the science of right-第31部分

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in　the　state；　being　constituted　by　the　relation　of　one；　as　king；　to

the　people；　so　that　there　is　one　only　who　is　the　lawgiver。　An

aristocracy；　as　a　form　of　government；　is；　however；　compounded　of　the

union　of　two　relations：　that　of　the　nobles　in　relation　to　one

another　as　the　lawgivers；　thereby　constituting　the　sovereignty；　and

that　of　this　sovereign　power　to　the　people。　A　democracy；　again；　is　the

most　complex　of　all　the　forms　of　the　state；　for　it　has　to　begin　by

uniting　the　will　of　all　so　as　to　form　a　people；　and　then　it　has　to

appoint　a　sovereign　over　this　common　union；　which　sovereign　is　no

other　than　the　united　will　itself。　The　consideration　of　the　ways　in

which　these　forms　are　adulterated　by　the　intrusion　of　violent　and

illegitimate　usurpers　of　power；　as　in　oligarchy　and　ochlocracy；　as

well　as　the　discussion　of　the　so　called　mixed　constitutions；　may　be

passed　over　here　as　not　essential；　and　as　leading　into　too　much

detail。

　　As　regards　the　administration　of　right　in　the　state；　it　may　be

said　that　the　simplest　mode　is　also　the　best；　but　as　regards　its

bearing　on　right　itself；　it　is　also　the　most　dangerous　for　the　people；

in　view　of　the　despotism　to　which　simplicity　of　administration　so

naturally　gives　rise。　It　is　undoubtedly　a　rational　maxim　to　aim　at

simplification　in　the　machinery　which　is　to　unite　the　people　under

compulsory　laws；　and　this　would　be　secured　were　all　the　people　to　be

passive　and　to　obey　only　one　person　over　them；　but　the　method　would

not　give　subjects　who　were　also　citizens　of　the　state。　It　is　sometimes

said　that　the　people　should　be　satisfied　with　the　reflection　that

monarchy；　regarded　as　an　autocracy；　is　the　best　political

constitution；　if　the　monarch　is　good；　that　is；　if　be　has　the　judgement

as　well　as　the　will　to　do　right。　But　this　is　a　mere　evasion　and

belongs　to　the　common　class　of　wise　tautological　phrases。　It　only

amounts　to　saying　that　〃the　best　constitution　is　that　by　which　the

supreme　administrator　of　the　state　is　made　the　best　ruler〃；　that　is；

that　the　best　constitution　is　the　best！



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　52。　Historical　Origin　and　Changes。

　　　　　　　　　A　Pure　Republic。　Representative　Government。



　　It　is　vain　to　inquire　into　the　historical　origin　of　the　political

mechanism；　for　it　is　no　longer　possible　to　discover　historically　the

point　of　time　at　which　civil　society　took　its　beginning。　Savages　do

not　draw　up　a　documentary　record　of　their　having　submitted

themselves　to　law；　and　it　may　be　inferred　from　the　nature　of

uncivilized　men　that　they　must　have　set　out　from　a　state　of

violence。　To　prosecute　such　an　inquiry　in　the　intention　of　finding　a

pretext　for　altering　the　existing　constitution　by　violence　is　no

less　than　penal。　For　such　a　mode　of　alteration　would　amount　to

revolution；　that　could　only　be　carried　out　by　an　insurrection　of　the

people；　and

not　by　constitutional　modes　of　legislation。　But　insurrection　against

an　already　existing　constitution；　is　an　overthrow　of　all　civil　and

juridical　relations；　and　of　right　generally；　and　hence　it　is　not　a

mere　alteration　of　the　civil　constitution；　but　a　dissolution　of　it。　It

would　thus　form　a　mode　of　transition　to　a　better　constitution　by

palingenesis　and　not　by　mere　metamorphosis；　and　it　would　require　a　new

social　contract；　upon　which　the　former　original　contract；　as　then

annulled；　would　have　no　influence。

　　It　must；　however；　be　possible　for　the　sovereign　to　change　the

existing　constitution；　if　it　is　not　actually　consistent　with　the

idea　of　the　original　contract。　In　doing　so　it　is　essential　to　give

existence　to　that　form　of　government　which　will　properly　constitute

the　people　into　a　state。　Such　a　change　cannot　be　made　by　the　state

deliberately　altering　its　constitution　from　one　of　the　three　forms

to　one　of　the　other　two。　For　example；　political　changes　should　not

be　carried　out　by　the　aristocrats　combining　to　subject　themselves　to

an　autocracy；　or　resolving　to　fuse　all　into　a　democracy；　or

conversely；　as　if　it　depended　on　the　arbitrary　choice　and　liking　of

the　sovereign　what　constitution　he　may　impose　on　the　people。　For；　even

if　as　sovereign　he　resolved　to　alter　the　constitution　into　a

democracy；　he　might　be　doing　wrong　to　the　people；　because　they　might

hold　such　a　constitution　in　abhorrence；　and　regard　either　of　the　other

two　as　more　suitable　to　them　in　the　circumstances。

　　The　forms　of　the　state　are　only　the　letter　（littera）　of　the　original

constitution　in　the　civil　union；　and　they　may　therefore　remain　so　long

as　they　are　considered；　from　ancient　and　long　habit　（and　therefore

only　subjectively）；　to　be　necessary　to　the　machinery　of　the

political　constitution。　But　the　spirit　of　that　original　contract

（anima　pacti　originarii）　contains　and　imposes　the　obligation　on　the

constituting　power　to　make　the　mode　of　the　government　conformable　to

its　idea；　and；　if　this　cannot　be　effected　at　once；　to　change　it

gradually　and　continuously　till　it　harmonize　in　its　working　with　the

only　rightful　constitution；　which　is　that　of　a　pure　republic。　Thus　the

old　empirical　and　statutory　forms；　which　serve　only　to　effect　the

political　subjection　of　the　people；　will　be　resolved　into　the　original

and　rational　forms　which　alone　take　freedom　as　their　principle；　and

even　as　the　condition　of　all　compulsion　and　constraint。　Compulsion

is　in　fact　requisite　for　the　realization　of　a　juridical

constitution；　according　to　the　proper　idea　of　the　state；　and　it　will

lead　at　last　to　the　realization　of　that　idea；　even　according　to　the

letter。　This　is　the　only　enduring　political　constitution；　as　in　it　the

law　is　itself　sovereign；　and　is　no　longer　attached　to　a　particular

person。　This　is　the　ultimate　end　of　all　public　right；　and　the　state　in

which　every　citizen　can　have　what　is　his　own　peremptorily　assigned

to　him。　But　so　long　as　the　form　of　the　state　has　to　be　represented；

according　to　the　letter；　by　many　different　moral　persons　invested　with

the　supreme　power；　there　can　only　be　a　provisory　internal　right；　and

not　an　absolutely　juridical　state　of　civil　society。

　　Every　true　republic　is　and　can　only　be　constituted　by　a

representative　system　of　the　people。　Such　a　representative　system　is

instituted　in　name　of　the　people；　and　is　constituted　by　all　the

citizens　being　united　together；　in　order；　by　means　of　their

deputies；　to　protect　and　secure　their　rights。　But　as　soon　as　a　supreme

head　of　the　state　in　person…　be　it　as　king；　or　nobility；　or　the

whole　body　of　the　people　in　a　democratic　union…　becomes　also

representative；　the　united　people　then　does　not　merely　represent　the

sovereignty；　but　they　are　themselves　sovereign。　It　is　in　the　people

that　the　supreme　power　originally　resides；　and　it　is　accordingly

from　this　power　that　all　the　rights　of　individual　citizens　as　mere

subjects；　and　especially　as　officials　of　the　state；　must　be　derived。

When　the　sovereignty　of　the　people　themselves　is　thus　realized；　the

republic　is　established；　and　it　is　no　longer　necessary　to　give　up

the　reins　of　government　into　the　hands　of　those　by　whom　they　have　been

hitherto　held；　especially　as　they　might　again　destroy　all　the　new

institutions　by　their　arbitrary　and　absolute　will。



　　It　was　therefore　a　great　error　in　judgement　on　the　part　of　a

powerful　ruler　in　our　time；　when　he　tried　to　extricate　himself　from

the　embarrassment　arising　from　great　public　debts；　by　transferring

this　burden　to　the　people；　and　leaving　them　to　undertake　and

distribute　them　among　themselves　as　they　might　best　think　fit。　It　thus

became　natural　that　the　legislative　power；　not　only　in　respect　of

the　taxation　of　the　subjects；　but　in　respect　of　the　government；　should

come　into　the　hands　of　the　people。　It　was　requisite　that　they　should

be　able　to　prevent　the　incurring　of　new　debts　by　extravagance　or

war；　and　in　consequence；　the　supreme　power　of　the　monarch　entirely

disappeared；　not　by　being　merely　suspended；　but　by　passing　over　in

fact　to　the　people；　to　whose　legislative　will　the　property　of　every

subject　thus　became　subjected。　Nor　can　it　be　said　that　a　tacit　and　yet

obligatory　promise　must　be　assumed　as　having；　under　such

circumstances；　been　given　by　the　national　assembly；　not　to

constitute　themselves　into　a　sovereignty；　but　only　to　administer　the

affairs　of　the　sovereign　for　the　time；　and　after　this　was　done　to

deliver　the　reins　of　the　government　again　into　the　monarch's　hands。

Such　a　supposed　contract　would　be　null　and　void。　The　right　of　the

supreme　legislation　in　the　commonwealth　is　not　an　alienable　right；　but

is　the　most　personal　of　all　rights。　Whoever　possesses　it　can　only

dispose　by　the　collective　will　of　the　people；　in　respect　of　the

people；　he　cannot　dispose　in　respect　of　the　collective　will　itself；

which　is　the　ultimate　foundation　of　all　public　contracts。　A

contract；　by　which　the　people　would　be　bound　to　give　back　their

authority　again；　would　not　be　consistent　with　their　position　as　a

legislative　power；　and　yet　it　would　be　made　binding　upon　the　people；

which；　on　t