the science of right-第4部分

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Hence　it　would　be　a　contradiction　to　have　anything　external　as　one's

own；　were　not　the　conception　of　possession　capable　of　two　different

meanings；　as　sensible　possession　that　is　perceivable　by　the　senses；

and　rational　possession　that　is　perceivable　only　by　the　intellect。

By　the　former　is　to　be　understood　a　physical　possession；　and　by　the

latter；　a　purely　juridical　possession　of　the　same　object。

　　The　description　of　an　object　as　〃external　to　me〃　may　signify

either　that　it　is　merely　〃different　and　distinct　from　me　as　a

subject；〃　or　that　it　is　also　〃a　thing　placed　outside　of　me；　and　to

be　found　elsewhere　in　space　or　time。〃　Taken　in　the　first　sense；　the

term　possession　signifies　rational　possession；　and；　in　the　second

sense；　it　must　mean　empirical　possession。　A　rational　or　intelligible

possession；　if　such　be　possible；　is　possession　viewed　apart　from

physical　holding　or　detention　（detentio）。



　　　　　　　　　2。　Juridical　Postulate　of　the　Practical　Reason。



　　It　is　possible　to　have　any　external　object　of　my　will　as　mine。　In

other　words；　a　maxim　to　this　effect…　were　it　to　become　law…　that　any

object　on　which　the　will　can　be　exerted　must　remain　objectively　in

itself　without　an　owner；　as　res　nullius；　is　contrary　to　the

principle　of　right。

　　For　an　object　of　any　act　of　my　will；　is　something　that　it　would　be

physically　within　my　power　to　use。　Now；　suppose　there　were　things　that

by　right　should　absolutely　not　be　in　our　power；　or；　in　other　words；

that　it　would　be　wrong　or　inconsistent　with　the　freedom　of　all；

according　to　universal　law；　to　make　use　of　them。　On　this

supposition；　freedom　would　so　far　be　depriving　itself　of　the　use　of

its　voluntary　activity；　in　thus　putting　useable　objects　out　of　all

possibility　of　use。　In　practical　relations；　this　would　be　to

annihilate　them；　by　making　them　res　nullius；　notwithstanding　the

fact　act　acts　of　will　in　relation　to　such　things　would　formally

harmonize；　in　the　actual　use　of　them；　with　the　external　freedom　of　all

according　to　universal　laws。　Now　the　pure　practical　reason　lays　down

only　formal　laws　as　principles　to　regulate　the　exercise　of　the　will；

and　therefore　abstracts　from　the　matter　of　the　act　of　will；　as　regards

the　other　qualities　of　the　object；　which　is　considered　only　in　so

far　as　it　is　an　object　of　the　activity　of　the　will。　Hence　the

practical　reason　cannot　contain；　in　reference　to　such　an　object；　an

absolute　prohibition　of　its　use；　because　this　would　involve　a

contradiction　of　external　freedom　with　itself。　An　object　of　my　free

will；　however；　is　one　which　I　have　the　physical　capability　of　making

some　use　of　at　will；　since　its　use　stands　in　my　power　（in　potentia）。

This　is　to　be　distinguished　from　having　the　object　brought　under　my

disposal　（in　postestatem　meam　reductum）；　which　supposes　not　a

capability　merely；　but　also　a　particular　act　of　the　free…will。　But

in　order　to　consider　something　merely　as　an　object　of　my　will　as　such；

it　is　sufficient　to　be　conscious　that　I　have　it　in　my　power。　It　is

therefore　an　assumption　a　priori　of　the　practical　reason　to　regard　and

treat　every　object　within　the　range　of　my　free　exercise　of　will　as

objectively　a　possible　mine　or　thine。

　　This　postulate　may　be　called　〃a　permissive　law〃　of　the　practical

reason；　as　giving　us　a　special　title　which　we　could　not　evolve　out

of　the　mere　conceptions　of　right　generally。　And　this　title　constitutes

the　right　to　impose　upon　all　others　an　obligation；　not　otherwise

laid　upon　them；　to　abstain　from　the　use　of　certain　objects　of　our　free

choice；　because　we　have　already　taken　them　into　our　possession。　Reason

wills　that　this　shall　be　recognised　as　a　valid　principle；　and　it

does　so　as　practical　reason；　and　it　is　enabled　by　means　of　this

postulate　a　priori　to　enlarge　its　range　of　activity　in　practice。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3。　Possession　and　Ownership。



　　Any　one　who　would　assert　the　right　to　a　thing　as　his　must　be　in

possession　of　it　as　an　object。　Were　he　not　its　actual　possessor　or

owner；　he　could　not　be　wronged　or　injured　by　the　use　which　another

might　make　of　it　without　his　consent。　For；　should　anything　external　to

him；　and　in　no　way　connected　with　him　by　right；　affect　this　object；　it

could　not　affect　himself　as　a　subject；　nor　do　him　any　wrong；　unless　he

stood　in　a　relation　of　ownership　to　it。



　　　　　　　　　　　4。　Exposition　of　the　Conception　of　the。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　External　Mine　and　Thine。



　　There　can　only　be　three　external　objects　of　my　will　in　the

activity　of　choice：

　　（1）　A　corporeal　thing　external　to　me；

　　（2）　The　free…will　of　another　in　the　performance　of　a　particular

act　（praestatio）；

　　（3）　The　state　of　another　in　relation　to　myself。

　　These　correspond　to　the　categories　of　substance；　causality；　and

reciprocity；　and　they　form　the　practical　relations　between　me　and

external　objects；　according　to　the　laws　of　freedom。



　　A。　I　can　only　call　a　corporeal　thing　or　an　object　in　space　〃mine；〃

when；　even　although　not　in　physical　possession　of　it；　I　am　able　to

assert　that　I　am　in　possession　of　it　in　another　real　nonphysical

sense。　Thus；　I　am　not　entitled　to　call　an　apple　mine　merely　because

I　hold　it　in　my　hand　or　possess　it　physically；　but　only　when　I　am

entitled　to　say；　〃I　possess　it；　although　I　have　laid　it　out　of　my

hand；　and　wherever　it　may　lie。〃　In　like　manner；　I　am　not　entitled　to

say　of　the　ground；　on　which　I　may　have　laid　myself　down；　that

therefore　it　is　mine；　but　only　when　I　can　rightly　assert　that　it　still

remains　in　my　possession；　although　I　may　have　left　the　spot。　For　any

one　who；　in　the　former　appearances　of　empirical　possession；　might

wrench　the　apple　out　of　my　hand；　or　drag　me　away　from　my

resting…place；　would；　indeed；　injure　me　in　respect　of　the　inner　〃mine〃

of　freedom；　but　not　in　respect　of　the　external　〃mine；〃　unless　I

could　assert　that　I　was　in　the　possession　of　the　object；　even　when　not

actually　holding　it　physically。　And　if　I　could　not　do　this；　neither

could　I　call　the　apple　or　the　spot　mine。

　　B。　I　cannot　call　the　performance　of　something　by　the　action　of　the

will　of　another　〃mine；〃　if　I　can　only　say　〃it　has　come　into　my

possession　at　the　same　time　with　a　promise〃　（pactum　re　initum）；　but

only　if　I　am　able　to　assert　〃I　am　in　possession　of　the　will　of　the

other；　so　as　to　determine　him　to　the　performance　of　a　particular

act；　although　the　time　for　the　performance　of　it　has　not　yet　come。〃　In

the　latter　case；　the　promise　belongs　to　the　nature　of　things

actually　held　as　possessed；　and　as　an　active　obligation　I　can　reckon

it　mine；　and　this　holds　good　not　only　if　I　have　the　thing　promised…　as

in　the　first　case…　already　in　my　possession；　but　even　although　I　do

not　yet　possess　it　in　fact。　Hence；　I　must　be　able　to　regard　myself

in　thought　as　independent　of　that　empirical　form　of　possession　that　is

limited　by　the　condition　of　time　and　as　being；　nevertheless；　in

possession　of　the　object。

　　C。　I　cannot　call　a　wife；　a　child；　a　domestic；　or；　generally；　any

other　person　〃mine〃　merely　because　I　command　them　at　present　as

belonging　to　my　household；　or　because　I　have　them　under　control；　and

in　my　power　and　possession。　But　I　can　call　them　mine；　if；　although

they　may　have　withdrawn　themselves　from　my　control　and　I　do　not

therefore　possess　them　empirically；　I　can　still　say　〃I　possess　them　by

my　mere　will；　provided　they　exist　anywhere　in　space　or　time；　and；

consequently；　my　possession　of　them　is　purely　juridical。〃　They　belong；

in　fact；　to　my　possessions；　only　when　and　so　far　as　I　can　assert

this　as　a　matter　of　right。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　5。　Definition　of　the　Conception　of　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　External　Mine　and　Thine。



　　Definitions　are　nominal　or　real。　A　nominal　definition　is

sufficient　merely　to　distinguish　the　object　defined　from　all　other

objects；　and　it　springs　out　of　a　complete　and　definite　exposition　of

its　conception。　A　real　definition　further　suffices　for　a　deduction

of　the　conception　defined；　so　as　to　furnish　a　knowledge　of　the　reality

of　the　object。　The　nominal　definition　of　the　external　〃mine〃　would

thus　be：　〃The　external　mine　is　anything　outside　of　myself；　such　that

any　hindrance　of　my　use　of　it　at　will　would　be　doing　me　an　injury　or

wrong　as　an　infringement　of　that　freedom　of　mine　which　may　coexist

with　the　freedom　of　all　others　according　to　a　universal　law。〃　The　real

definition　of　this　conception　may　be　put　thus：　〃The　external　mine　is

anything　outside　of　myself；　such　that　any　prevention　of　my　use　of　it

would　be　a　wrong；　although　I　may　not　be　in　possession　of　it　so　as　to

be　actually　holding　it　as　an　object。〃　I　must　be　in　some　kind　of

possession　of　an　external　object；　if　the　object　is　to　be　regarded　as

mine；　for；　otherwise；　anyone　interfering　with　this　object　would　not；

in　doing　so；　affect　me；　nor；　consequently；　would　he　thereby　do　me

any　wrong。　Hence；　according　to　SS　4；　a　rational　possession

（possessio　noumenon）　must　be　assumed　as　possible；　if　there　is　to　be

rightly　an　external　mine　and　thine。　Empirical　possession