the science of right-第10部分

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entering　into　civil　union　with　us；　we　are　to　be　considered　entitled　in

any　case　to　proceed　with　force　in　the　intention　of　founding　such　a

union；　and　bringing　into　a　juridical　state　such　men　as　the　savage

American　Indians；　the　Hottentots；and　the　New　Hollanders；　or…　and　the

case　is　not　much　better…　whether　we　may　establish　colonies　by

deceptive　purchase；　and　so　become　owners　of　their　soil；　and；　in

general；　without　regard　to　their　first　possession；　make　use　at　will　of

our　superiority　in　relation　to　them？　Further；　may　it　not　be　held

that　Nature　herself；　as　abhorring　a　vacuum；　seems　to　demand　such　a

procedure；　and　that　large　regions　in　other　continents；　that　are　now

magnificently　peopled；　would　otherwise　have　remained　unpossessed　by

civilized　inhabitants　and　might　have　for　ever　remained　thus；　so　that

the　end　of　creation　would　have　so　far　been　frustrated？　It　is　almost

unnecessary　to　answer；　for　it　is　easy　to　see　through　all　this　flimsy

veil　of　injustice；　which　just　amounts　to　the　Jesuitism　of　making　a

good　end　justify　any　means。　This　mode　of　acquiring　the　soil　is；

therefore；　to　be　repudiated。

　　The　indefiniteness　of　external　acquirable　objects　in　respect　of

their　quantity；　as　well　as　their　quality；　makes　the　problem　of　the

sole　primary　external　acquisition　of　them　one　of　the　most　difficult　to

solve。　There　must；　however；　be　some　one　first　acquisition　of　an

external　object；　for　every　Acquisition　cannot　be　derivative。　Hence；

the　problem　is　not　to　be　given　up　as　insoluble　or　in　itself　as

impossible。　If　it　is　solved　by　reference　to　the　original　contract；

unless　this　contract　is　extended　so　as　to　include　the　whole　human

race；　acquisition　under　it　would　still　remain　but　provisional。



　　　　　　　　　16。　Exposition　of　the　Conception　of　a　Primary

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Acquisition　of　the　Soil。



　　All　men　are　originally　in　a　common　collective　possession　of　the　soil

of　the　whole　earth　（communio　fundi　originaria）；　and　they　have

naturally　each　a　will　to　use　it　（lex　justi）。　But　on　account　of　the

opposition　of　the　free　will　of　one　to　that　of　the　other　in　the

sphere　of　action；　which　is　inevitable　by　nature；　all　use　of　the　soil

would　be　prevented　did　not　every　will　contain　at　the　same　time　a　law

for　the　regulation　of　the　relation　of　all　wills　in　action；　according

to　which　a　particular　possession　can　be　determined　to　every　one　upon

the　common　soil。　This　is　the　juridical　law　（lex　juridica）。　But　the

distributive　law　of　the　mine　and　thine；　as　applicable　to　each

individual　on　the　soil；　according　to　the　axiom　of　external　freedom；

cannot　proceed　otherwise　than　from　a　primarily　united　will　a　priori…

which　does　not　presuppose　any　juridical　act　as　requisite　for　this

union。　This　Law　can　only　take　form　in　the　civil　state　（lex　justitiae

distributivae）；　as　it　is　in　this　state　alone　that　the　united　common

will　determines　what　is　right；　what　is　rightful；　and　what　is　the

constitution　of　Right。　In　reference　to　this　state；　however…　and

prior　to　its　establishment　and　in　view　of　it…　it　is　provisorily　a　duty

for　every　one　to　proceed　according　to　the　law　of　external　acquisition；

and　accordingly　it　is　a　juridical　procedure　on　the　part　of　the　will　to

lay　every　one　under　obligation　to　recognise　the　act　of　possessing

and　appropriating；　although　it　be　only　unilaterally。　Hence　a　provisory

acquisition　of　the　soil；　with　all　its　juridical　consequences；　is

possible　in　the　state　of　nature。

　　Such　an　acquisition；　however；　requires　and　also　obtains　the　favour

of　a　permissive　law　（lex　permissiva）；　in　respect　of　the

determination　of　the　limits　of　juridically　possible　possession。　For　it

precedes　the　juridical　state；　and　as　merely　introductory　to　it　is

not　yet　peremptory；　and　this　favour　does　not　extend　farther　than　the

date　of　the　consent　of　the　other　co…operators　in　the　establishment

of　the　civil　state。　But　if　they　are　opposed　to　entering　into　the　civil

state；　as　long　as　this　opposition　lasts　it　carries　all　the　effect　of　a

guaranteed　juridical　acquisition　with　it；　because　the　advance　from　the

state　of　nature　to　the　civil　state　is　founded　upon　a　duty。



　　　　　　　　　　　17。　Deduction　of　the　Conception　of　the　Original

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Primary　Acquisition。



　　We　have　found　the　title　of　acquisition　in　a　universal　original

community　of　the　soil；　under　the　conditions　of　an　external　acquisition

in　space；　and　the　mode　of　acquisition　is　contained　in　the　empirical

fact　of　taking　possession　（apprehensio）；　conjoined　with　the　will　to

have　an　external　object　as　one's　own。　It　is　further　necessary　to

unfold；　from　the　principles　of　the　pure　juridically　practical　reason

involved　in　the　conception；　the　juridical　acquisition　proper　of　an

object…　that　is；　the　external　mine　and　thine　that　follows　from　the　two

previous　conditions；　as　rational　possession　（possessio　noumenon）。

　　The　juridical　conception　of　the　external　mine　and　thine；　so　far　as

it　involves　the　category　of　substance；　cannot　by　〃that　which　is

external　to　me〃　mean　merely　〃in　a　place　other　than　that　in　which　I

am〃；　for　it　is　a　rational　conception。　As　under　the　conceptions　of

the　reason　only　intellectual　conceptions　can　be　embraced；　the

expression　in　question　can　only　signify　〃something　that　is　different

and　distinct　from　me〃　according　to　the　idea　of　a　non…empirical

possession　through；　as　it　were；　a　continuous　activity　in　taking

possession　of　an　external　object；　and　it　involves　only　the　notion　of

having　something　in　my　power；　which　indicates　the　connection　of　an

object　with　myself；　as　a　subjective　condition　of　the　possibility　of

making　use　of　it。　This　forms　a　purely　intellectual　conception　of　the

understanding。　Now　we　can　leave　out　or　abstract　from　the　sensible

conditions　of　possession；　as　relations　of　a　person　to　objects　which

have　no　obligation。　This　process　of　elimination　just　gives　the

rational　relation　of　a　person　to　persons；　and　it　is　such　that　he　can

bind　them　all　by　an　obligation　in　reference　to　the　use　of　things

through　his　act　of　will；　so　far　as　it　is　conformable　to　the　axiom　of

freedom；　the　postulate　of　right；　and　the　universal　legislation　of

the　common　will；　conceived　as　united　a　priori。　This　is　therefore　the

rational　intelligible　possession　of　things　as　by　pure　right；

although　they　are　objects　of　sense。



　　It　is　evident　that　the　first　modification；　limitation；　or

transformation　generally；　of　a　portion　of　the　soil　cannot　of　itself

furnish　a　title　to　its　acquisition；　since　possession　of　an　accident

does　not　form　a　ground　for　legal　possession　of　the　substance。

Rather；　conversely；　the　inference　as　to　the　mine　and　thine　must　be

drawn　from　ownership　of　the　substance　according　to　the　rule：

Accessarium　sequitur　suum　principale。　Hence　one　who　has　spent　labour

on　a　piece　of　ground　that　was　not　already　his　own；　has　lost　his　effort

and　work　to　the　former　owner。　This　position　is　so　evident　of　itself

that　the　old　opinion　to　the　opposite　effect；　that　is　still　spread

far　and　wide；　can　hardly　be　ascribed　to　any　other　than　the

prevailing　illusion　which　unconsciously　leads　to　the　personification

of　things；　and；　then；　as　if　they　could　be　bound　under　an　obligation　by

the　labour　bestowed　upon　them　to　be　at　the　service　of　the　person　who

does　the　labour；　to　regard　them　as　his　by　immediate　right。　Otherwise

it　is　probable　that　the　natural　question…　already　discussed…　would　not

have　been　passed　over　with　so　light　a　tread；　namely：　〃How　is　a　right

in　a　thing　possible？〃　For；　right　as　against　every　possible　possessor

of　a　thing　means　only　the　claim　of　a　particular　will　to　the　use　of

an　object　so　far　as　it　may　be　included　in　the　all…comprehending

universal　will；　and　can　be　thought　as　in　harmony　with　its　law。

　　As　regards　bodies　situated　upon　a　piece　of　ground　which　is　already

mine；　if　they　otherwise　belong　to　no　other　person；　they　belong　to　me

without　my　requiring　any　particular　juridical　act　for　the　purpose　of

this　acquisition；　they　are　mine　not　facto；　but　lege。　For　they　may　be

regarded　as　accidents　inhering　in　the　substance　of　the　soil；　and

they　are　thus　mine　jure　rei　meae。　To　this　category　also　belongs

everything　which　is　so　connected　with　anything　of　mine　that　it

cannot　be　separated　from　what　is　mine　without　altering　it

substantially。　Examples　of　this　are　gilding　on　an　object；　mixture　of　a

material　belonging　to　me　with　other　things；　alluvial　deposit；　or

even　alteration　of　the　adjoining　bed　of　a　stream　or　river　in　my　favour

so　as　to　produce　an　increase　of　my　land；　etc。　By　the　same

principles；　the　question　must　also　be　decided　as　to　whether　the

acquirable　soil　may　extend　farther　than　the　existing　land；　so　as

even　to　include　part　of　the　bed　of　the　sea；　with　the　right　to　fish

on　my　own　shores；　to　gather　amber　and　such　like。　So　far　as　I　have

the　mechanical　capability　from　my　own　site；　as　the　place　I　occupy；

to　secure　my　soil　from　the　attack　of　others…　and；　therefore；　as　far　as

cannon　can　carry　from　the　shore…　all　is　included　in　my　possession；　and

the　sea　is　thus　far　closed　（mare　c