the civilization of the renaissance in italy-第16部分

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e　State　was　yet　his　first　and　last　thought。　

His　most　complete　program　for　the　construction　of　a　new　political　　system　at　Florence　is　set　forth　in　the　memorial　to　Leo　X；　composed　　after　the　death　of　the　younger　Lorenzo　Medici；　Duke　of　Urbino　（d。　　1519）；　to　whom　he　had　dedicated　his　'Prince。'　The　State　was　by　that　　time　in　extremities　and　utterly　corrupt；　and　the　remedies　proposed　are　　not　always　morally　justifiable；　but　it　is　most　interesting　to　see　how　　he　hopes　to　set　up　the　republic　in　the　form　of　a　moderate　democracy；　as　　heiress　to　the　Medici。　A　more　ingenious　scheme　of　concessions　to　the　　Pope；　to　the　Pope's　various　adherents；　and　to　the　different　Florentine　　interests；　cannot　be　imagined；　we　might　fancy　ourselves　looking　into　　the　works　of　a　clock。　Principles；　observations；　comparisons；　political　　forecasts；　and　the　like　are　to　be　found　in　numbers　in　the　'Discorsi；'　　among　them　flashes　of　wonderful　insight。　He　recognizes；　for　example；　　the　law　of　a　continuous　though　not　uniform　development　in　republican　　institutions；　and　requires　the　constitution　to　be　flexible　and　capable　　of　change；　as　the　only　means　of　dispensing　with　bloodshed　and　　banishments。　For　a　like　reason；　in　order　to　guard　against　private　　violence　and　foreign　interference'the　death　of　all　freedom'he　　wishes　to　see　introduced　a　judicial　procedure　（'accusa'）　against　hated　　citizens；　in　place　of　which　Florence　had　hitherto　had　nothing　but　the　　court　of　scandal。　With　a　masterly　hand　the　tardy　and　involuntary　　decisions　are　characterized　which　at　critical　moments　play　so　important　　a　part　in　republican　States。　Once；　it　is　true；　he　is　misled　by　his　　imagination　and　the　pressure　of　events　into　unqualified　praise　of　the　　people；　which　chooses　its　officers；　he　says；　better　than　any　prince；　　and　which　can　be　cured　of　its　errors　by　'good　advice。'　With　regard　to　　the　Government　of　Tuscany；　he　has　no　doubt　that　it　belongs　to　his　　native　city；　and　maintains；　in　a　special　'Discorso'　that　the　reconquest　　of　Pisa　is　a　question　of　life　or　death；　he　deplores　that　Arezzo；　after　　the　rebellion　of　1502；　was　not　razed　to　the　ground；　he　admits　in　　general　that　Italian　republics　must　be　allowed　to　expand　freely　and　add　　to　their　territory　in　order　to　enjoy　peace　at　home；　and　not　to　be　　themselves　attacked　by　others；　but　declares　that　Florence　had　un　at　the　　wrong　end；　and　from　the　first　made　deadly　Pisa；　Lucca；　and　Siena；　while　　Pistoia；　'treated　like　a　brother；'　had　voluntarily　submitted　to　her。

It　would　be　unreasonable　to　draw　a　parallel　between　the　few　other　　republics　which　still　existed　in　the　fifteenth　century　and　this　unique　　citythe　most　important　workshop　of　the　Italian；　and　indeed　of　the　　modern　European　spirit。　Siena　suffered　from　the　gravest　organic　　maladies；　and　its　relative　prosperity　in　art　and　industry　must　not　　mislead　us　on　this　point。　Aeneas　Sylvius　looks　with　longing　from　his　　native　town　over　to　the　'merry'　German　imperial　cities；　where　life　is　　embittered　by　no　confiscations　of　land　and　goods；　by　no　arbitrary　　officials；　and　by　no　political　factions。　Genoa　scarcely　comes　within　　range　of　our　task；　as　before　the　time　of　Andrea　Doria　it　took　almost　no　　part　in　the　Renaissance。

Indeed；　the　inhabitant　of　the　Riviera　was　proverbial　among　Italians　for　　his　contempt　of　all　higher　culture。　Party　conflicts　here　assumed　so　　fierce　a　char…　acter；　and　disturbed　so　violently　the　whole　course　of　　life；　that　we　can　hardly　understand　how；　after　so　many　revolutions　and　　invasions；　the　Genoese　ever　contrived　to　return　to　an　endurable　　condition。　Perhaps　it　was　owing　to　the　fact　that　all　who　took　part　in　　public　affairs　were　at　the　same　time　almost　without　exception　active　　men　of　business。　The　example　of　Genoa　shows　in　a　striking　manner　with　　what　insecurity　wealth　and　vast　commerce；　and　with　what　internal　　disorder　the　possession　of　distant　colonies；　are　compatible。

Foreign　Policy

As　the　majority　of　the　Italian　States　were　in　their　internal　　constitution　works　of　art；　that　is；　the　fruit　of　reflection　and　careful　　adaptation；　so　was　their　relation　to　one　another　and　to　foreign　　countries　also　a　work　of　art。　That　nearly　all　of　them　were　the　result　　of　recent　usurpations；　was　a　fact　which　exercised　as　fatal　an　influence　　in　their　foreign　as　in　their　internal　policy。　Not　one　of　them　　recognized　another　without　reserve；　the　same　play　of　chance　which　had　　helped　to　found　and　consolidate　one　dynasty　might　upset　another。　Nor　　was　it　always　a　matter　of　choice　with　the　despot　whether　to　keep　quiet　　or　not。　The　necessity　of　movement　and　aggrandizement　is　common　to　all　　illegitimate　powers。　Thus　Italy　became　the　scene　of　a　'foreign　policy'　　which　gradually；　as　in　other　countries　also；　acquired　the　position　of　a　　recognized　system　of　public　law。　The　purely　objective　treatment　of　　international　affairs；　as　free　from　prejudice　as　from　moral　scruples；　　attained　a　perfection　which　sometimes　is　not　without　a　certain　beauty　　and　grandeur　of　its　own。　But　as　a　whole　it　gives　us　the　impression　of　a　　bottomless　abyss。

Intrigues；　armaments；　leagues；　corruption　and　treason　make　up　the　　outward　history　of　Italy　at　this　period。　Venice　in　particular　was　long　　accused　on　all　hands　of　seeking　to　conquer　the　whole　peninsula；　or　　gradually　so　to　reduce　its　strength　that　one　State　after　another　must　　fall　into　her　hands。　But　on　a　closer　view　it　is　evident　that　this　　complaint　did　not　come　from　the　people；　but　rather　from　the　courts　and　　official　classes；　which　were　commonly　abhorred　by　their　subjects；　while　　the　mild　government　of　Venice　had　secured　for　it　general　confidence　　Even　Florence；　with　its　restive　subject　cities；　found　itself　in　a　false　　position　with　regard　to　Venice；　apart　from　all　commercial　jealousy　and　　from　the　progress　of　Venice　in　Romagna。　At　last　the　League　of　Cambrai　　actually　did　strike　a　serious　blow　at　the　State　which　all　Italy　ought　　to　have　supported　with　united　strength。

The　other　States；　also；　were　animated　by　feelings　no　less　unfriendly；　　and　were　at　all　times　ready　to　use　against　one　another　any　weapon　which　　their　evil　conscience　might　suggest。　Lodovico　il　Moro；　the　Aragonese　　kings　of　Naples；　and　Sixtus　IVto　say　nothing　of　the　smaller　powers　kept　Italy　in　a　constant　perilous　agitation。　It　would　have　been　well　if　　the　atrocious　game　had　been　confined　to　Italy；　but　it　lay　in　the　nature　　of　the　case　that　intervention　sought　from　abroadin　particular　the　　French　and　the　Turks。

The　sympathies　of　the　people　at　large　were　throughout　on　the　side　of　　France。　Florence　had　never　ceased　to　confess　with　shocking　_naivete　　_its　old　Guelph　preference　for　the　French。　And　when　Charles　VIII　　actually　appeared　on　the　south　of　the　Alps；　all　Italy　accepted　him　with　　an　enthusiasm　which　to　himself　and　his　followers　seemed　unaccountable。　　In　the　imagination　of　the　Italians；　to　take　Savonarola　for　an　example　　the　ideal　picture　of　a　wise；　just；　and　powerful　savior　and　ruler　was　　still　living；　with　the　difference　that　he　was　no　longer　the　emperor　　invoked　by　Dante；　but　the　Capetian　king　of　France。　With　his　departure　　the　illusion　was　broken；　but　it　was　long　before　all　understood　how　　completely　Charles　VIII；　Louis　XII；　and　Francis　I　had　mistaken　their　　true　relation　to　Italy；　and　by　what　inferior　motives　they　were　led。　The　　princes；　for　their　part；　tried　to　make　use　of　France　in　a　wholly　　different　way。　When　the　Franco…English　wars　came　to　an　end；　when　Louis　　XI　began　to　cast　about　his　diplomatic　nets　on　all　sides；　and　Charles　of　　Burgundy　to　embark　on　his　foolish　adventures；　the　Italian　Cabinets　came　　to　meet　them　at　every　point。　It　became　clear　that　the　intervention　of　　France　was　only　a　question　of　time；　even　if　the　claims　on　Naples　and　　Milan　had　never　existed；　and　that　the　old　interference　with　Genoa　and　　Piedmont　was　only　a　type　of　what　was　to　follow。　The　Venetians；　in　fact；　　expected　it　as　early　as　1462。　The　mortal　terror　of　the　Duke　Galeazzo　　Maria　of　Milan　during　the　Burgundian　war；　in　which　he　was　apparently　　the　ally　of　Charles　as　well　as　of　Louis；　and　consequently　had　reason　to　　dread　an　attack　from　both；　is　strikingly　shown　in　his　correspondence。　　The　plan　of　an　equilibrium　of　the　four　chief　Italian　powers；　as　　understood　by　Lorenzo　the　Magnificent；　was　but　the　assumption　of　a　　cheerful　optimistic　spirit；　which　had　outgrown　both　the　recklessness　of　　an　experimental　policy　and　the　superstitions　of　Florentine　Guelphism；　　and　persisted　in　hoping　for　the　best。　When　Louis　XI　offered　him　aid　in　　the　war　against　Ferrante　of　Naples　and　Sixtus　IV；　he　replied；　'I　cannot　　set　my　own　advantage　above　the　safety　of　all　Italy；　would　to　God　it　　never　came　into　the　mind　of　the　French　kings　to　try　their　strength　in　　this　country！　Should　they　ever　do　so；　Italy　is　lost。'　For　the　other　　princes；　the　King　of　France　was　alternately　a　bugbear　to　themselves　and　　their　enemies；　and　they　threatened　to　call　him　in　whenever　they　saw　no　　more　convenient　way　out　of　their　difficulties。　The　Popes；　in　their　　turn；　fancied　that　they　could　make　use　of　France　without　any　danger　to　　themselves；　and　even　Innocent　VIII　imagined　that　he　could　withdraw　to　　sulk　in　the　North；　and　return　as　a　conqueror　to　Italy　at　the　head　of　a　　French　army。

Thoughtful　men；　indeed；　foresaw　the　foreign　conquest　long　before　the　　expediti