philebus-第14部分

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of　doing　all　things　for　the　sake　of　it；　let　us　search　into　the　pure



element　of　mind　and　intelligence；　and　then　we　shall　be　able　to　say



whether　the　science　of　which　I　have　been　speaking　is　most　likely　to



possess　the　faculty；　or　whether　there　be　some　other　which　has　higher



claims。



　　Pro。　Well；　I　have　been　considering；　and　I　can　hardly　think　that



any　other　science　or　art　has　a　firmer　grasp　of　the　truth　than　this。



　　Soc。　Do　you　say　so　because　you　observe　that　the　arts　in　general



and　those　engaged　in　them　make　use　of　opinion；　and　are　resolutely



engaged　in　the　investigation　of　matters　of　opinion？　Even　he　who



supposes　himself　to　be　occupied　with　nature　is　really　occupied　with



the　things　of　this　world；　how　created；　how　acting　or　acted　upon。　Is



not　this　the　sort　of　enquiry　in　which　his　life　is　spent？



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　He　is　labouring；　not　after　eternal　being；　but　about　things



which　are　becoming；　or　which　will　or　have　become。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　And　can　we　say　that　any　of　these　things　which　neither　are　nor



have　been　nor　will　be　unchangeable；　when　judged　by　the　strict　rule



of　truth；　ever　become　certain？



　　Pro。　Impossible。



　　Soc。　How　can　anything　fixed　be　concerned　with　that　which　has　no



fixedness？



　　Pro。　How　indeed？



　　Soc。　Then　mind　and　science　when　employed　about　such　changing



things　do　not　attain　the　highest　truth？



　　Pro。　I　should　imagine　not。



　　Soc。　And　now　let　us　bid　farewell；　a　long　farewell；　to　you　or　me　or



Philebus　or　Gorgias；　and　urge　on　behalf　of　the　argument　a　single



point。



　　Pro。　What　point？



　　Soc。　Let　us　say　that　the　stable　and　pure　and　true　and　unalloyed



has　to　do　with　the　things　which　are　eternal　and　unchangeable　and



unmixed；　or　if　not；　at　any　rate　what　is　most　akin　to　them　has；　and



that　all　other　things　are　to　be　placed　in　a　second　or　inferior　class。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　And　of　the　names　expressing　cognition；　ought　not　the　fairest　to



be　given　to　the　fairest　things？



　　Pro。　That　is　natural。



　　Soc。　And　are　not　mind　and　wisdom　the　names　which　are　to　be



honoured　most？



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　these　names　may　be　said　to　have　their　truest；　and　most



exact　application　when　the　mind　is　engaged　in　the　contemplation　of



true　being？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　these　were　the　names　which　I　adduced　of　the　rivals　of



pleasure？



　　Pro。　Very　true；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　In　the　next　place；　as　to　the　mixture；　here　are　the　ingredients；



pleasure　and　wisdom；　and　we　may　be　compared　to　artists　who　have



their　materials　ready　to　their　hands。



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　now　we　must　begin　to　mix　them？



　　Pro。　By　all　means。



　　Soc。　But　had　we　not　better　have　a　preliminary　word　and　refresh　our



memories？



　　Pro。　Of　what？



　　Soc。　Of　that　which　I　have　already　mentioned。　Well　says　the



proverb；　that　we　ought　to　repeat　twice　and　even　thrice　that　which　is



good。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Well　then；　by　Zeus；　let　us　proceed；　and　I　will　make　what　I



believe　to　be　a　fair　summary　of　the　argument。



　　Pro。　Let　me　hear。



　　Soc。　Philebus　says　that　pleasure　is　the　true　end　of　all　living



beings；　at　which　all　ought　to　aim；　and　moreover　that　it　is　the　chief



good　of　all；　and　that　the　two　names　〃good〃　and　〃pleasant〃　are



correctly　given　to　one　thing　and　one　nature；　Socrates；　on　the　other



hand；　begins　by　denying　this；　and　further　says；　that　in　nature　as　in



name　they　are　two；　and　that　wisdom　partakes　more　than　pleasure　of



the　good。　Is　not　and　was　not　this　what　we　were　saying；　Protarchus？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　is　there　not　and　was　there　not　a　further　point　which　was



conceded　between　us？



　　Pro。　What　was　it？



　　Soc。　That　the　good　differs　from　all　other　things。



　　Pro。　In　what　respect？



　　Soc。　In　that　the　being　who　possesses　good　always　everywhere　and　in



all　things　has　the　most　perfect　sufficiency；　and　is　never　in　need　of



anything　else。



　　Pro。　Exactly。



　　Soc。　And　did　we　not　endeavour　to　make　an　imaginary　separation　of



wisdom　and　pleasure；　assigning　to　each　a　distinct　life；　so　that



pleasure　was　wholly　excluded　from　wisdom；　and　wisdom　in　like　manner



had　no　part　whatever　in　pleasure？



　　Pro。　We　did。



　　Soc。　And　did　we　think　that　either　of　them　alone　would　be　sufficient？



　　Pro。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　And　if　we　erred　in　any　point；　then　let　any　one　who　will；　take



up　the　enquiry　again　and　set　us　right；　and　assuming　memory　and



wisdom　and　knowledge　and　true　opinion　to　belong　to　the　same　class；　let



him　consider　whether　he　would　desire　to　possess　or　acquire…I　will



not　say　pleasure；　however　abundant　or　intense；　if　he　has　no　real



perception　that　he　is　pleased；　nor　any　consciousness　of　what　he　feels；



nor　any　recollection；　however　momentary；　of　the　feeling；…but　would



he　desire　to　have　anything　at　all；　if　these　faculties　were　wanting



to　him？　And　about　wisdom　I　ask　the　same　question；　can　you　conceive



that　any　one　would　choose　to　have　all　wisdom　absolutely　devoid　of



pleasure；　rather　than　with　a　certain　degree　of　pleasure；　or　all



pleasure　devoid　of　wisdom；　rather　than　with　a　certain　degree　of



wisdom？



　　Pro。　Certainly　not；　Socrates；　but　why　repeat　such　questions　any



more？



　　Soc。　Then　the　perfect　and　universally　eligible　and　entirely　good



cannot　possibly　be　either　of　them？



　　Pro。　Impossible。



　　Soc。　Then　now　we　must　ascertain　the　nature　of　the　good　more　or



less　accurately；　in　order；　as　we　were　saying；　that　the　second　place



may　be　duly　assigned。



　　Pro。　Right。



　　Soc。　Have　we　not　found　a　road　which　leads　towards　the　good？



　　Pro。　What　road？



　　Soc。　Supposing　that　a　man　had　to　be　found；　and　you　could　discover　in



what　house　he　lived；　would　not　that　be　a　great　step　towards　the



discovery　of　the　man　himself？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　now　reason　intimates　to　us；　as　at　our　first　beginning；　that



we　should　seek　the　good；　not　in　the　unmixed　life　but　in　the　mixed。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　There　is　greater　hope　of　finding　that　which　we　are　seeking　in



the　life　which　is　well　mixed　than　in　that　which　is　not？



　　Pro。　Far　greater。



　　Soc。　Then　now　let　us　mingle；　Protarchus；　at　the　same　time　offering



up　a　prayer　to　Dionysus　or　Hephaestus；　or　whoever　is　the　god　who



presides　over　the　ceremony　of　mingling。



　　Pro。　By　all　means。



　　Soc。　Are　not　we　the　cup…bearers？　and　here　are　two　fountains　which



are　flowing　at　our　side：　one；　which　is　pleasure；　may　be　likened　to　a



fountain　of　honey；　the　other；　wisdom；　a　sober　draught　in　which　no　wine



mingles；　is　of　water　unpleasant　but　healthful；　out　of　these　we　must



seek　to　make　the　fairest　of　all　possible　mixtures。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Tell　me　first；…should　we　be　most　likely　to　succeed　if　we



mingled　every　sort　of　pleasure　with　every　sort　of　wisdom？



　　Pro。　Perhaps　we　might。



　　Soc。　But　I　should　be　afraid　of　the　risk；　and　I　think　that　I　can　show



a　safer　plan。



　　Pro。　What　is　it？



　　Soc。　One　pleasure　was　supposed　by　us　to　be　truer　than　another；　and



one　art　to　be　more　exact　than　another。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　There　was　also　supposed　to　be　a　difference　in　sciences；　some　of



them　regarding　only　the　transient　and　perishing；　and　others　the



permanent　and　imperishable　and　everlasting　and　immutable；　and　when



judged　by　the　standard　of　truth；　the　latter；　as　we　thought；　were　truer



than　the　former。



　　Pro。　Very　good　and　right。



　　Soc。　If；　then；　we　were　to　begin　by　mingling　the　sections　of　each



class　which　have　the　most　of　truth；　will　not　the　union　suffice　to　give



us　the　loveliest　of　lives；　or　shall　we　still　want　some　elements　of



another　kind？



　　Pro。　I　think　that　we　ought　to　do　what　you　suggest。



　　Soc。　Let　us　suppose　a　man　who　understands　justice；　and　has　reason　as



well　as　understanding　about　the　true　nature　of　this　and　of　all　other



things。



　　Pro。　We　will　suppose　such　a　man。



　　Soc。　Will　he　have　enough　of　knowledge　if　he　is　acquainted　only



with　the　divine　circle　and　sphere；　and　knows　nothing　of　our　human



spheres　and　circles；　but　uses　only　divine　circles　and　measures　in



the　building　of　a　house？



　　Pro。　The　knowledge　which　is　only　superhuman；　Socrates；　is　ridiculous



in　man。



　　Soc。　What　do　you　mean？　Do　you　mean　that　you　are　to　throw　into　the



cup　and　mingle　the　impure　and　uncertain　art　which　uses　the　false



measure　and　the　false　circle？



　　Pro。　Yes；　we　must；　if　any　of　us　is　ever　to　find　his　way　home。



　　Soc。　And　am　I　to　include　music；　which；　as；　I　was　saying　just　now；　is



full　of　guesswork　and　imitation；　and　is　wanting　in　purity？



　　Pro。　Yes；　I　think　that　you　must；　if　human　life　is　to　be　a　life　at



all。



　　Soc。　Well；　then；　suppose　that　I　give　way；　and；　like　a　doorkeeper　who



is　pushed　and　overborne　by　the　mob；　I　open　the　door　wide；　and　let



knowledge　of　every　sort　stream　in；　and　the　pure　mingle　with　th