concerning civil government-第20部分

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secure；　though　there　be　good　and　equitable　laws　to　set　the　bounds　of

it　between　him　and　his　fellow…subjects；　if　he　who　commands　those

subjects　have　power　to　take　from　any　private　man　what　part　he

pleases　of　his　property；　and　use　and　dispose　of　it　as　he　thinks　good。

　　139。　But　government；　into　whosesoever　hands　it　is　put；　being　as　I

have　before　shown；　entrusted　with　this　condition；　and　for　this　end；

that　men　might　have　and　secure　their　properties；　the　prince　or　senate；

however　it　may　have　power　to　make　laws　for　the　regulating　of

property　between　the　subjects　one　amongst　another；　yet　can　never

have　a　power　to　take　to　themselves　the　whole；　or　any　part　of　the

subjects'　property；　without　their　own　consent；　for　this　would　be　in

effect　to　leave　them　no　property　at　all。　And　to　let　us　see　that　even

absolute　power；　where　it　is　necessary；　is　not　arbitrary　by　being

absolute；　but　is　still　limited　by　that　reason　and　confined　to　those

ends　which　required　it　in　some　cases　to　be　absolute；　we　need　look　no

farther　than　the　common　practice　of　martial　discipline。　For　the

preservation　of　the　army；　and　in　it　of　the　whole　commonwealth；

requires　an　absolute　obedience　to　the　command　of　every　superior

officer；　and　it　is　justly　death　to　disobey　or　dispute　the　most

dangerous　or　unreasonable　of　them；　but　yet　we　see　that　neither　the

sergeant　that　could　command　a　soldier　to　march　up　to　the　mouth　of　a

cannon；　or　stand　in　a　breach　where　he　is　almost　sure　to　perish；　can

command　that　soldier　to　give　him　one　penny　of　his　money；　nor　the

general　that　can　condemn　him　to　death　for　deserting　his　post；　or　not

obeying　the　most　desperate　orders；　cannot　yet　with　all　his　absolute

power　of　life　and　death　dispose　of　one　farthing　of　that　soldier's

estate；　or　seize　one　jot　of　his　goods；　whom　yet　he　can　command

anything；　and　hang　for　the　least　disobedience。　Because　such　a　blind

obedience　is　necessary　to　that　end　for　which　the　commander　has　his

power…　viz。；　the　preservation　of　the　rest；　but　the　disposing　of　his

goods　has　nothing　to　do　with　it。

　　140。　It　is　true　governments　cannot　be　supported　without　great

charge；　and　it　is　fit　every　one　who　enjoys　his　share　of　the　protection

should　pay　out　of　his　estate　his　proportion　for　the　maintenance　of　it。

But　still　it　must　be　with　his　own　consent…　i。e。；　the　consent　of　the

majority；　giving　it　either　by　themselves　or　their　representatives

chosen　by　them；　for　if　any　one　shall　claim　a　power　to　lay　and　levy

taxes　on　the　people　by　his　own　authority；　and　without　such　consent

of　the　people；　he　thereby　invades　the　fundamental　law　of　property；　and

subverts　the　end　of　government。　For　what　property　have　I　in　that　which

another　may　by　right　take　when　he　pleases　to　himself？

　　141。　Fourthly。　The　legislative　cannot　transfer　the　power　of　making

laws　to　any　other　hands；　for　it　being　but　a　delegated　power　from　the

people；　they　who　have　it　cannot　pass　it　over　to　others。　The　people

alone　can　appoint　the　form　of　the　commonwealth；　which　is　by

constituting　the　legislative；　and　appointing　in　whose　hands　that　shall

be。　And　when　the　people　have　said；　〃We　will　submit；　and　be　governed　by

laws　made　by　such　men；　and　in　such　forms；〃　nobody　else　can　say　other

men　shall　make　laws　for　them；　nor　can　they　be　bound　by　any　laws　but

such　as　are　enacted　by　those　whom　they　have　chosen　and　authorised　to

make　laws　for　them。

　　142。　These　are　the　bounds　which　the　trust　that　is　put　in　them　by　the

society　and　the　law　of　God　and　Nature　have　set　to　the　legislative

power　of　every　commonwealth；　in　all　forms　of　government。　First：　They

are　to　govern　by　promulgated　established　laws；　not　to　be　varied　in

particular　cases；　but　to　have　one　rule　for　rich　and　poor；　for　the

favourite　at　Court；　and　the　countryman　at　plough。　Secondly：　These　laws

also　ought　to　be　designed　for　no　other　end　ultimately　but　the　good

of　the　people。　Thirdly：　They　must　not　raise　taxes　on　the　property　of

the　people　without　the　consent　of　the　people　given　by　themselves　or

their　deputies。　And　this　properly　concerns　only　such　governments　where

the　legislative　is　always　in　being；　or　at　least　where　the　people

have　not　reserved　any　part　of　the　legislative　to　deputies；　to　be

from　time　to　time　chosen　by　themselves。　Fourthly：　Legislative

neither　must　nor　can　transfer　the　power　of　making　laws　to　anybody

else；　or　place　it　anywhere　but　where　the　people　have。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　XII

　　　　　　　　　　　The　Legislative；　Executive；　and　Federative　Power

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　Commonwealth



　　143。　THE　legislative　power　is　that　which　has　a　right　to　direct　how

the　force　of　the　commonwealth　shall　be　employed　for　preserving　the

community　and　the　members　of　it。　Because　those　laws　which　are

constantly　to　be　executed；　and　whose　force　is　always　to　continue；

may　be　made　in　a　little　time；　therefore　there　is　no　need　that　the

legislative　should　be　always　in　being；　not　having　always　business　to

do。　And　because　it　may　be　too　great　temptation　to　human　frailty；　apt

to　grasp　at　power；　for　the　same　persons　who　have　the　power　of　making

laws　to　have　also　in　their　hands　the　power　to　execute　them；　whereby

they　may　exempt　themselves　from　obedience　to　the　laws　they　make；　and

suit　the　law；　both　in　its　making　and　execution；　to　their　own　private

advantage；　and　thereby　come　to　have　a　distinct　interest　from　the

rest　of　the　community；　contrary　to　the　end　of　society　and

government。　Therefore　in　well…ordered　commonwealths；　where　the　good　of

the　whole　is　so　considered　as　it　ought；　the　legislative　power　is　put

into　the　hands　of　divers　persons　who；　duly　assembled；　have　by

themselves；　or　jointly　with　others；　a　power　to　make　laws；　which　when

they　have　done；　being　separated　again；　they　are　themselves　subject

to　the　laws　they　have　made；　which　is　a　new　and　near　tie　upon　them　to

take　care　that　they　make　them　for　the　public　good。

　　144。　But　because　the　laws　that　are　at　once；　and　in　a　short　time

made；　have　a　constant　and　lasting　force；　and　need　a　perpetual

execution；　or　an　attendance　thereunto；　therefore　it　is　necessary　there

should　be　a　power　always　in　being　which　should　see　to　the　execution　of

the　laws　that　are　made；　and　remain　in　force。　And　thus　the

legislative　and　executive　power　come　often　to　be　separated。

　　145。　There　is　another　power　in　every　commonwealth　which　one　may　call

natural；　because　it　is　that　which　answers　to　the　power　every　man

naturally　had　before　he　entered　into　society。　For　though　in　a

commonwealth　the　members　of　it　are　distinct　persons；　still；　in

reference　to　one　another；　and；　as　such；　are　governed　by　the　laws　of

the　society；　yet；　in　reference　to　the　rest　of　mankind；　they　make　one

body；　which　is；　as　every　member　of　it　before　was；　still　in　the　state

of　Nature　with　the　rest　of　mankind；　so　that　the　controversies　that

happen　between　any　man　of　the　society　with　those　that　are　out　of　it

are　managed　by　the　public；　and　an　injury　done　to　a　member　of　their

body　engages　the　whole　in　the　reparation　of　it。　So　that　under　this

consideration　the　whole　community　is　one　body　in　the　state　of　Nature

in　respect　of　all　other　states　or　persons　out　of　its　community。

　　146。　This；　therefore；　contains　the　power　of　war　and　peace；　leagues

and　alliances；　and　all　the　transactions　with　all　persons　and

communities　without　the　commonwealth；　and　may　be　called　federative

if　any　one　pleases。　So　the　thing　be　understood；　I　am　indifferent　as　to

the　name。

　　147。　These　two　powers；　executive　and　federative；　though　they　be

really　distinct　in　themselves；　yet　one　comprehending　the　execution

of　the　municipal　laws　of　the　society　within　itself　upon　all　that　are

parts　of　it；　the　other　the　management　of　the　security　and　interest

of　the　public　without　with　all　those　that　it　may　receive　benefit　or

damage　from；　yet　they　are　always　almost　united。　And　though　this

federative　power　in　the　well　or　ill　management　of　it　be　of　great

moment　to　the　commonwealth；　yet　it　is　much　less　capable　to　be　directed

by　antecedent；　standing；　positive　laws　than　the　executive；　and　so　must

necessarily　be　left　to　the　prudence　and　wisdom　of　those　whose　hands　it

is　in；　to　be　managed　for　the　public　good。　For　the　laws　that　concern

subjects　one　amongst　another；　being　to　direct　their　actions；　may

well　enough　precede　them。　But　what　is　to　be　done　in　reference　to

foreigners　depending　much　upon　their　actions；　and　the　variation　of

designs　and　interests；　must　be　left　in　great　part　to　the　prudence　of

those　who　have　this　power　committed　to　them；　to　be　managed　by　the　best

of　their　skill　for　the　advantage　of　the　commonwealth。

　　148。　Though；　as　I　said；　the　executive　and　federative　power　of

every　community　be　really　distinct　in　themselves；　yet　they　are

hardly　to　be　separated　and　placed　at　the　same　time　in　the　hands　of

distinct　persons。　For　both　of　them　requiring　the　force　of　the

society　for　their　exercise；　it　is　almost　impracticable　to　place　the

force　of　the　commonwealth　in　distinct　and　not　subordinate　hands；　or

that　the　executive　and　federative　power　should　be　placed　in　persons

that　might　act　separately；　whereby　the　force　of　the　public　would　be

under　different　commands；　which　would　b