the science of right-第21部分

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questions　point　to　what　is　in　itself　morally　wrong。

　　But　in　relation　to　a　court　of　justice…　and　generally　in　the　civil

state…　if　it　be　assumed　there　are　no　other　means　of　getting　to　the

truth　in　certain　cases　than　by　an　oath；　it　must　be　adopted。　In

regard　to　religion；　under　the　supposition　that　every　one　has　it；　it

may　be　utilized　as　a　necessary　means　（in　causu　necessitatis）；　in

behoof　of　the　legitimate　procedure　of　a　court　of　justice。　The　court

uses　this　form　of　spiritual　compulsion　（tortura　spiritualis）　as　an

available　means；　in　conformity　with　the　superstitious　propensity　of

mankind；　for　the　ascertainment　of　what　is　concealed；　and　therefore

holds　itself　justified　in　so　doing。　The　legislative　power；　however；　is

fundamentally　wrong　in　assigning　this　authority　to　the　judicial　power；

because　even　in　the　civil　state　any　compulsion　with　regard　to　the

taking　of　oaths　is　contrary　to　the　inalienable　freedom　of　man。



　　Official　oaths；　which　are　usually　promissory；　being　taken　on

entering　upon　an　office；　to　the　effect　that　the　individual　has　sincere

intention　to　administer　his　functions　dutifully；　might　well　be　changed

into　assertory　oaths；　to　be　taken　at　the　end　of　a　year　or　more　of

actual　administration；　the　official　swearing　to　the　faithfulness　of

his　discharge　of　duty　during　that　time。　This　would　bring　the

conscience　more　into　action　than　the　promissory　oath；　which　always

gives　room　for　the　internal　pretext　that；　with　the　best　intention；　the

difficulties　that　arose　during　the　administration　of　the　official

function　were　not　foreseen。　And；　further；　violations　of　duty；　under

the　prospect　of　their　being　summed　up　by　future　censors；　would　give

rise　to　more　anxiety　as　to　censure　than　when　they　are　merely

represented；　one　after　the　other；　and　forgotten。

　　As　regards　an　oath　taken　concerning　a　matter　of　belief　（de

credulitate）；　it　is　evident　that　no　such　oath　can　be　demanded　by　a

court。　1。　For；　first；　it　contains　in　itself　a　contradiction。　Such

belief；　as　intermediate　between　opinion　and　knowledge；　is　a　thing　on

which　one　might　venture　to　lay　a　wager　but　not　to　swear　an　oath。　2。

And；　second；　the　judge　who　imposes　an　oath　of　belief；　in　order　to

ascertain　anything　pertinent　to　his　own　purpose　or　even　to　the

common　good；　commits　a　great　offence　against　the　conscientiousness

of　the　party　taking　such　an　oath。　This　he　does　in　regard　both　to　the

levity　of　mind；　which　he　thereby　helps　to　engender；　and　to　the

stings　of　conscience　which　a　man　must　feel　who　to…day　regards　a

subject　from　a　certain　point　of　view；　but　who　will　very　probably

to…morrow　find　it　quite　improbable　from　another　point　of　view。　Any

one；　therefore；　who　is　compelled　to　take　such　an　oath；　is　subjected　to

an　injury。



　　　　　　　　Transition　from　the　Mine　and　Thine　in　the　State

　　　　　　　　　　　of　Nature　to　the　Mine　and　Thine　in　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Juridical　State　Generally。



　　　　　　　　　41。　Public　Justice　as　Related　to　the　Natural

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　and　the　Civil　State。



　　The　juridical　state　is　that　relation　of　men　to　one　another　which

contains　the　conditions　under　which　it　is　alone　possible　for　every　one

to　obtain　the　right　that　is　his　due。　The　formal　principle　of　the

possibility　of　actually　participating　in　such　right；　viewed　in

accordance　with　the　idea　of　a　universally　legislative　will；　is

public　justice。　Public　justice　may　be　considered　in　relation　either　to

the　possibility；　or　actuality；　or　necessity　of　the　possession　of

objects…　regarded　as　the　matter　of　the　activity　of　the　will…　according

to　laws。　It　may　thus　be　divided　into　protective　justice　（justitia

testatrix）；　commutative　justice　（justitia　commutativa）；　and

distributive　justice　（justitia　distributiva）；　in　the　first　mode　of

justice；　the　law　declares　merely　what　relation　is　internally　right

in　respect　of　form　（lex　justi）；　in　the　second；　it　declares　what　is

likewise　externally　in　accord　with　a　law　in　respect　of　the　object；　and

what　possession　is　rightful　（lex　juridica）；　and　in　the　third；　it

declares　what　is　right；　and　what　is　just；　and　to　what　extent；　by　the

judgement　of　a　court　in　any　particular　case　coming　under　the　given

law。　In　this　latter　relation；　the　public　court　is　called　the　justice

of　the　country；　and　the　question　whether　there　actually　is　or　is　not

such　an　administration　of　public　justice　may　be　regarded　as　the　most

important　of　all　juridical　interests。

　　The　non…juridical　state　is　that　condition　of　society　in　which

there　is　no　distributive　justice。　It　is　commonly　called　the　natural

state　（status　naturalis）；　or　the　state　of　nature。　It　is　not　the　social

state；　as　Achenwall　puts　it；　for　this　may　be　in　itself　an　artificial

state　（status　artificialis）；　that　is　to　be　contradistinguished　from

the　〃natural〃　state。　The　opposite　of　the　state　of　nature　is　the

civil　state　（status　civilis）　as　the　condition　of　a　society　standing

under　a　distributive　justice。　In　the　state　of　nature；　there　may　even

be　juridical　forms　of　society　such　as　marriage；　parental　authority；

the　household；　and　such　like。　For　none　of　these；　however；　does　any　law

a　priori　lay　it　down　as　an　incumbent　obligation：　〃Thou　shalt　enter

into　this　state。〃　But　it　may　be　said　of　the　juridical　state　that：　〃All

men　who　may　even　involuntarily　come　into　relations　of　right　with　one

another　ought　to　enter　into　this　state。〃

　　The　natural　or　non…juridical　social　state　may　be　viewed　as　the

sphere　of　private　right；　and　the　civil　state　may　be　specially　regarded

as　the　sphere　of　public　right。　The　latter　state　contains　no　more　and

no　other　duties　of　men　towards　each　other　than　what　may　be　conceived

in　connection　with　the　former　state；　the　matter　of　private　right　is；

in　short；　the　very　same　in　both。　The　laws　of　the　civil　state；

therefore；　only　turn　upon　the　juridical　form　of　the　coexistence　of　men

under　a　common　constitution；　and；　in　this　respect；　these　laws　must

necessarily　be　regarded　and　conceived　as　public　laws。

　　The　civil　union　（unio　civilis）　cannot；　in　the　strict　sense；　be

properly　called　a　society；　for　there　is　no　sociality　in　common　between

the　ruler　（imperans）　and　the　subject　（subditus）　under　a　civil

constitution。　They　are　not　co…ordinated　as　associates　in　a　society

with　each　other；　but　the　one　is　subordinated　to　the　other。　Those　who

may　be　co…ordinated　with　one　another　must　consider　themselves　as

mutually　equal；　in　so　far　as　they　stand　under　common　laws。　The　civil

union　may　therefore　be　regarded　not　so　much　as　being；　but　rather　as

making　a　society。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　42。　The　Postulate　of　Public　Right。



　　From　the　conditions　of　private　right　in　the　natural　state；　there

arises　the　postulate　of　public　right。　It　may　be　thus　expressed：　〃In

the　relation　of　unavoidable　coexistence　with　others；　thou　shalt　pass

from　the　state　of　nature　into　a　juridical　union　constituted　under

the　condition　of　a　distributive　justice。〃　The　principle　of　this

postulate　may　be　unfolded　analytically　from　the　conception　of　right　in

the　external　relation；　contradistinguished　from　mere　might　as

violence。

　　No　one　is　under　obligation　to　abstain　from　interfering　with　the

possession　of　others；　unless　they　give　him　a　reciprocal　guarantee

for　the　observance　of　a　similar　abstention　from　interference　with

his　possession。　Nor　does　he　require　to　wait　for　proof　by　experience　of

the　need　of　this　guarantee；　in　view　of　the　antagonistic　disposition　of

others。　He　is　therefore　under　no　obligation　to　wait　till　he　acquires

practical　prudence　at　his　own　cost；　for　he　can　perceive　in　himself

evidence　of　the　natural　inclination　of　men　to　play　the　master　over

others；　and　to　disregard　the　claims　of　the　right　of　others；　when

they　feel　themselves　their　superiors　by　might　or　fraud。　And　thus　it　is

not　necessary　to　wait　for　the　melancholy　experience　of　actual

hostility；　the　individual　is　from　the　first　entitled　to　exercise　a

rightful　compulsion　towards　those　who　already　threaten　him　by　their

very　nature。　Quilibet　praesumitur　malus；　donec　securitatem　dederit

oppositi。

　　So　long　as　the　intention　to　live　and　continue　in　this　state　of

externally　lawless　freedom　prevails；　men　may　be　said　to　do　no　wrong　or

injustice　at　all　to　one　another；　even　when　they　wage　war　against

each　other。　For　what　seems　competent　as　good　for　the　one　is　equally

valid　for　the　other；　as　if　it　were　so　by　mutual　agreement。　Uti

partes　de　jure　suo　disponunt；　ita　jus　est。　But　generally　they　must

be　considered　as　being　in　the　highest　state　of　wrong；　as　being　and

willing　to　be　in　a　condition　which　is　not　juridical；　and　in　which；

therefore；　no　one　can　be　secured　against　violence；　in　the　possession

of　his　own。



　　The　distinction　between　what　is　only　formally　and　what　is　also

materially　wrong；　and　unjust；　finds　frequent　application　in　the

science　of　right。　An　enemy　who；　on　occupying　a　besieged　fortress；

instead　of　honourably　fulfilling　the　conditions　of　a　capitulation；

maltreats　the　garrison　on　marching　out；　or　otherwise　violates　the

agreement；　cannot　complain　of　inju