessions；　and　so　cannot　be　an　absolute；　arbitrary　power　　over　their　lives　and　fortunes；　which　are　as　much　as　possible　to　　be　preserved；　but　a　power　to　make　laws；　and　annex　such　penalties　　to　them；　as　may　tend　to　the　preservation　of　the　whole；　by　cutting　　off　those　parts；　and　those　only；　which　are　so　corrupt；　that　they　　threaten　the　sound　and　healthy；　without　which　no　severity　is　　lawful。　　And　this　power　has　its　original　only　from　compact　and　　agreement；　and　the　mutual　consent　of　those　who　make　up　the　　community。　　　　　　Sec。　172。　　Thirdly；　Despotical　power　is　an　absolute；　　arbitrary　power　one　man　has　over　another；　to　take　away　his　life；　　whenever　he　pleases。　　This　is　a　power；　which　neither　nature　　gives；　for　it　has　made　no　such　distinction　between　one　man　and　　another；　nor　compact　can　convey：　for　man　not　having　such　an　　arbitrary　power　over　his　own　life；　cannot　give　another　man　such　a　　power　over　it；　but　it　is　the　effect　only　of　forfeiture；　which　the　　aggressor　makes　of　his　own　life；　when　he　puts　himself　into　the　　state　of　war　with　another：　for　having　quitted　reason；　which　God　　hath　given　to　be　the　rule　betwixt　man　and　man；　and　the　common　　bond　whereby　human　kind　is　united　into　one　fellowship　and　　society；　and　having　renounced　the　way　of　peace　which　that　　teaches；　and　made　use　of　the　force　of　war；　to　compass　his　unjust　　ends　upon　another；　where　he　has　no　right；　and　so　revolting　from　　his　own　kind　to　that　of　beasts；　by　making　force；　which　is　　their's；　to　be　his　rule　of　right；　he　renders　himself　liable　to　be　　destroyed　by　the　injured　person；　and　the　rest　of　mankind；　that　　will　join　with　him　in　the　execution　of　justice；　as　any　other　wild　　beast；　or　noxious　brute；　with　whom　mankind　can　have　neither　　society　nor　security*。　　And　thus　captives；　taken　in　a　just　and　　lawful　war；　and　such　only；　are　subject　to　a　despotical　power；　　which；　as　it　arises　not　from　compact；　so　neither　is　it　capable　of　　any；　but　is　the　state　of　war　continued：　for　what　compact　can　be　　made　with　a　man　that　is　not　master　of　his　own　life？　what　　condition　can　he　perform？　and　if　he　be　once　allowed　to　be　master　　of　his　own　life；　the　despotical；　arbitrary　power　of　his　master　　ceases。　　He　that　is　master　of　himself；　and　his　own　life；　has　a　　right　too　to　the　means　of　preserving　it；　so　that　as　soon　as　　compact　enters；　slavery　ceases；　and　he　so　far　quits　his　absolute　　power；　and　puts　an　end　to　the　state　of　war；　who　enters　into　　conditions　with　his　captive。　　　　　　（*Another　copy　corrected　by　Mr。　　Locke；　has　it