the science of right-第25部分

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overthrow　of　his　country　may　be　punished；　as　a　political　parricide；

even　with　death。　It　is　the　duty　of　the　people　to　bear　any　abuse　of　the

supreme　power；　even　then　though　it　should　be　considered　to　be

unbearable。　And　the　reason　is　that　any　resistance　of　the　highest

legislative　authority　can　never　but　be　contrary　to　the　law；　and　must

even　be　regarded　as　tending　to　destroy　the　whole　legal　constitution。

In　order　to　be　entitled　to　offer　such　resistance；　a　public　law　would

be　required　to　permit　it。　But　the　supreme　legislation　would　by　such

a　law　cease　to　be　supreme；　and　the　people　as　subjects　would　be　made

sovereign　over　that　to　which　they　are　subject；　which　is　a

contradiction。　And　the　contradiction　becomes　more　apparent　when　the

question　is　put：　〃Who　is　to　be　the　judge　in　a　controversy　between

the　people　and　the　sovereign？〃　For　the　people　and　the　sovereign　are　to

be　constitutionally　or　juridically　regarded　as　two　different　moral

persons；　but　the　question　shows　that　the　people　would　then　have　to

be　the　judge　in　their　own　cause。



　　The　dethronement　of　a　monarch　may　be　also　conceived　as　a　voluntary

abdication　of　the　crown；　and　a　resignation　of　his　power　into　the　hands

of　the　people；　or　it　might　be　a　deliberate　surrender　of　these

without　any　assault　on　the　royal　person；　in　order　that　the　monarch　may

be　relegated　into　private　life。　But；　however　it　happen；　forcible

compulsion　of　it；　on　the　part　of　the　people；　cannot　be　justified　under

the　pretext　of　a　right　of　necessity　（casus　necessitatis）；　and　least　of

all　can　the　slightest　right　be　shown　for　punishing　the　sovereign　on

the　ground　of　previous　maladministration。　For　all　that　has　been

already　done　in　the　quality　of　a　sovereign　must　be　regarded　as　done

outwardly　by　right；　and；　considered　as　the　source　of　the　laws；　the

sovereign　himself　can　do　no　wrong。　Of　all　the　abominations　in　the

overthrow　of　a　state　by　revolution；　even　the　murder　or　assassination

of　the　monarch　is　not　the　worst。　For　that　may　be　done　by　the　people

out　of　fear；　lest；　if　he　is　allowed　to　live；　he　may　again　acquire

power　and　inflict　punishment　upon　them；　and　so　it　may　be　done；　not

as　an　act　of　punitive　justice；　but　merely　from　regard　to

self…preservation。　It　is　the　formal　execution　of　a　monarch　that

horrifies　a　soul　filled　with　ideas　of　human　right；　and　this　feeling

occurs　again　and　again　as　of　as　the　mind　realizes　the　scenes　that

terminated　the　fate　of　Charles　I　or　Louis　XVI。　Now　how　is　this　feeling

to　be　explained？　It　is　not　a　mere　aesthetic　feeling；　arising　from

the　working　of　the　imagination；　nor　from　sympathy；　produced　by

fancying　ourselves　in　the　place　of　the　sufferer。　On　the　contrary；　it

is　a　moral　feeling　arising　from　the　entire　subversion　of　all　our

notions　of　right。　Regicide；　in　short；　is　regarded　as　a　crime　which

always　remains　such　and　can　never　be　expiated　（crimen　immortale；

inexpiabile）；　and　it　appears　to　resemble　that　sin　which　the

theologians　declare　can　neither　be　forgiven　in　this　world　nor　in　the

next。　The　explanation　of　this　phenomenon　in　the　human　mind　appears

to　be　furnished　by　the　following　reflections　upon　it；　and　they　even

shed　some　light　upon　the　principles　of　political　right。

　　Every　transgression　of　a　law　only　can　and　must　be　explained　as

arising　from　a　maxim　of　the　transgressor　making　such　wrong…doing　his

rule　of　action；　for　were　it　not　committed　by　him　as　a　free　being；　it

could　not　be　imputed　to　him。　But　it　is　absolutely　impossible　to

explain　how　any　rational　individual　forms　such　a　maxim　against　the

clear　prohibition　of　the　law…giving　reason；　for　it　is　only　events

which　happen　according　to　the　mechanical　laws　of　nature　that　are

capable　of　explanation。　Now　a　transgressor　or　criminal　may　commit

his　wrong…doing　either　according　to　the　maxim　of　a　rule　supposed　to　be

valid　objectively　and　universally；　or　only　as　an　exception　from　the

rule　by　dispensing　with　its　obligation　for　the　occasion。　In　the　latter

case；　he　only　diverges　from　the　law；　although　intentionally。　He　may；

at　the　same　time；　abhor　his　own　transgression；　and　without　formally

renouncing　his　obedience　to　the　law　only　wish　to　avoid　it。　In　the

former　case；　however；　he　rejects　the　authority　of　the　law　itself；

the　validity　of　which；　however；　he　cannot　repudiate　before　his　own

reason；　even　while　he　makes　it　his　rule　to　act　against　it。　His　maxim

is；　therefore；　not　merely　defective　as　being　negatively　contrary　to

the　law；　but　it　is　even　positively　illegal；　as　being　diametrically

contrary　and　in　hostile　opposition　to　it。　So　far　as　we　can　see　into

and　understand　the　relation；　it　would　appear　as　if　it　were

impossible　for　men　to　commit　wrongs　and　crimes　of　a　wholly　useless

form　of　wickedness；　and　yet　the　idea　of　such　extreme　perversity　cannot

be　overlooked　in　a　system　of　moral　philosophy。

　　There　is　thus　a　feeling　of　horror　at　the　thought　of　the　formal

execution　of　a　monarch　by　his　people。　And　the　reason　it　is　that；

whereas　an　act　of　assassination　must　be　considered　as　only　an

exception　from　the　rule　which　has　been　constituted　a　maxim；　such　an

execution　must　be　regarded　as　a　complete　perversion　of　the

principles　that　should　regulate　the　relation　between　a　sovereign　and

his　people。　For　it　makes　the　people；　who　owe　their　constitutional

existence　to　the　legislation　that　issued　from　the　sovereign；　to　be　the

ruler　over　him。　Hence　mere　violence　is　thus　elevated　with　bold　brow；

and　as　it　were　by　principle；　above　the　holiest　right；　and；　appearing

like　an　abyss　to　swallow　up　everything　without　recall；　it　seems　like

suicide　committed　by　the　state　upon　itself　and　a　crime　that　is　capable

of　no　atonement。　There　is　therefore　reason　to　assume　that　the

consent　that　is　accorded　to　such　executions　is　not　really　based　upon　a

supposed　principle　of　right；　but　only　springs　from　fear　of　the

vengeance　that　would　be　taken　upon　the　people　were　the　same　power　to

revive　again　in　the　state。　And　hence　it　may　be　held　that　the

formalities　accompanying　them　have　only　been　put　forward　in　order　to

give　these　deeds　a　look　of　punishment　from　the　accompaniment　of　a

judicial　process；　such　as　could　not　go　along　with　a　mere　murder　or

assassination。　But　such　a　cloaking　of　the　deed　entirely　fails　of　its

purpose；　because　this　pretension　on　the　part　of　the　people　is　even

worse　than　murder　itself；　as　it　implies　a　principle　which　would

necessarily　make　the　restoration　of　a　state；　when　once　overthrown；

an　impossibility。

　　An　alteration　of　the　still　defective　constitution　of　the　state　may

sometimes　be　quite　necessary。　But　all　such　changes　ought　only　to

proceed　from　the　sovereign　power　in　the　way　of　reform；　and　are　not

to　be　brought　about　by　the　people　in　the　way　of　revolution；　and　when

they　take　place；　they　should　only　effect　the　executive；　and　not　the

legislative；　power。　A　political　constitution　which　is　so　modified　that

the　people　by　their　representatives　in　parliament　can　legally　resist

the　executive　power；　and　its　representative　minister；　is　called　a

limited　constitution。　Yet　even　under　such　a　constitution　there　is　no

right　of　active　resistance；　as　by　an　arbitrary　combination　of　the

people　to　coerce　the　government　into　a　certain　active　procedure；　for

this　would　be　to　assume　to　perform　an　act　of　the　executive　itself。　All

that　can　rightly　be　allowed；　is　only　a　negative　resistance；

amounting　to　an　act　of　refusal　on　the　part　of　the　people　to　concede

all　the　demands　which　the　executive　may　deem　it　necessary　to　make　in

behoof　of　the　political　administration。　And　if　this　right　were　never

exercised；　it　would　be　a　sure　sign　that　the　people　were　corrupted；

their　representatives　venal；　the　supreme　head　of　the　government

despotic；　and　his　ministers　practically　betrayers　of　the　people。

　　Further；　when　on　the　success　of　a　revolution　a　new　constitution

has　been　founded；　the　unlawfulness　of　its　beginning　and　of　its

institution　cannot　release　the　subjects　from　the　obligation　of

adapting　themselves；　as　good　citizens；　to　the　new　order　of　things；　and

they　are　not　entitled　to　refuse　honourably　to　obey　the　authority

that　has　thus　attained　the　power　in　the　state。　A　dethroned　monarch；

who　has　survived　such　a　revolution；　is　not　to　be　called　to　account

on　the　ground　of　his　former　administration；　and　still　less　may　he　be

punished　for　it；　when　with　drawing　into　the　private　life　of　a

citizen　he　prefers　his　own　quiet　and　the　peace　of　the　state　to　the

uncertainty　of　exile；　with　the　intention　of　maintaining　his　claims　for

restoration　at　all　hazards；　and　pushing　these　either　by　secret

counter…revolution　or　by　the　assistance　of　other　powers。　However；　if

he　prefers　to　follow　the　latter　course；　his　rights　remain；　because　the

rebellion　that　drove　him　from　his　position　was　inherently　unjust。

But　the　question　then　emerges　as　to　whether　other　powers　have　the

right　to　form　themselves　into　an　alliance　in　behalf　of　such　a

dethroned　monarch　merely　in　order　not　to　leave　the　crime　committed

by　the　people　unavenged；　or　to　do　away　with　it　as　a　scandal