the science of right-第30部分

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allow　themselves　to　be　punished；　thus　disposing　of　themselves　and

their　lives。　For　if　the　right　to　punish　must　be　grounded　upon　a

promise　of　the　wrongdoer；　whereby　he　is　to　be　regarded　as　being

willing　to　be　punished；　it　ought　also　to　be　left　to　him　to　find

himself　deserving　of　the　punishment；　and　the　criminal　would　thus　be

his　own　judge。　The　chief　error　（proton　pseudos）　of　this　sophistry

consists　in　regarding　the　judgement　of　the　criminal　himself；

necessarily　determined　by　his　reason；　that　he　is　under　obligation　to

undergo　the　loss　of　his　life；　as　a　judgement　that　must　be　grounded

on　a　resolution　of　his　will　to　take　it　away　himself；　and　thus　the

execution　of　the　right　in　question　is　represented　as　united　in　one　and

the　same　person　with　the　adjudication　of　the　right。

　　There　are；　however；　two　crimes　worthy　of　death；　in　respect　of

which　it　still　remains　doubtful　whether　the　legislature　have　the　right

to　deal　with　them　capitally。　It　is　the　sentiment　of　honour　that

induces　their　perpetration。　The　one　originates　in　a　regard　for　womanly

honour；　the　other　in　a　regard　for　military　honour；　and　in　both　cases

there　is　a　genuine　feeling　of　honour　incumbent　on　the　individuals　as　a

duty。　The　former　is　the　crime　of　maternal　infanticide　（infanticidium

maternale）；　the　latter　is　the　crime　of　killing　a　fellow…soldier　in　a

duel　（commilitonicidium）。　Now　legislation　cannot　take　away　the　shame

of　an　illegitimate　birth；　nor　wipe　off　the　stain　attaching　from　a

suspicion　of　cowardice；　to　an　officer　who　does　not　resist　an　act

that　would　bring　him　into　contempt；　by　an　effort　of　his　own　that　is

superior　to　the　fear　of　death。　Hence　it　appears　that；　in　such

circumstances；　the　individuals　concerned　are　remitted　to　the　state

of　nature；　and　their　acts　in　both　cases　must　be　called　homicide；　and

not　murder；　which　involves　evil　intent　（homicidium　dolosum）。　In　all

instances　the　acts　are　undoubtedly　punishable；　but　they　cannot　be

punished　by　the　supreme　power　with　death。　An　illegitimate　child

comes　into　the　world　outside　of　the　law　which　properly　regulates

marriage；　and　it　is　thus　born　beyond　the　pale　or　constitutional

protection　of　the　law。　Such　a　child　is　introduced；　as　it　were；　like

prohibited　goods；　into　the　commonwealth；　and　as　it　has　no　legal

right　to　existence　in　this　way；　its　destruction　might　also　be　ignored；

nor　can　the　shame　of　the　mother；　when　her　unmarried　confinement　is

known；　be　removed　by　any　legal　ordinance。　A　subordinate　officer；

again；　on　whom　an　insult　is　inflicted；　sees　himself　compelled　by　the

public　opinion　of　his　associates　to　obtain　satisfaction；　and；　as　in

the　state　of　nature；　the　punishment　of　the　offender　can　only　be

effected　by　a　duel；　in　which　his　own　life　is　exposed　to　danger；　and

not　by　means　of　the　law　in　a　court　of　justice。　The　duel　is　therefore

adopted　as　the　means　of　demonstrating　his　courage　as　that

characteristic　upon　which　the　honour　of　his　profession　essentially

rests；　and　this　is　done　even　if　it　should　issue　in　the　killing　of

his　adversary。　But　as　such　a　result　takes　place　publicly　and　under　the

consent　of　both　parties；　although　it　may　be　done　unwillingly；　it

cannot　properly　be　called　murder　（homicidium　dolosum）。　What　then　is

the　right　in　both　cases　as　relating　to　criminal　justice？　Penal　justice

is　here　in　fact　brought　into　great　straits；　having　apparently　either

to　declare　the　notion　of　honour；　which　is　certainly　no　mere　fancy

here；　to　'be　nothing　in　the　eye　of　the　law；　or　to　exempt　the　crime

from　its　due　punishment；　and　thus　it　would　become　either　remiss　or

cruel。　The　knot　thus　tied　is　to　be　resolved　in　the　following　way。

The　categorical　imperative　of　penal　justice；　that　the　killing　of　any

person　contrary　to　the　law　must　be　punished　with　death；　remains　in

force；　but　the　legislation　itself　and　the　civil　constitution

generally；　so　long　as　they　are　still　barbarous　and　incomplete；　are

at　fault。　And　this　is　the　reason　why　the　subjective

motive…principles　of　honour　among　the　people　do　not　coincide　with

the　standards　which　are　objectively　conformable　to　another　purpose；　so

that　the　public　justice　issuing　from　the　state　becomes　injustice

relatively　to　that　which　is　upheld　among　the　people　themselves。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　The　Right　of　Pardoning。



　　The　right　of　pardoning　（jus　aggratiandi）；　viewed　in　relation　to

the　criminal；　is　the　right　of　mitigating　or　entirely　remitting　his

punishment。　On　the　side　of　the　sovereign　this　is　the　most　delicate

of　all　rights；　as　it　may　be　exercised　so　as　to　set　forth　the　splendour

of　his　dignity；　and　yet　so　as　to　do　a　great　wrong　by　it。　It　ought

not　to　be　exercised　in　application　to　the　crimes　of　the　subjects

against　each　other；　for　exemption　from　punishment　（impunitas　criminis）

would　be　the　greatest　wrong　that　could　be　done　to　them。　It　is　only

an　occasion　of　some　form　of　treason　（crimen　laesae　majestatis）；　as　a

lesion　against　himself；　that　the　sovereign　should　make　use　of　this

right。　And　it　should　not　be　exercised　even　in　this　connection；　if

the　safety　of　the　people　would　be　endangered　by　remitting　such

punishment。　This　right　is　the　only　one　which　properly　deserves　the

name　of　a　〃right　of　majesty。〃



　　　　50。　Juridical　Relations　of　the　Citizen　to　his　Country　and

　　　　　　　　to　Other　Countries。　Emigration；　Immigration；　Banishment；

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Exile。



　　The　land　or　territory　whose　inhabitants…　in　virtue　of　its

political　constitution　and　without　the　necessary　intervention　of　a

special　juridical　act…　are；　by　birth；　fellow…citizens　of　one　and　the

same　commonwealth；　is　called　their　country　or　fatherland。　A　foreign

country　is　one　in　which　they　would　not　possess　this　condition；　but

would　be　living　abroad。　If　a　country　abroad　form　part　of　the　territory

under　the　same　government　as　at　home；　it　constitutes　a　province；

according　to　the　Roman　usage　of　the　term。　It　does　not　constitute　an

incorporated　portion　of　the　empire　（imperii）　so　as　to　be　the　abode

of　equal　fellow…citizens；　but　is　only　a　possession　of　the

government；　like　a　lower　house；　and　it　must　therefore　honour　the

domain　of　the　ruling　state　as　the　〃mother　country〃　（regio　domina）。

　　1。　A　subject；　even　regarded　as　a　citizen；　has　the　right　of

emigration；　for　the　state　cannot　retain　him　as　if　he　were　its

property。　But　he　may　only　carry　away　with　him　his　moveables　as

distinguished　from　his　fixed　possessions。　However；　he　is　entitled　to

sell　his　immovable　property；　and　take　the　value　of　it　in　money　with

him。

　　2。　The　supreme　power；　as　master　of　the　country；　has　the　right　to

favour　immigration　and　the　settlement　of　strangers　and　colonists。　This

will　hold　even　although　the　natives　of　the　country　may　be　unfavourably

disposed　to　it；　if　their　private　property　in　the　soil　is　not

diminished　or　interfered　with。

　　3。　In　the　case　of　a　subject　who　has　committed　a　crime　that　renders

all　society　of　his　fellow…citizens　with　him　prejudicial　to　the

state；　the　supreme　power　has　also　the　right　of　inflicting　banishment

to　a　country　abroad。　By　such　deportation；　he　does　not　acquire　any

share　in　the　rights　of　citizens　of　the　territory　to　which　he　is

banished。

　　4。　The　supreme　power　has　also　the　right　of　imposing　exile

generally　（jus　exilii）；　by　which　a　citizen　is　sent　abroad　into　the

wide　world　as　the　〃out…land。〃　And　because　the　supreme　authority　thus

withdraws　all　legal　protection　from　the　citizen；　this　amounts　to

making　him　an　〃outlaw〃　within　the　territory　of　his　own　country。



　　　　　　　　　51。　The　Three　Forms　of　the　State：　Autocracy；

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Aristocracy；　Democracy。



　　The　three　powers　in　the　state；　involved　in　the　conception　of　a

public　government　generally　（res　publica　latius　dicta）；　are　only　so

many　relations　of　the　united　will　of　the　people　which　emanates　from

the　a　priori　reason；　and　viewed　as　such　it　is　the　objective

practical　realization　of　the　pure　idea　of　a　supreme　head　of　the　state。

This　supreme　head　is　the　sovereign；　but　conceived　only　as　a

representation　of　the　whole　people；　the　idea　still　requires　physical

embodiment　in　a　person；　who　may　exhibit　the　supreme　power　of　the　state

and　bring　the　idea　actively　to　bear　upon　the　popular　will。　The

relation　of　the　supreme　power　to　the　people　is　conceivable　in　three

different　forms：　either　one　in　the　state　rules　over　all；　or　some；

united　in　relation　of　equality　with　each　other；　rule　over　all　the

others；　or　all　together　rule　over　each　and　all　individually；　including

themselves。　The　form　of　the　state　is　therefore　either　autocratic；　or

aristocratic；　or　democratic。　The　expression　monarchic　is　not　so

suitable　as　autocratic　for　the　conception　here　intended；　for　a　monarch

is　one　who　has　the　highest　power；　an　autocrat　is　one　who　has　all

power；　so　that　this　latter　is　the　sovereign；　whereas　the　former　merely

represents　the　sovereignty。

　　It　is　evident　that　an　autocracy　is　the　simplest　form　of　government

in　the　state；　being　constituted　by　the　relation　of　one；　as　king；　to

the　people；　so　that　there　is　one　only　w